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   Abstract 
This thesis examines the dramatic implications of the grotesque in Romantic 
aesthetics, particularly in relation to its poetics of plurality. There have been few 
studies exploring the drama of the Romantic grotesque, a category that 
accentuates the multiplicity of the self, while permitting diverse ways of seeing. 
The post-Kantian philosophy backing Friedrich Schlegel’s Romantic irony 
provides the most decisive rationalisation of this plurality of identity and aesthetic 
expression through theatrical play, and forms the theoretical framework for my 
study. Poetry and philosophy are merged in Schlegel’s attempt to create Romantic 
modernity out of this self-conscious blurring of inherited perspectives and 
genres—a mixing and transgressing of past demarcations that simultaneously 
create the condition of the Romantic grotesque. The other writers examined in this 
thesis include A. W. Schlegel, Stendhal, Victor Hugo, and Charles Baudelaire. 
The primary research question that this thesis investigates is: how is the grotesque 
used to re-evaluate notions of aesthetic beauty? And my answer emerges from a 
study of those thinkers in Schlegel’s tradition who evolve a modern, ironic regard 
for conventional literary proprieties. Furthermore, how does the grotesque rewrite 
ideas of poetic subjectivity and expression? Here, my answer foregrounds the 
enormous importance of Shakespeare as the literary example supporting the new 
theories. Shakespearean drama legitimises the grotesque as ontology and literary 
mode. Consequently, in reviewing unique, critically hybrid texts like the 
Schlegelian fragments, Stendhal’s Racine et Shakespeare (Racine and 
Shakespeare), Hugo’s Préface de Cromwell (Preface to Cromwell), and 
Baudelaire’s De L’Essence du Rire (On the Essence of Laughter), this thesis will 
use theories of continental Romanticism to reposition the significance of an 
English aesthetic. Through this, I claim that the Romantic revisioning of the 
Shakespearean grotesque helps create the ideas of post-Revolutionary modernity 
that are crucial to the larger projects of European Romanticism, and the ideas of 
modernity emerging from them. 
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Introduction 
 
 
It is not I whom I depict. I am the canvass, a hidden hand colours somebody on 
me.
1
 
  — Fernando Pessoa, from Stations of the Cross, XI (1914-16) 
The great fault of a modern school of poetry is, that it is an experiment to reduce 
poetry to a mere effusion of natural sensibility; or what is worse, to divest it both 
of imaginary splendour and human passion, to surround the meanest objects with 
morbid feelings and devouring egotism of the writers’ own minds.
2
 
 — William Hazlitt, Lectures on the English Poets (1818) 
 
I—Grotesque Symptoms: Poetics of the Self in Romantic Theory 
The above quotations, one from a major modernist poet known for his 
cultivation of myriad poetic personae, the other from a primary essayist of English 
Romanticism, encapsulate a recurring theme in Romantic and post-Romantic 
aesthetics that this study will examine: the essentially dramatic tension between 
selfhood and the dissolution of self in the act of making a poem. In Pessoa’s case, 
the disjunction between author and persona comes to the forefront, a trope that 
appears in the work of a range of Romantic and late-Romantic writers including 
Keats, Byron, and Baudelaire.  In contrast, Hazlitt bemoans the ‘devouring 
egotism’ of his contemporary nineteenth-century poets, a position that he expands 
upon in his review of Wordsworth’s The Excursion:  
An intense intellectual egotism swallows up every thing…But the evident 
scope and tendency of Mr. Wordsworth’s mind is the reverse of the 
dramatic. It resists all change of character, all variety of scenery, all the 
bustle, machinery, and pantomime of the stage, or of real life…The power 
                                                          
1
 Fernando Pessoa, The Surprise of Being, trans. James Greene et al (London: Angel Books, 1986), 
p. 19. 
2
 William Hazlitt, Lectures on the English Poets in The Selected Writings of William Hazlitt, Vol. 
2, ed. Duncan Wu (London: Pickering and Chatto, 1998), pp. 163-321 (p. 213).   
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of his mind preys upon itself. It is as if there were nothing but himself and 
the universe.
3
 
 
Hazlitt’s words repeatedly reference theatre, performance, and the dramatic in 
poetry as oppositions to Wordsworth’s obsession with the self. He sets up the 
dialectic of dramatic poetry, which depends on the fragmentation of the individual 
self into many minds and personae, and the poetics of an intensely aware personal 
subjectivity that he sees in Wordsworth, the primary poet of English 
Romanticism.  In Hazlitt’s case, it is obvious that he is sceptical about the scope 
and effects of a poetry that smacks of an intense solipsism. In contrast, as we shall 
see, his Shakespearean hermeneutics celebrate the multiple visions that 
characterise drama. During the course of this analysis, I will interrogate the 
oscillation between the poles of such extreme egotism and its rejection by some 
major poets and theorists of the post-Romantic condition. What were the specific 
effects of this tension on nineteenth-century aesthetics? What roles do Friedrich 
Schlegel’s Romantic irony and the theory of the modern grotesque as revisioned 
by Schlegel, Hugo, and Baudelaire play in this alternation between self and 
insubstantiality? What are the dramatic implications of the grotesque in Romantic 
theory, and how does it reflect on this unstable interaction between self and 
plurality? 
 In one of the Athenäeum Fragments (1798), a founding and highly 
influential text of Jena Romanticism, August Wilhelm Schlegel, brother to 
Friedrich, distils the difference between the dramatic and lyric voice in poetry in a 
fashion similar to Hazlitt: ‘It seems to be a characteristic of the dramatic poet to 
                                                          
3
 ‘Observations on Mr. Wordsworth’s Poem, ‘The Excursion’’ in The Selected Writings of William 
Hazlitt, Vol. 2, ed. Duncan Wu (London: Pickering and Chatto, 1998), pp.112-121 (114, ellipses 
mine).  
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lose himself with lavish generosity in other people, and of the lyric poet to attract 
everything toward himself with loving egoism’.
4
 As we shall see, Hazlitt was 
familiar with the elder Schlegel’s work, even going so far as to celebrate and 
review the Shakespearean hermeneutics in Lectures on Dramatic Art and 
Literature (1809). A unique international cross-pollination of ideas becomes de 
rigueur. Furthermore, Shakespearean dramaturgy, from the Schlegel brothers to 
Hazlitt and the French Romantics, becomes the focal point for this cosmopolitan 
celebration of the dramatic vision in Romantic aesthetics. Consequently, I claim 
that the theory of the Romantic grotesque is inextricably linked to the Romantic 
re-creation of Shakespeare. In utilising the theorisation of the Shakespearean 
grotesque in the work of the continental Romantics, this study will use theories of 
drama to revitalise a radically English aesthetic. This, in turn, will help us tap the 
more subversively democratic moments in the critical theory of European 
Romanticism. 
If Romanticism inaugurated the modern and contemporary cult of the 
individual, a poetics of personal sensibility, and the Wordsworthian ego that made 
the self the terrain of speculative exploration, it simultaneously brought about a 
competing desire for embracing a no-self, or the paradoxical plurality of selves 
based on the denial of singular identity, best characterised in an English context 
by John Keats’s ideal of ‘negative capability’. In a letter to his brothers George 
and Tom, the poet famously defines ‘negative capability’ as the condition ‘when 
man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable 
                                                          
4
 Friedrich Schlegel, Lucinde and the Fragments, trans. Peter Firchow, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1971) p. 177. Future references will be cited in the text. The fragments contained 
in this text have been re-published in the same translation as Philosophical Fragments, trans. Peter 
Firchow (Minneapolis, MA: University of Minnesota Press, 1991).  
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reaching after fact & reason’.
5
 Later to Richard Woodhouse, this most aesthetic of 
English Romantics provides the most detailed account of this poetic ideal: 
As to the poetical Character itself…it is not itself—it has no self—it is 
everything and nothing—It has no character—it enjoys light and shade; it 
lives in gusto, be it foul or fair, high or low, rich or poor, mean or 
elevated—It has as much delight in conceiving an Iago as an Imogen. 
What shocks the virtuous philosop[h]er delights the camelion Poet. It does 
no harm from its relish of the dark side of things any more than from its 
taste for the bright one; because they both end in speculation. A Poet is the 
most unpoetical of any thing in existence; because he has no Identity—he 
is continually in for—and filling some other Body—the Sun, the Moon, 
the Sea and Men and Women who are creatures of impulse are poetical 
and have about them an unchangeable attribute—the poet has none; no 
identity...(Rollins, I. 387, ellipses mine) 
 
Keats here has sketched the groundwork for the philosophy of the Romantic 
ironist. The ideal poetic self for Keats paradoxically suggests and signifies the 
annihilation of self, the search not for embodiment, but disembodiment, and the 
subsequent loss of individuation. Keats had been attending Hazlitt’s lectures on 
Shakespeare (and Milton) around this time and references to the dramatist abound 
in the above passage.
6
 Shakespeare becomes the ultimate embodiment of the lack 
of body, of fixed attributes, of singularity of perspective. He annihilates himself 
(to use Hazlitt’s term) through a process of the dramatic multiplication of the self. 
The mind of the dramatic poet, like that of the actor, dwells in perpetual 
potentiality, not in itself, but in its ability to transform into other characters. It 
                                                          
5
 The Letters of John Keats: 1814-21, Vol. 1& I, ed. Hyder Edward Rollins (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 193. The opposition between Wordsworth’s ‘egotistical 
sublime’ and the Shakespearean dramatic ideal in Hazlitt and Keats has also been examined 
recently in Jack Stillinger’s Romantic Complexity: Keats, Coleridge, and Wordsworth (Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 2006). 
6
 See Jonathan Bate’s Shakespeare and the English Romantic Imagination (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1986), where he says: ‘Keats learns most from Hazlitt in matters of artistic process, not of 
self-examination. Indeed it is to Hazlitt that he owes the aspiration to ‘annihilate’ the self, as he 
later put it, for the purposes of artistic creation…Within months of reading the essay ‘on Gusto’ 
Keats was using the term himself and writing of negative capability, the willingness to be in 
uncertainties and doubts that renders the mind open to acts of sympathetic identification...One 
reason why Shakespeare was seen as the great poet of sympathy was that he wrote plays, the form 
most conducive to impersonality’ (164, ellipses mine). Hazlitt’s notion of annihilation with regards 
to the self is a recurrent motif in this study. 
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must be able to free itself from itself, at least in isolated moments of apprehending 
objects in the outside world. This condition leads to the important irony addressed 
in Keats’s letter—the poet should be unpoetical in order to be a poet. This strange 
creature should not possess a single, ‘unchangeable attribute’. This 
philosophically offensive hybridity, which states that poetic identity emerges 
through the annihilation of the self and the correlated process of perpetual 
transformation in form and identity, creates a symptom particular to what we shall 
refer to as the Romantic grotesque. By implication then, the poet should celebrate 
the poetics of change and transformation. Fixity of philosophic perspective is 
shunned. Consequently, negative capability constructs a poetic persona that is 
empty in itself. It allows the systematic progression towards insubstantiality. In 
attempting to fill some other body through the process of losing individual 
subjectivity, Keats’s ideal poet becomes the object of contemplation. Subjectivity 
flows outwards, and loses itself in the object instead of ‘swallowing up’ all things 
that it perceives. A type of inverse solipsism is born. The circularity of this 
movement towards achieving poetic voice is crucial. The connection to 
Shakespeare, as we shall see in our analysis, becomes reflective of a larger 
Romantic phenomenon.  
Incidentally, this Keatsian passage echoes a remarkable exposition of the 
dramatic personality by Friedrich Schlegel: 
But to transport oneself arbitrarily now into this, now into that sphere, as if 
into another world, not merely with one’s reason and imagination, but with 
one’s whole soul; to freely relinquish  first one and then another part of 
one’s being, and confine oneself entirely to a third; to seek and find now in 
this, now in that individual the be-all and end-all of existence, and 
intentionally forget everyone else: of this only a mind is capable that 
contains within itself simultaneously a plurality of minds and a whole 
system of persons, and in whose inner being the universe which, as they 
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say, should germinate in every monad, grown to fullness and maturity. 
(Firchow, 177) 
 
Schlegel is making a philosophical point regarding the mind that dwells in the 
dramatic potential for plurality, while Keats propounds a poetic ideal. However, in 
the varied Romanticisms, the boundaries between philosophy and poetry slowly 
become null and void. In one of the Critical Fragments from the Athenäeum 
journal, Schlegel announces the ambition of his Romantic project that attests to 
this desire to dissolve boundaries of knowledge: ‘The whole history of modern 
poetry is a running commentary on the following brief philosophical text: all art 
should become science and all science art; poetry and philosophy should be made 
one’ (Firchow, 157). Characteristically, the fragment plays with a self-reflexive 
imperative. Schlegel’s ‘poetry of poetry’ enacts a philosophical dictum, which 
negates the strict separation of the divisionary principle in knowledge. By 
exemplifying the need to merge poetry and philosophy, Schlegel establishes the 
ideal of unification that comes to characterise Jena Romanticism. Ironically, this 
ideal bases itself on the concept of multiplicity, on the ceaseless questioning and 
subversion of rigid divisions of perspectives. I claim that this subversion, located 
in the aesthetics of irony, comes to define the fluid and shape-shifting patterns of 
the Romantic grotesque. Multiplicity of viewpoint becomes the catchword of the 
Romantic theory. Art is theorised, while philosophy explores its aesthetic 
ambitions. In effect, the similarities between Keats and Schlegel illustrate the 
extent to which the dramatic proliferation of plurality, and its relationship with the 
self, becomes a vital and recurrent Romantic theme. In its becoming, the plural 
and hybrid ways of seeing corroborate the aesthetic ontology of the grotesque. 
 
 14 
  II—The Self as Dramatic Act: Multiplying Identity  
Keats and Schlegel are obviously not alone in addressing the problem of 
selfhood in the process of poetic composition. As numerous scholars have pointed 
out, this issue is bequeathed to Romantic poetics by Kantian philosophy that 
dislocated the mind from its privileged position at the centre of the universe.
7
 
 
If 
Hume had stated that the mind could not be known as an object, Kant limited the 
mind’s capacity to know metaphysical concepts through his dualist separation of 
the world into phenomena and noumena: the world of appearance and the 
unknowable realm of things-in-themselves beyond the dictates of spatio-
temporality. Fichte would react with his brand of solipsism or total self-
consciousness that appealed to the Jena Romantics. The noumenal is done away 
with. The I creates itself by positing a not-I that exists solely for the self to 
understand self-consciousness. In The Self as Mind (1986), Charles J. Rzepka 
studies this struggle for embodiment through the identification of mind with self. 
Using the lens of modern western philosophy, from Descartes to Heidegger, 
Rzepka analyses the manifestation of individuality in the poetry of Wordsworth, 
Coleridge, and Keats, culminating in what he calls ‘visionary solipsism’. 
Nevertheless, the very characteristics of this poetry revolve around ‘bodily 
disidentification, the experience of a waking-dream state, a feeling of oneness 
with a transcendent mind or consciousness, trust in an imaginative, introspective 
empathy with other minds’.
8
  Liminality, uncertainty, and the mixing of 
                                                          
7
 For detailed analyses of the impact of Kanitan and post-Kantian philosophy on the poetics of 
Romanticism see Mark Kipperman’s Beyond Enchantment: German Idealism and English 
Romantic poetry (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), and the introduction to 
Paul Hamilton’s Metaromanticism: aesthetics, literature, theory (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2003). 
8
 Charles J. Rzepka, The Self as Mind: vision and identity in Wordsworth, Coleridge and Keats 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 2. 
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ontological states coexist with transcendence through self-consciousness. In my 
view, this leads to a profound paradox—the poetic mind constructs the universe 
around itself, only to realise that through this process of construction, the very 
stability of this mind is brought into question.  
In this context, Mark Kipperman’s Fichtean understanding of self-
consciousness in Romanticism is also illuminating:  
Romanticism tended to see self-consciousness not as merely a formal unity 
or self-negation but rather as an act in which the self asserts its being in 
the world. Certainly a self-consciousness that does not engage the world 
remains merely formal, enclosed, or in the language of idealism, a bare 
possibility of freedom. But the self becomes real only as it sees itself in 
encounter with the world.
9
 
 
The Fichtean idea of the self as creation-through-action bears ethical and 
performative implications. As we shall see during the course of this investigation, 
the ethico-political and the aestheical-performative are not necessarily disjunctive. 
Romantic irony’s endeavoured merging of the aesthetic and the political is vital. 
Similarly, I propose that the dramatic resonances of the grotesque—the theoretical 
construct of theatrical performance—herald an unstable and fluid socio-political 
cohesion.  Importantly, the self in Romanticism—in a manner that precedes 
Deleuze and Derrida— is often re-imagined in plurality through the act of 
performance.  I would claim that the Schlegel brothers, by exploding the absolute 
self in Fichte, envision identity through the momentary existence of multiple 
selves that are always in motion and metamorphoses. This ontology is primarily 
dramatic, mirroring the plays of theatrical performance. In the case of 
Wordsworth’s ‘egotistical sublime’, the self encounters the world and through that 
encounter falls back upon and realises its own subjective state. The object is 
                                                          
9
 Mark Kipperman, Beyond Enchantment: German Idealism and English Romantic poetry 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), p. 11. 
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pulled into the subject. The object functions as a state of mind. In other words, the 
poet does not see nature in itself but only the individual, subjective mind and its 
responses to and through nature. Conversely, in ‘negative capability’ the self 
wants to prolong the contact with the ‘not-I’, to hold the tension of not being or 
defining itself.  In any case, the back and forth movement from total 
consciousness of self to its dissolution in other objects exterior to it becomes a 
recurrent Romantic leitmotif. If Wordsworth saw nature as a means with which to 
understand himself, Keats’s ‘negative capability’, Victor Hugo’s theorisation of 
the grotesque in his Préface de Cromwell (1827), and Friedrich Schlegel’s 
engendering of Romantic irony, are examples of the aesthetic movement towards 
the negation of singularity, and the simultaneous privileging of plural and diverse 
ways of seeing. The mind occupies mutating opinions and genres, other personae, 
other objects, attributes, or characters through poetics that are essentially 
dramatic. Shakespeare, in his ability to mix genres negates the distinction between 
‘tragedy’ and ‘comedy’ so dear to Voltaire and French neoclassicism. His famous 
characters—‘an Iago or an Imogen’—are complex, conflicting, and vital. From 
Hazlitt’s perspective, the bard’s creation of a seemingly inexhaustible spectrum of 
dramatic characters, renders him the ideal chameleon poet. In this sense, he is not 
just the ‘objective’ poet that Browning termed him to be—Shelley being the 
‘subjective’ counterpoint—but the creator of multiple subjectivities. 
Shakespeare’s most famous character, Hamlet, is a poet in himself, struggling to 
reconcile his own performed personae with the longing for unchanging attributes. 
In the new, Romantic era heralded by the chaos and shifting power structures of 
the French Revolution, perhaps the stability of the self as an ontological condition 
 17 
has been destroyed. What Shakespeare perceived as a theatrical conceit and 
necessity—the creation of confused and conflicting self-consciousness(es) in 
characters like Hamlet—has become an historical condition.
10
  In Kant, the self 
exists as an accidental necessity, as an aggregation of sensations and concepts that 
are organised by the categories of mind: space, time, quality, relation etc. For the 
poets, this ‘transcendental apperception of unity’ allows for the creation of 
multiple personae.  
Erich Heller, in a succinct and brilliant analysis of the dramatic poet, 
outlines the position of the (post)Romantic mind which has been ‘disinherited’: 
In fact, the politeness of good High Table manners, with everyone ready to 
see everyone’s point of view except his own, is, on the highest level of 
imaginative achievement, the cardinal virtue of the dramatic writer; and 
the wider the scope of his imagination, the less evidence will he leave 
behind to show what he himself thought about this or that controversial 
issue. Having dwelt in so many divided minds and believed so many 
conflicting beliefs, he is likely to be slow in fulfilling the first 
commandment of all enlightened education: to form his own opinions. He 
may, alas, even begin and end by not knowing what he himself believes, 
or not believing what he himself knows.
11
  
 
 The ‘divided minds’ and ‘conflicting beliefs’ of a single personality would have 
shocked Keats’s virtuous philosopher as they would have also questioned the neo-
classical stress on decorum and order. By extension, the notions of bienséance 
                                                          
10
 See Allan H. Pasco’s impressive study of the relationship of ‘sickness’ to the very idea of the 
Romantic hero in Sick Heroes: French Society and Literature in the Romantic Age (Exeter: 
University of Exeter Press, 1997). Pasco provides an intriguing, and italicised, definition of 
Romanticism: ‘Romanticism is a sense of insecurity, both widespread and profound, that grows 
from a tumultuous personal, public, and natural world, marked by acute awareness of reality, 
extreme self-consciousness, and a desire to escape’ (12). Furthermore, the Romantic hero is 
viewed as a product of this cultural ‘sense of insecurity’, of mass migration, of widespread disease 
(typhoid, syphilis, cholera, TB), and the deterioration of church and the monarchy. Of the 
Romantic hero, Pasco says that ‘Excessive individualism, acute self-consciousness, and neurotic 
introspection make Romantic heroes moody, unstable, and passive, capable of little but momentary 
paroxysms of desire and revolt. When they do act, they habitually set themselves up for failure and 
victimisation’ (6). While Pasco’s study focuses on French Romanticism, I feel that it is also 
symptomatic of a general Romantic malaise that defines German and English Romanticisms as 
well. In my view, the sick, impassive, Romantic hero bleeds into Baudelaire, while recalling the 
sensitivity and intellectual paralysis of Hamlet. This theme will be explored in Chapter IV. 
11
 Erich Heller, The Disinherited Mind: essays in modern German literature and thought (London: 
Bowes and Bowes, 1975), p. 125, italics mine. 
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(‘tact’) and vraisemblance (‘versimilitude’) are questioned. Similarly, in one of 
his letters, Keats states that the ‘only means of strengthening one’s intellect is to 
make up one’s mind about nothing—to let the mind be a thoroughfare for all 
thoughts’ (Rollins, II. 213). Not knowing one’s opinions and permitting the mind 
to be a poetically productive cauldron of change is beneficial. Metamorphoses, 
sudden shifts in perspective, simultaneous assertion and negation (to echo 
Friedrich Schlegel) render themselves the province of the dramatic poet. Drama 
thrives on such continual conflict, on the coexistence of opposite emotions, on 
transgression, and the dramatic poet must show these tensions and antinomies by 
being multifarious. Drama and theatricality do not allow the comfort zone of 
having a single, all-encompassing opinion or world view. Performance erects a 
system only to dismantle it step by step with a smug cruelty. Aristophanes’s 
chorus of clouds represents this eternal chaos, where these clouds can adopt many 
shapes, illustrating their dramatically dynamic characteristic. Coincidentally, 
Kierkegaard launches his attack on Schlegel’s Romantic irony with measured 
references to The Clouds where Socrates becomes the ultimate ironist whose 
contribution to sophistry is the ‘nothing’ of having shifting opinions.
12
 
Historically, the irony deepens when we realise that it was none other than 
Socrates who launched a scathing attack on the sophists of his time. It is drama 
then that can ironise irony, philosophy, and drama itself. Its battle with virtuous 
philosophers from the time of Plato’s Republic to the closing down of theatres in 
                                                          
12
 See The Concept of Irony, with continual reference to Socrates; together with 
Notes of Schelling's Berlin lectures, trans. Howard E. Hong et al (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
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an England gripped by civil war and regicide in the seventeenth century testifies 
to its perceived threat on morals and civic life which need some stability of 
opinion.  
Drama rejects such stability. It is fluid, and escapes every attempt to hold 
it in check. Given this quality, it is Proteus and not just Dionysus who, in his state 
of becoming, emphasises theatrical conflict. Proteus’s endless metamorphoses set 
the symbolic pattern for this art form. Born of water, Proteus adopts mutability. 
He changes shapes. He bears the gift of prophecy, but will tell tales only when he 
is captured. He wears masks, takes on guises, occupies the form of other objects. 
In a passage on drama in his book Mimesis: On Appearance and Being (1997), the 
Dutch scholar Samuel IJsseling outlines the conflicting reactions that such 
mutability in theatre brings about: 
From of old, drama has been glorified as one of the most perfect art forms, 
but it has also been vilified as black art and trickery. Within living 
memory, man has been captivated by it, but it has also been seen as 
exceedingly threatening. Theater has been looked upon as a mirror in 
which man sees himself reflected and in which he is revealed to himself, 
but also as a world of appearance and illusion. For many it functions as a 
metaphor for human existence and as a model for understanding what it 
means to be human, but at the same time it is understood as the most 
unreal.
13 
 
It would be hard to find a passage that more bravely tries to sum up the 
experience, the method, and the philosophy of drama. In many ways, being the 
most obviously mimetic of all art forms, it brings forth some of the most troubling 
questions about art itself. If the plastic arts attempt to portray a moment of stasis 
in lived or imagined experience—an artificial eternity that implies movement and 
the existence of time—theatre is the most palpably kinetic of art forms, revelling 
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in the actual embodiment of action, tied as it is with the visual enactment of 
causality. It is based on reaction and change. It is reaction and change. As a result, 
it not only courts, but also flaunts contradiction, multiplicity, transformation. It is 
the great Shakespearean metaphor for life, while also, at the same time, being the 
‘most unreal’ of art forms. It does not aim to present static Platonic ideals but by 
its very nature occupies the realms of seeming, of deception, of black magic, of 
dreams and trance. Christopher Janaway, reviewing Plato’s distrust of poetry, sets 
up the alternative perspective grounded in philosophy’s historical problem with 
poetry and theatre: 
Philosophy is thinking, probing, questioning, with a firm scientific 
method, and for it fine words are never enough. A poet or a writer of 
speeches is someone who is stuck at the level of words, and will not let 
them go, because beyond them there is no knowledge and no method that 
will ever attain it.
14
 
 
Since Book X of The Republic, aesthetics in the western world has dealt with this 
imposed bifurcation of philosophy and poetry/theatre, a wound that the Jena 
Romantics wanted to heal by uniting poetry, philosophy, criticism, science and 
mythology. Through a Nietzschean lens, it can be seen that in Plato’s world 
theatrical activity revolved around the festivals of Dionysus, the god of fertility, of 
theatre, of wine, where Apollonian clarity and distinctions were threatened and 
dissolved. In other words, the theatre was thought to inhabit a realm of wild 
emotion, and comprised a systematic assault on the rational methodology of 
dialectical debate. In effect, every attempt to define drama falls back on itself, as 
by its very nature, it resists pat definitions. In this, I claim that it is closest to 
Friedrich Schlegel’s chaos of irony. Drama represents irony doing irony.  
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In fragment 123 of the Athenäeum fragments, Schlegel asks with a clarity 
and confidence slightly at odds with his more typically paradoxical (and ironic) 
claims: ‘Isn’t poetry the noblest and worthiest of the arts for this, among other 
reasons: that in it alone drama becomes possible?’ (Firchow, 177) Typically, this 
‘assertion’ undercuts itself by being framed as a question—the reader, in a 
Barthesian sense, must complete the claim. In my reading, Schlegel sees all poetry 
as dramatic, as he would see all poems as being Romantic to a greater or lesser 
degree. However, each reader, keeping the paradigm of drama and irony in mind, 
will have his/her own opinion and answer to this troubling question. Is all poetry 
drama, in the sense that it presents conflicting opinions at loggerheads with 
themselves? If so, the Romantic nostalgia for Schiller’s naïve poet—one who 
sings a lyric without the curse of self-consciousness, who is in an intimate, 
perhaps anti-intellectual contact with nature—is an illusion of nostalgia since 
every poem is in reflective conflict with itself. Rather than have poetry of ‘morbid 
feelings and devouring egotism’, Schlegel wants poetry that is complex, mixed, 
and dramatic, as if anticipating the Victorian dramatic monologue. Motion in its 
varied guises—aesthetic, political, and historical—and not stasis, is the call of the 
day. 
 
 III—The Grotesque as Hybridity and Mourning  
Significantly, in an age that saw Schiller’s naïve poet as a remembrance of 
things past, the proliferation of dramatic personae shows the mind a way through 
which it can deal with, or even compensate for, the curse of self-consciousness. 
The mind needs a way out of continually reflecting upon itself. Hyper self-
consciousness produces the need for persona, where one does not need to form 
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one’s opinions or ponder what one’s opinions actually are, but instead can allow 
the splitting of the mind to become a series of experimental selves and characters. 
Geoffrey Hartman’s intriguingly titled essay, ‘Romanticism and Anti-Self-
Consciousness’, outlines the link between persona and consciousness in European 
Romanticism, and I quote at length: 
One of the themes which best expresses this perilous nature of 
consciousness, and which has haunted literature since the Romantic period 
is that of the Solitary, or Wandering Jew. He may appear as Cain, 
Ahasuerus, Ancient Mariner, and even Faust. He also resembles the later 
(and more static) figures of Tithonus, Gerontion, and the poète maudit. 
These solitaries are separated from life in the midst of life, yet cannot die. 
They are doomed to live a middle or purgatorial existence which is neither 
life nor death, and as their knowledge increases so does their solitude. It is 
consciousness, ultimately, which alienates them from life and imposes the 
burden of a self which religion or death or a return to the state of nature 
might dissolve…The very confusion in modern literary theory concerning 
the fictive “I,” whether it represents the writer as person or as persona, 
may reflect a dialectic inherent in poetry between the relatively self-
conscious self, and that self within the self which resembles Blake’s 
“emanation” and Shelley’s “epipsyche.”
15
 
 
Hartman references the poetics of the often grotesque solitary as a transnational 
issue in modern European poetry. These alienated, bohemian figures occupy the 
space of paradox—they ‘are separated from life in the midst of life, yet cannot 
die’, effectively representing the living dead and vice versa. This paradoxical state 
signifies another grotesque symptom. The voice given to the selves ‘within the 
self’ is the reward for this alienation from life and stable individuality. The poet 
has actually ceased to be an individual and has become a modern mythic 
archetype, an actor playing parts. These solitary suffering archetypes of the post-
Romantic poet feel the split between self and nature, self and consciousness, more 
acutely than the average human being of the mass culture that the likes of Gautier, 
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Baudelaire, and T. S. Eliot so abhorred. This was the myth they made for 
themselves and for the writers following them, a myth growing from the inability 
of multiple subjectivity to come together in a longed-for sense of stable 
wholeness. The mourning that this results in for writers inherently dizzy on the 
precipice that overlooks perpetual chaos and perpetual change forms one of the 
significant moments in the birth of an emerging and radical modernity in 
Romantic theory.  
In a recent book on melancholy in nineteenth-century poetics, Allegories 
of One’s Own Mind (2005), David Riede contends that this splitting of the mind 
from itself (and in a philosophically Romantic reading, from the world around it) 
led to an inchoate melancholy that commenced with Byron and continued through 
the major Victorian poets. Using the Freudian model in ‘Mourning and 
Melancholia’, he argues that this condition of the mind turning on itself—and in 
my view, reflecting on an endless series of its own reflections—produces a strong 
Hamlet-like melancholy similar to ‘depression’ in our postmodern world.
16  
I will 
take my cue from Riede and the emerging obsession with the personae of Hamlet, 
whether it is explicitly voiced in Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister or implicitly 
internalised in Baudelaire’s adoption of Hamletian morbidity in Les Fleurs du 
Mal, or championed through the cult of Hamlétisme in fin de siècle Paris . Like 
Shakespeare, Hamlet the persona, hovers over this thesis. In this perpetually self-
reflecting character, melancholy (which the Renaissance writer Robert Burton 
associated with madness) prevents action, and in this sense he is the hyper-
sensitive poet-philosopher and precursor to the melancholic poetics of modernity. 
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Too much thinking, not enough doing. For Hamlet, suicide itself is rationalised 
out of existence:
 
Thus conscience does make cowards of us all, 
And thus the native hue of resolution 
Is sickled o'er with the pale cast of thought, 
And enterprises of great pith and moment 
With this regard their currents turn awry 
And lose the name of action.
17
 
 
The actor Laurence Olivier in his film version of the play famously introduced a 
prologue that stated that Hamlet’s tragedy was that of a man unable to act. For an 
actor, the part of Hamlet is a nightmare of possibilities and reflections. An actor at 
rehearsal is often told to make a clear choice in a scene: what is your 
objective/goal? What is the obstacle to this objective/goal? Make your choice and 
stick with it, says the director. Don’t waver in your intentions. In Hamlet, the 
obstacles confronting the actor are almost always within Hamlet himself. In other 
words, the actor must make clear choices in showing how a complex character 
cannot make choices. This conundrum, paradox, or irony is similar to Keats’s 
contention that the poet is the most unpoetical being. It is an irony that the theatre 
can contain. Hamlet's detailed and endless soliloquies actually anticipate the 
Fichtean call to inner action, of 'thinking oneself', of an almost Schlegelian 
alternation between assertion and negation, self and non-self. Hamlet performs an 
endless series of roles and the age-old question of whether his madness is ‘real’ or 
‘feigned’ cannot be answered. All we do know is that Hamlet is melancholy and 
he mourns, for himself and the loss of objects around him.  
 This fragmentation of self-consciousness, the alternation between 
egotistical sublime and negative capability, and the mourning this results for 
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writers in the nineteenth century are vital themes in my study. This thesis will 
examine ruptures in (post)Romantic philosophy and practice when the conflict 
between self-consciousness and no-self becomes acute. This very conflict 
schematises the grotesque—in form, through the mixing of genres, and in content, 
through the adoption of multiple subjects of study, often characterised by 
obscenity and violence. In Germany, Friedrich Schlegel’s notions of irony—a 
mode that always resists containment—prove highly influential in the course of 
post-Kantian philosophy as Hegel and Kierkegaard after him fight with the 
phantoms of ironic awareness, endless self-reference, and what they perceive as a 
certain insincerity in the legacy of Romantic irony. In Schlegel, irony is a means 
of celebrating the dramatic chaos of the world: ‘Irony is the clear consciousness of 
eternal agility, of an infinitely teeming chaos’ (Firchow, 247).  Irony signifies the 
drama of life. Similarly, in Préface de Cromwell (1827), Victor Hugo defines the 
grotesque as an idiom that necessarily reflects the post-Revolutionary world 
where things are ‘deformed’. Crucially, Hugo associates the grotesque with drama 
and Shakespeare, and calls for an art that represents reality in an accurate fashion. 
This new, vitally dramatic art for a post-Revolutionary epoch should indulge in 
the mixing of modes: tragedy and comedy, ugly and beautiful, horror and 
buffoonery. It should willingly destabilise aesthetic categories. Hugo’s 
classifications of human history into primitive, ancient, and modern, each with its 
own characteristic form of poetry (lyric, epic, dramatic) and his understanding of 
Shakespeare as the creator of grotesque laughter and horror owe much to A. W. 
Schlegel’s Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature (1809).
18
 In turn, these 
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influential lectures by a monumental translator and interpreter of Shakespeare 
(which effectively commenced bardolatry in Europe) were reviewed and praised 
effusively by none other than William Hazlitt in England (1816) as 
accompaniments to his own lectures on Shakespeare that so influenced Keats. 
Consequently, in this cauldron of cosmopolitanism, we seem to have come full 
circle and the evidence of international correspondances between the leading 
Romantic thinkers and artists of the day will be the glue that binds this analysis. 
The importance of Shakespeare as a plenipotentiary of the modern grotesque is 
the recurrent motif in these transnational dialogues.  
Furthermore, keeping in mind the Schlegelian frame of uniting poetry and 
philosophy, this investigation underscores another quintessential (post)Romantic 
phenomenon: writers theorising their art, and thus productively refocusing theory 
from an aesthetic perspective. From Keatsian 'negative capability' and the 
Schlegel brothers, to Stendhal's Racine et Shakespeare (1823/25) and Hugo's  
Préface, culminating in Baudelaire's De L'Essence du Rire (1855), this double 
lens that negotiates and blurs aesthetic and critical faculties is itself a grotesque 
feature. Alternatively, the Schlegel brothers choose to aestheticise their 
philosophical perspectives. In keeping with the imperative of plurality inherent to 
this study, we can say that the grotesque characteristics that emerge through 
Romantic upheaval sanction a multiplicity of perspective. Philosophy and art 
begin to operate simultaneously. 
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 IV—Defining the Grotesque 
 So what then is the grotesque, and how does it relate to Romantic irony? 
How can the grotesque in its Romantic incarnation help us understand this play of 
irony that negotiates the back and forth movement between identity and the 
dramatic engendering of plurality in nineteenth-century aesthetics? In a recent 
book on the relationship of the grotesque to theories of performativity, Ralph E. 
Remshardt punctuates the inherently amorphous characteristic of the grotesque as 
a critical term: 
The grotesque will frustrate our desire to hold and name it; it will reside in 
persistent regression and dispersal from our cognitive faculties, in constant 
deferral. Coming to it with terms is not yet coming to terms with it. A 
potent stimulus to critical desire, the grotesque is also the concept that got 
away.
19
 
 
In other words, the grotesque resists capture and control. Every attempt to 
systematise it leads to epistemological failure. More than any other aesthetic 
construct, the grotesque exceeds the limits imposed by our critical knowing. By 
extension, the very act of writing about the grotesque (and the fragmentation 
endemic to Romantic irony) is self-defeating. The drama of fragmentary 
exposition mocks extended theoretical intervention. The dramatic paradigm that 
helps address the grotesque—drama and theatrical activity imply perpetual motion 
and change—accentuates its open-endedness. Consequently, this thesis will 
explore the Romantic problem with the self as negation and apotheosis through 
the prism of dramatic alternation.  
Interestingly, grotesqueness is ‘historically indifferent and historically 
particular’ (Remshardt, 45) and it is this simultaneous quality of being within and 
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beyond socio-historical location that is crucial. Friedrich Schlegel’s Romantic 
irony, which serves as the theoretical framework for the aesthetic corollary of the 
grotesque, operates on this axis of simultaneity. In this context, the alternation of 
creation and destruction in Schlegel or the simultaneous reaching after 
transcendence and animality in Baudelaire are syndromes of the grotesque 
ontology that reaches a tipping point in nineteenth-century critical theory. The 
grotesque is a symptom of the modernity that articulates itself through the 
cataclysms of Romanticism. 
So should we even endeavour to define the grotesque? What are the 
origins of this grotesque? The etymology of the word goes back to this idea of 
shape-shifting, fluid transformation, and metamorphoses. The origins of the 
grotesque are found in the fantastical hybrid images that were unearthed in the 
baths of Titus and Nero outside Rome towards the end of the fifteenth century. 
These images were located underground, in rooms that had become caves, 
grottoes. Mikhail Bakhtin, the primary theoretician of the grotesque in the 
twentieth century, describes these grottesca as the ‘extremely fanciful, free and 
playful treatment of plant, animal and human forms. These forms seemed to be 
interwoven as if giving birth to each other. The borderlines that divide the 
kingdoms of nature in the usual picture of the world were boldly infringed. 
Neither was there the usual static presentation of reality…instead the inner 
movement of being itself was expressed in the passing of one form into the other, 
in the ever incompleted character of being’.
20
 This merging of normally disparate 
biological forms, dwelling in the infringement of boundaries, sets up the model 
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for grotesque play. Fundamentally, the grottesca function as a counterpoint to 
(neo)classical aesthetics. In addition, the hybridity of these grotesque figures 
italicises the negation of boundaries and forms that would appeal to the Romantic 
ironists. It is not coincidental that Bakhtin refers to Friedrich Schlegel as one of 
the principal theorists of ‘the new grotesque in the next period of world literature’ 
(Bakhtin, 38, italics mine). This thesis will analyse the effects of this ‘new 
grotesque’ where the medieval carnival of the grotesque body was ‘cut down to 
cold humor, irony, sarcasm. It ceased to be a joyful, triumphant hilarity. Its 
positive regenerating power was reduced to a minimum’ (Bakhtin, 38). This 
minimizing of the joyful element in the grotesque is vital for our purposes, 
specifically given Baudelaire’s aesthetics of Satanic mockery in the period that 
follows the failed and bloody revolutions of nineteenth-century France. For Hugo 
and Stendhal, Shakespearean drama—positioned against the Classicism of an 
outmoded Racine— reflects the blood and gore of the post-Revolutionary world.    
In addition to the negation of limits, we must remember that the framework of 
‘grotesque realism’ in Bakhtin, which is characteristic of the new grotesque, also 
revolves around the paradoxical celebration of ‘degradation’, a seeping into the 
grottoes of the flesh, the baser instincts, the animal in the human: ‘The essential 
principal of grotesque realism is degradation, that is, the lowering of all that is 
high, spiritual, ideal, abstract; it is a transfer to the material level, to the sphere of 
earth and body in their indissoluble unity’ (Bakhtin,19-20). So whether it is 
blinding of Gloucester in King Lear, or Hamlet brooding over Yorick’s skull, or 
the attempted aestheticisation of a rotting carcass in Baudelaire’s ‘Une Charogne’ 
(‘A Carcass’)—three specifically grotesque instances to which we shall repeatedly 
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return in this study—this ‘grotesque realism’ creates images that repudiate the 
perfection in form represented by the classical body.21  
 To further our attempts at moving towards a theory of the grotesque in 
relation to Shakespearean theatricality, let us look at an intriguing passage in 
Rabelais and His World, where having established the connection of the grotesque 
to fluid shape-shifting, Bakhtin begins to theorise the mask and its relation to 
grotesque: 
The mask is connected with the joy of change and reincarnation, with gay 
relativity and with the merry negation of uniformity and similarity; it 
rejects conformity to oneself. The mask is related to transition, 
metamorphoses, the violation of natural boundaries, to mockery and 
familiar nicknames. It contains the playful element of life; it is based on a 
peculiar interrelation of reality and image, characteristic of the most 
ancient rituals and spectacles. Of course it would be impossible to exhaust 
the intricate multiform symbolism of the mask. Let us point out that such 
manifestations as parodies, caricatures, grimaces, eccentric postures, and 
comic gestures are per se derived from the mask. It reveals the essence of 
the grotesque. (Bakhtin, 40) 
 
Of course, the mask literally and figuratively constitutes the theatre, from Hellenic 
tragedy to contemporary performance art. By wearing a mask, one instantly 
dramatises oneself, assumes a role, much like Baudelaire’s hypocrite lecteur 
(hypokritos being the Greek for actor). The mask functions on multiple, 
paradoxical levels. Primarily, it helps to hide individuality while simultaneously 
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creating (another) individuality. It can be used to fundamentally understand the 
simultaneous creation and annihilation of Schlegel’s 'permanent parabasis' which 
defines Romantic irony.
22
 Of course, in the theorising of dramatic action, the 
‘mask’ extends to metaphorically represent the totality of theatrical presentation. 
For Bakthin, the mask conveys to us the pleasure of reincarnation and 
metamorphosis, while its ‘merry negation of uniformity’ and ‘conformity to 
oneself’ gets to the very heart of the continual self-parody of Schlegelian 
discourse. The celebration of ‘the playful element in life’ questions all 
sanctimonious attempts at systematic system building. The world of ‘parodies, 
caricatures, grimaces, eccentric postures, and comic gestures’, often the province 
of the Shakespearean Fool for example, signifies the essence of the grotesque.  
 Finally, Bakhtin’s acknowledgement that the ‘new grotesque’ in the play 
of Schlegel’s irony highlights a movement from carnival towards dark irony 
carries us towards Wolfgang Kayser’s influential interpretation of the grotesque in 
The Grotesque in Art and Literature (1981). As opposed to Bakhtin, Kayser sees 
the grotesque as resulting from the human subject’s acute estrangement from the 
world, creating a certain sinister element in its becoming. The Munchian scream is 
its emblem. Kayser regards the origins of the grottesca differently: 
By the word grottesco the Renaissance, which used it to designate a 
specific ornamental style suggested by antiquity, understood not only 
something playfully gay and carelessly fantastic, but also something 
ominous and sinister in the face of a world totally different from the 
familiar one—a world in which the realm of inanimate things is no longer 
separate from those of plants, animals, and human beings, and where the 
laws of statics, symmetry, and proportion are no longer valid. This 
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meaning ensues from a synonym for grotesque which came into usage 
during the sixteenth century: the dreams of painters (sogni dei pittori).
23
 
 
The grotesque grows from estrangement towards the picturesque shades of dream, 
where boundaries are blurred, genres mixed, perspectives muddled through 
perennial play and motion. Vitally, Kayser considers Shakespeare to be 'the 
master of the grotesque' (41), and he makes numerous references to Schlegel. For 
Kayser, Schlegel's treatment of the grotesque in the Athenäeum  fragments 'is 
constituted  by a clashing contrast between form and content, the unstable mixture 
of heterogeneous elements, the explosive force of the paradoxical, which is both 
ridiculous and terrifying' (53). This violent clash of disparate parts, 'the unstable 
mixture' of opposites, and the resultant creation of the comic situated within the 
confines of terror, becomes the defining characteristic of the modern, Romantic 
grotesque. This study will often focus on the darker aspects of the grotesque in the 
nineteenth century, from the revisioning of the Shakespearean grotesque to 
Baudelaire's rotting carcass in Les Fleurs du Mal, but will recall the shadows of 
the carnivalistic ecstasy familiarised by Bakhtin. Aesthetic interplay governs the 
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condition of the grotesque. The terror of the modern, post-Revolutionary world 
legitimises it.    
  The French Revolution and the resulting Reign of Terror may now be 
seen as the starting points of the age of grotesque transformation. Louis XVI, 
Danton, and Robespierre have had their heads chopped off. Charlotte Corday has 
stabbed Marat in his bath. Thousands of others have been decapitated, and the 
drama of the guillotine has been watched and cheered and jeered by thousands as 
if at a great amphitheatre of political metamorphoses.
24
 There is something 
simultaneously frightening and comic about this state of affairs, which may be 
why Friedrich Schlegel famously bracketed the French Revolution with Fichte’s 
philosophy and Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister as being the dominating ‘tendencies of 
the age’ (Firchow, 190). Politics has become similar to German idealist 
philosophy and the classic Bildungsroman. There is something grotesque in this 
very suggestion itself, symptomatic of the aesthetics of irony that mixes and 
matches apparent oppositions in the same way that Aristophanes united Socrates 
with his sophistic enemies. As we shall see in the next chapter, this fragmentary 
association of apparently disparate concepts, creates the foundation for the 
grotesque and the aesthetics of irony. The aestheticisation of political activity 
coincides with a politicisation of art. The chiasmic nature of this relationship is 
crucial for our exploration of the grotesque.  
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 See in particular Christine Marcandier-Colard’s excellent Crimes de Sang et Scène Capitales: 
Essai sur l’esthétique romantique de la violence (Paris: Presses Universitaire de la France, 1998) 
for an analysis of the theatricalisation of crime in Revolutionary France. Marcandier-Colard's 
treatment of the guillotine as the socio-political symbol of grotesque transformation is a vital 
theme in this study. This text will be referred to again in Chapter III.  
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 V—Outlining the Grotesque 
 The first chapter of this thesis, 'Exposing the Protagonist: The Play of 
Romantic Irony', will examine Friedrich Schlegel’s Romantic irony as the 
theoretical framing for the grotesque. While commentators have studied 
Schlegel’s irony in relation to the novel as well as the ‘crisis of reason’ in post-
Kantian philosophy, little attention has been paid to the essential drama of 
Romantic irony. This chapter aims at filling this lacuna, while forming the 
theoretical and philosophical groundwork for the explorations conducted in this 
thesis. Using the insights of twentieth-century and current critical theory—from 
Walter Benjamin to Andrew Bowie—this chapter studies the theatrical 
implications of Schlegel’s fragments, his reworking of the solipsistic nature of 
Fichtean philosophy, as well as the effects of self-conscious ironic discourse on 
Romantic aesthetics. Fundamentally, it looks towards establishing theatricality as 
ontology as a means through which to conduct our exploration into the grotesque 
in Romantic theory. 
 The second chapter, 'The Antagonist Speaks: Romantic Shakespeare', 
further investigates the link between Romantic irony and a theory of the grotesque 
in conjunction with the Romantic theorisation of Shakespearean drama. For 
Friedrich Schlegel, Shakespeare is at ‘the center of Romantic art’ (Firchow, 197), 
exemplifying the dramatic process of perpetual becoming, occasionality, and 
regeneration. One of the claims of this chapter is that the Romantic apperception 
of the Shakespearean grotesque in Schlegelian theory (positioned against the 
hegemony of French Neoclassicism) is a watershed in Romantic theory. A. W. 
Schlegel’s highly influential readings of the bard in his lectures on drama (1809) 
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make  the English dramatist into the  total representation of the Romantic view of 
the world, which delights in shifts in perspective, transformation, and the 
simultaneous celebration of the spiritual and the bodily, the tragic and the comic, 
the horrific and the absurd. The effects of these lectures on William Hazlitt’s 
formulations of Shakespeare as natural genius and the creator of varied and highly 
developed individual characters further accentuate particular themes that start to 
cast shadows over Romantic criticism. Oppositions are examined: Shakespeare 
the Romantic versus the Shakespeare of Enlightenment thought, Shakespeare as 
studied by the ‘home-grown’ critic (Hazlitt) versus the one re-created by the 
‘foreign’ observer (Schlegel), and the Shakespeare on the page versus the 
engendering of the Shakespearean grotesque on the stage.  
 Chapter III explores the birth of Shakespearean revolution in early French 
Romanticism, giving vent to the concerns voiced by a ‘foreign’ Shakespeare in 
Chapter II. This chapter will first examine a forgotten text in French by A. W. 
Schlegel, Comparaison entre la Phèdre de Racine et celle d’Euripide 
(Comparison between Racine’s Phèdre and that of Euripides, 1807), which 
denigrates Racine in favour of Euripides and Shakespeare. In doing so, I will set 
up a vital connection between Schlegelian theory and the French interpretation of 
it. Racine exemplifies a dead Classicism, Shakespeare a vibrant Romanticism. 
Stendhal recreates this Schlegelian binary in Racine et Shakespeare (1823/25). 
For Stendhal, influenced by the Schlegel lectures and Hazlitt, the ‘Romantic 
Shakespeare’ constitutes the literature for the nineteenth century, whereas the 
plays of Racine are representative of doctrine, conformity, and a pre-
Revolutionary status quo. Victor Hugo’s Préface de Cromwell (1827) extends the 
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implications in Stendhal’s polemic: Shakespeare is irrevocably aligned with the 
modern grotesque. The drama of the grotesque, unlike both the lyric and the epic, 
is particular to the modern world which celebrates the mixing of contraries and 
opposites, while placing the physically ugly at the centre of modern art. 
Significantly, the Shakespeare of French Romanticism revolts violently against 
the rules of Neoclassical dogma, the ancien régime of Voltaire and Boileau. 
 Chapter IV will look at the significance of the grotesque in the poetics of 
‘late-Romanticism’ in Baudelaire as a development of the theoretical foundations 
provided by the treatises of the Schlegel brothers, Stendhal, and Hugo.
25
 The 
chapter will focus specifically on Baudelaire’s own study of the grotesque and its 
relationship to the comic in De L’Essence du Rire (1855), juxtaposed with case-
studies of specific poems in Les Fleurs du Mal (1857/61), particularly ‘Une 
Charogne’. The poetry of Baudelaire—in its constant negotiations between poet-
persona and audience/reader, and its aesthetics of radical shock—allow theories of 
the grotesque to become practical. As a poet and critic, Baudelaire makes the 
grotesque blur the boundaries between comic and tragic, while introducing the 
element of mourning into the carnival of the grotesque. This chapter will also 
make the claim that Baudelaire’s personae in Les Fleurs du Mal are reflective of 
his obsession with Hamlet. Consequently, through the complex and multiple 
figures of Baudelaire, I will reflect on the resonances of the (post)Romantic 
grotesque, in its articulation of an emerging poetics of shock and mourning. I will 
claim that through Baudelaire, the grotesque lurches towards modernism, thereby 
establishing the foundation for the radical experiments carried out in The Waste 
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 I am referring to Allain Vaillant’s charcterisation of Baudelaire as a ‘late-Romantic’ in his 
remarkable La Crise de la Littérature: Romantisme et Modernité (Grenoble: Ellug, Université 
Stendhal, 2005). 
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Land. In doing so, I will claim that the Romantic grotesque helps us relocate the 
bases of twentieth-century modernism, while its dramatically plural, playful, and 
open-ended nature points us towards the subversions of postmodern and 
contemporary theory.      
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    Chapter I  
 
 
            Exposing the Protagonist: The Theory of Romantic Irony 
 
…for there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.
1
 
  William Shakespeare, Hamlet 
 
 
I—Irony and The Philosophy of Art 
 
In a famous fragment published in the Athenäeum journal during the last 
years of the eighteenth century, Friedrich Schlegel draws the reader into a 
startling juxtaposition of apparently disparate concepts and events: the French 
Revolution, Fichte’s speculative idealism that tried to bridge the Kantian divide 
between theoretical and practical reason, sensibility and understanding, the world 
of phenomena and the troublesome ‘thing-in-itself’, and Goethe’s influential 
Bildungsroman, Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship (1795). These events represent 
political upheavals of a hitherto unimaginable degree, transcendental philosophy, 
and a novel describing the protagonist’s attempted journey to self-discovery as 
actor and playwright. Interestingly, Robespierre’s Reign of Terror has already 
taken place. We are, in effect, on the cusp of the Napoleonic era. Schlegel himself 
is aware of the seeming arbitrariness of these connections, and it would be well 
worth quoting the fragment in its entirety, a paradoxical proposition that Schlegel 
would have surely delighted in: 
The French Revolution, Fichte’s philosophy, and Goethe’s Meister are the 
greatest tendencies of the age. Whoever is offended by this juxtaposition, 
whoever cannot take any revolution seriously that isn’t noisy and 
materialistic, hasn’t yet achieved a lofty, broad perspective on the history 
of mankind. Even in our shabby histories of civilization, which usually 
resemble a collection of variants accompanied by a running commentary 
                                                          
1
 Hamlet (2.2. 244-45) in The Norton Shakespeare, 2
nd
 ed. Greenblatt et al (New York: W. W. 
Norton and Company, 2008), p. 1724, ellipses mine. 
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for which the original classical text has been lost; even there many a little 
book, almost unnoticed by the noisy rabble at the time, plays a greater role 
than anything they did. (Firchow, 190) 
 
A few vital themes can be detected here. The intention of the first sentence is to 
shock. How, the reader asks, are the dominating ‘tendencies’ of the age to be 
related? What is the common strand that unites politics, idealist philosophy, and 
the modern novel? In other words, how are we to negotiate and interpret the 
disparate tendencies of this mixing of oppositions that is characteristic of 
Schlegel’s Romantic irony? In this case, the reader indeed is Novalis’s extended 
author. Revolt and insurrection of some sort are common features of each ‘event’. 
However, what forms of revolt are we referring to here? As these questions 
display, what is at stake not just in this isolated example but throughout the post-
Kantian struggle with aesthetics and its relation to epistemology, ethics, and the 
ontological ‘ground’ for human experience, is decisively a question of 
hermeneutics, of the creation and temporary completion of understanding, of the 
play in the possibilities of meaning.  
In Wilhelm Meister, a minor character Barbara asks a key question of 
Marianne when she is torn between the man she loves (Wilhelm) and the man 
who supports her (Norberg): ‘Why do young people always think in terms of 
irreconcilable opposites?’
2
 Goethe’s character seems to question the validity of 
thinking in terms of either/or, a position that the Jena Romantics would endorse. 
Aesthetically, Schlegel provides a fitting riposte to Barbara—he was around 
twenty-five years of age during the high tide of Jena Romanticism—allowing his 
                                                          
2
 Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship, trans. Eric A. Blackall et al (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1989), p. 23. 
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imagination to momentarily reconcile opposites. All revolutions have become 
aesthetic happenings. 
Ernst Behler, in Irony and the Discourse of Modernity (1990), hones in on 
the distinguishing feature of Schlegelian associations through a historicising 
account of Romanticism’s reaction to obsolete systems, whether socio-political or 
aesthetic: ‘The late eighteenth century thus appears to be marked by at least three 
revolutions, that is, in politics, in literature, and in philosophy, which in each case 
overcame an old order, an ancient regime, for a modern state of affairs’.
3 
Conversely, it would seem here that political and historical metaphors—Behler’s 
obvious reference to the stranglehold on social life by the ancien régime of the 
French first and second estates before 1789 makes this clear—are being applied to 
historically locate comparatively minor cataclysms in philosophy and art. The 
question as to whether aesthetics has been politicised (and vice versa) remains 
ambiguous. In a Romantic context, Friedrich Schiller’s letters on education reflect 
on the uncertain nature of the rapport shared by art and politics, and on the role of 
the aesthetic life in the shaping of a functioning, proto-capitalist polis. Either way, 
the give and take between political and aesthetic domains forms the basis of an 
inconclusive (post)Romantic argument.  
                                                          
3
 Irony and the Discourse of Modernity (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1990) p. 58. In 
philosophy, Behler is specifically referring to Kant’s ‘Copernican’ revolution—the ‘ready made’ 
world has been destroyed and the study of empirical objects necessarily includes the self-reflective 
method of observing how it is that we, as subjects undertaking the observation, play a role in the 
formation of these objects. In literature, Behler has in mind the deviance of Romantic methods 
from neoclassical and enlightenment principles—‘decorum,’ ‘rationality,’ etc. In a more general 
consideration, this book is a succinct account of the growth of Romantic irony as a form that lays 
the rules for the modernist and post-modernist self-consciousness in aesthetics. Schlegel’s 
Romantic irony is examined also in relation to Derrida’s deconstruction and Rorty’s notion of 
philosophy as a form of performative literature. The study also interrogates the notion of ‘post’-
modernism itself as Behler refuses to see it as a clean break from Romanticism and Modernism. 
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In returning to offensive Schlegelian connections, the second sentence of 
the fragment (beginning ‘Whoever is offended by this juxtaposition…’) self-
consciously reflects on its own outrageousness, as the author leaves room (and 
tells us so) for the reader to disagree, or to be ‘offended’. Curiously, and in a 
characteristically ironic manner, Schlegel asks us to actually forget the ‘noisy and 
materialistic’ revolutions (the French Revolution?) for the quieter, littler ones 
(Fichte and Goethe?). The final sentence sets up the opposition between the ‘noisy 
rabble’ and the ‘little book’ of the poet-philosopher. In a Romantic reading, 
Schlegel says that the lasting monuments of culture are limited in reception to the 
elite chosen few, and will be recognised after their time. Finally, symptomatic of 
the aesthetics of self-consciousness, Schlegel’s fragment (or system of 
fragments—another paradoxical formulation), which in many ways embodies the 
quieter revolt and the ‘little book’, justifies its own existence. In other words, 
what seems small, to put it simply, is actually great.  
Already, within the interpretative space of a single fragment, the author 
confronts us with a plethora of meanings. Moreover, the associations born is this 
text accentuate the method and effects of the aesthetics of Romantic irony, which 
bases itself on an intrinsically dramatic encounter between author and reader, 
interpretation and meaning. Romantic irony seeks to destabilise interpretative 
activity through an active methodology of disruption and ironic distancing.  
Inherently, the fragment and Romantic irony are inseparable. Notions of 
the distinction of form and content are being attacked, destabilised to the point 
where expression and what is expressed collapse into one another. Consequently 
the fragment, for Schlegel and Novalis, becomes an essentially aesthetic medium 
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of reflection, and ‘reflection’ (reflexion) as we shall see, from Kant’s 
categorisation of aesthetic pleasure in the third Critique to Fichte’s treatment and 
modification of the self-reflective paradigm of consciousness, wakes one and all 
from dogmatic slumbers. Fragmentary irony, or in a typically Schlegelian move, 
the irony of fragmentation, becomes the new aesthetics. The method of what we 
can refer to, developing a position first articulated by Walter Benjamin, as the 
reciprocity of mutual reflections awoken by the fragment—a means through 
which oppositional and contrasting entities illustrate and exist because of their 
shared polysemy of relations—works towards an apotheosis of sorts, an artistic 
one. All poetry becomes Romantic, and the different disciplines of empirically 
verifiable knowledge and understanding—science, art, criticism—are related. As 
in the Derridean ‘trace,’ things exist because of relations to other objects.  
Schlegel, unabashedly, meticulously, and self-consciously works towards the 
autonomy of the beautiful.  
This working towards, a process that is simultaneously infinite and longs 
for totality and completion, comprises the methodology of Romantic irony. 
During the course of this chapter, I will examine this process through its self-
proclaimed goal of mixing ‘poetry and prose, inspiration and criticism’, in its 
attempt to see the world through a modern Romanticism. Furthermore, modern 
Romantic poetry, and its manifestation as irony, is perennially self-reflexive, 
thereby becoming Schlegel’s poetry of poetry. This chapter aims to conceptualise 
this self-reflection through a fundamentally dramatic paradigm, which sets the 
tone for an exploration of the grotesque. Within this framework, we shall also 
come to understand how Romantic irony continues the questioning of Kant’s 
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model of self-reflective judgement in the third Critique and philosophy’s general 
‘crisis of reason’, which in many ways necessitates its ‘turn’ to art.
4
 As numerous 
commentators have pointed out, the word ‘romantic’ (romantische) 
etymologically refers to the novel (in German as well as in French) thereby 
making it into the art form in the age of mechanical production, the purveyor of 
irony and mixing. The primary argument of this chapter is that while Romantic 
irony, the fragment, and the novel necessarily operate together, a clearer 
exposition of Schlegel’s debt to the aesthetics of drama is vital. Dramatic 
becoming and theatrical activity actually play out the process of dialectics, 
juxtaposition, and interruption in a phenomenological manner. The hermeneutic 
wonder of a dramatic work is exposed when it is played out in multiple ways, 
thereby being representative of the endlessness of Romantic reflection. 
Consequently, the dramatic imperative located in Romantic irony will help us 
explore the tension between subjectivity and fragmentation of the self in 
Romantic aesthetics that I have broached in my introductory chapter. 
Schlegel characterises irony continually as a ‘permanent parabasis’, 
parabasis being the method of authorial intervention through the chorus in Attic 
comedy.
5
 This self-conscious intervention, developing crucially from a dramatic 
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 See Frederick C. Beiser’s The Fate of Reason (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1987) for an excellent historicising account of the ‘crisis of reason’ at the end of the 
enlightenment, Kant’s reaction to this crisis in his critical and transcendental philosophy, and most 
importantly, the varied reactions to the problems bequeathed by Kant to his successors. Moving 
from Jacobi’s study of Spinoza and the subsequent pantheism controversy (with Mendelsohn et 
al), the primary choice for post-Kantian philosophy becomes one between ‘rational scepticism and 
irrational fiedeism’, the question of ‘feeling’ (Gefühl) and ‘faith’ (Glaube) and their relation to 
reason, and the search for a philosophy of first principles from Reinhold to Fichte. Andrew 
Bowie’s work is another vital investigation into the same themes as Beiser, with an ‘aesthetic’ 
twist.  Why does post-Kantian philosophy turn to art? In many ways, this question runs through 
my argument, contextualising the aesthetic and philosophic significance of Romantic irony. 
5
 Quoted in ‘Narratives of Irony: Alienation, Representation, and Ethics in Carlyle, Eliot, and 
Pater’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Pittsburgh University, 2007), p. 15. Original source, ‘Zur 
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and theatrical context, constructs the basis for ironic reflection which is often the 
reflection of reflection: every proposition or genre starts to reflect upon its own 
expressive validity. In the movement from Kantian judgement to the multi-
dimensionality and self-renewing quality of Schlegelian reflection, I would like to 
highlight the inescapably dramatic implications of this unstable and 
metamorphosing back and forth movement between the reflective oppositions of 
Romantic irony. Through this process, I hope to end by contextualising the play of 
Romantic irony as the theoretical frame for the nineteenth-century arabesques of 
the grotesque. 
 
If, as I had claimed in the introduction, the Romantic age is marked by 
creative writers theorising their art, this period simultaneously exhibits the 
tendency of philosophers who use art to intimate trans-intellectual methods of 
viewing reality.  The turning towards the mysteries of art becomes a philosophic 
imperative in the nineteenth century, an apodictical trope, a position that has been 
explored in an Anglo-American context by Andrew Bowie in From Romanticism 
to Critical Theory: The Philosophy of German Literary Theory (1997) and in 
Aesthetics and Subjectivity: from Kant to Nietzsche (2nd edition, 2003). Bowie 
explicates what is the assimilative compensation that art provides for the imposed 
specialisations and divisions of secular, industrial society: ‘Romantic enthusiasm 
for art has generally—and in some cases rightly—been understood as part of the 
attempts to fill gaps left by the process of secularisation and rationalisation in 
                                                                                                                                                               
Philosophie’ in Philosophie Lehrjahre I (1796-1806), Kritische Friedrich Schlegel Ausgabe 18, 
ed. Ernst Behler (Munich: Thomas Verlag, 1963), p. 89. 
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Western societies’.
6
  In a world of economic specialisation, art, and philosophy as 
art—a procedure that has been adopted in varying ways in contemporary thinking 
from Derrida to Rorty—functions as the principle that unites by multiplying 
deferred patterns where other disciplines necessarily divide.  For the Romantics, 
art obsesses with the dream of a new mythology of unification. In the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), Kant tries to recuperate the 
innermost dignity of a human being in his kingdom of ends, where one treats free 
subjects as ends-in-themselves for the sake of duty and not as objects having a 
market price. Schiller, in The Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters 
(1794-95), extends this moral imperative by seeing art as the unifying principle in 
a healthy society. For Schlegel and the early Romantics, aesthetic free-play also 
has a vitally cognitive potential that revolts against the discourse of industrial 
specialisation. A form of ethical aesthetics endeavours to free the human subject 
and her activities from the tyranny of profit and loss. 
Bowie locates the growth of Romantic philosophy, and its attendant 
morality, in the Kantian critiques: 
Whereas Kant begins by wishing to circumscribe the spheres of 
legitimacy, so that the cognitive, the ethical and the aesthetic become 
distinct domains, the Romantics follow indications in Kant that the 
aesthetic is inextricably bound up with the cognitive and ethical, and that 
the relationship between the domains may be the most important factor in 
the new philosophy. (Bowie, 1997, p. 205) 
 
One might question the validity of this Romantic turn, since Kant explicitly states 
that the three critiques are individual parts of an overarching architectonic of the 
critical philosophy, where beauty becomes the symbol of morality. Nevertheless, 
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 From Romanticism to Critical Theory: The Philosophy of German Literary Theory (London: 
Routledge, 1997) p. 14. Future references to this book and Aesthetics and Subjectivity: from Kant 
to Nietzsche, 2
nd
 ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003) will be cited in the text. 
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the earliest system program of German idealism—the work of Hölderlin, 
Schelling, and the young Hegel—speaks blithely of the ‘new mythology of 
reason’, of ‘eternal unity’, of art as the ‘highest act of reason’, and most 
gnomically that ‘the philosopher must possess just as much aesthetic power as the 
poet’ (Bowie, 2003, p. 334). Similarly, in Jena Romanticism, Schlegel and 
Novalis would think of the Mischgedicht, the mixing of different genres and 
expressive potentialities in a work or art. Paradoxically, it would seem that this 
‘mixing’ nevertheless happens on aesthetic terms. 
Bowie’s work on the implications of music, for example, hints at this 
paradox: ‘The divorce of music from representation is the vital step in the genesis 
of the notion of aesthetic autonomy, the idea that what is conveyed by the work of 
art could not be conveyed by anything else’(Bowie, 2003, p. 36). While Hegel 
pronounced the death of art, Beethoven wrote his late string quartets. Art, as an 
English decadent would say, starts aspiring to the condition of music, because it is 
non-representational and assaults our self-reflective methods of judging what 
comprises an artwork. It does so in order to be free from other domains of 
knowledge. To achieve this then, must it subsume other modes of scientific or 
critical knowing into its own scheme of aesthetic jouissance, of Schiller’s 
spieltrieb? Does it unify, only to exalt its dream of aesthetic autonomy? Is art’s 
reaction to modern specialisation based on a desire to maintain its position in the 
face of threats posed by the growth of scientific and economic means with which 
to structure reality? 
In what can be viewed as the first and clearest articulation of the l’art pour 
l’art credo that would dominate nineteenth-century aesthetics, something that we 
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can reflect upon as developing through Kant’s famous characterisation of 
aesthetic beauty as ‘purposiveness without purpose’, Schiller says:  
It [beauty] accomplishes no practical purpose, neither intellectual nor 
moral; it discovers no individual truth, helps us to perform no individual 
duty and is, in short, as unfitted to provide a firm basis for character as to 
enlighten the understanding. By means of aesthetic culture, therefore, the 
practical worth of a man, or his dignity, inasmuch as this can solely 
depend on himself, remains completely indeterminate; and nothing more is 
achieved by it than he is henceforth enabled by the grace of Nature to 
make of himself what he will—that the freedom to be what he ought to be 
is completely restored to him.
7
 
 
On one hand, Schiller successfully disconnects art from the realms of logical and 
ethical action. In being ‘unfitted to provide a firm basis for character’, he 
reiterates a more balanced, and less alarming, perspective of Platonism from The 
Republic. Neither can art tell us how things really are-in-themselves. Schiller also 
accounts for the essential ambiguity and indeterminacy of aesthetic culture (and 
moral worth and cognition often demand a certainty of opinion and the 
‘unchangeable attributes’ of Keats’s virtuous philosopher). However, while all art 
is useless and would be seen to be so for a century after, it nevertheless bestows 
on a human subject the ability to fashion itself—often in the decadence of 
aesthetics, a character, a persona—with the utmost freedom of play. 
Indeterminacy grants freedom. For Schiller, this freedom should somehow still 
relate to practical philosophy, the ethical realm. One should be what one ought to 
be, should act by making a subjective maxim into an ethical law through a 
realisation of one’s aesthetic character. Significantly, Schiller’s play-drive, which 
is aesthetic, succeeds in bringing together the Kantian separation of intellect and 
sensibility, a position that becomes a dominating tendency in the philosophy of 
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Fichte and the early Romantics. In keeping with the unifying principle of art, the 
play-drive heralds the temporary harmony of the ‘formal drive’—intellectual, 
static, complete—with the ‘sensible drive’—intuitive, temporal, sensual.  
Towards the end of his seminal text, Schiller provides us with his theory of 
‘semblance’, the art of seeming (die Kunst des Scheins), by which he continues to 
dissect art from the body politic in a method that Gadamer would call ‘aesthetic 
differentiation’—art and reality, art and nature, are distinct. Aesthetic semblance 
becomes its own law. It would seem here that art, rather than uniting, is heading 
towards its own authentic specialisation. However, for Schiller’s republic, 
aesthetic semblance should form the basis of human interaction, where ‘none may 
appear to the other except as form, or confront him as an object of free play. To 
bestow freedom by means of freedom is the fundamental law of this kingdom’ 
(Wilkinson, 215). Something is surely rotten in the state of the modern polis. 
Treating other individuals as ‘form’ and objects of ‘play’ seems, in a Schillerian 
sense, problematic. How, in concrete terms, is semblance to be reconciled with 
ethics? Plato detested seeming, Schiller embraces it. If all is seeming, as it is on 
the stage, how can it morph into stable moral conduct? One of the primary 
questions in Wilhelm Meister picks out the problem: how can the world of actors 
and the theatre cohabitate the world of moral action? (Blackall, Wilhelm Meister, 
see introduction) How can theatre, which continually plays out reflection and 
seeming and illusion, teach human beings how to behave in the world of reality? 
Can semblance be anything but semblance? Romantic irony, developing a year or 
so after Schiller’s letters, for the most part does not seek to answer these 
questions. Instead, it explores to what extent the drama of art puts into process the 
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questions posed by post-Kantian philosophy without ever needing to reach a 
conclusion. It ends to begin anew. 
In his essay ‘Aesthetic theory, Psychoanalysis and the Ironic End of Art’ 
(2005), evidence of some of the newest work done on Romantic irony, Josh 
Cohen succinctly reconstructs Hegel’s argument against Schlegel’s ‘infinite 
negativity’: 
This destructive logic found its exemplary contemporary expression for 
Hegel in romantic irony. The culture of aesthetic irony was the triumph of 
the hypostatized Fichtean ego, an empty mechanism for reason and 
cognition whose very abstractness negates any and every content. Artistic 
life becomes the life of capricious annihilation, the dissolution of every 
substantial meaning and value in the name of the vacuous ‘bliss of self-
enjoyment’. The horror of irony is above all its indifference to any limit on 
its annihilating logic: unlike the comic, it is directed not against the 
illusion of substantiality, but against substance itself.
8
 
 
The Fichtean ego, which Jacobi had also condemned as a ‘nothingness’, as an 
inverse Spinozism—if Spinoza’s deterministic universe destroyed human 
freedom, then Fichte’s idealism destroyed outer reality—would have an enormous 
influence on Schlegel. Translated to the ‘culture of aesthetic irony’, this ego 
becomes symbolic of the Romantic, artistic act that makes all into semblance and 
play, even semblance itself. It is a counterpoint to the logic of either/or. In 
Schlegel’s definition, it creates and simultaneously annihilates. In this manner, it 
would seem to negate Cohen’s contentions about the ‘end of art’ (itself a Hegelian 
formulation), since the point of irony is that beginnings and endings are opposite 
sides of the same coin. The process of irony is unending. Cohen renews the end of 
art theory with reference to Martin Creed’s installation ‘Work 127’ (infamous 
recipient of the Turner Prize in 1995, where lights go on and off in a room after 
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every thirty seconds), itself constitutive of irony. Yet, I doubt whether most 
theatre practitioners would ever pander to concepts that proclaim closure and 
finality. Drama, etymologically, means to do, to act. I would claim that drama is 
action, and therefore renews itself as process. It plays as it does and thinks. 
Similarly, the theatre is the place for seeing such action take shape. The script 
(and in contemporary non-textual possibilities, the space), the actors, the director, 
all play out their subjective hermeneutics that somehow strive to function within a 
harmonised whole. The space of performance would seem to play out the 
multiplicity of Romantic irony. In this fashion, the experience of theatrical 
activity operates as a symbol of a social, and even a political, organism that exists 
due to the plurality of choices and positions of action that each member of the 
party enacts.   
 For Cohen though, irony questions the very notion of substance itself, and 
post-Romantic reactions to this attack on substance, have been varied. 
Ontologically, irony attacks substance; epistemologically, it corroborates the post-
Kantian crisis of a lack of ground in philosophy; aesthetically, it opens up the play 
of paradox.  
 After Hegel, Kierkegaard would re-member irony as ‘infinite absolute 
negativity’, ‘not the essence but the opposite of essence’, as perpetually 
exemplifying a ‘Protean change of masks’, thereby stressing its dramatic and 
shape-shifting character.
9
 Walter Benjamin’s work on Schlegel’s movement from 
Fichte—his treatment of the infinity of reflection in Romantic irony is a recurrent 
influence on this chapter— was a critical twentieth-century statement on the 
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philosophic resonance of Romantic irony, and more recently Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Nancy in The Literary Absolute (1979) study the Romantic fragment as the art 
theory of Romantic literature that builds on the philosophic groundwork 
schematised by Kant.
10
 Ernst Behler and Werner Hammacher, have examined the 
importance of Romantic irony, within in a postmodern context, and with 
references to Fichte and the novel.
11
 In English Romanticism, work on Romantic 
irony has been sparse,
12
 while sections of Paul Hamilton’s Metaromanticism 
(2003) also look at the political ramifications of self-reflective Romantic 
aesthetics, with the republicanism of the young Schlegel and the lateral movement 
of ironic discourse serving as foundations for looking at contemporary 
multicultural politics. More recently, Elizabeth Millán Zaibert’s Friedrich 
Schlegel and the Emergence of Romantic Philosophy (2008) has made a strong 
case for the urgent relevance of the philosophic importance of Romantic irony, 
finally claiming that it is ‘a sort of play that reveals the limitations of a view of 
reality that presumed to have the last word. With the use of romantic irony, 
Schlegel showed that there was no last word’.
13
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 My work in this chapter seeks to explore this open-ended play of irony 
from the perspective of dramatic becoming. This chapter forms an account that 
will investigate Romantic irony as a mode that reacts to the crisis of reason, an 
aesthetic means that simultaneously fulfils its aim to theorise art while setting up a 
sketch with which to trace the movement of post-Romantic literature, and of 
philosophy as literature. This blurring of critical and aesthetic boundaries 
becomes crucial in our investigation into the grotesque, setting up the theory for 
our treatment of A. W. Schlegel, Stendhal, Hugo, and Baudelaire. In staying 
within the scope and prescriptive model of the Romantic fragment, I will start 
with Fichte and Schlegel (inscribed through Walter Benjamin), work my way to 
specific examples of the dramatic boundaries circumscribed and explored in the 
Schlegelian fragments, and culminate with Kierkegaard’s and Gadamer’s differing 
takes on the legacy of irony. As the theoretical base for this thesis, this chapter 
will seek to establish the foundations from which to conduct our exploration into 
the Romantic grotesque. 
 
 
II—‘Intellectual Intuition’: Transcending the Fichtean ‘subject-
object’ 
 
In what is perhaps the most influential text on the role of the fragment in 
the literary theory of German Romanticism, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-
Luc Nancy say that ‘fragments are definitions of the fragment; this is what installs 
the totality of the fragment as a plurality and its completion as the incompletion of 
its infinity’ (Barnard, 44). The fragment, the force of Romantic irony, always and 
inevitably refers to itself and its own aesthetic construction. Furthermore, this 
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very process of self-referencing (which becomes characteristic of Romantic art in 
particular) connects with the self-renewing multiplicity of other mutually 
illuminating fragments. The formal ‘completion’ of a single fragment ironically 
signals, in keeping with its thematic framing, the impossibility of its finitude.  
Within the scope of what can be known about ontology, each and every fragment 
affirms that truth and wholeness are not necessarily compatible, that knowledge 
fashions itself through shards, cracks and sudden fractures of temporary, 
incomplete, and perpetually deferred meaning.  
Walter Benjamin contextualises these concerns in his doctoral dissertation, 
‘The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism’ (1919)—an early and 
seminal effort to rehabilitate the philosophical resonance of Schlegel’s critical 
theory, particularly his use of Fichte’s reflection model of cognition and action in 
consciousness. In his emphasis on the infinity of the reflective taxonomy in 
fragmentation and irony, this text works as a precursor to the ideas present in 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy.  
Benjamin starts by stating that Schlegel’s theory of art criticism—
Romantic irony—represents ‘the Romantic theory of criticism’ (Jennings, 118). 
Moreover, this theoretical formulation of how one is supposed to critique, or 
rather complete, a work of art directly relates to epistemological concerns. How 
do we know things? In a Fichtean frame, how am I to receive objective validity of 
my essentially subjective state? Is the self a ‘thing’ just like other things? Art for 
the early Romantics cannot be separated from these questions of self-
consciousness and is a means that contains and illustrates the principle 
precondition of the post-Cartesian method. If Kant’s ‘transcendental unity of 
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apperception’ necessitates that experience is bound to a thinking subject, or 
should be so tied to subjectivity, Fichte locates his first principle in the subject’s 
activity of ‘positing’ (setzen). As Fichte’s philosophy is, according to Schlegel, a 
primary ‘tendency’ of the Romantic age, it is vital to examine how the Romantic 
ironists reevaluate his theory of the self. Fichte’s ‘absolute I’ functions as a 
dramatic counterpoint to the negation of singularity in Schlegel.  Since the 
Fichtean ego sets up the groundwork for Benjamin’s exploration of Schlegelian 
reflection, an understanding of the process of positing is paramount.  
What, then, does it mean for the individual subject to posit? Is it a method 
of cognition? An act? Peter Heath and John Lachs, in their translation of the 1794 
version of the Wissenschaftslehre, provide some answers:  
By setzen Fichte refers to a nontemporal, causal activity that can be 
performed only by minds. We can be conscious of performing the activity 
of positing, but Fichte seems to be of two minds as to whether or not this 
activity is endowed with consciousness. Perhaps the most fundamental 
meaning of the word in ordinary German is to put, place, set up, or 
establish: as such, it implies creative causal endeavor.
14
 
 
In being ‘nontemporal’ yet ‘causal’—the act that is outside of time, and yet 
creates time—positing inhabits an uncertain realm, being between phenomena and 
noumena. However, by emphasising the performative nature of its causal 
endeavour, positing relates to action. It is simultaneously a fact of consciousness 
while also being an activity. This active principle becomes the ‘ground’ for 
experience. There is no ground, or mode of self-consciousness, prior to this act 
performed by the I (das Ich).  
‘The I posits itself unconditionally’. This is the first maxim and starting 
point of Fichte’s Wissenshaftslehre. Fichte’s twist to Kant’s apperception comes 
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in the guise of the infamous ‘intellectual intuition’ (intellectuelle Anschauung), 
which furthers our understanding of the notion of positing. Intellectual intuition, 
the active and reflective basis of consciousness, is truly transcendental: it happens, 
is an event, a performance of positing, but can it be discursively and critically 
analysed? The problems posed by the implications of this question have been 
looked at by Xavier Tilliette in Recherches sur L’intuition Intellectuelle de Kant à 
Hegel (Research into Intellectual Intuition from Kant to Hegel, 1995). For 
Tilliette, the primary question revolves around why Kant’s successors—primarily 
Reinhold and Fichte— revitalised something which the master himself had 
‘banned’, as for him experience could only be studied by distinguishing between 
sense-experience/the immediacy of intuition and the conceptual work done by the 
a priori categories in ordering, and reflecting upon, this immediacy within the 
framework of generalised experience. After all, Kant in the first critique did say 
that intuitions without concepts are blind, and concepts without intuitions empty. 
Nevertheless, in the transcendental distinction concepts and sensibility have to be 
separate, and it would be worthwhile revisiting this famous passage:  
It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to 
add the object to them in intuition, as make our intuitions intelligible, that 
is, to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot 
exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses 
can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise.
15
 
 
Kant makes the division between these two powers sacrosanct, while also 
acknowledging that understanding arises only through the union of the two. Given 
this background, Fichte’s intellectual intuition constitutes one of two possibilities: 
concept and intuition remain distinct but ‘happen’ as an ontological event of unity 
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at the same time, or the Kantian severing of the two faculties that construct 
knowledge is itself an illusion of intellectual nit-picking, that both are essentially 
the same prior to self-conscious conceptualisation. In the latter sense, intellectual 
intuition and its positing represent the primordial and immediate apprehension of 
union where no division ever existed, a means to come to terms with, and 
reconnect, Kantian dualisms.  For Tilliette, the tendency to make intellectual 
intuition the starting point of Fichte’s philosophy is attributed to the 
Romanticising spirit of the early idealists, characterised by the conventional 
Romantic tropes of nature, art, and transcendental yearnings: 
Sous cet angle, l’intuition intellectuelle est un phénomène de 
crystallisation, elle a drainé des expériences récurrantes dans l’air du 
temps mais qui transcendent le temps, comme l’instant, le paysage état 
d’âme, le tableau, la chose de beauté…Elle a servi de mirroir aux 
métamorphoses de Moi, et elle s’est expliquée elle-même en expliquant le 
‘divers de l’intuition sensible’.  
 
[From this perspective, intellectual intuition is a phenomenon of 
crystallisation, it has drained recurrent experiences into the scheme of time 
but transcends time, like the instant, the panorama of the state of the soul, 
the painting, the thing of beauty…It has served as a mirror to the 
metamorphoses of the I, and it has explained itself while illustrating the 
‘diversity of sensible intuition’]
16
 
 
Crystallisation emphasises a bringing together of the diversity of intuition and 
sense-experience (‘sensible intuition’) and somehow marks the threshold of being 
between time and eternity. Obviously, for the Romantic sensibility, this applies to 
the thing of beauty which is always a joy forever. The mirror that reflects the 
metamorphoses of the self would influence the early Romantics in their 
revisioning of Fichte’s strategy of consciousness. Intellectual intuition, then, 
consists of a post-Kantian paradox that relates to both aesthetics and 
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epistemology. In trying to capture the immediacy of self-consciousness and its 
simultaneously reflective activity, Fichte’s philosophy uses an oxymoron—
‘intuition’ occupies the sector of immediacy, ‘intellectual’ refers to the reflective 
act. When the I posits infinitely, it acts. When it simultaneously reflects on this 
action, it also prevents this infinite positing, which in the theoretical context leads 
to the creation of the I. This is the infamous ‘check’ (Anstoss) that reflection 
performs on action. For Frederick Neuhouser, this ‘check’—‘the matter of 
sensation’—is the self-sufficient agent’s own activity upon itself that it confuses 
as being ‘an external, independent thing’, while in his essay devoted to the 
mysterious workings of Anstoss, Daniel Breazeale affirms that the finite essence 
of this check is a precondition, actually the ‘prime mover’, to the infinite striving 
of the primordial I.
17
  
But how can reflection, a turning inward as opposed to the movement 
outwards of doing and acting, act? How does the passive principle of the ‘check’ 
actively deconstruct the limitless, unconditional positing of the I? Action and 
reflection work, or should logically work, at cross-purposes. Yet, and this would 
be important for Schlegel, they exist in a reciprocal relationship. In this sense, the 
I functions as the ‘active’ principle, the not-I as the ‘passive’, reflective one. Or is 
it as simple as this? As on most occasions with Fichte, things are not what they 
seem.  
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In the published 1794 version of his system of knowledge, Fichte is 
emphatic about the not-reality of the not-I: ‘The not-self, as such, has no reality of 
its own; but…it has reality insofar as the self is passive…the not-self has reality 
for the self only to the extent that the self is affected, and in the absence of such 
affection, it has none whatsoever’ (Heath/Lachs, 130, ellipses mine). So here, it 
seems that the I is both active and passive and oscillates from one mode of being 
to the other within the primary act of consciousness. Similarly, when the I is 
passive, the not-I becomes the active principle, even though it does not exist. The 
not-I then is the reflective other—in the sense of mirroring—to the I. As this 
other, it helps take the I to its position of self-consciousness. How can that which 
does not exist-in-itself affect, and act upon, what does possess reality? The image 
in the mirror has no reality of its own. It is semblance. However, just as our daily 
lives are often influenced by what we see in the mirror—the advent of 
Narcissus—so too the imaginary not-I may affect the workings of the self. 
Nevertheless, in the second introduction of the new (and clearer) 
presentation of his doctrine of science, things are different as ‘insofar as the I 
exists for itself, a being outside of the I must also necessarily arise for the I at the 
same time. The former contains within itself the ground of the latter; the latter is 
conditioned by the former. Our self-consciousness is necessarily connected with a 
consciousness of something that is supposed to be something other than 
ourselves’.
18
 Evidently, both the I and its other exist as chiasma, but the not-I now 
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seems to represent what is actually outside oneself, existing as necessity, and 
perhaps as nature. Where Fichte stands on this point remains ambiguous. 
However, for our purposes, this connectivity of one to the other is important.  
Active and passive, reality and semblance, intellect and intuition, are being 
problematised as categories of cognition. 
In the second introduction, Fichte also gives us the clearest definition of 
intellectual intuition, this troublesome term:  
‘Intellectual intuition’ is the name I give to the act required of the 
philosopher: an act of intuiting himself while simultaneously performing 
the act by means of which the I originates for him. Intellectual intuition is 
the immediate consciousness that I act and of what I do when I act. 
(Breazeale, 46) 
 
The before and after of acting, thinking, and reflecting are contained in the 
immediacy of intellectual intuition. Self-consciousness is a state that exists prior 
to this performance (as intuition—space and time are the conditions of 
experience) and paradoxically comes about, becomes, as its function, this 
primordial and primary act of the philosopher. Trying to unpack or discursively 
relate to this concept itself becomes problematic.  
I act and observe my action. I perform and observe the performance. I am 
both actor and audience of my own performance. I act, and at the same time, 
reflect on the action.  
For Fichte, intellectual intuition marks the unity of being and seeing, doing 
and knowing. What he is trying to achieve is to re-connect the Kantian divide 
between theoretical and practical reason. If I act and simultaneously observe my 
action, it logically follows that I will act according to how I should act. I know the 
ethical value of each action that I perform simply because I see myself doing it. 
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This ‘spontaneous’ intellectual intuition –yet, this is necessarily paradoxical—is 
immediate apperception before thought. The self-reflective ‘seeing’ of my actions 
while I am acting is also spontaneous while also being self-conscious. 
Spontaneous action should logically limit reflection, yet ‘happens’ while 
reflecting. In a neo-Kantian study of Fichte, where the ‘absolute’ I is not a super-
consciousness but represents the epistemological isolation of multiple subjects, 
Günter Zöller describes intellectual intuition as ‘that condition in each finite 
rational being due to which consciousness is possible. Like Kant’s apperceptive 
‘I’ think, Fichte’s ‘intellectual intuition’ is, in principle, present in each and every 
act of representing. It is the feature that makes my being conscious of something 
my being conscious of something’.
19
  For Zöller, intellectual intuition is a 
different name for the Kantian cogito, the necessary ground of experience. 
However, it is possible that he neglects how crucially sits the notion of action in 
Fichte’s groundwork. Are we to associate intellectual intuition with Fichte’s 
thetic, predicate-less statement ‘I am’? Yet, in this proposition, the notion of 
action is yet to be born. If I see my action, I must see myself doing, or thinking, 
something. When ‘I am’, I am pure subjectivity. Yet, risking tautology, I must ask 
myself: if I am, what then am I? When I see my actions, I am trying to make 
myself into an object.  
In Fichte’s famous call to the reader to ‘think oneself,’ he asks the subject 
‘to engage in a type of inner acting that depends upon his own self-activity and 
will realize that, in accomplishing what is thus requested of him, he actually 
affects himself through his own self-activity; i.e. he acts’ (Breazeale, 45). The 
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dramatic references are vital for our purposes, being indicative of a Hamletian 
dialogue with oneself. Consciousness has been split. If the theatre in its most basic 
state requires the creation of dramatic tension between a protagonist and an 
antagonist, we can say that in the Fichtean method, theatricality and drama are 
internalised. The mind’s dialogue with itself has commenced. Identity becomes a 
performative act.  Consequently, inner acting entails a conflict within self-
consciousness. The not-I is once again the passive reflective principle to the 
activity of the I. Difficult though it may be to conceptualise, both happen together. 
Thinking, or more correctly, reflecting has been made into an act, and here lies the 
profundity of Fichte’s argument. By making thinking into a self-reflective act, we 
grasp the nature of acting itself: the thinking of thinking. Thinking equals acting. 
When I act in this inward fashion, my thoughts determine who I become. 
Thinking/reflecting limits and paradoxically also motivates action. In other words, 
our earlier distinction between inner and outer action becomes null and void. I and 
not-I become interchangeable. Furthermore, Fichte’s own divide between the 
‘feeling of freedom’ that constitutes the inner world of a subject, and the ‘feeling 
of necessity’ that sketches the borders of experience in the outer world, self-
reflectively turns in on itself. The boundaries collapse, and are effaced. Many 
scholars have referred to the monism of the post-Kantians. Fichte makes the first 
stride towards such a position. In making a move beyond subjectivity, Fichte even 
calls his I a ‘subject-object’. Here we are on the edges of experience and 
discursive thought. As Dieter Henrich and Manfred Frank have repeatedly 
acknowledged, Fichte is working within, and reacting to, the reflective model of 
self-consciousness which makes the I into an object.
20
 Heinrich’s point is about 
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‘overcoming the self’ and he credits Fichte as being the first to understand this as 
a necessary path towards apprehending the nature of consciousness, where the I 
‘must be understood as a plurality of equi-primordial elements which cannot be 
separated from another, but which cannot be reduced to one another’ (25, italics 
mine). This sense of plurality—or rather unity in plurality, or in Schelling’s sense, 
identity in difference—becomes emblematic of the philosopher’s methodology in 
the science of knowledge. In a telling passage, Fichte contrasts his investigation 
from that of other philosophers who follow a more linear, as opposed to a more 
multidimensional, perspective: 
The Wissenschaftslehre contains two very different series of mental 
acting: that of the I the philosopher as observing, as well as the series 
consisting of the philosopher’s own observations. The opposed manner of 
philosophizing to which I have just referred contains but a single series of 
the philosopher’s own thoughts, for the content or object of his thinking is 
not presented as something that is itself engaged in thinking. (Breazeale, 
37) 
 
Not only does Fichte think, but so do his thoughts, which multiply in reflecting on 
themselves.  
Here, we encounter another Fichtean problem, that of the ‘infinite regress’. 
Fichte has often told his reader and audience to ‘think themselves’, as well as to 
‘think the wall’ and the ‘he who thought the wall’. In each case, the self is 
objectified, and in keeping with the explosive plurality of every thought, the very 
notion that the self is objectified places itself under the scrutiny of another thought 
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that seeks to objectify the thought preceding it. And so on to infinity. Fichte has 
also addressed the problem of this infinite regress, and his attempt to define and 
examine intellectual intuition as an act of consciousness that is simultaneously 
subjective and objective grows from the desire to avoid the trap of this regress, 
since if I continue to ‘think the wall’ and the other Is who thought me thinking it, 
there can be no coherent account of the stability of an individual consciousness. 
This is why, in a monist manner, Fichte says: 
…I am originally neither the reflecting subject nor the object of reflection, 
and neither of these is determined by the other. Instead, I am both of these 
in their unity with each other; though I am admittedly unable to think of 
this unity, because whenever I think I must distinguish the object of 
reflection from the reflecting subject. (Breazeale, 74, ellipses mine) 
 
This adoption of a non-dual perspective—I am both subject and object before the 
separation of self-consciousness—accords well with Henrich’s call for the 
‘overcoming of the self’ that he sees indicated in some of Fichte’s writings, by 
which the self realises its necessary submission to a law that exceeds it. ‘Being’, 
in Heidegger’s sense, exists prior to self-consciousness. As Manfred Frank 
adumbrates in ‘Philosophical Foundations of Early Romanticism’, this position 
was also embraced and developed by the early Romantics, not in this case 
Friedrich Schlegel, but most vociferously by his intimate friend and collaborator, 
Novalis.
21
 
For Novalis, self-reflection should point a way out of the reflective theory 
of consciousness which proves what it presupposes. The metaphor of the mirror 
highlights this, a point that Frank labours: ‘All mirroring makes what is being 
mirrored appear reversed. If I hold an object in front of a mirroring glass, then 
                                                          
21
 Manfred Frank, ‘Philosophical Foundations of Early Romanticism’ in The Modern Subject: 
Conceptions of the Self in Classical German Philosophy, ed. Karl Ameriks et al (Albany, NY; 
State University of New York, 1995), pp. 65-87. Future references will be cited in the text. 
 64 
right and left will be reflected as left and right…Novalis calls this order, which is 
characteristic for the finite world of consciousness altogether, “ordo inversus”. 
According to it, consciousness is “not what it represents, and does not represent 
what it is’” (Ameriks, 75, ellipses mine). Consequently, when we self-consciously 
reflect upon consciousness and subjective experience, we necessitate a similar 
inversion, this time with regards to how we perceive reality. If we are concerned 
with appearances, we let this inverse order—the image in the mirror—act upon 
how we actually behave. This is the issue at stake with the reflective model, which 
makes subjectivity into an object. Novalis rejects this standpoint, as he does the 
formula of setting up philosophy on Fichtean first principles. The way out of this 
bind of inversion is ironically to reflect upon the reflection that first caused it. We 
reflect only to destroy the original sin of self-reflection. As a result, we move 
beyond objective notions of subjectivity, occupying instead the liminal ground of 
being neither subject nor object, but somehow both and neither. As an isolated 
point in his unique essay on self-consciousness, Dieter Henrich says that this 
moving beyond the subject-object paradigm of consciousness is articulated in 
detail in ‘the philosophy of the East’ (27). Of course, this totalising picture does 
violence to the variety of philosophical positions found in the classical traditions 
of India, China, and Japan. Yet, what I think he is getting at is the primacy of 
nonduality as an ontological condition in ‘eastern’ philosophy, where the 
either/or, this/that mode of thinking is reversed for a different, being-oriented 
understanding of consciousness. David Loy, in Nonduality: a Study in 
Comparative Philosophy (1988), provides the most detailed account of this 
tradition in Asian philosophy as well as its appearance in the Western history of 
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ideas. Given that Indology in its modern avatar was born with the Schlegels, 
Henrich’s point could be the impetus for further work in this area. 
However, for our purposes, this rejection of the divisionary principle in 
post-Kantian philosophy is crucial for our foray into Schlegelian aesthetics. For 
Fichte, and for the Romantics, it is the power of the imagination that reconciles 
dualities and forms itself into the faculty that allows contradiction, irony, and 
paradox: 
The interplay of the self, in and with itself, whereby it posits itself as finite 
and infinite—an interplay that consists, as it were, in self-conflict, and is 
self-reproducing, in that the self endeavors to unite the irreconcilable, now 
attempting to receive the infinite in the form of the finite, now baffled, 
positing it again outside the latter, and in that very moment seeking once 
more to entertain it under the form of finitude—this is the power of the 
imagination. 
The imagination posits no sort of fixed boundary; for it has no fixed 
standpoint of its own; reason alone posits anything fixed, in that is first 
gives fixity to imagination itself. Imagination is a faculty that wavers in 
the middle between determination and nondetermination, between finite 
and infinite…This wavering is characteristic of imagination even in its 
product; in the course of its wavering, so to speak, and by means thereof it 
brings the latter to birth. (Heath/Lachs, 193) 
 
This is plausibly the most detailed account of the imagination in the nascent 
Romantic philosophy. This faculty acts through ‘interplay’, tries to constantly 
reconcile opposites, is limitless and, crucially for Schlegel, perpetually in motion. 
Like Erich Heller’s dramatic poet, imagination ‘has no fixed standpoint of its 
own’. It cannot make up its mind about anything, instead playing with varying 
possibilities of comprehending the world. While reason tries to fix into form, 
imagination encourages movement and change. Finally, in his emphasis on the 
‘wavering’ quality of the imagination, Fichte contributes most tellingly to the 
hovering, disinterested, ironic, and distancing glance of Romantic irony.  As 
Manfred Frank, and Benjamin before him, have said: the Romantics move beyond 
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the boundaries sketched by Fichte, for the sake of the aesthetic, which becomes 
the new ‘ground’ for philosophy. Perhaps it has become this ground because it 
leads us to the disconcerting thought that philosophy, and by extension 
knowledge, can have no ground at all. Art opens up the failure of philosophy to 
reach a ground without creating an infinite regress that is the result of working 
within a strict subject/object model. By pointing towards this epistemological 
insufficiency, the roots of which go back to Jacobi’s attack on reason and 
philosophic pretension, art becomes autonomous. It differentiates itself from other 
forms of cognition, while simultaneously attempting to occupy and conquer their 
territories. Philosophy for the early German Romantics, even in the case of Fichte 
who strives to correct the infinite regress, is caught chasing its own tail. In 
contrast, art crystallises the immediate, making Fichte’s intellectual intuition into 
a form of artistic representation, a possibility that Manfred Frank alerts us to in his 
study of Novalis: ‘that which philosophy can grasp only in an infinite amount of 
time, and thus can never reach, aesthetic imagination is able to grasp in an 
instant—to be sure, only as something irresolvable…This is accomplished by art 
as the “presentation of the unpresentable” (73, ellipses mine). Art then, is both 
intellectual and intuitive, simultaneously. 
Werner Hammacher in ‘Position Exposed: Friedrich Schlegel’s 
Poetological Transposition of Fichte’s Absolute Proposition’—an essay that I take 
to be a companion piece to Benjamin’s work on Romantic irony—narrates how 
the ‘problems of self-foundation and self-reflection’ that were inaugurated by 
Fichte transpose themselves onto the principle of aesthetic autonomy so dear to 
both Schlegel and Novalis (Fenves, 231). Beauty and aesthetics are inextricably 
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linked to Fichte’s primary proposition where I=I. Instead of the absolute self, 
beauty, the first (non) principle of knowledge, becomes absolute. 
 
 III—The Ironic Drama of Selves: Schlegelian Plurality as Ontology  
 In his essay on the concept of criticism, Benjamin charts out the advances 
that Schlegel makes on Fichte in his theory of ironic fragmentation. Most 
conclusively, criticism—the interpretative work of the reader and audience, with 
which we started this chapter—foregrounds itself.  Essentially revitalising 
Novalis’s famous dictum, and thereby looking forward to Barthes, Benjamin 
asserts the importance of the reader’s role in reflection, which formally 
harmonises with the artwork’s mode of operation. The artwork is born of and in 
reflection, and is raised to the next level by the reader’s own reflective process. 
Reflection meets reflection as a medium of aesthetic play between text and reader. 
The reader’s hermeneutics complete the art work. Criticism becomes a part of the 
objet d’art. While in Fichte, the drama of inner and outer acting was played out in 
an amphitheatre where the only audience was the sole actor, the multivalent 
feature of Schlegelian connections permits itself through its interaction with an 
audience(s). In many ways then, Romantic irony takes the infinite regress of 
Fichte’s philosophy and dramatically multiplies it to infinity. However, here we 
are not thinking ourselves, but moving away from a conception of self and its 
singularity altogether. In English Romanticism, a parallel can be found in the 
dialectic between Wordsworth’s ‘egotistical sublime’ and Keats’s ‘negative 
capability’. In my introductory chapter, we had seen how Hazlitt chastises 
Wordsworth for being too solipsistic and anti-dramatic in his poetry, while Keats 
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found his ideal in the metamorphosing poetics of Shakespeare, where the 
individuality of the poet fragments into multiple personae. A similar process 
seems to be taking place in the contemporaneous movement to Romantic 
fragmentation in Germany. The self has realised the limitations of its perennial 
discussion with itself. Instead, every thought, every fragment grows from itself 
and in its multiple incarnations and rebirths through the hermeneutic activity of 
the reader.  
In this context, Benjamin’s seminal account of the ‘romantic theory of 
object-knowledge’ is illuminating. Here ‘everything that is in the absolute, 
everything real, thinks; because this thinking is that of reflection, it can think only 
itself, or, more precisely, only its own thinking; and because its own thinking is 
full and substantial, it knows itself at the same time that it thinks itself’ (Jennings, 
151). Coincidentally, the Fichtean I ‘signifies for Schlegel and Novalis only an 
inferior form among an infinite number of forms for the self’ (Jennings, 145, 
italics mine). This infinity of the self, or the dramatic proliferation of many selves, 
comes about due to Romantic irony’s refusal to accept the primacy of the 
individual and its subject/object duality in constructing awareness and knowledge. 
In studying this ‘romantic theory of object-knowledge’, Benjamin presents us 
with an intriguing response to how objects in the world of phenomena come to 
cognise each other: 
Thus, there exists no mere being-known of a thing; just as little, however, 
is the thing or being limited to a mere being-known through itself. Rather, 
the intensification of reflection in it suspends the boundary that separates 
its being-known by itself from its being-known by another; in the medium 
of reflection, moreover, the thing and the knowing being merge into each 
other. Both are only relative unities in reflection. Thus, there is in fact no 
knowledge of an object by a subject. (Jennings, 146) 
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As this passage indicates, it is the process of merging that lays the epistemic 
foundation for the aesthetics of irony. We have moved from acting as being a 
perpetual reverting to ourselves (Fichte), towards acting with, and through, other 
objects that act upon us at the same time in the same way that we act upon them. 
In moving beyond the subject/object model of reflection, Romantic criticism 
seismically shifts the concerns of (post)Romantic aesthetics. Just as Keats in his 
letters would speak of the poet as having no self, of occupying other objects in the 
world of phenomena, the Romantic theory of object-knowledge a few decades 
earlier says that the very notion of a knowing self and the object that is being 
known is limiting. Rather, and this is significant, a subject’s encounter with an 
object is reciprocal, thereby undermining the concept of knower and known. If I 
encounter a thing of beauty, my understanding of this thing is equally conditioned 
by that thing’s particular and peculiar understanding of me. Similarly, in an 
interaction with another human being, I become victim to an insatiable egotism if 
I think of myself as a knowing subject that is in the process of understanding an 
object that is up for grabs. In fact, I am devaluing a human being into a mere 
object of possible domination. Instead, the other person—etymologically, this 
refers to persona, role, mask—simultaneously is trying to understand me, and this 
attempt at comprehension affects our individual relation to each other. In effect, 
our attempts to understand one another ironically presuppose, and contribute to, 
understanding itself as a hermeneutic problem.  
It is hard to untie this conceptual knot, but Benjamin endeavours to do so 
by saying that ‘the being-known of one being by another coincides with the self-
knowledge of that being which is being known, coincides with the self-knowledge 
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of the knowing being and with the being-known of the knowing being by the 
being it knows’ (Jennings, 146). What is being unearthed here is the infinity of the 
process of knowing, of the possible endlessness of exchange and argument. 
Dialectics and interplay are continually in motion, thereby conveying their 
dramatic essence. Nothing is successive. Everything is synchronic. Consequently, 
the fundamental quality of understanding something—of a text, a philosophic 
problem, an object, or a person—is never-ending. For Benjamin, this feature 
translates to the inherent multivalence of interpretation that feeds Romantic irony, 
and more importantly, the task of criticism. Like its ‘object’, the artwork, criticism 
is perpetually in motion, being affected by, and in turn affecting, the totality that it 
is trying to know. In other words, one does not simply critique an artwork as an 
exterior object, but actually participates in, and helps create, its aesthetic 
becoming. In a vitally dramatic mode, criticism and art are always already 
interacting. Both come into being simultaneously, and Schlegel’s ‘poetry of 
poetry’ attests to this process. In this manner, the Romantic fragment is an 
aesthetic representation of the limits of thinking in dualist patterns. Not without 
reason would Schlegel say: ‘Irony is the form of paradox. Paradox is everything 
simultaneously good and great’ (Firchow, 149). Paradox allows me to be the 
knowing ‘subject’ and the being that is known. It allows me to be one and the 
other, and in doing so, decentres the primacy of singularity in perspective. What is 
undeniably new here, is a belief that the ‘work’—art, and its process of 
becoming—exists prior to, within, and beyond, the artist. The work drives the 
artist, and itself. The artist informs the work, and is informed by it. 
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The process of critiquing becomes similar to conducting an experiment on 
given objects, a position that Benjamin embraces unequivocally halfway through 
the essay: ‘Thus, criticism, is, as it were, an experiment on the artwork, one 
through which the latter’s own reflection is awakened, through which it is brought 
to consciousness and to knowledge of itself’ (Jennings, 151). The notion of the 
experiment is reminiscent of Fichte’s contention that the philosopher functions in 
much the same way as the chemist. An idea is let loose, and other dependent ideas 
multiply from the initial thought experiment. Like the chemist who mixes and 
matches certain elements in the periodic table, and then watches the reaction take 
effect, so too the philosopher conducts and creates her system. Evidently, the 
reactions brought about by the primary thought experiment lie beyond the 
philosopher’s control. Benjamin collates the implications of the reflection theory 
in Romanticism, by which each reflection is an experiment that leads to, and is in 
turn ‘completed’ in the drama of a perpetual dialectics: 
Romanticism did not base its epistemology on the concept of reflection 
solely because this concept guaranteed the immediacy of cognition, but 
did so equally because the concept guaranteed a peculiar infinity in its 
process. Reflective thinking won its special systematic importance for 
Romanticism by virtue of that limitless capacity by which it makes every 
prior reflection into the object of a subsequent reflection. (Jennings, 123) 
 
What may be open to contention is whether the very notion of ‘subsequent’—of 
one reflection succeeding the other in an endless casual chain—is undermined by 
the transformative ontology of the reflective model in Romantic irony. Perhaps, 
we are still too embedded in the linear paradigm, something that the simultaneity 
of the Schlegelian model actively questions and destabilises. 
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A brief analysis of the most widely quoted Schlgelian fragment can, in this 
particular framing, serve as a foundation for our larger project. In Athenäeum 
fragment 116 (1798), Schlegel describes ‘romantic poetry’ as ‘a progressive, 
universal poetry’ which ‘tries to and should mix poetry and prose, inspiration and 
criticism, the poetry of art and the poetry of nature; and make poetry lively and 
sociable, and life and society poetical’ (Firchow, 175). The emphasis falls again 
on the idea of ‘mixing’ opposites. The distinction between the poetry of art/nature 
goes back to Kant, while the desire to poeticise life and socialise poetry looks 
forward to the late-Romantic and decadent aesthetics of the nineteenth century 
where the ‘art’ and ‘life’ metaphors cease to officiate as substitutes or opposites 
for each other. Schlegel then proceeds to outline the reflection model of Romantic 
poetry: 
It alone can become, like the epic, a mirror of the whole circumambient 
world, an image of the age. And it can also—more than any other form—
hover at the midpoint between the portrayed and the portrayer, free of all 
real and ideal self-interest, on the wings of poetic reflection, and can raise 
that reflection again and again to a higher power, can multiply it in an 
endless succession of mirrors. (Firchow, 175) 
 
Mirroring, reflection, and crucially, the reflection of reflection—the infinite 
regress of reflection, which to Fichte was anathema, a stumbling block that any 
philosophy of consciousness had to overcome—are key features. Schlegel also 
takes up the importance of ‘hovering’, which he borrows from Fichte’s 
characterisation of the imagination, transforming it into the unconditioned 
condition of the aesthetics of Romantic literature. The ‘endless succession of 
mirrors’ becomes Romantic irony’s clarion call for the disruption of singularity 
and system. Everything multiplies itself ad infinitum. In the last lines of this 
particular passage, he goes onto state: 
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Other kinds of poetry are finished and are now capable of being fully 
analyzed. The romantic kind of poetry is still in the state of becoming; 
that, in fact, is its real essence: that it should forever be becoming and 
never be perfected. It can be exhausted by no theory and only a divinatory 
criticism would dare try to characterize its idea. It alone is infinite, just as 
it alone is free; and it recognizes as its first commandment that the will of 
the poet can tolerate no law above itself. The romantic kind of poetry is 
the only one that is more than a kind, that is, as it were, poetry itself: for in 
a certain sense all poetry is or should be romantic. (Firchow, 175-76) 
 
The irony is lost on me, since the above lines seem closest to a manifesto, 
Schlegel’s own system program. Nevertheless, let us say that for Schlegel, 
Romantic poetry is characterised by endless becoming and it cannot be theorised, 
since in effect it escapes every attempt to grasp it conceptually, as it is always in 
motion. However, Schlegel begins by saying that ‘other kinds of poetry’ are 
finished (i.e. fixed, and therefore, capable of being theorised), and ends, and 
herein jumps the irony, that all poetry, whether it is ‘finished’ or not, ‘is or should 
be romantic’. In a manner that foreshadows Stendhal’s intimation of Romanticism 
as being simultaneously current and eternal in Racine et Shakespeare (1823/25), 
Schlegel implies that Romantic poetry is always already finished and perpetually 
becoming, simultaneously. How then can the poetry of the past—Shakespeare is 
the prime example—be finished, theorised, and still capable of endlessly 
becoming, endlessly Romantic? How can poetry be simultaneously alive and 
dead, infinite and finite, obsolete and Romantic? These questions stress Schlegel’s 
unique method of trying to understand the complexity of art and its relation to 
reason. In an accidentally self-reflective manner, I began analysing this fragment 
as representative of a fragmentary manifesto, and ended by realising the hidden, 
nuanced, and subtle nature of ironic methodology. I am caught unawares by the 
text and by my own endeavour of interpreting it. In this way, Romantic irony 
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keeps referring to, like the encounter with the Kantian beautiful, to our own 
method of cognition and ratiocination. Most emphatically, it also comes clear that 
the poet is Shelley’s ideal legislator of laws, since ‘the will of the poet can tolerate 
no law above itself’. 
 
 IV—The Play of Romantic Irony 
 In an evocative rumination in Private Thoughts, René Descartes reflects 
on what he perceives to be the truth-content in the artworks of poets:  
It might seem strange that opinions of weight are found in the works of 
poets rather than philosophers. The reason is that poets wrote through 
enthusiasm and imagination; there are in us seeds of knowledge, as of fire 
in a flint; philosophers extract them by way of reason, but poets strike 
them out by imagination; and then they shine more bright.
22
  
 
Written at the dawn of the modern age, these words testify to the vexed rapport 
shared by art and philosophy ever since Plato banished the poets from his 
republic. They also act as prolepses to the crisis of reason and the philosophic turn 
to art that has been a constant theme, and a nagging question, in this chapter. 
Descartes’ emphasis on ‘enthusiasm and imagination’ anachronistically prefigures 
Romantic tropes, when the idea of feeling and an unshakeable faith in the 
consistency and validity of one’s feelings become vital. Frederick C. Beiser traces 
the ramifications of this issue in its various guises, from Hamann’s critique of 
Kant’s ‘purism of reason’ that neglected cultural relativism to Jacobi’s attack on 
philosophy which claimed that it functioned as a groundless enterprise.
23
 The likes 
of Hamann and Jacobi reinstated the importance of feeling and belief in a way that 
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would resonate with Kierkegaard’s ‘leap of faith’ ontology in the nineteenth 
century. In the 1794 version of his system, even Fichte, the unwilling begetter of 
German Romanticism, focuses on the subjectivity of sensation in human 
understanding: 
Anything sweet or sour, or red or yellow, is absolutely incapable of being 
described, and can only be felt, nor can it be communicated by any 
description to something else, for everyone must relate the object to his 
own feelings, if ever a knowledge of my sensation is to arise in him. 
(Heath, 274) 
 
Günter Zöller would take this as a corroboration of his insistence that Fichte’s I is 
not necessarily absolute in the way that Romantic transcendentalist yearnings 
would have construed it to be, but merely absolute in its totality of 
epistemological isolation. No matter how hard I try, my sensations will remain 
just that: my own. The difficulty in relating this to other independent subjects 
increases manifold. The adversities that logic encounters in this realm are perhaps 
superseded by artistic expression, which may be why poets often convey sensation 
through synesthesia—a particular type of sense impression (taste) is often 
conveyed through another (sound). Consequently, Rimbaud’s revolutionary 
sonnet associates each vowel (sound) with a specific colour. In a familiar (post) 
Romantic fashion, one sense can only be conveyed through its reflection in 
another.  
 The most famous exposition of the philosophic consequences of feeling 
and sensation takes place in Kant’s Critique of Judgement (1790), and my interest 
in the third critique, coinciding with the allowance of space in this chapter, stems 
from a recent essay in the continental tradition by Andrea Kern. In ‘Reflecting the 
Form of Understanding: The Philosophic Significance of Art’, Kern locates the 
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hermeneutic circularity that subtends our encounter with the beautiful in the 
impossibility, and even failure, of the philosophic endeavour to limit and control, 
or in Derrida’s terms, to posit a ‘logical frame’ ‘on a nonlogical structure’.
24
 Here, 
Kern reflects on the always already philosophical nature of aesthetic experience 
and its essential difference from the philosophic method that tries to 
systematically summarise an experience that, by its very nature, cannot be 
logically communicated. While aesthetic experience works within the contours of 
sensation as it simultaneously reminds us of our existence and activity as rational 
agents, philosophy conceptually prescribes what the encounter with the aesthetic 
should constitute without making us experience it (Rothfield, 110). Perhaps then, 
for the early Romantics, and for contemporary criticism, the effacing of the 
art/philosophy boundaries marks a means to re-inscribe philosophy’s commitment 
to an aesthetic presentation of conceptual ideas. Philosophy yearns for the 
aesthetic immediacy of art.  
Significantly, Kern examines the premises of the third critique and her 
investigation into the ‘failure of philosophy’ in relation to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics in the highly influential Truth and Method (1960). The uniqueness 
of aesthetic play, and its differentiation from other forms of empirical and 
conceptual verification, asserts itself due to the reality that it cannot be rigorously 
analysed. Or rather, and Kern’s connection to Gadamer’s ‘hermeneutic circles’ is 
a master move, art can be analysed from more than one interpretative stance at the 
same time, both of which are equally ‘correct’ and valid. Another way of putting 
this may be: I can analyse an artwork, frame it within an immaculate conceptual 
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structure, but every attempt to do so makes me encounter my own interpretative 
insufficiency. The residue of (non)interpretation is left over. This residue confirms 
art’s grotesque ontology. In the introduction, we had seen how the grotesque is a 
concept that evades theoretical framing. Given Kern’s analysis, and the fact that 
the grotesque in the play of irony is an aesthetic and an ontological principle, it is 
possible that the study of irony merely reinforces the idea of aesthetic singularity. 
Or as Kern asserts: ‘In aesthetic play we are not entering ever more deeply into a 
single hermeneutic circle. Rather, we move back and forth between the two of 
them…In aesthetic play between two such circles, the inescapable circularity of 
all our interpretation is revealed’ (Rothfield, 118-120, ellipses mine). Aesthetic 
experience, then, perennially takes us beyond the linear paradigm of 
consciousness. Instead, we are caught in reflection. Finally, as a possible ‘answer’ 
to the question of why philosophy turns to art, Kern concludes by stating that 
aesthetic experience opens up ‘the possibility of a radical failure of our ordinary 
interpretive understanding’ (Rothfield, 124). Therefore, each successful 
hermeneutic action on our part also corresponds to ‘the possibility of radical 
failure’, and it is this possibility that necessitates the turn to, and creation of, the 
need to reflect upon aesthetic reflection.  
 Andrea Kern’s recent essay does much to recoup the philosophic 
significance of art within the post-Kantian context, and as I have pointed out, the 
resonances of this perspective are embedded within, and emerge from, her 
recourse to Hans Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics in Truth and 
Method (1960). In order to understand how art as Romantic irony exceeds the 
limits of philosophy, it is necessary to examine the concept of ‘play’ (spiel) in 
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Gadamer’s text. By doing so, I will claim that Gadamer’s theory of play is the 
most contemporary revisioning of Romantic irony. Furthermore, this theory 
accentuates the necessary dependence of Romantic irony on the phenomenology 
of drama and theatrical activity. Certainly the first part of Truth and Method, 
which explores the relation of truth to the experience of an artwork, revitalises the 
concept of experience (Erlebnis) in the nineteenth century, while also examining 
the interplay of post-Kantian aesthetics as a hermeneutic ontology. Kern focuses 
on the back/forth paradigm in Gadamer in her treatment of Kant, and it is this 
paradigm that contributes most concretely to our understanding of the philosophic 
importance of art as the experience of a transcendental harmony between 
imagination and understanding, combined with the disharmony arising from the 
possibility of interpretative failure. I would like to scan this hermeneutic territory, 
as the back/forth model not only characterises the play of Romantic irony, but also 
serves as groundwork for the notion of interplay between opposites, whether in 
the movement from the beautiful to the grotesque, or in the Baudelairean 
obsession with the simultaneous pull towards animality and spiritual apotheosis 
that we shall examine in Chapter IV.  
Gadamer’s treatment of hermeneutics moves around a basic premise 
where ‘all encounter with the language of art is an encounter with an unfinished 
event and is itself part of this event’.
28
 We are in very familiar territory here. We 
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began this chapter with such an encounter, and as Benjamin explicates, each such 
encounter is an ‘unfinished event’ that multiplies its potential through reflection. 
The critic is also an artist, as Wilde would say. Conversely, for Baudelaire, each 
poet must necessarily contain a critic. The critic actualises the untapped potential 
of an artwork, thereby reflecting on its interior decoration and its expressive 
exterior incarnation. The critic becomes a part of this event, and the artwork by 
implication does not exist outside the circumference of critical knowing. The 
development that Gadamer makes on his Romantic predecessors is in his 
fascinating study of ‘play’ (spiel) as an ontological condition that informs the 
back/forth model of hermeneutics while also transcending the subject/object 
schema of consciousness that was being looked at contemporaneously by Dieter 
Henrich. 
As in Kant’s conditioning of our encounter with the beautiful to Schiller’s 
ideal recombination of the formal and sensual drives that form our individual 
natures, the idea of ‘play’ is an incessant leit-motif in modern critical theory, 
working its way in different masks through Schlegel to Nietzsche to Derrida. In 
translation depending on context, ‘spiel’ could connote ‘play’ (as in ‘to play’ and 
also, importantly, the play one sees in a theatre), ‘game’, a certain slackness in 
endeavour, as well as chance, the hazarding of a bet, a process, an adventure. For 
Gadamer, this proliferation of meanings seems to come together in our experience 
of the work of art. If for Kant, aesthetic free-play happens in an essentially 
subjective encounter with, and deciphering of, an artwork (how is my subjective 
sensation also a universal syndrome of taste?), Gadamer wants to move beyond 
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subjectivity altogether. In this, he is closely linked to the Jena Romantics and their 
reaction to Kant: 
The ‘subject’ of the experience of art, that which remains and endures, is 
not the subjectivity of the person who experiences it but the work itself. 
This is the point at which the mode of being of play becomes significant. 
For play has its own essence, independent of the consciousness of those 
who play…The players are not subjects of play; instead, play merely 
reaches presentation (Darstellung) through the players. (103, ellipses 
mine) 
 
Novalis’s contention that self-consciousness emerges from, and is dependent 
upon, ‘being’, would resonate with Gadamer. The latter’s debt to Heidegger’s 
reaction to the subjectification of philosophy is also obvious. In his later essays, 
Heidegger spoke of a mode of thinking that eliminates the subject/object model, 
preferring instead to ponder upon notions of the ‘clearing’ of truth—being’s 
consciousness (not a being, but Being) before the birth of knowledge in 
subjectivity. Similarly, Fichte and Benjamin move towards rejecting the duality of 
a being that knows and a being that is known. In the primordial act of 
consciousness, this distinction has not taken place. Gadamer’s ‘mode of being of 
play’ is itself problematic. On one level, he seems to be referring to the artwork as 
independent of a knowing subject, on another he seems to say that play is actually 
even beyond the artwork. Another way of putting it would be that play exists and 
functions within the artwork and in the individual consciousness of the players 
who bring it to fruition as in a theatrical piece. How do we, then, know the dancer 
from the dance? For the critic reading a work, the play that is present in it evolves, 
originates, and emerges in a clearing of consciousness that is independent of critic 
and art object. Like the Aeolian harp, the consciousness of the artwork, the critic, 
and the players are brought about by the breath of play that happens to pass 
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through them in their mutual interactions. Gadamer then expands upon what we 
have unearthed: 
The movement of playing has no goal that brings it to an end; rather, it 
renews itself in constant repetition. The movement backward and forward 
is obviously so central to the definition of play that it makes no difference 
who or what performs this movement. The movement of play as such has, 
as it were, no substrate. It is the game that is played—it is irrelevant 
whether or not there is a subject who plays it. The play is occurrence of 
movement as such. (104) 
 
We have been here before, or in our circular fragmentary method of presentation, 
we were always already here. Playing, then, like the movement of Romantic 
irony, has no end or beginning, thereby giving us an excellent position from 
which to counter-attack the ‘end of art’ fashion that Hegel unwittingly brought 
into aesthetic theory. Play then is constant repetition, eternal renewal. (It ends to 
begin anew). 
 Like Joyce’s ‘ricorso’ in Finnegans Wake or Eliot’s journey in Four 
Quartets, the end leads to the beginning. Interestingly, to rehearse a play in 
French means literally to repeat (répétition). One rehearses the same scene 
endlessly while harbouring two intimately related hopes. Through repetition I will 
avoid the fright of failure, while ensuring that my (the) performance has some 
polish. Through repetition I will also allow the possibility of pure spontaneity, 
when my consciousness as an actor playing a particular role will be subverted by 
the sudden inspiration of play in my performance. In other words, I paradoxically 
want the back and forth movement between the ideal of perfection (by repeating I 
will get better) and the awesome jerk of automatic action that testifies to the spirit 
of play that lies beyond and within me. We are then occupying the give and take 
between the oppositions of intention and instinct that surface in Romantic 
 82 
philosophy. In fact, I am actually performing Novalis’s call to destroy the ordo 
inversus of self-reflection, which is destroyed by reflecting on self-reflection. 
Similarly, in repeating play, I paradoxically create the possibility of destroying the 
banality of repetition and artificiality in the performance that the audience is 
seeing. Freedom paradoxically arises not from the abandonment of rules, but from 
working within them.  
‘The movement back and forward’ that is central to play hits upon the 
action/reaction medium that forms the basis of all dramatic and theatrical 
possibility, and of all types of critical aspirations in Romantic theory. Most 
importantly, play is movement without end, where the consciousness of the player 
oscillates, or in more familiar terms, hovers, between belief and non-belief. I act 
and simultaneously observe my action, not knowing whether I believe in my 
metamorphosis into a particular persona or not. Instead, I inhabit a double-
consciousness: I act and watch my performance as an actor playing out a 
particular persona, while also being aware of the fact that I am engaged in such a 
performance. In a Fichtean sense, I am intellectually intuitive.  
In the most lucid and extended passage of this treatment of play, Gadamer 
goes on to intimate that: 
It is part of play that the movement is not only without goal or purpose but 
also without effort. It happens, as it were, by itself. The ease of play—
which naturally does not mean that there is any real absence of effort but 
refers phenomenologically only to the absence of strain—is experienced 
subjectively as relaxation. The structure of play absorbs the player into 
itself, and thus frees him from the burden of taking the initiative, which 
constitutes the actual strain of existence. This is also seen in the 
spontaneous tendency to repetition that emerges in the player and in the 
constant self-renewal of play, which affects its form (e.g. the refrain). 
Inasmuch as nature is without purpose and intention, just as it is without 
exertion, it is a constantly self-renewing play, and can therefore appear as 
a model of art. Thus Friedrich Schlegel writes, “All the sacred games of 
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art are only remote imitations of the infinite play of the world, the 
eternally self-creating work of art”’. (105) 
 
On one hand, Gadamer reaffirms the Schillerian theme of uselessness in the play 
of art. If art was seen as being without utility in the nineteenth century as a 
reaction to commodity culture (all that is useful is ugly, says Gautier), for 
Gadamer play as a principle of ontology and consciousness and as the formative 
essence of art, cannot also be treated as having any practical worth. It has no goal, 
but is a primordial happening that informs all other events. The individual 
consciousness that experiences this primordial play also enjoys ‘the absence of 
strain’—play happens by itself and liberates the individual from having to endure 
the effort and ontological burden of choice. To be freed from choice entails a 
separation from the logistics of either/or, subject/object. Moreover, Gadamer 
associates the primacy of play as being a symbolic and performative counterpart 
to the functioning of nature which is also without purpose, intention, and 
importantly, exertion. Nature then ‘appears’, seems, as the paradigm for art, as 
both operate through an interplay without which neither can exist of itself. As 
Kant had stated, nature appears as art and art as nature. For Gadamer, both come 
into being through the infinity of play, which vitiates purposiveness as a concept. 
The reference to Schlegel’s categorisation of nature and world as ‘the eternally 
self-creating work of art’ confirms the priority of beauty. As in The Winter’s Tale, 
where the statue of Hermione miraculously comes to life—one of the most 
decadent and grotesque acts performed in the theatre—the art itself is nature. The 
reflection in the mirror, semblance, and the reflection on semblance become 
supreme in rank, the authoritative legislation in a world without ground or law. In 
this unique field of play, the ‘player experiences the game as a reality that 
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surpasses him. This is all the more the case where the game is itself ‘intended’ as 
such a reality—for instance, the play which appears as presentation for an 
audience’ (109). The acuteness of this remarkable insight now becomes clear: in a 
play that is presented to an audience, the individual player (the actor) must always 
work within the confines invoked by the play and those imposed by the 
limitations and possibilities of her own role. As Chekov and Stanislavski would 
say: there is no small role, only a small actor. In other words, individuality of 
performance ironically presupposes its own insignificance within the framework 
of play.  
Let us unpack this theme through a practical example from the theatre. 
Theatre workshops and laboratories are famed for their use of games.
29
 One such 
game involves the making of a ‘machine’. It is often played with a number of 
people who are told to create a machine with their bodies and voices. A single 
individual starts this exercise by adopting an idiosyncratic motion (say, miming 
the action of a piston or bicycle pump) combined with a particular sound (say, a 
whistle). The other individuals soon join in on this by adding their own peculiar 
machine to the first one. Importantly, each individual is supposed to build upon 
the work of the other. As more people join in, the larger overarching machine 
starts to take shape until the point where the workings of each individual actor 
officiate only in relation to the larger machine. Practically, this game fulfils and 
teaches us a fundamental theatrical law, bordering on a truism: each individual 
exercises her own capacities of visualisation and imaginative choice in 
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conjunction with the need to work with other people, to a point where the 
sovereignty of the machine, the play, the polis, takes over from the individuality 
of the player. The political metaphors I use are not accidental. The structure of 
play teaches the individual the limitations of the self within the context of play. 
Individuality of choice coexists always with the co-operative effort.  
A lot can be learnt from this basic theatre game. Primarily, we realise the 
ontological need of ‘overcoming the self’. Secondly, we learn to adapt to each 
other’s individual performances for the sake of play. Art may be autonomous, but 
in a Schillerian sense, the essence of semblance teaches us to respect individual 
choices within a social framing. Art then may be decadence for the sake of social 
harmony.
30
 Consequently, play is perhaps not just play. However, for Gadamer, 
play is the premise of hermeneutic endeavour. If Romantic philosophy tries to 
subsume phenomena under aesthetics, Gadamer emphasises that aesthetics must 
be hermeneutical. Or rather, as his reference to Schlegel betrays, aesthetics is 
always already a hermeneutic enterprise.  
 
 Gadamer’s recourse to Schlegel in characterising the concept of play takes 
us to the final act of this chapter. Play, in effect, is not a concept, just as for Paul 
de Man Romantic irony cannot be a concept, which requires a working within a 
subject/object model that we have actively questioned and destabilised. De Man’s 
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 I have taken my cue here from Paul Hamilton’s treatment of the republican promise of irony’s 
lateral movement in Metaromanticism: aesthetics, literature, theory (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2003) : ‘Irony is therefore not a history of inauthentic foreclosures of an infinite 
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larger whole.   
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essay, ‘The Concept of Irony’ self-consciously refers to Kierkegaard’s 
monumental dissertation of the same name (Benjamin’s work on Romantic irony 
also took the form of a doctoral thesis, an irony of coincidence?), while also 
acknowledging the inherent irony of trying to frame such playful awareness 
within a conceptual setting: ‘Understanding would allow us to control irony. But 
what if irony is always of understanding, if irony is always the irony of 
understanding, if what is at stake in irony is always the question of whether it is 
possible to understand or not to understand?’
31
 Irony then problematises 
hermeneutics and definition, while having a ‘performative function’, thereby 
allowing ‘us to perform all kinds of performative linguistic functions which seem 
to fall out of the tropological field, but also to be closely connected with it’ (165). 
Language for deconstruction is performance, but this very notion of 
performance—without subject-object—exceeds language and the subjective 
framing of language, while being simultaneously dependent on theatrical 
methodology, the famous parabasis of Greek comedy. In this parabasis, the 
dramatist literally interferes with the action of the play, commenting on it through 
the function of the Greek chorus, whether it is made of clouds or frogs. The 
individual voice of the author expresses itself through the voice (s) of a multitude, 
a theatrical reality that Paul Hamilton reminds us of (see endnote 30). For 
Schlegel, irony would constitute a ‘permanent parabasis’, where this self-
conscious parodying of aesthetic form through authorial commentary aligns itself 
with the condition of ironic expression. 
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 Play, irony, and theatricality are intimately involved, taking us beyond a 
purely linguistic praxis.  In his essay, De Man reminds us that Kierkegaard’s The 
Concept of Irony (1841) is ‘the best book on irony that’s available’, and it is in 
this book that me we may find our concluding remarks. The work is a polemic 
against the insincerity of a ‘pure’ aesthetic consciousness epitomised by Schlegel. 
Decisively, Kierkegaard locates the origins of Romantic irony in the figure of 
Socrates. For Kierkegaard, irony contrasts with the earnestness of true inward 
subjectivity that he sees exemplified in Christianity. Platonism, however, destroys 
the possibility of such earnestness, which was also present in the ‘naivete’ of a 
pre-sentimental Greece: 
Irony, on the other hand, is simultaneously a new position and as such is 
absolutely polemical toward early Greek culture. It is a position that 
continually cancels itself; it is a nothing that devours everything, and 
something one can never grab hold of, something that is and is not at the 
same time, but something that at rock bottom is comic. (Hong, 131) 
 
Throughout the text, Kierkegaard returns to the ‘I know nothing’ mask that 
Socrates wears, analysing it as the confirmation of his nihilism rather than as 
being representative of supposed moral strength and wisdom: ‘Every philosophy 
that begins with a presupposition naturally ends with the same presupposition, and 
just as Socrates’ philosophy began with the presupposition that he knew nothing, 
so it ended with the presupposition that human beings know nothing at all’ (Hong, 
37). Kierkegaard repeatedly returns to the persona of Socrates portrayed in 
Aristophanes’ The Clouds—‘something that at rock bottom is comic’—where the 
historical figure of the philosopher is mercilessly parodied.  
The plot of the play is simple enough: Strepsiades is a country landowner 
suffering from penury due to the extravagant proclivities (primarily horses) of his 
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son, Phidippides. Hoping for a cure to his financial ailments, Strepsiades sends his 
son to the ‘Thinkery’, which is run by none other than Socrates. Phidippides’ 
subsequent learning has alarming consequences: he loses his faith in the gods of 
Hellas, becomes a subtle logician who worships the new ‘god’ chaos, and ends up 
physically beating his own father. The final action of the play concerns 
Strepsiades burning the ‘Thinkery’, proactively giving weight to the satire against 
the sophists and their schools for scandal. Ironically, Socrates—the primary 
opponent of the sophists in his time—becomes the ultimate sophist in 
Aristophanes’ play. Also, in a classic example of the multivalent use of stage 
imagery, the chorus of clouds in the play allegorically comes to represent the 
essential emptiness of philosophical and dramatic manoeuvre. Clouds can take 
any shape they desire. They are without substance, fluid, perpetually in motion. 
Logically then, we can justify any opinion through the art of rhetoric and debate. 
We are already prefiguring the Romantic crisis of a ground for philosophy. For 
Kierkegaard, the clouds also symbolise the emptiness of ironic posturing. 
Ironically enough, a philosopher opposed to irony falls back on a dramatist whose 
mode of operation involves ironic discourse, the semblance of play and illusion. 
The clouds then should also represent the play and emptiness of drama. Drama 
plays out irony doing irony. This theatrical presentation of irony reflects on its 
own ironic premise. As Kierkegaard laconically states, irony is ‘a subjectivity’s 
subjectivity, which corresponds to reflection’s reflection’ (Hong, 242). Irony 
cannot stop itself in its tracks. It continues to simultaneously create and destroy in 
Schlegel’s endless succession of mirrors. Socrates then ‘was not like a 
philosopher delivering his opinions in such a way that just the lecture itself is the 
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presence of the idea, but what Socrates said meant something different. The outer 
was not at all in harmony with the inner but was rather its opposite’ (Hong, 12). 
The question of disharmony between outer representation and inner presence (or 
the lack of it) is acute. Socrates is a philosopher of connivance, whose words 
never mean what they say.  
The recourse to Socrates is not an accident on Kierkegaard’s part, 
considering the principal target of his polemic is Friedrich Schlegel who once 
described novels as ‘the Socratic dialogues of our time’ (Firhow, 145). What 
Schlegel sees in these dialogues then is the manner in which they pit opposing 
forces—opinions, identities, genres—against each other, which then go about 
their own way of coalescence and disjunction in a typically back and forth 
movement. The modern novel, and Cervantes was a favourite example just as 
Shakespeare and Calderon were for drama, brings together a number of expressive 
potentialities and genres while remaining self-reflexive, and Schlegel would 
attempt to put theory into practice in his own decadent novel, Lucinde (1799). 
Yet, this pitting together of contraries is inherently dramatic in nature, given that 
the Socratic dialogues were inextricably tied to the creation of personae and 
characters: the Socrates we know is Plato’s Socrates, a dramatic figure who in his 
interplay with other notable characters, configures one of the finest meeting points 
of philosophy and art, of philosophy as art. These points emerge in Schlegel’s 
most detailed account of Socratic irony, his own model, in the Critical Fragments: 
Socratic irony is the only involuntary and yet completely deliberate 
dissimulation. It is equally impossible to feign it or divulge it. To a person 
who hasn’t got it, it will remain a riddle even after it is openly 
confessed…In this sort of irony, everything should be playful and serious, 
guilelessly open and deeply hidden…It contains and arouses a feeling of 
indissoluble antagonism between the absolute and the relative, between the 
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impossibility and the necessity of complete communication…It is a very 
good sign when the harmonious bores are at a loss about how they should 
react to this continual self-parody, when they fluctuate endlessly between 
belief and disbelief until they get dizzy and take what is meant as a joke 
seriously and what is meant seriously as a joke. (Firchow, 155-56, ellipses 
mine) 
 
The first sentence proclaims to ironically divulge and decode what is in itself 
ironic—a dissimulation that is coincidentally instinctual and intentional. The 
stress on ‘dissimulation’ gets directly to the heart of artifice in aesthetic 
presentation, and the self-consciousness of artificiality is a foundational trope of 
the literature that Schlegel admires, and a theme that risks becoming tautology 
during the course of the nineteenth century, from Baudelaire’s hypocrite reader to 
Wilde’s Dorian Gray. In one of his epigrams, Wilde delights in the artifice of 
dissimulation: ‘Man is least himself when he talks in his own person. Give him a 
mask and he will tell the truth’.
32
 The mask of pretence and persona reflects on the 
absence of core individuality. Wilde’s method is similar to Schlegel’s: the only 
truth that the mask can tell is that of a profound ontological emptiness, of a lack in 
and of ‘truth’ itself. Schlegel nevertheless goes on to ‘define’ Socratic irony in 
negative terms, by stating what it is not. Irony cannot be learnt or logically 
explained. Then, in a manner that would have infuriated Hegel and Kierkegaard, 
Schlegel progresses to fix irony through paradox: it is ‘playful and serious, 
guilelessly open and deeply hidden’ (What are we saying here? The search for an 
answer is itself problematic).  
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Most emphatically, irony plays out the antagonism of the absolute and the 
relative, and we could add that irony permits the relative to flourish through an 
incessant questioning of absolute perspectives. The ‘harmonious bores’ are those 
who do not understand irony, perhaps because they cannot clue into how deeply 
their own ‘harmonious’ positions and postures are themselves momentary 
embodiments of the ironic play that exceeds them. Irony fluctuates, hovers, 
parodies all striving towards the absolute. It can accomplish this through a 
realisation of dissimulation, and by extension theatricality, as ontology.  
Elsewhere, Schlegel calls poetry the ‘noblest and worthiest’ of arts because it 
functions on the premise of drama, and as if predicting the growth of the dramatic 
monologue, gives us another intriguing fragment: ‘The pantomimes of the 
ancients no longer exist. But in compensation, all modern poetry resembles 
pantomimes’ (Firchow, 169). 
The pantomime is another theatrical reference, taking us back to the vexed 
problem of ‘mimesis’ in theory and the arts. Samuel Ijsseling in Mimesis: On 
Appearance and Being (c 1990) gives us an excellent outline of the multiple 
meanings of the Greek word mimesthai: ‘to imitate, to follow, to mimic, to ape, to 
counterfeit, to forge, to reproduce, to copy, to mirror, to double, to depict, to 
represent, to render, to impersonate, to repeat and to translate, to recite and to 
cite…’.
33
 The unifying factor in all these possibilities is the idea of 
representing/constructing something else, of changing through reiteration, of 
parodying and eliding notions of uniqueness and centrality. What is of note is that 
the word ‘mimesis’ grew from the basis of a mime, a theatrical performance, as 
                                                          
33 Samuel Ijsseling, Mimesis—On Appearance and Being, Trans. Hester IJsseling and Jeffrey 
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noted by Göran Sörbom in Mimesis and Art (1966): ‘As far as we know the mime 
was either a recitation with different parts acted by one person or a dramatic 
performance executed by two or more persons’.
34
 As he also points out, it is not 
until Plato that the term is applied as an aesthetic idea to all the other arts, leading 
to the philosopher’s infamous rejection of artistic mimesis as a method to 
comprehend reality in The Republic. Here we have a detailed articulation of the 
first theory of art, one that is based on the larger framework of envisioning an 
ideal stable city, free from inimical elements. Plato elsewhere always refers to, 
and praises, the works of Homer as springing from divine madness, and yet it is 
this very inspiration that threatens the polis. The exploration of the idea of 
mimesis and art grows out of Plato’s metaphysics, which may be briefly outlined 
as follows.  
The world we live in is a world of appearances and Heraclitean flux where 
each object/idea is a reflection of its ideal that rests permanently in the realm of 
forms. In Plato’s classification, it is the world of stasis, of permanence, of the 
Ideal, of the intellectual, that is valued over the world of phenomenological 
change. In Book VI of The Republic, Plato establishes the ‘Dividing Line’ 
between this world of change and the realm of permanent forms—the phenomenal 
world revolves around shadows, images, and illusions that are grasped only 
through belief. The realm of forms (that transcends matter and the corporeal) can 
be understood only through the intellect, through mathematical reasoning and 
philosophy—this is the world of pure thought, of conceptual knowledge, of 
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permanent beauty, of the immortality of the soul.
35
 In contrast, art can only inhabit 
the world of ‘seeming’ and total flux. Yet, this is not enough as art, through its 
process of mimetic representation in a world of appearances (i.e. seeming in a 
world where everything ‘seems’), ‘is third in succession to the throne of truth’ 
(Lee, 374), hierarchically and morally worse than the work of a carpenter. The 
bed that a carpenter makes mimics and reflects the Ideal bed, but a painting or a 
description of that very bed is an imitation of an imitation. So, in a world of 
appearance dominated by sight, art functions merely as a mirror of what one sees.  
As a development to his treatment of mimesis, Plato uses the mirror as a metaphor 
for art—the primary metaphor of aesthetics—in a passage that treats the 
intricacies of the idea of representation. Socrates tells Glaucon to ‘take a mirror 
and turn it round in all directions; before long you will create sun and stars and 
earth, yourself and all other animals and plants’ (Lee, 372). Glaucon responds to 
this elaborate metaphor for the artistic act, saying: ‘Yes, but they would only be 
reflections…not real things’ (372, ellipses mine). The arts—the theatre in 
particular—are trickery and lies taking us away from conceptual truth. Theatre 
and performance then, lie at the root of the very concept of mimesis, the world of 
performance and seeming. Plato devalues this world, where Aristotle would 
celebrate it in The Poetics. It is by reflecting on mimesis that we can reverse the 
ordus inversus of Novalis’s mirror.  
In his concept or irony, Kierkegaard is keen to follow up on the theatrical 
promise of Romantic irony in a remarkable passage that commingles ironic 
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posturing with the metamorphoses of role-playing. Without doubt, he betrays 
Plato’s scepticism towards mimesis and imitation: 
What takes the ironist’s time, however, is the solicitude he employs in 
dressing himself in the costume proper to the poetic character he has 
poetically composed for himself. Here the ironist is very well informed 
and consequently has a considerable selection of masquerade costumes 
from which to choose. At times he walks around with the proud air of a 
Roman patrician wrapped in a bordered toga. Or he sits in the sells curulis 
with imposing Roman earnestness; at times he conceals himself in the 
humble costume of a penitent pilgrim; then again he sits with his legs 
crossed like a Turkish pasha in his harem; at times he flutters about as 
light and free as a bird in the role of an amorous zither player. This is what 
the ironist means when he says that one should live poetically; this is what 
he achieves by poetically composing himself. (Hong, 283) 
 
‘Ironist’ then is another name for poet and actor. She dresses herself in numerous 
garbs and disguises, flirts with a perpetual masquerade for an appreciative public, 
and the range of costumes that she can choose from reflect on the infinite variety 
of moods that dominate her from time to time. As a result, she can be a Roman 
patrician, a pilgrim, and a Turk with equal ease through the manipulation of 
moods and the hovering glance of a moving, multiplying imagination. The life of 
the ironist ‘is nothing but moods’, and her metamorphoses come about through 
the motivation of Baudelaire’s ennui: ‘Boredom is the only continuity the ironist 
has. Boredom, this eternity devoid of content, this salvation devoid of joy, this 
superficial profundity, this hungry glut. But boredom is precisely the negative 
unity admitted into a personal consciousness, wherein the opposites vanish’ 
(Hong, 285). Kierkegaard has ironically sketched the portrait and persona of his 
own seducer in Either/Or, the mid-nineteenth-century aesthete who treats all life 
as performance, where the possibility of stasis and stagnation is the greatest threat 
to the unbearable lightness of being composed poetically. The ironist is a slave to 
the mirrors that reflect the body and the mind. 
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Romantic irony puts into process the Olympian indifference of play and its 
mimetic reflection on what it means to reflect and imitate. It is an aesthetic and 
philosophic treatment of the question of reflection and self-reflection, which 
perhaps tells us that reality need not be divided into phenomena and the thing-in-
itself, but that the appearance of semblance itself is the condition of human 
consciousness. 
This section of my chapter has explored the dramatic resonance of 
Romantic irony and its treatment of post-Kantian issues of interpretation and play 
in empirical knowledge, in the hope that we can understand the premise of 
Schlegel’s art criticism as one that constantly tries to overcome duality through 
the drama of temporary rapprochements. Unity or nonduality are not ends-in-
themselves, but critically emerge from their dependence on a plurality of choices 
and avenues of being. In a strikingly postmodern sense, we are all more than 
one—the self contains many selves, and we move from one possible mask to the 
other often without realising it. Schlegel’s mixed-genre artwork becomes 
representative of self-consciousness. These self-consciousness(es) are however 
dependent on spiel, on play and irony as play that extends beyond self-awareness. 
It is the substrate, the groundless ground, of individual consciousness. This vital 
and open-ended dramatic ‘paradigm’ sets the tone for the Romantic grotesque, 
rooted in the revisioning of Shakespearean drama.   
What is ‘play’ or ‘being’ for continental philosophers, is simply ‘life’ for 
the renowned theatre director Declan Donnellan who, in attempting to negotiate 
the thorny issue of artifice’s relation to spontaneity—which for Schlegel was the 
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binary between ‘intention’ and ‘instinct’—can move us towards some concluding 
remarks: 
The highly controlled art must appear, in some way, spontaneous…The 
difference in quality between one performance and another is not in 
technique alone, but in the surge of life that makes technique seem 
invisible. The years of training must seem to evaporate in the heat of life; 
truly great technique has the generosity to vanish and take no credit… 
Even the most stylised art is about life, and the more life there is present in 
a work of art, the greater the quality of that art. Life is mysterious and 
transcends logic, so the living thing cannot be analysed, taught or 
learned.
36
  
 
Like the play of irony, ‘the surge of life’ cannot be discursively stated, or rather 
any endeavour to do so necessarily posits and implies an alternative explanation. 
Paradoxically, great technique and artifice must know when to ‘vanish’. Or as 
Schlegel affirms only to negate: ‘One can only become a philosopher, not be one. 
As soon as one thinks one is a philosopher, one stops becoming one’ (Firchow, 
167). Irony, play, life are always becoming, while exceeding the individual 
consciousness of self. Given this context, it is the supreme irony that Friedrich 
Schlegel, the revolutionary aesthetician and young republican, would go on to 
become Metternich’s secretary during the creation and systematically 
conservative re-building of a post-Napoleonic Europe. 
  
V—Towards the Drama of the Grotesque 
We began this chapter with Schlegel’s violent framing of the French 
Revolution, Fichte, and Goethe, which directly went about addressing the rapport 
of art and politics in Romanticism, or rather the amorphous blurring of the two. In 
a ‘draft of a letter’ written to Jens Baggasen in 1795, Fichte too audaciously 
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connects his controversial doctrine of scientific knowledge to the politics of 
ceaseless transformation in Revolutionary France: ‘Just as France has freed man 
from external shackles, so my system frees him from the fetters of things in 
themselves, which is to say, from those external influences with which all 
previous systems—including the Kantian—have more or less fettered him’.
37
 The 
ding-an-sich is the French ancien régime. Fichte’s idealist philosophy, stemming 
from the sufficiency of the I also frees the individual from such ‘external 
influences’. Fichte’s philosophy then relates to the revolutionary ideals of 1789. 
Or so he would have us believe. As in Schlegel, so too in Fichte. Aesthetics and 
philosophy seem to draw inspiration from the political domain. With Schiller’s 
theory of ‘semblance’, art, however, starts to move away from socio-political 
concerns, and in a large amount of the work done by the early Romantics, politics 
casts an inscrutable shadow, often being grotesquely aestheticised.  
In another Athenäeum fragment, Schlegel bravely characterises the French 
Revolution ‘as the centre and apex of the French national character, where all its 
paradoxes are thrust together; as the most frightful grotesque of the age, where the 
most profound prejudices and their most brutal punishments are mixed up in a 
frightful chaos and woven bizarrely as possible into a monstrous human 
tragicomedy’ (Firchow, 233). To Schlegel then, the Revolution, like the work of 
art, opens up the clearing for the battle of antinomies—paradox, chaos, the 
grotesque (das grotesk) are the hallmarks of the age. If Victor Hugo would see the 
grotesque in his Préface de Cromwell (1827), another ‘little book’ of literary 
revolution and continental Romanticism, as an aesthetic means to account for the 
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simultaneity of contradictions in modern life, his reference point is surely the 
chaos and shifting structures of Revolutionary change. In Schlegel’s terminology 
close to thirty years earlier, the great Revolution reflects an aesthetic principle: 
arbitrary political change symbolises the whimsical mixing of genres and styles in 
an ironic artwork. The French Revolution becomes the most grotesque example of 
the Mischgedicht.  This is the leit-motif which, starting with Romantic irony, 
continues to reappear in the course of nineteenth-century aesthetics. Not without 
implications does Schlegel call this ‘frightful grotesque’ a ‘tragicomedy’, neither 
just tragic nor comic, but somehow both at the same time. As we shall see in 
Chapter III, the tragicomedy of the French Revolution exemplifies Shakespearean 
tropes. The method of his plays, as opposed to the neoclassical drama of Racine 
and Moliere, seems to accurately reflect the cataclysms of Revolutionary change. 
Significantly, the French Revolution for those not directly participating in it, 
becomes an amphitheatre of grotesque and ironic transformation. Somehow, in 
this context, the grotesque seems removed from being frightful, or rather, is 
fascinating because it continually shifts shapes and follows the principle of 
aesthetic and ontological randomness. Perpetual variation is the only consistency. 
Moreover, the aestheticisation of politics may itself function as an ironic 
prefiguring of grotesque associations in the nineteenth century. 
 In a rare book-length study of Romantic irony and its application to 
English Romanticism (particularly Byron), Anne Mellor comments on the 
importance of this play in irony as a philosophic and aesthetic mode: 
Romantic irony is a way of thinking about the world that embraces change 
and process for their own sake…Romantic irony is both a philosophical 
conception of the universe and an artistic program. Ontologically, it sees 
the world as fundamentally chaotic…This chaos is abundantly fertile, 
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always throwing up new forms, new creations…To borrow the terms used 
by modern physics, we might think of this chaos as pure energy…The 
artist who shares this conception of the universe as chaos must find an 
aesthetic mode that sustains this ontological reality, this neverending 
becoming…Thus the romantic ironist sustains his participation in a 
creative process that extends beyond the limits of his own mind. He 
deconstructs his own texts in the expectation that such deconstruction is a 
way of keeping in contact with a greater creative power. 
38
 
 
Ontologically then, Romantic irony functions in its historical context, being 
characteristic of an age that threw up ‘new forms, new creations’. The primary 
themes are those of chaos and becoming. Stasis, completion, the ‘primal images’ 
of Goethe’s muses, are being sacrificed for change. In referring to the self-
conscious method of the Romantic ironist, Mellor (in keeping with the times she 
was writing in) twice refers to the need for ‘deconstruction,’ illustrating that 
Romantic irony is the precursor to poststructuralist jouissance. Mellor also 
comments on Schlegel’s arabesques, which he associated with the grotesque.  
Here, these arabesques are:   
the decorative, linear, capricious designs of Pompeian Third Style wall-
painting, the kind of designs rediscovered in the Golden House of Nero by 
Italian Renaissance painters and frequently utilized by Raphael and 
Giovanni da Udine in the vatican lodge, the Logetta Del Cardinal 
Bibbiena, and the Villa Farnesina. Known as grottesche, these delicately 
drawn, brightly painted curvilinear designs arbitrarily blend architectural, 
vegetal, animal, and human motifs in irrational but balanced 
patterns…Schlegel too saw the arabesque as a form that released creative 
excess of the imagination. (19, ellipses mine) 
 
Mellor, in her interplay with Schlegel, takes us back to the origins of the word 
‘grotesque’, which came from the grottoes of Nero’s Golden House. These figures 
are hybrid and mixed, and according to Mellor, arbitrary and irrational. These 
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grotesque arabesques then modulate the dramatic movement from a particular 
type of imagery and design to another through the freedom of the imagination, 
which is without boundary and limit. Increasingly, they perhaps also hint that this 
‘creative excess of the imagination’ corresponds with ‘the eternally self-creating 
work of art’ that for Schlegel was the art-world of nature in its infinite variety.  
            During the course of this chapter, we have looked at Schlegel’s use of 
dramatic themes to define ironic awareness. Hugo would relate his grotesque to 
drama and theatre as well. So, whether it is Hazlitt in England, Hugo in France, or 
most tellingly August Wilhelm Schlegel (elder brother to Friedrich) in Germany, 
drama and particularly Shakespearean drama, becomes representative of the 
Romantic excess of imagination. Shakespeare holds up the mirror to the nature of 
a post-Revolutionary Europe, mimetically representing its chaos and confusion. It 
is to this emerging obsession with Shakespearean drama to which we must now 
turn in order to further define the play of the modern, Romantic grotesque. 
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      Chapter II 
 
   The Antagonist Speaks: ‘Edgar I nothing am’—  
    Romantic Shakespeare/Grotesque Irony 
 
Despite the two-hundred year tradition of translating foreign 
Shakespearean criticism in English, British and American historians of 
that criticism tend to assign it no major role in the continuing development 
of the British view of Shakespeare.
1
 
  
Thoman G. Sauer, from A.W. Schlegel’s Shakespearean Criticism 
in England 
 
Shakespeare’s universality is like the center of romantic art.
2
 
 
Friedrich Schlegel, from the Athenäeum Fragments 
 
 
 
I—Romantic Shakespeare 
 
 In the last chapter we studied Friedrich Schlegel’s Romantic irony, and its 
conjunction with his concept of Romantic poetry (romantische Poesie), as a 
vitally dramatic form of cognition. Romantic irony develops on the cusp of the 
nineteenth century as an aesthetic reaction to the un-groundedness of post-Kantian 
philosophy. Rationalism has encountered its discontents. Kant’s valorisation of 
the aesthetic in the third critique as a category that marks the harmony of 
understanding and sensibility, of the aesthetic object as being defined by a 
‘purposiveness without purpose’, opens up a can of worms for critical theorists.
3
 
Philosophy turns to art since the latter informs the former of its own interpretative 
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insufficiency. Simply put, an artwork can be looked at from multiple viewpoints, 
thereby problematising the desire for a systematic, singular world-view.
4
 For 
Kant, in his attempt to sketch the experience of art, the question is: how can my 
subjective experience of an artwork, of feeling the reciprocal play of intelligence 
and sensation, be communicated to others? Or rather, can the generalisations I 
impose on personal aesthetic experience be representative of universal taste? As 
we saw in the last chapter, Fichte’s solipsism is one reaction to these 
epistemological problems. In contrast, the early German Romantics propose their 
own solution, which paradoxically annuls and mocks the striving for solutions: 
‘truth’ is fragmentary, inter-subjective, and multiple. Art, as opposed to 
philosophy, opens up the clearing for this dramatic interaction of ungrounded 
perspectives. 
 Friedrich Schlegel indicates this condition in a simple statement, 
characteristic of his method of fragmentary reflection: ‘Where philosophy ceases, 
poetry has to begin’ (Firchow, 245). The new philosophy then must be poetic. 
Similarly, poetry and poetics become the first and final commandments, the 
supreme law and legislation in a world characterised not by classical rigidity, 
purity, and fixedness, but by perpetual motion and change.  
As we saw in Chapter I, fragment 116 of the Athenaeum Fragments 
outlines the tenets of this Romantic poetry. Fundamentally, it is a ‘progressive, 
universal poetry’ that ‘should mix and fuse poetry and prose, inspiration and 
                                                          
4
 See Andrea Kern’s remarkable essay on this subject, ‘Reflecting the Form of Understanding: The 
Philosophic Significance of Art’ in Kant after Derrida, ed. Philip Rothfield (Manchester: 
Clinamen Press, 2003). Here, Kern reflects on the always already philosophical nature of aesthetic 
experience and its essential difference from the philosophic method that tries to systematically 
summarise an experience that, by its very nature, cannot be logically communicated. Kern 
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criticism, the poetry of art and the poetry of nature; and make poetry lively and 
sociable, and life and society poetical’ (Firchow, 175). Romantic poetry then, 
operates on the premise of making everything undeniably aesthetic. Rigid 
separations between poetry/prose and art/nature—in many ways, the principal 
Romantic binary—should be challenged and vitiated. This kind of poetry 
differentiates itself from other forms of expression as it is in a state of perpetual 
becoming. It multiplies itself in ‘an endless succession of mirrors’ (Firchow, 175). 
Importantly, as a maxim to our own attempts at reading Romantic literature, this 
form of poetry cannot be contained or theorised. In other words, any endeavour to 
define it necessarily turns in on itself, opening up to us our own hermeneutic 
failures. It also functions as the image of its time, but in its very essence is beyond 
historic specificity. Romantic poetry, and its sense of becoming as the play of 
irony, is historically particular to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
while simultaneously standing as a symbol for ‘poetry’ as a whole. If Shakespeare 
is at the ‘center of romantic art’, his dramatic poetry becomes Romantic avant la 
lettre. In effect, Schlegel theorises an untheorisable Romantic poetry after the fact. 
In a manner that prefigures Stendhal’s take on Shakespeare in Racine et 
Shakespeare (1823/25), Schlegel makes the bard’s centrality to Romantic poetry 
symptomatic of its trans-historical relevance.  Yet, given his method of a 
peculiarly circular mode of reflection it may be said that Romantic theory, just 
like Romantic poetry, breaks through the barriers of a linear ‘then and now’ 
paradigm. In one of his other fragments, Schlegel says that ‘Philosophy is still 
moving too much in a straight line; it’s not yet cyclical enough’ (Firchow, 166). 
By implication, his own symphilosophie/ sympoesie adopts the patterns of 
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circularity, characterised by a dramatic back/forth interplay between ideas that 
become points of contact and reference on a circular spectrum. This self-
conscious celebration of circularity is crucial: a linear format validates a 
‘beginning’ and an ‘end’ between two points, while such specific demarcations 
are not possible in the circular model. In this way, every end is a beginning. It is 
this model that brings forth the random, arbitrary, and transformative mode of 
Romantic irony. 
In the present chapter, I will look into the mirroring of this play of 
Romantic irony in the Romantic theorisation of Shakespeare, the principal model 
and example for Friedrich Schlegel and his brother August Wilhelm Schlegel, 
fellow Romantic and most influential champion of Shakespearean drama. By 
exploring the Schlegels’ far-reaching Shakespearean criticism in the critical 
theory of William Hazlitt, as well as its positioning against neoclassical 
interpretations of drama, we can interrogate the extent to which the Romantic 
translations of Shakespeare create the conditions of the modern grotesque. During 
the course of this chapter, I will claim that the Romantic recreation of 
Shakespeare coincides with the birth of this new grotesque, thereby becoming 
intimately and inextricably linked to it. This Romantic grotesque—which can also 
be referred to as the Shakespearean grotesque—develops from the foundational 
play of Schlegel’s Romantic irony. This hermeneutic paradigm accentuates the 
link between ironic play and a theatre of the grotesque, with the ‘Romantic 
Shakespeare’ as its primary prophet. Finally, this chapter will also emphasise the 
importance of foreign interpretations of Shakespeare in the developing arc of 
European Romanticism, leading us towards the political reconstruction of the 
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Shakespearean grotesque in France, which we shall examine in the next chapter of 
this thesis.  
  
II—Shakespearean drama as Romantic Irony 
In order to review the principle themes of the last chapter, as well as to 
push us towards an exploration of the literary embodiment of the play of irony,  I 
would like to examine an intriguing passage in Frederick C. Beiser’s The 
Romantic Imperative (2003), one of the few recent book-length studies of early 
German Romanticism. Here Beiser outlines his take on the aesthetic theory of 
Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis in its definition of ‘romantic poetry’ as an all-
encompassing worldview, which is fundamentally aesthetic: 
First, it [romantic poetry] refers to not only literature, but also the arts and 
sciences; there is indeed no reason to limit its meaning to literary works, 
since it also applies to sculpture, music, and painting. Second, it designates 
not only the arts and sciences but also human beings, nature, and the state. 
The aim of the early romantic aesthetic was indeed to romanticize the 
world itself, so that human beings, society, and the state could become 
works of art as well.
5
 
 
By emphasising the desire to ‘romanticize the world itself’, Beiser highlights the 
unbridled ambition of the Romantics. The concept of ‘romantic poetry’—and its 
active methodology of a becoming ironic awareness—could well just as easily be 
the concept of ‘romantic art’. Indeed, the aesthetics of Romantic irony and its 
defined model, the mixed-genre artwork that was often linked to the development 
of the modern novel, could apply to all the art-forms. Significantly, what I 
referred to as the process of Romantic irony in the last chapter—a process that is 
simultaneously infinite while longing for totality and completion—extends to 
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include the mixing of all forms of empirical, rational, and aesthetically determined 
human knowledge. Crucially, philosophy becomes poetic, and poetry becomes 
philosophical. For Schlegel, Romantic poetry functions as a metonym for all 
forms of intellectual and aesthetic endeavour. Furthermore, human inter-
subjectivity and political frameworks must also be regarded as functioning on 
aesthetic premises.  As Beiser also points out, the concept of Romanticism begins 
to operate as an umbrella for the world itself: ‘human beings, nature, and the 
state’. ‘Romantic poetry’ then, and its manifestation as irony, becomes an 
ontological concept, a philosophic tool with which to comprehend nature, as well 
as a political project of amelioration. As Beiser also says: ‘Irony consists in the 
recognition that, even though we cannot attain the truth, we still must forever 
strive toward it, because only then do we approach it’ (129). Truth and 
epistemological certainty are necessary fictions that can, and should, be aimed for. 
This striving towards, the multiple movements of a ‘progressive, universal 
poetry’, encapsulates the Romantic ideal of improvement and empowerment, the 
bettering of humankind. Nothing is fixed. Everything is shifting and plural in the 
reflection model of Romantic poetry.  
For Beiser however, aesthetics finally must subsume itself in politics, 
thereby allowing Romantic poetry to operate as a fundamentally political project: 
The ethical and the political have primacy over the literary and critical in 
the sense that the romantic devotion to aesthetics was ultimately guided by 
their ethical and political ideals. These ideals were the ends for the sake of 
which they undertook their literary and critical work. If this is the case, 
then we must abandon, once and for all, one of the most common myths 
about romanticism: that it was essentially apolitical, an attempt to flee 
from social and political reality into the world of the literary imagination. 
Rather than escaping moral and political issues for the sake of literature 
and criticism, the romantics subordinated their literature and criticism to 
their ethical and political ideals. (24) 
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My argument with the above passage concerns the notion of ‘primacy’ of one 
category over another, in this instance the political over the aesthetic. Similarly, 
the supposed subordination of literature/aesthetics to the ethical/political is itself 
problematic. Through my investigation of the dramatic and performative 
implications of Romantic irony, centring on the idea of play (spiel), such 
distinctions are not sacrosanct. Instead, the reciprocity of relations grounded in the 
back and forth movement of dialectical interplay asserts itself. Aesthetics and 
politics are necessary images of each other, functioning together. Separation is 
anathema.  
For Friedrich Schlegel, the ‘permanent parabasis’ that he extricates from 
the methodology of Greek drama, forms itself into the condition of Romantic 
irony. To recap, this parabasis constitutes the following:  in the midst of the 
denouement of a particular dramatic plot, the playwright suddenly disrupts her 
own creation with a highly self-referential commentary on the action of the drama 
itself. This intervention inherently dismantles the setting up of systems, world-
views, individual perspectives in favour of an aesthetic self-reflexivity that 
challenges fixed positions. Or as Paul Hamilton, in his study of the philosophy-as-
drama paradigm in post-Kantian theory, says: ‘In Schlegel’s writing, the Chorus 
stands for this taking up of the position of philosophy onto the stage in order to 
diversify dramatically its perspectives upon the truth’.
6
 This idea of diversification 
connects with the multiplicity that theatrical production revolves around. To 
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double back on Beiser, plurality in aesthetic representation—engendered 
dramatically by parabasis—mirrors the diversity of available political viewpoints. 
The play-within-a-play in Hamlet is a more modern dramatic equivalent of 
Schlegel’s parabasis. Or, take the scene in The Tempest where Prospero, after 
having created the great pageantry of masques to celebrate the betrothal of 
Ferdinand to Miranda, suddenly interrupts his own creation only to comment on 
the insubstantiality of theatricality, and by implication, life itself. Let us briefly 
read this scene as the prime Shakespearean example of Schlegelian parabasis. 
In Act IV, scene one of The Tempest, Prospero (with the help of Ariel) 
creates a curiously pagan performance for the eyes of Ferdinand and Miranda so 
as to celebrate their wedding and what the man with the magic wand refers to as 
the ‘vanity of mine art’ (Norton 2
nd
 Ed, 4. 1. 41, italics mine, p. 3103). The lovers, 
Prospero himself, and the audience enjoy moments of metatheatricality, as Ceres, 
Juno, and the nymphs sing and perform for their unique audience(s). This 
performance makes complex use of spectacle, music, action, and language, as the 
scene presents us with an intricate triangular relationship between 
audience/reader, the principal actors of the play, and the actors impersonating the 
Roman goddesses of ‘a most majestic vision’. It is this vision that lulls Ferdinand 
into a poppy-like trance where, as when watching a convincing performance on 
the stage, the barriers between subject and object are questioned through the trope 
of identification with what one sees—Ferdinand becomes the consummate, even 
ideal, audience member who loses his sense of self while being absorbed by the 
mimetic illusions of the stage. 
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However, at the climax of this self-conscious representation of the 
theatrical trance, we have a rather random and unsettling moment of dramatic 
interruption as the stage directions say: ‘Enter certain Reapers, properly habited; 
they join with the nymphs in a graceful dance; towards the end whereof Prospero 
starts suddenly, and speaks; after which, to a strange, hollow, and confused noise, 
they heavily vanish.’ The abruptness of this transition as dramatic action brings 
forth the cultivated ‘trickery’ of stagecraft: Shakespeare’s drama involves mimetic 
activity, the actors who play the parts indulge in their own personal ‘trickery’ 
while playing them, the masque in this scene is another mimetic act, and 
Prospero’s interruption reflects on the mimetic construction of theatrical illusion. 
In many ways, this scene parodies our own willing suspension of disbelief when 
watching a play. It borders on self-parody. Of course, the famous lines that 
follow, addressed to a bemused Ferdinand (and presumably to an equally bemused 
audience/reader) endeavour to make a philosophy out of self-conscious artifice: 
And, like the baseless fabric of this vision, 
The cloud-capp’d towers, the gorgeous palace, 
The solemn temples, the great globe itself, 
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve, 
            And like this insubstantial pageant faded, 
Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff 
As dreams are made on; and our little life 
Is rounded with a sleep. (Norton 2
nd
 Ed, IV. 1, 151-158, p. 3104) 
 
The passage stresses hollowness in the act of dramatic representation, and 
juxtaposed with words like ‘dissolve’ and ‘faded’, seems to conjoin the theatre 
with the inherent temporality of life, as well as with the ontological state of 
change. Yet, similar to Jacques’s musings in As You Like It or Macbeth’s reaction 
to his wife’s death, these lines indicate that the visions and dreams presented on 
the stage reflect what it means to be human. In other words, theatricality is not 
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just baseless imitation as Plato would have it, but points us to the mimetic reality 
of lived experience. In a manner that jolts the audience out of its poppy-dreams 
and makes it confront its values on art and life, the layered tapestry of this scene 
prefigures Romantic musings on the interconnectivity of art and life, art and 
nature, as epistemological concepts.  
 The dramatic fluidity of the scene constitutes its becoming as the play of 
irony. Given the circularity of irony, this is a fundamentally Schegelian drama. 
More appropriately, Prospero’s interruption connects with the ontological 
resonance of dramatic parabasis. Prospero essentially intervenes to disrupt his 
own creation. The fact that he is a character in Shakespeare’s play performing a 
parabasis further deconstructs, and multiplies, our understanding of theatrical 
practice and philosophic reflections on that practice.  
Here, disruption signals uncertainty of interpretation, because categories 
and genres and audience expectations start to melt into each other to the point 
where they operate as reflections in Schlegel’s endless series of mirrors. The 
art/life interaction in Prospero’s world cannot be fixed. Instead, both perhaps 
function as shadows of each other. In a similar vein, returning to Beiser, the 
question as to whether politics has been aestheticised or whether Romantic art is 
necessarily subordinate to Romantic politics annihilates itself. Duality—based on 
a strict subject/object epistemological divide— is negated in what Walter 
Benjamin, in his study of Schlegel, calls the ‘romantic theory of object-
knowledge’.
7
 Consequently, whether it is in the Socratic dialogue or the 
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Shakespearean play or the modern novel—for Schlegel, three specific and 
repeated examples of Romantic irony—knowledge is not grounded in a pre-
established rationalistic philosophic system, but characterises itself through 
movement and sudden change. Chance, coincidence, paradox, and chaos become 
the catchwords of romantic aesthetics. Certainty is a remembrance of things past. 
As Beiser affirms succinctly: ‘Schlegel’s romanticism was the aesthetics of anti-
foundationalism’ (108).  
The theatre, being in many ways the most interactive of the arts, 
corroborates this lack of foundation: there is no single truth, but a multiplicity of 
viewpoints that may be equally valid. In a play, theatrical conflict develops 
through interaction. In its most basic state, drama involves a protagonist and an 
antagonist. The conflict between the two defines drama. However, this interaction 
manifests itself in many forms. The actors and director interact with the text; the 
actors interact with each other; the performers interact with a live audience.  
Furthermore, each and every audience member has her own singular perspective 
on what she is watching depending on which particular angle of vision she is 
watching it from. Finally, these multiple perspectives only come into being 
through their inter-connectivity. The coalescing of this multiplicity on the stage 
contributes to the vitally unpredictable, malleable, and incessantly self-renewing 
power of theatricality. In the theoretician Alan Read’s terminology, it is this 
unpredictable nature of the stage, along with the fact that it is not obviously and 
mechanically reproducible in the age of digital and globalised reproduction that 
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knows’ (146). See Chapter I for my analysis of this essay. 
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creates the unique and uncertain ‘aura’ of the theatre.
8
 Or, in what is Read’s 
dramatic juxtaposition to the Romantic theory of object-knowledge, ‘the thinking 
being is no longer pre-emptive of existence, I think therefore I am, but rather I 
think of you therefore I might be’ (94). The primacy of the Cartesian subject 
splinters into the privileging of interrelation. Subjects exist because of their 
relation to other subjects. In this way, theatricality fundamentally emphasises that 
we are all multiple, because of our relation to other beings. 
It is imperative here to remind ourselves that Romantic irony for Friedrich 
Schlegel and the Romantic ironists conducts itself on both a micro and a 
macrocosmic level. Within a literary context, Romantic poetry destabilises binary 
opposites: genres like ‘tragedy’ and ‘comedy’—the prized distinction of French 
neoclassical theatre—are no longer separate, but start to bleed into each other, 
giving birth to the particularly modern (and postmodern) anti-genre—the 
tragicomedy. Or staying with Shakespeare, the late romances like The Tempest 
(the connection to the word ‘romantic’ is profound) are just that because they do 
not fit neatly into conventional categorisations. The tragic and the comic interact 
perennially, rather than being separate, fixed genres. Schlegel seems to be saying 
much about this in fragment sixty of the ‘Critical Fragments’: ‘All the classical 
poetical genres have now become ridiculous in their rigid purity’ (Firchow, 150). 
 On another level, Romantic poetry starts to emerge as ontology. Or in 
other words, the mixed-genre artwork (Mischgedicht) that best represents the ideal 
of Romantic poetry splits into multiple reflections. The inherent theatricality of 
Romantic irony mirrors an ontological principle. If Shakespeare is the centre of 
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Romantic art, this becomes another way of saying that his plays most closely 
present to readers and audiences not only the inner-workings of human character 
in its endless variety, but allow us to also apprehend the functioning of that vitally 
Romantic concept: nature. To put it simply: if you want to understand how the 
world works, read Shakespeare.  
 In his most detailed fragment on Shakespeare, Schlegel tells us that: 
 In the nobler and more original sense of the word correct—meaning a 
conscious main and subordinate development of the inmost and most 
minute aspects of a work in line with the spirit of the whole—there 
probably is no modern poet more correct that Shakespeare. Similarly, he is 
systematic as no other poet is: sometimes because of those antitheses that 
bring into picturesuqe contrast individuals, masses, even worlds; 
sometimes through musical symmetry on the same great scale, through 
gigantic repetitions and refrains; often by a parody of the letter and an 
irony on the spirit of romantic drama; and always through the most 
sublime and complete individuality and the most variegated portrayal of 
that individuality, uniting all degrees of poetry, from the most carnal 
imitation to the most spiritual characterization. (Firchow, 198) 
 
Writing some eleven years before his brother’s monumental lectures on drama 
and Shakespeare in Vienna, Friedrich Schlegel here sketches the main themes of 
the Romantic recreation of Shakespeare that would so profoundly influence 
nineteenth-century aesthetics. By defining ‘correctness’ in Shakespeare, Schlegel 
sets the tone for the ‘organic’ concept of literature that would be passed on to A. 
W. Schlegel and Coleridge.
9
 The development of the ‘most minute aspects of a 
work’ harmonises with the larger framework of the drama: the play grows from its 
interior mechanism and is in reciprocity with the minutiae of its constituent parts. 
For Schlegel then, ‘In poetry too every whole can be a part and every part really a 
                                                          
9
 See Charles I. Armstrong’s Romantic Organicism: From Idealist origins to Ambivalent Afterlife 
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003) for the most detailed account of the notion of organicism 
in Romantic theory, from Kant’s third Critique and Fichte’s Wissenschafteslehre to Schlegel’s 
paradoxical and violent opening up of the organic paradigm.    
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whole’, and Shakespeare fulfils this paradigm. Beiser’s definition of the organic 
concept of nature that mirrors itself and is in turn mirrored by the organic concept 
of art also reflects this: ‘The organic concept means that nature as a whole is one 
vast natural purpose, each of whose parts are also such purposes, so that nature is 
an organism of organisms’ (138). Fundamentally then, the art/nature binary also 
drops away, and the artwork is both a product of nature, while also being a force 
that shapes the very nature it is a part of. In this way, Shakespearean drama is a 
model for this organic concept of the tracing of art in nature, and of nature in art. 
 
As is symptomatic of a typical Schlegelian fragment, the remainder of his 
commentary on Shakespeare develops organically through a series of oppositions. 
The idea of ‘correctness’ continues in his affirmation that Shakespeare is the most 
systemic of writers. Yet, rather paradoxically, this systemic nature of the English 
playwright moulds itself through antitheses (the province of dialectical interplay) 
and contrast. System then develops through the oppositional play of many mini-
systems. Interestingly, contrast is the prism through which Victor Hugo would 
come to see the Shakespearean grotesque in Préface de Cromwell a few decades 
later. For Schlegel, musical symmetry and repetition (though in a manner 
prefiguring Deleuze, this is a dramatic repetition of difference in the 
Shakespearean mosaic) are opposed to parody and irony. Similarly, 
individuality—another Romantic trope that reappears in Hazlitt’s Shakespeare—
gets emphasised by the varied presentation of individuality. Finally, in a prelude 
to the grotesque, Shakespeare’s plays mark the unification of the carnal and 
bodily with spiritual apotheosis. 
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This paradigmatic connection of the bodily and the spiritual in Romantic 
readings of Shakespeare is of vital interest to me in this chapter and thesis. 
Furthermore, Romantic irony—given its theatrics of play and shape-shifting—
locates itself as a starting point for, and a reflection of, a theatre of the grotesque. 
It is not accidental that Mikhail Bakhtin, in his hugely influential study of the 
grotesque in Rabelais and His World (1965) refers to Friedrich Schlegel (along 
with his contemporary at Weimar, Jean-Paul) as the primary theorist of the 
modern grotesque where the medieval carnival of ‘copulation, pregnancy, birth, 
growth, old age, disintegration, dismemberment’
10
 gives way to Romantic irony. 
Bakthin also illuminates how in the ‘Discourse on Poetry’ Schlegel calls the 
grotesque the ‘natural form of poetry’, linking it with his personal champions of 
Romantic literature, Shakespeare and Cervantes: plenipotentiaries of the modern 
theatre and the modern novel (41).  
In the introductory chapter, I outlined the origins of the grotesque in the 
unique hybrid images found in the baths of Titus and Nero outside Rome in the 
fifteenth century. The fantastical combination of human, animal, and vegetable 
forms of these grottesca underscores their opposition to the sculpted phenomena 
of classical aesthetics. Essentially, these grottesca violate notions of aesthetic 
separation and proportion, embodying instead visions of the world that are 
fragmentary, mixed, and implicitly shocking. The grotesque mirrors the 
dynamically dramatic state of phenomena, where things are in perpetual motion. 
Furthermore, these ‘abnormal specimens’ position themselves between Bakhtin’s 
carnival and the dark estrangement of Wolfgang Kaiser’s interpretation of the 
                                                          
10
 Michael Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. Hélène Iswolsky (USA: Midland Books, 
1984). p. 25. All future references will be cited in the text. 
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demonic aspects of the grotesque vision.
11
 Given this framework, one may ask 
what Friedrich Schlegel’s take on the grotesque might be. Is it synonymous with 
the play of irony? Is it interchangeable with the plurality of ironic consciousness? 
Or rather, is it the aesthetic corollary of Romantic irony? In the Athenäeum 
Fragments, Schlegel approaches and defines the grotesque on a few occasions, in 
each case returning to the idea of playful transformation that characterises his 
method of fragmentary exposition. In fragment 305, he goes on to say that ‘the 
grotesque plays with the wonderful permutations of form and matter, loves the 
illusion of the random and the strange and, as it were, coquettes with infinite 
arbitrariness’ (Firchow, 205-06). The accent falls on the play of form and matter, 
strangeness of appearance in form, as well as a certain celebration of the random. 
This ‘infinite arbitrariness’ comprises the hallmark of the grotesque, and this can 
also be looked at as a functioning example of the constant and whimsical ‘self-
parody’ of permanent parabasis, the prime condition of Romantic irony. The 
connection between the grotesque and the play of performance becomes acute.
12
 
The grotesque and theatricality are inextricably linked. 
                                                          
11
 See Wolfgang Kayser, The Grotesque in Art and Literature, trans. Ulrich Weisstein (Gloucester, 
Mass : P. Smith, 1968) for an account of the more disturbing, demonic, and absurd elements of the 
grotesque in art. See also Geoffrey Galt Harpham, On the Grotesque: Strategies of Contradiction 
in Art and Literature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982) for an excellent outline of 
the grotesque and its problems. See my introduction for an analysis of these perspectives on the 
grotesque. 
12
 See Ralph E. Remshardt recent Staging the Savage God: The Grotesque in Performance 
(Southern Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 2004), which is a bracing exploration into 
the relationship of the grotesque to performance. Commencing with Jarry’s Ubu Roi, Remshardt 
extends the concept of performance by saying that ‘every performance is a kind of grotesque, 
every grotesque is a kind of performance. The Savage God of the grotesque, Dionysus’s progeny, 
is found somewhere in every act of performance. Such a notion extends the notion of 
“performance” beyond what some may find tolerable, encompassing not only dramatic 
performance (with which I am mainly concerned) but also the performance of carnival and 
monstrosity, the linguistic performance of metaphor and related tropes, performance art, and so 
on’ (2). 
 
 117 
In fragment 389, Schlegel also relates the grotesque to systems of 
philosophy and poetry, both of which as we have already established, are 
essentially mirror images of each other in Schlegel’s system of fragments: 
If every purely arbitrary or purely random connection of form and matter 
is grotesque, then philosophy has its grotesques as well as poetry; only it 
knows less about them and had not yet been able to find the key to its own 
esoteric history. There are works of philosophy that are a tissue of moral 
discords from which one could learn disorganization, or in which 
confusion is properly constructed and symmetrical. Many a philosophical 
quasi chaos of this kind has had stability enough to outlast a Gothic 
church. (Firchow, 225)  
 
There is something very interesting going on here. On one hand, Schlegel 
reiterates the grotesque as a mode that is marked by the arbitrary, the random, and 
the sudden. Form and content are not necessarily harmonised in the manner 
similar to the ideal of perfection in Hellenic sculpture, for example. Instead, it is 
the misapplication of matter to form (and vice versa), embodied by Gothic griffins 
or the mixed and fluid forms of Ovidian personae, that constitute the grotesque. 
Disorganisation of aesthetic representation, or conversely the paradoxical 
construction of confusion that Schlegel hints at, outlines the domain of the playful 
grotesque. Also, poetry’s relation to grotesque grimaces and caricatures 
foregrounds its own self-conscious relation to the theatricality inherent in the 
poses of poetic practice.  
Importantly, it is philosophy that knows less about the history of the 
grotesque in its own schema (represented by ‘moral discords’) than poetry, which 
by its nature of being governed by a limitless, free-flowing, hovering imagination, 
knows no fixed boundaries. If philosophy limits, or effaces, the history of its 
relation to a grotesque problematising of its precepts, it is only due to its striving 
after a singularity of system. Randomness destabilises moral certainty, the 
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province of pre-Romantic rationalism that built its systems on the foundations of 
questionable first principles. Furthermore, philosophy has ‘not yet been able to 
find the key to its own esoteric history’ because it does not self-consciously 
reflect on the probability that its systems are momentary manifestations of a 
theatrical play that essentially exceeds them. Perhaps, there is not enough of a 
philosophical parabasis in the systems of philosophy. The very first of the 
Athenäeum Fragments connects to, and reflects this: ‘Nothing is more rarely the 
subject of philosophy than philosophy itself’ (Firchow, 161). Here Schlegel seems 
to be saying that philosophy has not been self-reflexive enough, not 
metaphilosophical enough. At the same time, the positioning of this fragment as 
the launch pad of the Athenäeum collection indicates that his own fragmentary 
musings aesthetically fill in the gaps of a newly burgeoning self-consciousness in 
philosophy that commenced with Kant. 
 Returning to fragment 389, Schlegel provides an interesting aside to the 
tradition of English criticism, saying that ‘it consists of nothing but applying the 
philosophy of common sense (which is itself only a permutation of the natural and 
scholastic philosophies) to poetry without any understanding for poetry’ (Firchow, 
226). By implication, ‘the philosophy of common sense’ and poetry have little to 
do with each other. Rather, common sense should be at loggerheads with poetry in 
its Romantic incarnation. And in what might be termed a blow to the tradition of 
common sense classicism in English literature, the German ironist concludes that 
in critics like Dr. Johnson, ‘there isn’t even the faintest trace of a feeling for 
poetry’ (226). The reference to Dr. Johnson—who famously could not endure the 
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death of Cordelia in King Lear—is crucial for our purposes.
13
 It is the same Dr. 
Johnson who also despised the blinding of Gloucester on stage in the same play, 
terming it ‘an act too horrid to be endured in dramatic exhibition’ (Dukore, 417). 
Conversely for our purposes, this very act is one of the most daring and grotesque 
performed in the theatre by which Shakespeare inverts the Greek mechanism 
where acts of violence were purposely kept offstage and merely reported. In 
keeping with a neoclassical conservatism of taste, Dr. Johnson also endorsed and 
supported Nahum Tate’s version of the play in which Cordelia is married off to 
Edgar and Lear restored to his kingship. A classic tale of editorial censorship.
14
 
King Lear then, the ‘black theatre of romanticism’,
15
 would not be performed in 
its fragmented and grotesque glory until the mid-nineteenth century. 
Consequently, given this cultural and historical background, the critic ‘Johnson’ 
in Schlegel’s fragment is the personification of organised common sense over the 
play of grotesque irony. For Schlegel, he comes to represent sense over 
sensibility. Or as he says in a fragment that is inimitably sharp, terse, and a direct 
counterpoint to a Johnsonian view of the theatre: ‘Good drama must be drastic’ 
(Firchow, 166). Shakespeare’s more extreme dramatic choices—the 
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 See Samuel Johnson’s famous 1765 Preface to the Complete Works of Shakespeare printed in 
Dramatic Theory and Criticism—Greeks to Grotowski, ed. Bernard F. Dukore (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, inc., 1974), pp. 405-17 and ‘General Observations on King Lear’ in the 
same book, pp. 417-418. Of Cordelia’s death, Dr. Johnson says: ‘And, if my sensations could add 
anything to general suffrage, I might relate, I was many years so shocked by Cordelia’s death, that 
I know not whether I endured to read again the last scenes of the play till I undertook to revise 
them as an editor’ (Dukore, 418).  
14
 See Nahum Tate’s The History of King Lear: Acted at the Queen’s Theatre, Revised with 
alterations (London: Printed for Richard Wellington, 1712). This version of Shakespeare’s 
bleakest work was performed throughout the eighteenth century. Whether it is Dr. Johnson or 
Nahum Tate, it seems that editing the more gruesome, irrational, and rather grotesque elements of 
the play represented the norm. 
15
 See Jan Kott’s extremely influential essay, ‘King Lear, or Endgame’ in his groundbreaking 
Shakespeare our Contemporary, trans. Boleslaw Taborski (Great Britain: University Paperbacks, 
1967), p. 101. 
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aforementioned blinding of Gloucester, the headless corpse in Cymbeline, the 
infamous statue scene in The Winter’s Tale, Prospero’s self-reflective parabasis in 
The Tempest—are examples of this Schlegelian maxim. If according to Alan 
Read, ‘Theatre is worthwhile because it is antagonistic to official views of reality’ 
(1), then it may even be surmised that Dr. Johnson misunderstood the more 
innovative moments in dramatic presentation, which are defined by subversion, 
intervention, disruption. In this manner, the great eighteenth-century English critic 
continues the Platonic tradition of fearing and excluding subversive drama and 
theatricality from a common-sense republic. It is an interesting coincidence that 
post-civil war (or post-Elizabethan or post-Shakespearean) England did know the 
closing of the theatres (1642) and the shutting down of the Globe (1644). 
 In The Romantics on Shakespeare (1992), Jonathan Bate asserts that ‘A. 
W. Schlegel, Coleridge and Hazlitt all set up their own critical practice in 
conscious opposition to Johnson’s’, and elsewhere he unequivocally states that 
‘The rise of Romanticism and the growth of Shakespeare idolatory are parallel 
phenomena’.
16
 While the implications of the last statement may border on 
hyperbole, it nevertheless functions as a driving force in my exploration of the 
Romantic recreation of the Shakespearean grotesque. The reason that the Schlegel 
brothers in Germany, and through them the likes of Hazlitt and Hugo, start to 
theorise him as a model for a new form of literature specific to the nineteenth-
century, is the freedom he provides from the rules of French neoclassical drama 
                                                          
16
 See The Romantics on Shakespeare (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 4, Shakespeare and the English 
Romantic Imagination (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 6, and Shakespearean Constitutions—
Politics, Theatre, Criticism 1730-1830 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). These three texts, which 
should be looked at as companion pieces, provide an excellent overview of the reinterpretation of 
Shakespeare during Romanticism. Bate’s work is also significant since he acknowledges and 
explores the significance of German literary theory on the likes of Coleridge and Hazlitt. 
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and theory.
17
 Shakespeare, the genius of nature, gives the rule to nature itself. His 
work, in its mixing of comic and tragic forms, its celebration of fantasy and play, 
its mingling (and creation) of multiple forms of speech, its representation of a 
myriad characters each with their own highly developed sense of subjectivity, 
symbolises the larger themes of Romantic discourse. His plays constitute the 
grotesque through the aesthetics of hybridity and change. In the following section 
of this chapter, I will further explore how these authors of Romanticism theorise 
Shakespeare in ‘conscious opposition’ to neoclassical principles of beinséance 
and vraisemblance. This opposition often took an equally political and aesthetic 
mask in the age of republican revolutions at home and imperial empires abroad. 
This was the period when the French Revolution itself was described by Friedrich 
Schlegel as the most ‘frightful grotesque of the age’ and as a ‘tragicomedy’ 
(Firchow, 233). The Revolution becomes a hybrid form, merging the traditional 
modes of ‘tragedy’ and ‘comedy’. Significantly, Schlegel chooses to frame 
political upheaval within aesthetic discourse. Politics becomes an aesthetic 
happening in a manner that foreshadows the cataclysms of French Romanticism. 
In Chapter III, the guillotine sanctions the grotesque in life and art. Elsewhere, 
Madame de Stael eloquently says that ‘In England, all classes are equally attracted 
by the pieces of Shakespeare. Our finest tragedies, in France, do not interest the 
people’ (Bate, 82). The province of the Shakespearean grotesque emblematises 
                                                          
17
 See Erich Auerbach’s essay ‘La Cour et La Ville’ in Scenes From the Drama of European 
Literature (USA: Meridian Books, 1959) for an historical account of French classical theatre and 
its principles that so influenced European aesthetics until Romanticism. See also Thoman G. 
Sauer’s A. W. Schlegel’s Shakespearean Criticism in England (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert 
Grundmann, 1981) for an excellent study of the aesthetic and political significance of the 
Romantic Shakespeare in opposition to French neo-classicism. See also Barry V. Daniels’s 
Revolution in the Theatre: French Romantic Theories of Drama (London: Greenwood Press, 
1983) and W. D. Howarth’s essay on French romantic drama in The French Romantic Movement, 
Vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) for elaborations on neoclassical theory.  
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revolt in its essential theatricality, the original postmodern mixing of high and low 
culture, of the carnality of the body and the ethereal imaginings of the mind. 
Furthermore, it reflects accurately a world damaged by the Terror.  
However, in keeping the frame of irony in view, it must be remembered 
that while Shakespeare’s theatricality becomes a model for reverent and irreverent 
interpretation/translation in Europe (and elsewhere to this very day), his textuality 
in the English language becomes a codeword for high culture. Hazlitt, Lamb, 
Coleridge all had their problems with Shakespeare on the stage.
18
 
Younglim Han, in Romantic Shakespeare (2001) focuses on the anti-
theatrical prejudice on part of the English Romantics: 
The Romantics’ antipathy to performance originates in the premise that 
Shakespeare’s texts have intrinsic meanings, that is, his authorial 
intentions, which can be discovered and restored only in an ideal 
performance. Their antitheatricalism grows out of their awareness of the 
gap between actual and ideal performance: between the physical theater 
and the theater of the mind. (16-17) 
  
This obsession with ‘intrinsic meanings’ and the intentional fallacy that Han 
observes in the writings of Hazlitt, Lamb, and Coleridge, seem to split 
‘Shakespeare’ into irreconcilable divisions. The ‘ideal performance’ demanded of 
Shakespeare on the stage misses the point, grossly falsifying the purposes of 
stagecraft. The stage is different every night. There can be no ‘ideal performance’. 
As Hazlitt surmises in his acutely insightful essay, ‘On Actors and Acting’: ‘The 
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 For the most sustained interrogations of the differences in Shakespeare on the page and in 
performance, see Martin Buzacott’s The Death of the Actor: Shakespeare on Page and Stage 
(London: Routledge, 1991), particularly his analysis of the historical dispute between ‘close-
readers’—Lamb, Hazlitt, Hunt, Coleridge, Bradley—and the more contemporary ‘theatrical 
champions’ like John Russel Brown and John Barish. See also Younglim Han’s introduction to her 
recent Romantic Shakespeare: From Stage to Page (London: associated University Presses, 2001) 
for an effective illustration of the ‘anti-theatrical prejudice’ of Lamb, Hazlitt, and Coleridge.  
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stage is always beginning anew’.
19
 In Han’s interpretation, perhaps this statement 
signifies negativity associated with the stage. For our exploration, the multiple 
transmigration of Shakespearean themes on stage, comprises the very ‘essence’ of 
the theatre and Shakespearean dramaturgy. In the theatre there can be no ‘ideal’, 
and it is often the engendering of ‘mistakes’ on particular performance nights that 
paradoxically contributes to the gusto that animates dramatic performance. 
Similarly the dramatic ‘text’ is pragmatic and dependent on individualist 
interpretations. It exemplifies a perpetual occasionality that disrupts pretentions 
towards any authoritative essentialism of the ‘text’. 
 In another specific elucidation of English Romanticism’s discontent with 
theatricality, and its resultant elitism, Han says: 
The Romantic notion of Shakespeare’s authorship is an account of the 
primary status of his text: his rich linguistic texture is crafted out of 
imaginative words whose meanings cannot be realized by stylized acting 
nor by scenic splendor. The Romantics contend that the complexity and 
artistry of Shakespeare’s texts are accessible only through imaginative 
reading, because the actor tends to degrade their literary and dramatic 
values for the sake of momentary theatrical effect. The Romantic bias 
against performance intends to establish Shakespeare’s works as literary 
artifacts whose inherent meanings should not be distorted by spectacular 
delights, inevitably discounting theatrical criteria for its own purposes. 
(24-25) 
 
The ‘bias against performance’ and the actor sets a precedent, while the making of 
the Shakespearean text into an artefact, a holy relic, negates the factuality of the 
plays as theatrical notebooks composed of beautiful English poetry (and prose). 
Similarly, the search for authorial intentions, or the ‘correct’ manuscript of a 
particular play, has continued into our own day, often manifesting itself in endless 
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 William Hazlitt, ‘On Actors and Acting’ from The Round Table, printed in Selected Writings of 
William Hazlitt, Vol. 2, ed. Duncan Wu (London: Pickering and Chatto, 1998), pp. 151-154 (p. 
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editions of the Complete Works. The very idea of any Shakespearean work being 
‘complete’ revolts against theatre practice. Jonathan Bate, in Shakespearean 
Constitutions—Politics, Theatre, Criticism 1730-1830 (1989), summarises the 
complex relationship between this longing for the ideal Shakespearean text and 
the reality of the playhouse revision of these texts:  
Each revision is a preparation for performance of a script that is only 
completed in performance; there is no such thing as a unitary ‘ideal’ text 
because in freeing a play from playhouse ‘contamination’ one is 
destroying its peculiar identity as a play, for a play unless it folds after one 
night and is never revived, is intrinsically multiple and constantly open to 
revision and re-creation. (207) 
 
Bate here successfully acknowledges theatricality as an open concept that shifts 
the boundaries of Shakespearean hermeneutics. What he perhaps does not do is 
follow the implications of this theatricality as a politics of subversion. Indeed, he 
ends his book by, on one hand, acknowledging that Shakespeare ‘does not exist in 
an Authorised version’, while simultaneously appropriating him into the history of 
an exclusively English political paradigm by which he conflates Shakespeare with 
the English Constitution (213). While it could be said that comparing Shakespeare 
to the English constitution vindicates itself on the fact that the latter is intrinsically 
uncodified (and thereby symbolic of the multiplicity of Shakespearean 
dramaturgy), it nevertheless salutes the desire to keep Shakespeare tied to the soil.  
Instead, this study focuses on reconstructing the vitalism of the Shakespearean 
grotesque as a theatrical force that is multiple and open to incessant renewal of 
perspective in a fashion that works beyond national boundaries. In this fashion, 
the dramatic openness of Shakespeare reaffirms the Schlegelian idea of plurality, 
which is based on the paradigm of drama.  
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Furthermore, Hazlitt, ‘the exemplary English Shakespearean critic’ (Bate, 
Shakespearean Constitutions, p. 7), is a more complicated figure of English 
Romanticism, given his championing of effective theatricality, particularly in his 
celebrations of Edmund Kean, the archetypal Romantic figure and Shakespearean 
actor. Furthermore, he openly acknowledges the influence of his German 
predecessor on Shakespeare, A. W. Schlegel. Nevertheless, this dramatic fissure 
between text and performance also lights upon the interesting separation of 
private interpretation (individual reading) with public interaction (collective 
theatre-going) that Han hits upon: 
The Romantics’ reservations about the stage brought privacy and 
individualism to the fore. They tried to keep Shakespeare’s characteristics 
in a world of self-communings in solitude rather than leave them on the 
scale of public opinion: the power of emotively structured speech and the 
processes of a character’s mind were of concern to them. Hamlet was a 
key figure in the Romantic emphasis on the individual personality. He was 
appropriated into an image based on the Romantic mind: outstanding in 
thinking yet ineffectual in action. (19) 
 
Drama is action and the representation of action. In its interconnectivity to the 
audience in a theatrical spectacle, the total theatre-going experience should 
constitute a total involvement with socio-political praxis. The self-imposed 
solitude of Hamlet (the character, not the play), the separation of how he thinks 
with how he (does not) act, his acutely sensitive intelligence, become from 
Wilhelm Meister onwards, the poses of the (post) Romantic poet. Paradoxically 
then, Shakespeare dramatically presents to us a character who in essence, is anti-
dramatic: too much thinking, not enough doing. Of rather, as in a Fichtean sense, 
Hamlet inaugurates the divided subjectivity where dramatic tension is internalised 
within an individual consciousness. The apotheosis of Hamlet the persona over 
and above Hamlet the play is crucial. Hamlet, the Romantic model for the poet-
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philosopher and individual genius, extricates himself in solitude from the larger 
collect/connect-ivity of which he has to be a part. Theatrically, Hamlet cannot and 
should not be made to exist in isolation. Within a Schlegelian frame, the comic 
gravediggers in the play—whom we shall return to in the next section of this 
chapter—are as important as the protagonist himself. Textualising Hamlet the 
character perhaps, limits him. Dramatising Hamlet the play in a collective, almost 
translingual, spectacle releases the endless possibilities of the work. 
In what follows, the exploration of this eternally malleable, often 
politically charged, and provocatively disruptive Shakespearean grotesque, will 
remind us of the theatricality of Shakespeare that became the clarion call for 
Romantic subversion in the nineteenth century. The tension between the ‘purity’ 
of Shakespearean verse and the fragmented anarchy of Shakespearean theatre 
becomes acute in the Romantic reconstruction of the bard, at ‘home’ and ‘abroad’, 
at home and in the theatre. Through my investigation, we can perhaps understand 
the need to keep Shakespeare contemporary (to rephrase the title of the 
groundbreaking book by Jan Kott), to allow what Kiernan Ryan calls ‘the 
systematic counter-interpretation and reappropriation of Shakespeare’s plays’.
20
  
It was this contemporising-through- reappropriation of the dramatist that began 
with the Schleglel brothers that confirms his grotesque malleability.  
Dennis Kennedy, in his remarkable book on non-English language 
treatments of Shakespeare, Foreign Shakespeare: Contemporary Performance 
(1992) reflects on the vitality of the Schlegelian revitalisation of the bard: 
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 Shakespeare (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), p.5. Ryan’s important text outlines the 
limitations of both the New-Historicist and post-structuralist approaches to Shakespeare, calling 
instead for a more dynamic, fluid re-reading of the plays ‘which bring the dimensions of past 
constraint and present-day viewpoint—the moment of production and the moment of reception— 
into dynamic reciprocity’ (14).   
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The first major example of finding that desire [for Shakespeare] outside of 
English occurred in German 200 years ago. The roughness and relatively 
sprawling nature of the plays, as well as their political stories, made them 
felicitous cultural material for an embryonic nationalist 
movement…Because Shakespeare was not French, and because his work 
violated neoclassic (i.e. aristocratic) principles, he became a rallying point 
for the new spirit of romantic democracy. It was, ironically, this very 
foreignness that made him useful as a model for the Germanic future: 
“unserShakespeare” was an outright appropriation, dependent upon the 
absence of an existing tradition. Shakespeare could be made to signify 
what no familiar literature could signify, and simultaneously serve to 
validate Schiller’s own dramaturgy.
21 
 
This is a dense passage that highlights some key themes in our own investigation. 
Shakespeare for the Germans (and by extension, the larger Romantic movements) 
positions himself as a counterpoint to neoclassical principles, which are 
fundamentally aristocratic and elitist, emblematic of conformity. What is also 
noticeable is that the English playwright, due to the vitality of his dramatic 
openness and plurality rather than the ‘beauty’ of his verse, contains the seeds for 
‘the new spirit of romantic democracy’. ‘UnserShakespeare’ (‘our Shakespeare’) 
constitutes the revisioning and seismic displacement of the playwright from his 
original culture to one that, due to a certain detachment, can harness the more 
latently subversive aspects of his plays. The trick then is not to simply recite 
Shakespeare in the glory of his original language but to be fundamentally 
Shakespearean. Kennedy’s text intimates that Shakespeare is vital because he is 
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plural, and his presence in languages other than English is often in 
contradistinction to the English take on him.  His ‘universal’ appeal then emerges 
from the dramatic mutability of interpretation that his numerous translators have 
celebrated in his work. In this fashion, the ‘foreign Shakespeare’ that commenced 
with Romanticism, becomes aesthetically and politically resonant, to a point 
where the separation of one aspect from another, aesthetico-political, is 
impossible. 
 
III—‘A Drunk Savage’: Neoclassical Shakespeare 
 To understand the importance of the Romantic Shakespeare, it is necessary 
to examine how crucially the Romantic theorisation(s) of him differed from 
earlier treatments. In his landmark review of A. W. Schlegel’s lectures on drama 
in the Edinburgh Review in February 1816, William Hazlitt adumbrates what may 
be referred to as the Romantic comprehension of Shakespeare: 
By an art like that of the ventriloquist, he throws his imagination out of 
himself, and makes every word appear to proceed from the mouth of the 
person in whose name it is spoken. His plays alone are expressions of the 
passions, not descriptions of them. His characters are real beings of flesh 
and blood: they speak like men, not like authors. One might suppose that 
he stood by at the time, and overheard all that passed.
22
  
 
Hazlitt may be in turn ventriloquising A. W. Schlegel here, but what is of 
importance is the association of Shakespeare with nature and what appears 
‘natural’, the primary Romantic theme. As we shall see in the next chapter, the 
concept of Shakespeare as an author representative of powerful natural forces 
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becomes crucial for Continental Romantic perspectives.  In Hazlitt’s 
hermeneutics, we are returned to the Keatsian ‘negative capability’ that served as 
a starting point for this thesis. Shakespeare transcends himself, becoming the 
character he creates. He expresses passion in much the way an actor does. His 
personages appear real and human, and not as the artificial products of a writer. 
Finally, Shakespeare becomes the silent listener to all that has passed in the lives 
of his myriad personae. Shakespeare is the most accurate reflection of natural 
principles. For Friedrich Schlegel, the choice between interpreting Shakespearean 
drama as ‘art or as nature’ is among the ‘simplest and most immediate questions’, 
which nevertheless requires ‘the deepest consideration and the most erudite 
history of art’ (Firchow, 158). In Romantic theory, the emphasis often falls on the 
natural elements of Shakespeare.   
This aesthetic concept of ‘Shakespeare’ as a Romantic writer, through 
which the mysterious workings of nature manifest themselves, while receiving 
widespread circulation in the early nineteenth century, nevertheless develops from 
a historical lineage of theorising Shakespeare where the nature/art binary is 
paramount. 
 Shakespeare’s role as the poet of ‘nature’ has a long and distinguished 
history, going as far back as Ben Jonson’s celebrated elegy in the First Folio 
edition of the complete works in 1623.
23
 It can be surmised that readers 
acquainted with this edition would have also been familiar to Jonson’s influential 
poem, which functions as textual commentary on Shakespeare’s oeuvre. The title 
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of the poem itself is worth quoting in its entirety: ‘To the memory of my beloved, 
The Author, Mr. William Shakespeare, and what he hath left us’. The genitive 
case of ‘my beloved’ says much about what Jonson is doing in the poem: by 
immortalising Shakespeare, he immortalises himself. Furthermore, the attempt to 
claim Shakespeare sets up a precedent, comprising the first commentary and 
reinterpretation of the bard. Secondly, it is emphasised that Shakespeare is ‘The 
Author’, in effect textualising him, shifting him from the floorboards of the stage.   
Throughout the poem, Jonson states that Shakespeare is beyond 
comparison. He ‘outshines’ his contemporaries—Lyly, Kyd, Marlowe—while 
being beyond the dramatists of Greece and Rome (14-27). Vitally, Shakespeare’s 
superiority goes hand in hand with a vital and emergent nationalism: 
 Triumph, my Britain; thou hast one to show 
 To whom all scenes of Europe homage owe.  
 He was not of an age, but for all time! 
 And all the muses still were in their prime 
 When like Apollo he came forth to warm 
 Our ears, or like a Mercury to charm. (28-33) 
 
Thus begins the trope of Shakespeare’s ‘universality’—he is of his time but 
somehow transcends it in an almost godlike manner. The comparisons to Apollo 
and Mercury corroborate this. The next two lines go on to elaborate this 
deification: ‘Nature herself was proud of his designs, / And joyed to wear the 
dressing of his lines’ (34-35). Shakespeare then has become the paradigm for 
nature, in many ways becoming the creator of nature in, and through, his verse. 
Consequently, Shakespeare does not just hold the mirror up to nature in his 
drama, but manages to establish a crucial reciprocity by which nature asserts itself 
through the dramatic action of his words and characters. In contrast, Aristophanes, 
Terence and Plautus seem dated since they ‘were not of Nature’s family’ (40). 
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Then, as a prolepsis to the nature/art dialectic that would dominate Romantic 
literature and theory, Jonson apostrophises to the dead poet in a manner that 
creates their mutual intimacy and interdependence: 
 Yet must I not give Nature all; thy Art, 
 My gentle Shakespeare, must enjoy a part. 
 For though the poet’s matter Nature be, 
 His art doth give the fashion… 
 For a good poet’s made as well as born. (41-50, ellipses mine) 
 
The ‘good poet’ is perhaps Jonson himself. Yet, in these lines, he reiterates the 
importance of self-conscious artifice in the creation of nature, yet one that is 
particularly artistic. Shakespeare here is quite ‘gentle’: the word connotes 
refinement and opposes the idea of the dramatist as simply a representation of an 
unlettered unruly nature. In many ways then, the Schlegelian dyad between 
intention and instinct strikes a fundamental chord in our endeavour to understand 
the uniqueness of Shakespeare. In Jonson’s framework, one must be born a poet 
and create instinctively, while simultaneously working consciously to hone and 
refine that primary natural force. In the context of this poem however, it seems 
evident that Shakespeare falls more on the side of ‘natural genius’. He is this 
natural genius despite, and in spite of, the little Latin and less Greek that he knew. 
In an age of aristocratic education for aristocratic men of letters, Shakespeare 
trumps stereotypes and expectations. Therein lies his individuality. 
 This obsession with Shakespeare’s individuality, originality, and his 
affinity to nature, keeps recurring in subsequent and famous editions of his plays. 
In Alexander Pope’s controversial editions of the plays in 1725/28, the themes of 
Shakespearean originality are expanded upon. In his Preface to the first edition of 
Shakespeare’s oeuvre, Pope says: 
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If ever any Author deserved the name of an Original, it was Shakespear. 
Homer himself drew not his art so immediately from the fountains of 
Nature: it proceeded thro' AEgyptian strainers and channels, and came to 
him not without some tincture of the learning or some cast of the models 
of those before him. The Poetry of Shakespear was Inspiration indeed: he 
is not so much an Imitator as an Instrument of Nature; and 'tis not so just 
to say that he speaks from her as that she speaks thro' him.
24
 
 
Pope stands on the shoulders of two particular giants before him, as he openly 
acknowledges the previous commentaries on Shakespeare by Ben Jonson and 
Dryden (19). In a fashion similar to Jonson, Shakespeare in the above passage 
becomes the most original of ‘authors’, as opposed to being a dramatist and 
playwright. He is also the beacon of inspired creation over laborious development. 
And in an anachronistically Romantic fashion, he lights the lamp of nature 
(instrument) as opposed to being its mirror (imitator). Nature embodies and 
emboldens itself through his work. Pope also develops the nature theme by 
saying: ‘But every single character in Shakespeare is as much an Individual as 
those in Life itself; it is as impossible to find any two alike…’ (13, ellipses mine). 
Coincidentally, Hazlitt chooses to begin his preface to the Characters of 
Shakespeare’s Plays with the beginning of Pope’s preface, thereby paying 
homage to an earlier thinker. Indeed, the third paragraph of Hazlitt’s own preface 
states unequivocally: ‘The object of the volume here offered to the public, is to 
illustrate these [Pope’s] remarks in a more particular manner by a reference to 
each play’ (85, parentheses mine). By doing this, he locates his own 
Shakespearean criticism within the individuality of Shakespearean characters, 
rather than the individual play as a whole. In addition, Pope’s hermeneutics are 
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validated as pre-Romantic as opposed to Dr. Johnson’s, about whom Hazlitt says 
in a fashion sharply reminiscent of Schlegel: 
We have a high respect for Dr. Johnson’s character and understanding, 
mixed with something like personal attachment: but he was neither a poet 
nor a judge of poetry. He might in one sense be a judge of poetry as it falls 
within the limits and rules of prose, but not as it is poetry. (88) 
 
Once again, Dr. Johnson is void of poetic sensibility. However, Hazlitt 
exaggerates the difference between Johnson and Pope. Pope’s focus on the 
‘defects’ of Shakespeare shade into Dr. Johnson’s own preface of 1765. For Pope, 
Shakespeare remains a writer of immense faults: ‘It must be own'd that with all 
these great excellencies he has almost as great defects; and that as he has certainly 
written better so he has perhaps written worse than any other’ (14). The attraction 
to elaborate on these supposed faults in Shakespearean drama becomes 
commonplace in the pre-Romantic period. These ‘defects’, as becomes evident 
towards the end of this preface, emerge as a result of the neoclassical principles 
governing theatrical production that were in vogue during French theatre’s 
dominance over eighteenth-century aesthetic theory. Specifically, its strict 
interpretations of the unities of time, place, and action in Aristotle’s Poetics do 
not sit well with Shakespearean drama.
25
 The ‘manner’ of his plays illustrates 
what is fundamentally wrong with Shakespeare’s dramatic practice.  
However, what is more interesting here is how Pope chooses to justify 
these faults:  
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It must be allowed that Stage-Poetry of all other is more particularly 
levell'd to please the Populace, and its success more immediately 
depending upon the Common Suffrage. One cannot therefore wonder if 
Shakespear, having at his first appearance no other aim in his writings 
than to procure a substinance, directed his endeavours solely to hit the 
taste and humour that then prevailed. The Audience was generally 
composed of the meaner sort of people; and therefore the Images of Life 
were to be drawn from those of their own rank…(15, ellipses mine ) 
 
Once again, the tension between a perceived democracy of the theatrical medium 
and the more elevated elitism of poetry uncorrupted by the taint of performance 
comes to the forefront. In more contemporary terms, Shakespeare’s poetry of, and 
for, the stage is a ‘dumbed-down’ version of his higher artistic intentions. The 
populace, the groundlings, the masses, all demand an easier access to 
understanding Shakespeare. Furthermore, it is implied that Shakespeare initially at 
least wrote for money and personal profit, which would help explain the defects of 
his ‘Stage-Poetry’. For Pope, the faults of Shakespeare’s plays are the faults of his 
audience. This ‘common’ audience comprised of ‘the meaner sort of people’: the 
uneducated masses who ‘had no notion of the rules of writing’ (15).  
Shakespeare’s disadvantages then are ‘to be obliged to please the lowest of 
people, and to keep the worst of company’, both being the faults of collective 
theatre-going. The ‘lowest of people’ are the common theatre-goers, while ‘the 
worst of company’ arguably concerns his fellow actors, who by necessity as much 
as need, would have been bohemians of questionable reputations. For Pope then, 
the actors of Shakespeare’s age were certainly of a lower social ilk: ‘As then the 
best Playhouses were Inns and Taverns (the Globe, the Hope, the Red Bull, the 
Fortune, &c.) so the top of the profession were then meer Players, not Gentlemen 
of the stage’ (23). The Inns and taverns would have surely encouraged the baudy 
behaviour that we so often see in Shakespeare’s plays, specifically in the figure of 
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Falstaff. ‘Shakespeare’ then, stands somehow above the company he kept. He 
becomes himself and his plays despite the baser influences of his time. In Chapter 
III, we shall also see how this dialectic between the essential democracy and the 
perceived autocracy of Shakespearean drama becomes the prime thematic conflict 
in French Romanticism’s negotiations with political and aesthetic freedom. 
Evidently, the claiming of Shakespeare as a negotiator of the pretensions of high 
art and the enjoyment inherent to popular spectacle has a distinguished history. 
Being part of a neoclassical tradition as opposed to a Romantic one, Pope chooses 
to denigrate the influences of a larger audience on Shakespearean drama. 
Pope then concludes his Preface with a remarkable passage:  
I will conclude by saying of Shakespeare that, with all his faults, and with 
all the irregularity of his Drama, one may look upon his works, in 
comparison of those that are more finish'd and regular, as upon an ancient 
majestick piece of Gothick Architecture compar'd with a neat Modern 
building: the latter is more elegant and glaring, but the former is more 
strong and solemn. It must be allow'd that in one of these there are 
materials enough to make many of the other. It has much the greater 
variety, and much the nobler apartments; tho' we are often conducted to 
them by dark, odd, and uncouth passages. Nor does the whole fail to strike 
us with greater reverence, tho' many of the Parts are childish, ill-plac'd, 
and unequal to its grandeur. (25-26) 
 
The dramatic tension between what is irregular, imperfect, often incomplete 
(Gothic architecture/Shakespeare) and that which is ‘finish’d and regular’ (the 
modern neo-classical building/neoclassical drama) critically reminds us of the 
separation between the complete form of the classical body in representation and 
the unfinished flux of the grotesque figure. In the nineteenth century, Gothic 
architecture most famously connects itself with the grotesque in Ruskin’s Stones 
of Venice.
26
 And Williard Farnham, in what is to my knowledge the only book-
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 136 
length study of the Shakespearean grotesque, considers the Gothic age and its 
plays of morality and mystery as laying the foundations for Shakespeare’s 
idiosyncratic mixing of tragic and comic forms.
27
  For Pope, this mirroring of 
Shakespeare with Gothic architecture through an epic simile has the undeniable 
result of making the reader associate the ‘dark, odd, and uncouth passages’ with 
‘the greater variety’ and grandeur of Shakespearean drama. Victor Hugo’s Préface 
de Cromwell (1827) would see Shakespeare through a similar lens, except that the 
faults of the playwright would constitute his Romantic originality.  
 This defining of, and working through, the perceived faults of Shakespeare 
continue into Samuel Johnson’s 1765 edition of the plays, perhaps the most 
important and influential of the eighteenth century, a summing up of a developing 
pre-Romantic notion of Shakespeare, the author. In keeping Pope’s model of 
regular/finished and irregular/unfinished in mind, let us look at Dr. Johnson’s 
elaboration of the imperfect grandeur of Shakespearean drama: 
The work of a correct and regular writer is a garden accurately formed and 
diligently planted, varied with shades, and scented with flowers; the 
composition of Shakespeare is a forest, in which oaks extend their 
branches, and pines tower in the air, interspersed sometimes with weeds 
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and brambles, and sometimes giving shelter to myrtles and to roses; filling 
the eye with awful pomp, and gratifying the mind with endless diversity. 
Other poets display cabinets of precious rarities, minutely furnished, 
wrought to shape, and polished into brightness. Shakespeare opens a mine 
which contains gold and diamonds in unexhaustable plenty, though 
clouded by incrustations, debased by impurities, and mingled with a mass 
of meaner minerals.
28
 
 
Dr. Johnson returns to the idea of opposing Shakespeare to ‘a correct and regular 
writer’, this time by adopting the metaphor of the forest versus the ‘accurately 
formed’ garden. Crucially, this garden is ‘diligently planted’, thereby being 
representative of the manicured, polished work of a gardener who moulds nature, 
its plants and flowers. In contrast, Shakespeare is compared to a forest, 
immediately a larger, more powerful, and vitally, a more natural entity than a 
garden, which is fundamentally made for human pleasure and benefits. The 
Shakespearean forest, with its proliferation of natural forces in all their variety, 
with an abundance of classical sylvan images (myrtles, roses) juxtaposed with 
‘weeds and brambles’, ‘fills the eye with awful pomp’. The work of other poets is 
‘minutely furnished, wrought to shape, and polished to brightness’—the verbs 
used here by Dr. Johnson communicate to us the artfulness of this particular type 
of literature. The Shakespearean universe, however, despite its abundance of 
riches, is marred by faults. Examine Dr. Johnson’s choice of words to convey the 
effects of these faults on Shakespeare’s work: ‘clouded’, ‘debased by impurities’, 
‘mingled’ with ‘meaner minerals’.   
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 To move from metaphor to the literal specifics of Dr. Johnson’s problem 
with Shakespeare, let me list the primary faults that the critic sees in the work of 
the playwright. The defects according to Johnson are: 
1) the sacrificing of virtue to convenience 
2) pleasure over instruction 
3) loosely formed plots 
4) no distinction of time or place 
5) excessive ‘licentiousness’ and irony 
6) excessive passion 
7) circumlocution 
8) the unclear expression of ‘unwieldly sentiments (Dukore, 410-16) 
 
Evidently for Dr. Johnson, pleasure must be contained by didacticism and the 
teaching of virtue. Molière, writing his preface to Tartuffe—one of the 
benchmarks of respected, neoclassical comedy—would similarly speak of 
wanting to réctifier la vice in his audience. This obsession with the promotion of 
virtue through the theatre leaks into Dr. Johnson’s problems with Shakespeare’s 
‘excessive passion’ and licentiousness as well. Too much irony, the starting point 
for Schlegel’s Shakespeare, also becomes an issue of contention. Whatever is 
cloudy and unclear—loosely formed plots, no distinction of time and place, 
unclear expressions of unclear emotions—becomes problematic. Anything beyond 
the frame of common-sense normality is shunned.  
Dr. Johnson then goes on to illustrate the very features of Shakespearean 
drama that would appeal to the Romantics: 
Shakespeare's plays are not in the rigorous and critical sense either 
tragedies or comedies, but compositions of a distinct kind; exhibiting the 
real state of sublunary nature, which partakes of good and evil, joy and 
sorrow, mingled with endless variety of proportion and innumerable 
modes of combination… 
Shakespeare has united the powers of exciting laughter and sorrow not 
only in one mind but in one composition. Almost all his plays are divided 
between serious and ludicrous characters, and, in the successive evolutions 
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of the design, sometimes produce seriousness and sorrow, and sometimes 
levity and laughter. (Dukore, 407-08, ellipses mine) 
 
The emphasis falls on the tropes of ‘variety’ of dramatic presentation and a 
curious ‘mingling’ of conventionally opposed emotions and genres. Shakespeare’s 
plays operate beyond the traditional categories of ‘tragedy’ and ‘comedy’, 
partaking of the features of both in order to create something distinguishably 
unique, ‘exhibiting the real state of sublunary nature’ (italics mine). The italicised 
words reiterate that Shakespeare’s universe displays the workings of the 
terrestrial, natural forces, which exemplify the combination of opposites: 
good/evil, tragic/comic, laughter/sorrow. His plays present to us a variety of 
personages, who allow the drama to alternate between these multiple poles of 
contention. Finally, Shakespeare as ‘poet of nature’ also gets another elucidation 
in Dr. Johnson’s Preface: 
Shakespeare is, above all writers, at least, above all modern writers, the 
poet of nature; the poet that holds up to his readers a faithful mirror of 
manners and of life. His characters are not modified by the customs of 
particular places, unpracticed by the rest of the world; by the peculiarities 
of studies on professions, which can operate but upon small numbers; or 
by the accidents of transient fashions or temporary opinions: they are the 
genuine progeny of common humanity, such as the world will always 
supply, and observation will always find. His persons act and speak by the 
influence of those general passions and principles by which all minds are 
agitated, and the whole system of life is continued in motion. In the 
writings of other poets a character is too often an individual: in those of 
Shakespeare it is commonly a species. (Dukore, 405, italics mine) 
 
In this passage, the linking of Shakespearean dramaturgy to nature follows a 
mimetic paradigm: Shakespeare represents nature (‘the poet that holds up to his 
readers a faithful mirror of manners and of life’) rather than actually and 
simultaneously shaping that very nature. Nevertheless, Dr. Johnson here 
accentuates the transcendence of Shakespearean themes and characters in a 
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manner characteristic of Enlightenment thought: his personae belong to a 
‘common humanity’ that is beyond the ‘transient fashions’ and habits of specific 
nations and places. Finally, the italicised sentence brings about an interesting 
disjunction where the characters of Shakespeare’s plays are celebrated because 
they are types, and not as individuals. Dr. Johnson’s emphasis on species over 
individuality harmonises with the thrust of his argument for Shakespeare’s 
‘universality’. If his characters are types rather than particular individuals, it is 
easier for them to transcend the particularity of culture and nation so as to be 
emblematic of a ‘common humanity’. In contrast, the Romantic Shakespeare 
would fervently speak for the characters of Shakespeare’s plays as being 
individuals, not types. As Hazlitt would say in his differentiation of French drama 
and Shakespeare: 
In the French dramatists, only class is represented, never the individual: 
their kings, their heroes, and their lovers are all the same, and they are all 
French—that is, they are nothing but the mouth-pieces of certain rhetorical 
common-place sentiments on the favourite topics of morality and passion. 
The characters in Shakespeare do not declaim like pedantic school-boys, 
but speak and act like men, placed in real circumstances…No two of his 
characters are the same, more than they would be so in nature. 
29
 
 
The representation of ‘class’ in French drama coincides with the ‘type’ that Dr. 
Johnson seeks to celebrate in Shakespeare, almost as if he were trying to fit his 
interpretations of the dramatist to prevailing Gallic opinions.  
I would like to end this section of the chapter with a brief look at the 
vanguard of such opinions, Voltaire, the international champion of neoclassicism 
in the eighteenth century, so as to solidify the values against which the Romantics 
opposed their Shakespeare. Voltaire’s shadow hovers over neoclassical Europe, 
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and in the next chapter we will see how the Romantic recreation of Shakespeare in 
the work of A. W. Schlegel, Stendhal, and Hugo is positioned in response to him. 
The French writer and cultural figure famously could not tolerate the comic 
gravediggers in Hamlet, since they are representatives of the intrusion of low 
comedy in the tapestry of what is ostensibly a tragic play.  It is interesting to note 
that Williard Farnham locates the comic gravedigger within the sphere of the 
Shakespearean grotesque: 
The grave-digging clown in Hamlet might in a way be called a sinister 
grotesque figure. He has delight in bringing any man’s dust home to the 
earth when it was taken. Yet he has a remarkable lack of malice. He works 
happily at his occupation of burying mankind but it shows not the slightest 
ill will towards mankind. (128) 
 
The delight in burying corpses—itself constitutive of a dramatic juxtaposition of 
the comic and the tragic—creates the grotesque. For Voltaire, the action of 
burying human bodies should obviously be a far more solemn affair.  
In his later years, Voltaire would refer to Shakespeare as ‘un sauvage ivre’ 
(a drunk savage), would declaim against the ‘barbarous irregularities’ of Julius 
Caesar, and would associate the name of the English playwright with a Gothicism 
characteristic of dark, medieval times.
30
 Writing a letter to the English Gothic 
novelist Horace Walpole a few years after Dr. Johnson’s Preface, Voltaire dwells 
on the differences between Shakespeare and the more refined neoclassical drama 
of the French: 
In my opinion, he is precisely like the Spaniard Lope de Vega, and like 
Calderon. His nature is beautiful but uncivilized; he has neither regularity, 
decorum, nor art; mixing meanness with grandeur, buffoonery with terror; 
in his chaotic tragedies are a hundred flashes of light… 
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You free Britons do not observe the unity of place, or of time, or of action. 
In truth, by failing to do so you do not improve things; versimilitude 
should count for something. Art is the more difficult because of it, and 
difficulties which are overcome provide pleasure and glory in every 
genre… 
I have believed, I do believe, and I will believe that in the composition of 
tragedy and comedy, Paris is quite superior to Athens (Dukore, 286, 
ellipses mine) 
 
Here Voltaire does a few things: he accentuates the primary principles of French 
neoclassicism that would dominate European aesthetics until Romanticism 
(decorum, verisimilitude, and the unities of time, place, action, and tone) and 
trumpets the supposed superiority of French theatre—divided neatly into the 
tragedies of Racine and the comedies of Molière—over the Greeks. A very strong 
claim.
31
 The division between comedy and tragedy becomes sacrosanct. Mixed 
genres, the province of the Shakespearean grotesque, are negated. Anything that 
attacks the propriety of decorum (violence on stage, for example) or questions the 
premise of verisimilitude (disunity in place or time, for example), should be kept 
away from the theatre. For Voltaire then, rules are meant to be followed. For him, 
it is the very freedom from rules characterising British drama, which is 
fundamentally unsettling. This freedom translates to the lack or ‘regularity, 
decorum, and art’ in the natural compositions of Shakespeare. The mixing of 
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tragedy and comedy. Tragedy deals with affairs of state or great actions; its characters are drawn 
from the ruling class; its style is noble. Comedy treats domestic or private situations; its characters 
are drawn from the middle or lower classes; its style is familiar. The tragic and the comic are kept 
strictly apart. Mixed genres exist but do not merit serious attention’ (23, ellipses mine). 
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‘meanness with grandeur, buffoonery with terror’ symbolises this want of 
decorum. 
 
However, as an interesting letter to another Englishman, Lord 
Bolingbroke, Voltaire acknowledges that regularity in verse and success in 
dramatic action are not necessarily synonymous: 
Hitherto there has been wanting, in all the tragic authors of your nation, 
that purity, that regular conduct, that decorum in the action and style, and 
all those strokes of art which have established the reputation of the French 
theatre since the time of the great Corneille: though at the same time, it 
must be acknowledged, that your most irregular pieces have very great 
merit with regard to the action. (Dukore, 281) 
 
Another binary is here established, that between image (action on stage) and 
sound (regularity in verse to the ear). These regular ‘strokes of art’ in Corneille 
then, by inference, may not transpose themselves onto effective theatricality. And 
in an extremely perceptive statement in the same letter, Voltaire declares: ‘The 
English are more fond of action than we are, and speak more to the eye: the 
French give more attention to elegance, harmony, and the charms of verse’ 
(Dukore, 285). This admirable concern with action is vital, since drama centres 
itself around the becoming of connected activity on the stage, rather than strong 
declamations in verse. Also, the French focus on ‘the charms of verse’ is possibly 
anti-dramatic: these charms could obviously dissipate in translation, from word-on 
page to word-in-action, from language to language, from culture to culture. Here 
Voltaire, almost unbeknownst to himself, intimates the reasons for Shakespeare’s 
significance as a dramatist, which develops from the vitality of action in his plays.  
In maintaining these binaries between action/sound, eye/ear temporarily, I 
would like to recall how action-on-stage is, in an example of subtle self-
reflexivity, a socio-political act. In contrast, the attention to sound-in-verse at the 
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expense of action-on-stage, courts the private, individual readings of dramatic 
verse that, despite its promised and oft delivered pleasures, is ironically anti-
dramatic. The Romantic theorising of Shakespeare in the Schlegels and Hazlitt 
marks a supremely novel way of negotiating the tensions occupying the imagined 
spaces between stage and sound, eye and ear, nature and art. 
  
 IV—A. W. Schlegel and Hazlitt: Romanticising Shakespeare   
 Jonathan Bate, in his important Shakespeare and the English Romantic 
Imagination (1986), emphasises the importance of German theory in the 
canonising of the bard: 
German idealism permeated the spirit of the English Romantic age. 
Reality came to be located in the interplay of mind and world through 
imagination, no longer in a fixed exterior ‘general nature’; it was because 
of this philosophic development that Romantic poets, even those who did 
not know the works of Kant and Schelling as Coleridge did, dwelt 
persistently on the perceiving self and the creative imagination. There is a 
close correlation between the rise of Shakespeare and the rise of 
Romanticism in Germany, but it should not be forgotten that Shakespeare 
was the stick with which the Sturm und Drang beat off French cultural 
hegemony and initiated the Romantic revolution. (9) 
 
 This is one of the few passages in the book that openly attributes the development 
of English Romanticism, and the conjunctive canonisation of Shakespeare, to the 
Germans. For some readers, Bate may seem to be doing too much in this 
particular passage: he conflates Kant, German idealism, German and English 
Romanticism, and the Sturm und Drang. However, he correctly locates this 
‘interplay of mind and world’ as perhaps the defining feature of German and 
English Romanticisms. For our purposes, it is this very interplay (and its 
subsequent dramatic possibilities) that alerts us to the significance of a peculiarly 
German Shakespeare. Bate also reframes the importance of ‘Shakespeare’ as a 
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political tool that interrogates the validity of ‘French cultural hegemony’. For the 
Sturm und Drang, the springboard for German Romanticism, Shakespearean 
drama becomes the opposition to the generally aristocratic tastes of French 
neoclassical theory.  
In the first volume of the impressive compendium, Shakespeare on the 
German Stage (1990), Simon Williams expands on the ideological significance of 
Shakespeare to the nascent Romantic movement: 
The vision Sturm und Drang had of Shakespeare was totally antithetical to 
prevailing theatrical tastes. Sturm und Drang regarded him as a visionary 
with access to the irrational centre of human conduct and understanding of 
man as a natural being. His plays demonstrated neither the working of a 
moralistic ‘poetic justice’, nor did they argue for social cohesion in the 
way that the domestic drama did. Sturm und Drang prized Shakespeare’s 
characters because they shattered the narrow limits of dramatic action 
circumscribed by contemporary taste. Indeed, for them the plays validated 
the values of the individual rather than those of society. Given such a 
view, Shakespeare’s drama could be regarded as potentially subversive of 
social order and therefore directly opposed to the purpose of theatre in the 
eighteenth century.
32
  
 
The vision of Shakespeare as the personification of natural principles reappears. 
In turn, this goes hand in hand with a clear articulation of the irrational as a 
primary dramatic force. In this context, the blinding of Gloucester as a dramatic 
act repudiates common-sense interpretation, but fits conveniently with a rising 
Romantic view of the world. Conventional eighteenth-century notions of 
theatricality work on the principle of teaching morality and virtue. Shakespearean 
drama undercuts such precepts. The claiming of individuality and the ‘potentially 
subversive’ reconnects with the attempted overthrow of French cultural 
domination, which coincide with the development of a German revisioning of an 
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essentially English aesthetic. As Williams points out, the imitation, translation, 
and staging of Shakespeare in Germany allowed the English playwright ‘a 
symbolic status as a nurturing presence during the most fruitful and crucial stage 
of the country’s cultural growth’ (xii). Furthermore, this appropriation of 
Shakespeare sought to destroy the emasculating effects of French theory on a 
national literature eager to establish its own unique voice: ‘Its [French neo-
classicism] pre-eminence was challenged by a rising middle class that used 
models from English and national German literature to give its own literature 
identity. Shakespeare was a pivotal figure in this change’ (9, parentheses mine). 
‘Shakespeare’ starts becoming a political concept. Romantic German nationalism 
arises from the necessary disruption of the ethical, political, and aesthetic 
premises that had solidified into the laws of French hegemony. 
 Jonathan Bate’s commentary on the opposition between the Romantic 
Shakespeare and Dr. Johnson’s theory of the bard also sheds some light on the 
curious position that Shakespeare comes to occupy for the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries: 
In Johnson, then, there are still vestiges of the argument that Shakespeare 
is the great exception, the genius who broke the rules, who snatched a 
grace beyond the reach of art. The shift from Johnson to Coleridge, from 
classic to Romantic, is not a matter of condemnation giving way to 
commendation but of the great exception becoming the great exemplum. 
(Shakespeare and the English Romantic Imagination, 8) 
 
This is a remarkably astute judgement on the organic growth of Shakespeare as 
we reach into the nineteenth century. ‘Nature’ beyond rules, far from being a rare 
phenomenon, becomes the standard judging point on literary activity.  As a result, 
the example of Shakespeare can be appropriated for an emerging national 
consciousness (German) and an emerging aesthetic point of view (Romantic), 
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which wallows in the celebration of that notorious Romantic creation: individual 
genius. If Shakespeare moves from exception towards exemplum, Romantic 
theory attests to the democratic possibility that everyone and anyone can become 
this poetic genius. Or in Hazlitt’s sense, any individual poet can have access to the 
aristocratic power provided by poetic discourse.
33
 In a very Romantic reading, 
poetry democratically confers the mantle of aristocracy on the creative individual 
willing to acknowledge her dependence on the shared language of artistic activity. 
The famous passage that splits the imagination from the understanding in Hazlitt’s 
essay on Coriolanus, underpins this interplay between aristocratic power and 
democratic exchange: 
The language of poetry naturally falls in with the language of power. The 
imagination is an exaggerating and exclusive faculty: it takes from one 
thing to add to another: it accumulates circumstances together to give the 
greatest possible effect to a favourite object. The understanding is a 
dividing and measuring faculty: it judges of things not according to their 
immediate impression on the mind, but according to their relations to one 
another. The one is a monopolising faculty, which seeks the greatest 
quantity of present excitement by inequality and disproportion, the other is 
a distributive faculty, which seeks the greatest quantity of ultimate good, 
by justice and proportion. The one is an aristocratical, the other a 
republican faculty. The principle of poetry is a very anti-levelling 
principle. It aims at effect, it exists by contrast. It admits of no medium. It 
is every thing by excess…Poetry is right-royal.
34
 
 
Here Hazlitt takes on the transcendental distinction in Kant’s first critique, giving 
it a particularly poetic and political spin. The language of poetry functions with 
the free-flowing, hovering glance of Romantic imagination. As Fichte and 
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Friedrich Schlegel before him say, the imagination knows no boundaries. The 
understanding, on the other hand, is republican in essence, since it aims to level 
out differences. The excess of imagination—a particularly Romantic theme—
spills over into autocracy. Yet, it is an autocracy that every poet-individual, 
through the virtue of her imagination, has access to. In a typically Schlegelian 
sense, the categories ‘republican’ and ‘aristocrat’ are in interaction, and Hazlitt’s 
privileging of the democratic autocracy of poetry echoes a Critical fragment: 
‘Poetry is republican speech: a speech which is its own law and end unto itself, 
and in which all the parts are free citizens and have the right to vote’ (Firchow, 
150). Famously, Hazlitt opposed the ‘negative capability’ of Shakespeare (to 
double Keats’ term onto the Hazlitt lectures he was so influenced by) to the 
intense egotism of Milton and Wordsworth.
35
 Consequently, Shakespeare in the 
democratising spirit that vindicates every type of individual in his plays, becomes 
the most comprehensive of poetic souls in being without a singular ego. Instead, 
his dramatic openness permits him to inhabit and create multiple personalities. He 
democratises the yearning for aristocracy.  
This ‘shift from Johnson to Coleridge, from classic to Romantic’, which 
marks the dramatic and democratic celebration of the aristocratic significance of 
every individual, assumes its most visible manifestation in A. W. Schlegel’s 
commentary on Shakespeare in the Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature, 
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which were published in German in 1809, and then translated into English by 
John Black in 1815. As Thoman G. Sauer’s neglected exploration into the 
influence exercised by these lectures on English intellectual life shows, ‘it was not 
until Schlegel’s Vorlesungen became known in England, to Coleridge private in 
1811 and to the English reading public in 1815, that a new aesthetic was applied 
to Shakespeare so that the reservations of the eighteenth century…could be 
dismissed and the era of Shakespeare idolatory ushered in’.
36
 In turn, the many 
translations of these lectures had international resonances, as a cosmopolitanism 
of perspective starts becoming a defining feature of British and continental 
Romanticisms.
37
 Sauer’s statements are exemplary, and towards the closing pages 
of his study, he unequivocally states that the lectures of A. W. Schlegel literally 
‘altered the way in which the English thought about and wrote about Shakespeare’ 
(146). 
 So why are these lectures so strikingly significant? In numerous ways, 
they represent one of the first and most exhaustive attempts to theorise the 
dramatic medium, developing along the thematic categories provided by Friedrich 
Schlegel. A third of these lectures are devoted to Shakespeare as the Romantic 
poet par excellence, while also studying the individual plays in detail in a manner 
that prefigures Hazlitt’s Characters of Shakespeare’s Plays (1816). They also 
provide the theoretical framing and impetus for the eponymous Schlegel/Tieck 
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translations of the Shakespearean plays.
38
 Thoman G. Sauer reviews the 
significance of these lectures within a political framework that we have already 
approached: 
But the Vorlesungen is also a thorough condemnation of the hegemony of 
the Enlightenment embodied specifically in an aesthetics dominated by 
reason and by a dramatic formula based on French classical theory and 
practice; and concurrently it is a call to the German nation to throw off the 
fetters of French subjugation and create its own dramatic and, indeed, 
political identity. (31). 
 
The dramatic and political ‘identities’ are interlinked. Shakespearean drama then, 
forms itself into the Romantic idea of theatrical activity that challenges the 
domination of rationalism on the stage, and political conformity outside of it. 
Right from the first introductory lectures on Attic tragedy and comedy, A. W. 
Schlegel is already setting up the foundations for the democratic drama of 
Romanticism. For Schlegel, Hellenic theatre is characterised by ‘the poetry of 
joy’, while the poetry of the moderns is one of desire, recollection, hope, 
melancholy.
39
 The birth of this Schillerian ‘sentimental’ poetry grows into a 
peculiarly modern type of drama: ‘The romantic drama, which, strictly speaking, 
can neither be called tragedy nor comedy in the sense of the ancients, is 
indigenous only to England and Spain’ (28). The mixed styles, the ‘mingled 
scenes’ that Dr. Johnson had problems with in Shakespeare, are the archetypal 
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modes of Romantic recollection. Shakespeare in England and Calderon in Spain 
are the representatives of this new form of drama. Interestingly, this Romantic 
type of drama works by injecting the ‘confusion of anarchy’, the ‘democracy of 
poetry’ (148, italics mine), the chaotic exuberance of classical comedy into the 
mosaic of the tragic perspective.  
 For Schlegel then, tragedy involves earnestness and morality, while 
comedy rotates on the axis of celebrating the sport of being animal. In his lecture 
on the comic medium, he eloquently reminds the reader of the parabasis 
performed by the Attic chorus, the primary condition of Romantic irony: 
The most remarkable peculiarity, however, of the comic chorus is the 
Parabasis, an address to the spectators by the chorus, in the name, and as 
the representative of the poet but having no connexion with the subject of 
the piece. The unlimited dominion of mirth and fun manifests itself even 
in this, that the dramatic form itself is not seriously adhered to, and that its 
laws are often suspended; just as in a droll disguise the masquerader 
sometimes ventures to lay aside the mask. (151) 
 
The arbitrary fashioning of parabasis conveys to us the essential play of 
perspectives that do not take themselves too seriously. Furthermore, the laws of 
drama—reminiscent of French classical practice in the modern age—are broken 
mercilessly as the ‘masquerader’ delights in severing, replacing, multiplying her 
masks and disguises. This interrogation of essentiality in identity that takes place 
in the comic medium, once conjoined with tragedy, creates the Romantic drama. 
In developing this notion of parabasis and its connection to Romantic drama, 
Schlegel says that irony in drama ‘is a sort of confession interwoven into the 
representation itself, and more or less distinctly expressed, of its overcharged one-
sidedness in matters of fancy and feeling, and by means of which the equipoise is 
again restored’ (227). The parabasis in Attic comedy is this confession that 
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simultaneously deconstructs system while working towards establishing dramatic 
balance, simultaneously. Then, in his introductory lecture on Shakespeare, 
Schlegel finally provides us with his sincere definition of Romantic art. This he 
does by juxtaposing it with the poetry of the ancients: 
The ancient art and poetry rigorously separate things which are dissimilar; 
the romantic delights in indissoluble mixtures; all contrarieties: nature and 
art, poetry and prose, seriousness and mirth, recollection and anticipation, 
spirituality and sensuality, terrestrial and celestial, life and death, are by it 
blended together in the most intimate combination. (342) 
 
Here we have the groundwork for Coleridge’s reconciliation of opposites. The 
form of Romantic art works towards romanticising the world by allowing the back 
and forth interplays of contrarieties. Nature/art, poetry/prose, animal/human, are 
all combined. This element of unification, or rather the acceptance of the 
proliferation of opposites that are coincidentally co-dependent, represents 
Romantic art’s mirroring of the larger game of the natural world, where 
everything that exists, must exist in relation to its perceived opposite. Or rather, 
the concept of ‘opposition’ disappears. Instead, connectivity, the ‘blending 
together’ of what appears to be separate is not a task, but the actual grotesque 
ontology of the world. In sharp contrast to what Schlegel calls the ‘order’ of the 
ancients, Romantic poetry and drama intimate the underlying and perennial 
motion of natural phenomena: ‘Romantic poetry, on the other hand, is the 
expression of the secret attraction to a chaos which lies concealed in the very 
bosom of the ordered universe, and is perpetually striving after new and 
marvellous births’ (343). Shakespeare becomes the poet who understands the 
dramatic potential in this chaos. Shakespeare has the ability to harness the 
productive capacity of the play of irony that hides itself in the guise of an ‘ordered 
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universe’. This ‘striving after new and marvellous births’ becomes the striving of 
a perpetually becoming Romantic poetry, which delights in the creation of myriad 
personae that interact with each other in multiple dramatic situations. 
 Consequently, the character of the dramatic poet, embodied by the 
Shakespearean example, operates on a god-like level. According to Schlegel, this 
dramatic poet has ‘the capability of transporting himself so completely into every 
situation, even the most unusual, that he is enabled, as plenipotentiary of the 
whole human race, without particular instructions for each separate case, to act 
and speak in the name of every individual. It is the power of endowing the 
creatures of his imagination with such self-existent energy, that they afterwards 
act in each conjecture according to general laws of nature: the poet, in his dreams, 
institutes, as it were, experiments which are received with as much authority as if 
they had been made on waking objects’ (362). This is plausibly the most 
influential account of the Shakespearean model of dramatic poetry, which seems 
to sum up the preoccupations of Shakespeare as the poet of nature, while also 
pushing us towards a particularly nineteenth century understanding of the 
dramatic poet as the incarnation of a totalising and essentially sympathetic 
medium of dramatic transformation. According to Hazlitt, Shakespeare’s ability 
of ‘transporting himself’ into multiple situations leads into his model of 
disinterested sympathy.
40
 Fundamentally then, no situation is beyond the scope 
and grasp of the Shakespearean dramatic sympathy and intuition. As a result, any 
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of the more grotesque and questionable dramatic choices in his plays are 
sanctioned since they are products of a sympathetic imagination. Shakespeare 
allows his own subjectivity to split into multiple personae, which then assume 
their own self-reflexive reality. His characters function as do the characters of real 
life. By extension, since they act like human beings of ‘flesh and blood’, the very 
distinction between the real and the imaginary, the natural and the created, is 
questioned. As a result, in a Shelleyan sense, the poet’s dramatic imagination 
reflects and simultaneously constitutes the laws of the world.   
In his translator’s preface to Schlegel’s lectures, John Black states that ‘it 
will hardly fail to astonish us, however, to find a stranger better acquainted with 
the brightest political ornament of this country than any of ourselves; and that the 
admiration of the English nation for Shakespeare should first obtain a truly 
enlightened interpreter in a critic of Germany’ (1). The ‘us’ in the above 
obviously refers to English readers of Shakespeare, while the rest of the statement 
betrays an incredulity at having a ‘foreign’ critic understand him better than any 
of his own countrymen. In this way, Black seems to negate the importance of 
previous English commentaries on the bard. As we have already seen, these 
commentaries were performed by some of the most respected figures in English 
letters. However, by respecting the sheer scale of Schlegel’s interpretations, Black 
allows one of his contemporaries, William Hazlitt, to fashion his own remarkable 
Shakespearean hermeneutics.    
 In the Characters of Shakespeare’s Plays (1816), Hazlitt generously 
accepts the influence of A. W. Schlegel’s lectures, ‘which give by far the best 
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account of the plays of Shakespeare that has hitherto appeared’.
41
 In his review of 
these lectures, he reasserts the idolatry professed by the German critic for the 
English playwright: ‘If Shakespeare never found a thorough partisan before, he 
has found one now. We have not room for half of his praise. He defends himself 
at all points’ (Wu, 299). We have moved here from the neoclassical dissection of 
Shakespearean ‘faults’ to an unreserved endorsement of his aesthetic über-
individuality. However, as the preface to the Characters of Shakespeare’s Plays 
suggests, Hazlitt’s attitude to his German predecessor can be ambiguous. Earlier 
in this chapter, we looked at how Hazlitt frames his own criticism as a 
development of Pope’s statement on the unique individuality of every 
Shakespearean character. This wilful referencing of Pope’s influence on his work 
coincides with a certain anxiety that Hazlitt betrays towards his eminent German 
contemporary. While acknowledging the significance of the elder Schlegel’s 
lectures on Shakespeare, Hazlitt nevertheless feels compelled to rectify ‘an 
appearance of mysticism in his [Schlegel’s] style’ (Wu, 86, parentheses mine). 
According to Hazlitt, Schlegel has not referenced ‘particular passages of the plays 
themselves’ (Wu, 86). Interestingly, though, Hazlitt’s desire to ‘correct’ Schlegel 
connects with the desire to provide an English riposte to a German understanding 
of Shakespeare: 
We will at the same time confess, that some little Jealousy of the character 
of the national understanding was not without its share in the following 
undertaking, for ‘we were piqued’ that it should be reserved for a foreign 
critic to give ‘reasons for the faith which we English have in Shakespear’’ 
(Wu, 86) 
 
                                                          
41
 Characters of Shakespeare’s Plays in Selected Writings of William Hazlitt, Vol. 1, ed. Duncan 
Wu (London: Pickering and Chatto, 1998), p. 86. 
 
 156 
And as if to prove a point, Hazlitt goes on to quote a large section from Schelgel’s 
lectures, which he opposes to the Johnsonian view of Shakespeare. The above 
passage itself is particularly interesting as it betrays the anxiety that appears on 
encountering the ‘foreign critic’ of Shakespeare, particularly a critic whose 
analyses spark off German nationalism’s own hopes of claiming, appropriating, 
stealing Shakespeare. The Romantic dyad between strong nationalism(s) and 
equally powerful cosmopolitanism(s) comes to fore.  
  While Hazlitt does not fault the German’s appreciation of his countryman, 
he nevertheless endeavours to distinguish his own method of criticism by making 
some valid generalisations on the German character: 
They write, not because they are full of a subject, but because they think it 
is a subject upon which, with due pains and labour, something striking 
may be written. So they read and meditate, and having, at length, devised 
some strange and paradoxical view of the matter, they set about 
establishing it with all their might and main. The consequence is, that they 
have no shades of opinion, but are always straining at a grand or 
systematic conclusion. (Wu, 271) 
 
The ‘shades of opinion’ obviously belong to the sphere of Hazlitt, the trained 
painter, the corrector of German generalisations. The apparent differences 
between the two approaches to critical theorising can be glimpsed in Hazlitt’s own 
take on the Schlgelian differences between Classical and Romantic art. While the 
Schlegels attempt to characterise an untheorisable romantische Poesie by 
paradoxically framing it within concepts, Hazlitt’s perspectives are often more 
muted in tone. Or, to use Schlegelian terminology, Hazlitt’s criticism of striking 
shades is more picturesque, less plastic. As a result, ‘The most obvious 
distinction’ between classical and romantic art ‘is, that the one is conversant with 
objects that are grand or beautiful in themselves, or in consequence of obvious 
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and universal associations; the other, with those that are interesting only by force 
of circumstance and imagination’ (Wu, 274). The examples that embed this 
distinction are the Greek temple (Classical) and the ruins of a Gothic castle 
(Romantic). The Classical temple then, stands on its own, in its self-sufficient 
beauty. Crucially, the Romantic (or grotesque) Gothic castle becomes beautiful 
through interrelation and contrast.  
 Hazlitt goes on to expand on this primary distinction, which he has 
absorbed from his Schlegelian readings: 
The classical idea or form of any thing, it may also be observed, remains 
always the same, and suggests nearly the same impressions; but the 
associations of ideas belonging to the romantic character, may vary 
infinitely, and take in the whole range of nature and accident. Antigone, in 
Aeschylus, offering sacrifice at the tomb of Agamemnon—are classical 
subjects, because the circumstances and the characters have a 
correspondent dignity, and an immediate interest, from their mere 
designation. Florimel, in Spenser, where she is described sitting on the 
ground in the Witches’ hut, is not classical, though in the highest degree 
poetical and romantic: for the incidents and situation are in themselves 
mean and disagreeable, till they are redeemed by the genius of the poet, 
and converted, by the very contrast, into a source of utmost pathos and 
elevation of sentiment. (Wu, 274) 
 
Here we keep coming back to the primary distinction between the static body of 
Classicism and the perpetually becoming form of Romantic poetry with which we 
began this chapter. The Classical form is fixed, similarly exciting emotions that 
are inherently repeated. The Romantic form develops through variety and sudden 
happenings. It is interesting that Hazlitt takes a scene from Spenser as his example 
of the Romantic idea, yet the ‘elevation of sentiment’ over the ‘mean and 
disagreeable’ situation, or rather, the melange of both, constitute the Romantic 
idiom. Hazlitt proceeds to say that Romantic poetry forms itself through ‘rapid 
combinations, those unrestrained flights of fancy, which, glancing from heaven to 
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earth, unite the most opposite extremes’ (Wu, 275). The temporary unification of 
contrarieties is once again the defining mark of Romanticism. The Classical 
poetry is one of form, the Romantic one of effect (Wu, 276). Form comprises 
completion, while the poetry of effect by necessity implies relation and 
interconnectivity.  
 The recurrent theme of interconnection feeds into one of the sharpest 
statements that Hazlitt makes on Shakespeare: ‘Shakespeare was thoroughly a 
master of the mixed motives of human character’ (Characters, 147, italics mine). 
For Hazlitt then, Shakespearean interplay and mixing does not limit itself, in a 
Schlegelian sense, to the relationships between parts and the whole, but operates 
even within the subjectivity of each Shakespearean character. In this manner, 
Hazlitt fundamentally shifts his concerns from the Schlegels, while keeping their 
models of comprehension in mind. For Hazlitt, the Shakespearean character starts 
to take precedence over the play as a whole. Sauer draws upon this intrinsic 
distance between the elder Schlegel and Hazlitt by saying that ‘in Schlegel’s 
criticism the overriding theme is Shakespeare’s conscious artistry and the 
constructed unity of his plays, whereas in Hazlitt’s it is truth to nature of 
Shakespeare’s characters and their actions as depictions of human passion’ (108). 
Here, it seems as if there is a splitting of the poetry of art (Schlegel) and the 
poetry of nature (Hazlitt). Hazlitt’s tendencies rotate along the need to elevate the 
primary character over and above her co-dependent subsidiaries. His famous 
commentary on Iago confirms this need, as does his remarkably apt and 
inimitably Romantic statement on the character of Hamlet: ‘It is we who are 
Hamlet’ (Wu, 143). It is not coincidence that the title of Hazlitt’s most famous 
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work on Shakespeare calls attention to the characters of his plays, rather than 
starting with the plays themselves. Significantly, as we shall see in relation to 
Baudelaire’s reviewing of the Shakespearean grotesque, the persona of Hamlet 
becomes the embodiment of grotesque morbidity in nineteenth-century aesthetics. 
The elevation of the individual as a Romantic construct is vital. 
Hazlitt’s stress on individuality and the actions developing from that 
individual consciousness transpose themselves onto his legendary commentaries 
on Edmund Kean. Let us take one specific example. In his appraisal of Kean’s 
dynamic performance as Richard III (the master trickster, a character who almost 
always indulges in his own peculiar parabasis), Hazlitt says: 
Mr. Kean’s manner of acting this part has one particular advantage; it is 
entirely his own, without any trace of imitation of any other actor. He 
stands upon his own ground, and he stands firm upon it. Almost every 
scene had the stamp and freshness of nature. (A View of the English Stage, 
11) 
 
Key romantic themes—individuality, naturalness, lack of imitation—assert 
themselves. The words he uses repeatedly to characterise Kean’s performance are 
the following: ‘animation’, ‘vigour’, ‘bold’, ‘varied’, ‘original’ (A View of the 
English Stage, 12). Each word is a reflection of the Hazlittian gusto, while 
emphasising the dramatic suddenness in Kean’s performance. In addition, he 
makes a trenchant observation on the audience’s general expectations of the 
actor’s art: 
Our highest conception of an actor is, that he shall assume the character 
once and for all, and be it throughout, and trust to this conscious sympathy 
for the effect produced. Mr. Kean’s manner of acting is, on the contrary, 
rather a perpetual assumption of his part, always brilliant and successful, 
almost always true and natural, but yet always a distinct effort in every 
new situation, so that the actor does not seem entirely to forget himself, or 
to be identified with the character…But why do we try this actor by an 
ideal theory? (A View of the English Stage, 14, ellipses mine) 
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The above lines hit upon a theoretical division in Hazlitt’s metaphysics and 
critical theory: the hyper-individuality that he so often criticises in Wordsworth 
and the annihilation of subjectivity that he celebrates in Shakespeare. Uttara 
Natarajan has commented extensively on this primary division, stating that the 
Keatsian ‘negative capability’ that we locate in Hazlitt’s essays on Shakespeare 
can mislead the reader into thinking that the essayist roundly denigrates the 
‘egotistical sublime’. Instead, ‘The protean construct that emerges from Hazlitt’s 
Shakespeare criticism is less than compatible, however, not only with his own 
very distinctive and non-protean authorship, but also with the egotism that he 
repeatedly describes as the condition of poetry and of art in general’.
42
 
Shakespeare’s insubstantiality as singular persona, Keats’s ‘camelion Poet’, is an 
exception to the rules of ‘ordinary genius’ (Natarajan, 107). In this sense, the 
‘ideal theory’ of acting, based on a totalising sympathy with the character 
portrayed, is at odds with the sheer individual force of Edmund Kean, the actor. In 
effect, just as Hamlet and Iago and Richard III are extricated from the plays, so 
too Kean the personality transcends the character he is supposed to play. In his 
book, The Death of the Actor: Shakespeare on Page and Stage (1991), Martin 
Buzacott comments on the significance of Kean the personality on the English 
Romantic poets. He becomes: 
A symbol of wild Romantic passions both on-and off-stage, he was the 
sometime darling not just of Hazlitt, but of all the Romantic poets and 
essayists during the height of his career (which was almost exactly 
contemporary with Hazlitt’s time as a theatre critic) between 1814 and the 
end of the decade.
43
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It is imperative to note that Kean functions as the symbol of Romantic 
individuality ‘both on-and off-stage’. The person becomes larger than the actor. If 
Hazlitt ‘almost single-handedly (with the exception of important assistance from 
his friend, fellow-radical and sometime employer Leigh Hunt) established the 
standards of modern theatre criticism in Britain’ (Buzacott, 2), it may be said that 
the glamorising of the actor that has now become commonplace in contemporary 
culture, roots itself in Hazlitt’s celebration of Edmund Kean. Consequently, while 
Hazlitt applauds Shakespeare as being ‘the least of an egotist that it was possible 
to be’, he simultaneously trumpets the egotism of the characters of his plays and 
the primary actor who played these personae. For Hazlitt, Shakespeare is 
somehow beyond individuality, becoming the model for the dramatic poet: ‘He 
was nothing in himself, but he was all that others were, or that they could become’ 
(Lectures, 208). In contrast, both in his interpretations of the plays, and in his 
reviews of Kean, Hazlitt betrays an emphasis on individuality that is sharply at 
odds with the interconnectivity of drama that we have explored throughout this 
chapter.   
 How then, do we negotiate the dramatic disembodiment of ‘negative 
capability’ with the assertion of individuality, the ‘egotistical sublime’, the stamp 
of the original actor, poet and playwright? Must they essentially be at odds with 
each other? This question is one of the fundamentally important ones in our 
exploration of the grotesque in the play of irony. In response, I will take a 
Schlegelian view: the negation of self does not categorically reject the assertion of 
the poet’s individual ego. Instead, these opposing positions are in dramatic 
interplay with each other, thereby allowing a poet like Shakespeare to be both the 
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most original of writers (Pope) and the least of an egotist (Hazlitt), 
simultaneously. This dynamic negotiation between uber-subjectivity and aesthetic 
fragmentation becomes a defining mark of Romanticism’s repositioning of the 
play inherent to the Shakespearean grotesque. 
 
 V—Thinking-in-Action: The Shakespearean Grotesque 
 Over these last few pages, we have noted the undeniable influence of A. 
W. Schlegel’s lectures on William Hazlitt’s own Shakespearean criticism, as well 
as Hazlitt’s subtle shifting of the Germanic paradigm. In doing so, we have 
illustrated the key themes in our investigation of the Romantic recreation of 
Shakespeare: the annihilation of singularity, the rejection of neoclassical 
principles, the apotheosis of the individual character (textual) versus the organic 
connectedness of the play (dramatic). The dramatic proliferation of these themes 
roots itself in the functioning of Shakespeare as a writer of the grotesque, a drama 
of playful transformation that infringes upon fixed boundaries in thought and 
action. The grotesque marks the continuation of the performance in Romantic 
irony, and becomes its aesthetic result. The grotesque operates on the axes of 
interplay and theatrical connectivity. Through this chapter, we have also remarked 
upon the importance of the foreign interpretations of Shakespeare.
44
 The 
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 The last lines of Dennis Kennedy’s Foreign Shakespeare/ Contemporary Performance 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), intimate that ‘foreign Shakespeare’ may actually 
be more Shakespearean than those performances that are in English: ‘Shakespeare performance in 
English, especially in the well-established theatres, has again become tame and expected. 
Generally speaking, it has ceased to be a political challenge, and rarely is an intellectual one. 
Perhaps intercultural performances, which force the issue of Shakespeare’s foreignness and urge 
audiences to reassess comfortable attitudes about the integrity of culture, can teach us how to 
regain some of what we have lost, as those foreigners Brecht and Kott did after the war. The most 
extreme examples of foreign Shakespeare can show us what we miss most of all in the Anglo-
American theatre: the power of danger, the cruelty of power, the real prospect that a dead English 
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Schlegelian revisioning of the bard’s plays makes him into a Romantic, while 
Hazlitt’s resultant hermeneutics continue the process of making Shakespeare 
contemporary. By implication, the plurality of interpretative stances that transcend 
national border, accentuate the inherent democratic potential of a Romantic 
Shakespeare. This potential radicalises the grotesque. 
 ‘Foreignness’ itself starts to emerge as a dramatic concept, creating its 
own anxiety of influence. Hazlitt’s studies on Shakespeare betray this anxiety, and 
in the next chapter we shall see how A. W. Schlegel similarly positions his attack 
on French neoclassicism by being self-reflexive of his ‘foreigner’ status in 
Comparaison entre le Phèdre de Racine et celle d’Euripide (Comparison between 
Racine’s Phèdre and that of Euripides, 1807). I would claim that this concept of 
‘foreignness’ itself constitutes dramatic interaction. 
The physical space of the theatre (and theatre-going) represents the 
clashing of multiple viewpoints in their connectivity. To use Bakhtin’s term, it is 
perhaps the most complete representation of heteroglossia in action. Philip Davis, 
in his essay connecting Shakespeare to Hazlitt, comments on the effects caused by 
the shock of the dramatic image:  
Drama is not founded upon what we already think we think, or assume we 
are, on the basis of a past sense of reality. It is about immersion in the 
midst of action, about present time reacting imaginatively towards a future 
for itself which is as yet by definition unknown, uncreated and untried. 
(45) 
 
Drama then emerges through thinking-in-action rather than the Fichtean action-in-
thinking. The shock of a particular image collates with the Schlegelian maxim that 
good drama must be drastic. Similarly, dramatic shock, by its very nature, must be 
                                                                                                                                                               
playwright might still shake audiences to the bone, get the censor riled, make the Queen angry, get 
the actors arrested, and make us want to do something besides sit back and politely applaud’. (305) 
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‘foreign’, and by this word, I also mean alien, inherently othered. The specific 
image that Davis has in mind is Lear’s encounter with Poor Tom on the heath. 
The grotesque reality of this image asserts itself: a king finally goes mad by 
coming into contact with a character who is feigning madness, acting the role of a 
Bedlam Beggar. I would seek my moment of shock even earlier in the play, when 
Edgar performs his transformation into Poor Tom, concluding with the lines: 
‘Poor Turlygod! Poor Tom!’/ That’s something yet. Edgar I nothing am’ (Norton, 
2
nd
 ed, 2. 2. 158-160, p. 2391). Here Edgar plays out irony doing irony: the 
exclamatory words constitute the persona he creates in action for the audience that 
watches him. Ironically, this persona has substance, while in a shocking chiasmus, 
his own personality as Edgar becomes insubstantial, trivial, essentially empty. In 
French Romanticism’s negotiations with the Revolution and the Terror, as well as 
its revisioning of the Shakespearean grotesque, this notion of shock becomes 
crucial. 
 King Lear, performed not in the version by Nahum Tate, but in its entirety, 
transforms itself to the grotesque drama of Romanticism. As we have seen, it is a 
foreign critic who first takes on the onerous task of rehabilitating Shakespeare for 
the nineteenth century. In the next chapter, we shall examine how the effects of 
this rehabilitation bleed into the political stage of France in the 1820s, the country 
that uses Shakespeare to arm its own attack on its own rules of neoclassical 
drama. A. W. Schlegel’s thorough Comparaison entre le Phèdre de Racine et 
celle d’Euripide (Comparison between Racine’s Phèdre and that of Euripides, 
1807) positions Euripides and Shakespeare against the artificial and imitative 
Classicism of Racine, thereby introducing German theory to French letters. Then, 
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in Stendhal’s Racine et Shakespeare (1823/25), ‘Shakespeare’ becomes the 
vanguard of contemporary literature and drama, launching the Romantic revolt. 
Significantly, Stendhal was familiar with both Schlegel and Hazlitt, becoming in 
effect the first French Romantic. In Victor Hugo’s Préface de Cromwell (1827), 
Shakespeare comes to represent the modern grotesque for a post-Revolutionary 
world where things are necessarily deformed. In such specific examples of 
‘foreign Shakespeare’(s), the bard morphs into the harbinger of the nineteenth- 
century aesthetics of shock and dramatic vitality. Shakespeare is re-imagined in 
another culture, appropriated to the cause of Romantic modernity, thereby 
reminding us of Peter Brook’s words that ‘it is only by forgetting Shakespeare, 
that we can begin to find him’.
45
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    Chapter III 
 
 
Revolutionary Catharsis: Shakespearean Negotiations  
    In A. W. Schlegel, Stendhal, and Hugo 
 
I am a furious Romantic, that is to say I am for Shakespeare against 
Racine.
1
 
 
Stendhal, from a Letter of 1818 
 
The [Academy] hates Shakespeare. It detects in him the very act of 
mingling with the people, going to and fro in public thoroughfares…the 
drama of Shakespeare is for the people.
2
 
 
Victor Hugo, from William Shakespeare  
 
The preface to ‘Cromwell’ was to our eyes like the Tablets of the Law on 
Sinai, and no refutation was possible.
3
 
 
Théophile Gautier, from Histoire du Romantisme 
 
 
I—‘Foreign Shakespeare’ and the French Romantics 
 
 In our journey through Romantic theory thus far, we have examined the 
anti-essentialism and theatrical plurality of Friedrich Schlegel’s Romantic irony, 
while simultaneously pushing towards a theory of the grotesque that celebrates 
shape-shifting, multiplicity of perspective, and carnality in art that was often 
hidden away by neoclassical aesthetics. In the first chapter then, I proposed the 
notion of theatricality as ontology in the progressive, circular movement of 
Romantic irony. Art forms itself into the prime mover in the mythology of 
Romantic unification, while outlining the failure of first principle philosophic 
systems. Once the comfort of a Fichtean absolute self is destroyed, the Jena 
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Romantics open up the play of paradox and metamorphosis. Crucially, as we saw 
in the last chapter, for the Schlegel brothers, this particularly playful interaction of 
perspectives and modes of being is mirrored most completely in Shakespearean 
drama. The Romantic reinvention of Shakespeare, inaugurated by A. W. Schlegel 
in his Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature (1809), and then transmitted to 
and reviewed in Hazlitt’s extensive Shakespearean criticism, becomes 
synonymous with a drastic reinterpretation of traditional notions of artistic beauty, 
the strict separation of styles and genres, as well as the apotheosis of the natural 
over self-conscious artifice. Furthermore, in an age of revolutionary excess, the 
dismantling of the ancien régime of aesthetics coincides with the interrogation of 
political hierarchies.
4
 Shakespearean drama, by mingling tragedy and comedy, 
high seriousness and buffoonery, by engendering itself as a perpetually moving 
pageant of princes and clowns, by constituting the give and take between high art 
and popular cultural forms, represents the myriad faces of a new republic of 
letters.  
For the Germans, his first foreign re-inventors, Shakespeare (‘Unser 
Shakespeare’) sets up the foundation for a national Renaissance.
5
 Shakespeare 
instantiates freedom from the dictates of French neoclassicism. Shakespeare, as 
the über-individual author, negates the hackneyed rules of bienséance, 
vraisemblance, and the unities of time, place, and action. The bard acquires a god-
like stature, to which he has ever since been accustomed. His plays come to 
                                                          
4
 The connection between Romantic aesthetics and political upheaval caused by the French 
Revolution is a theme that runs through this investigation. See the texts by Ernst Behler, Andrew 
Bowie, and Paul Hamilton, discussed in Chapter I. 
5
 See Chapter II, particularly my references to Thoman G. Sauer’s A. W. Schlegel’s Shakespearean 
Criticism in England (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1981), Simon Williams’ 
Shakespeare on the German Stage, Vol I 1586-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), and Dennis Kennedy’s Foreign Shakespeare: Contemporary Performance (Cambridge: 
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represent the mysterious workings of the universe in all its variety. What had been 
previously perceived as heinous faults—the mixing of genres, the use of the 
supernatural, the representation of the carnivalesque body, for example—start to 
embody the totalising vision of the English dramatist. The cultural and political 
ramifications of this Teutonic deconstruction and simultaneous recreation of the 
bard were immense. Neoclassical unities were ceaselessly questioned and 
subverted. 
In his iconic Scenes From the Drama of European Literature (1959), Erich 
Auerbach provides an interesting socio-political twist to the notion of 
vraisemblance, the overarching idea behind Neoclassical dramatic theory: 
Vraisemblance, on which the new arguments for the “unities” was 
eventually based, marks a way of thinking which found change of scene 
improbable and therefore objectionable because the stage was small and 
could never be anything but the same stage, and rejected extension of time 
because of the brevity of performance. The notion of vraisemblance is 
typical of cultivated society. It combines the arrogant nationalism that 
refuses to be taken in by imaginative illusion with contempt for the indocte 
et stupide vulgaire which is perfectly willing to be taken in.
6
 
 
Similarly, bienséance, which is ‘cemented by a subtly developed sense of tact’ 
(Auerbach, 158), prohibits the representation of bodily activities on the stage. 
Primarily, depictions of all forms of violence are banned. As illustrated in the last 
chapter, Shakespearean scenes like the blinding of Gloucester in King Lear—a 
vitally dramatic and grotesque ‘physical indication of human frailty’ (Auerbach, 
160)—are to be abhorred. In some cases, even eating and drinking are left 
perennially off-stage. Like ‘verisimilitude’, ‘decorum’ is a function of polite 
culture. Such a culture damns fantasy and ‘imaginative illusion’ as theatrical 
idiosyncrasies best enjoyed by the ‘vulgar’ sections of the community. 
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 Scenes From the Drama of European Literature (USA: Meridian Books, 1959), p. 159. 
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Shakespeare, the product of a barbaric England, the ‘sauvage ivre’ (‘drunk 
savage’) so dear to Voltaire, is not to be admitted into civilised society.
7
 As we 
shall see, the juxtaposition of Shakespeare to ideas of ‘wildness’ and ‘savagery’ 
are uncanny when related to the Voltairean rejection of the bodily and the natural.  
Effectively, art must transcend the baser concerns of our animal origins 
and constitutions. The ordered, enlightened mind must necessarily evince a 
calculated revulsion towards the Falstaffian figure. The assault on rationally 
constructed aesthetic systems, which by their very nature vitiate the supra-natural 
and ever-renewing play of art in Romantic literature, must be resisted. 
Furthermore, the ‘arrogant nationalism’ that Auerbach refers to is necessarily 
French. In other words, neoclassical theory circumvents categories of cultural and 
aesthetic difference by subsuming them into a dominant French cultural 
imperialism in Europe.    
 In Chapter II, we have seen how the theatre, in its democratic mixing of 
world-views, is often at odds with le bon ton and le bel usage of a royal court and 
its manners. By exhibiting an unequivocal desire for transgression, the violently 
dramatic nature of the Shakespearean grotesque nullifies attempts at a merely 
polished theatrical production common to the aristocratic tastes of a cultivated 
Paris. By relegating the rules of decorum to a pre-Revolutionary past, 
Shakespearean drama paves the way to the future, and signifies the most serious 
challenge to French dominance of cultural discourse and production in the 
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 See John Pemble, Shakespeare Goes to Paris: How the Bard Conquered France (London: 
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nineteenth century.  As we shall see in this chapter, the French reception and 
relocation of Shakespeare within the context of a blood-filled, post-Revolutionary 
society, marks the most personal, and scathing, attack on the premises of a Gallic 
cultural hegemony. 
Just as the English translation of A. W. Schlegel’s lectures in 1815 
inspired Hazlitt’s Characters of Shakespeare’s Plays (1816), so too the earlier 
French translation moved a certain Stendhal towards defining his own take on the 
nascent Romantic literature in Italy and France. As Emile J. Talbot, reviewing 
René Welleck’s assertion in her influential Stendhal and Romantic Esthetics 
(1985) says, ‘Stendhal was the first French writer to call himself a Romantic’.
8
 In 
the second decade of the nineteenth century, while resident in Milan, this first 
Romantic of French letters was beginning to define his own theoretical notions of 
Romantic literature. For Stendhal, an emphasis on the inner world of the 
individual, combined with a focus on ‘strong passions’ comprised the 
fundamental tenets of Romanticism (Talbot, 29). Significantly, Schlegel’s lectures 
helped galvanise these thoughts for the young Frenchman. He admired, and then 
slowly over the next few years, began to revolt against Schlegelian formulations: 
Stendhal first learnt about Romanticism by reading Schlegel’s Cours de la 
littérature dramatique in 1813 and was at first favourably disposed to 
Schlegel’s presentation of it within the context of a North/South 
opposition. As he began reading the Edinburgh Review, however, his 
opinion of Schlegel changed, and he quickly began to attack Schlegel on 
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 Stendhal and Romantic Esthetics (Lexington, KY: French Forum Publishers, 1985), p. 10. This 
text remains the classic study in English on Stendhal’s development as a writer, while highlighting 
the prevalent ideas that came to dominate his unique take on Romantic literature. The relationship 
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all fronts, but particularly for his arrogance and what Stendhal called his 
‘mysticism’. But he remained convinced, nevertheless, of the need for a 
new literature which would have to be defined in a formulation different 
from Schlegel’s. (Talbot, 29) 
 
The above passage accentuates the cosmopolitan exchange of ideas that 
characterises our take on Romantic aesthetics in this study. A. W. Schlegel’s 
commentary on the endlessly becoming, organic, and picturesque (as opposed to 
plastic) Romantische poesie unique to the Anglo-Germanic north makes an 
obvious and profound impression on Stendhal. However, once he begins reading 
the Edinburgh Review, an outlet for certain ideas of British Romanticism, he 
begins questioning the elder German’s propensity towards ‘mysticism’. As we 
saw in the last chapter, Hazlitt launches this unbridled attack on Germanic 
generalisations and mystical yearnings.
9
 Furthermore, his work frequently 
appeared in the Edinburgh Review. In particular, his review of Schlegel’s 
lectures—the first of its kind in Britain—was first published in the Edinburgh 
Review 26 in February 1816. Later in that year, it was reprinted in his hugely 
important Characters of Shakespeare’s Plays. As Duncan Wu has observed 
recently, Stendhal was intimately familiar with Hazlitt’s work, and their meeting 
and conversations in London in 1824 even helped shape Stendhal’s polemic in 
Racine et Shakespeare (1823/25).
10
 Consequently, a careful and sustained reading 
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 See Hazlitt’s review of Schlegel’s Lectures in Characters of Shakespeare’s Plays in Selected 
Writings of William Hazlitt, Vol. 1, ed. Duncan Wu (London: Pickering and Chatto, 1998), where 
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 William Hazlitt: The First Modern Man (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Wu claims 
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of German and British perspectives on the elements of Romanticism starts to 
shape Stendhal’s burgeoning aesthetic philosophy, which would receive its 
theoretical treatment in his eponymous, and immensely influential, Racine et 
Shakespeare pamphlets of 1823 and 1825. The opposition between two theatrical 
giants—one representative of Gallic ‘good taste’ (Racine), the other posing a 
threat from the gargantuan Gothic ruins of a foggy, northern clime 
(Shakespeare)—sets up a dialectic that would dominate French Romanticism.  
Theatrical resonances and reconfigurations are vital in this context.   
 Charles Affron, in his study of French Romantic drama, illuminates the 
importance of theatrical spectacle in the development of French Romanticism: 
The history of Romanticism is punctuated with important dates related to 
the theatre: Constant’s version of Wallenstein (1809), Stendhal’s Racine et 
Shakespeare (1823), the visit of the Kemble-Smithson troupe (1827), 
Hugo’s Preface to Cromwell (1827), Dumas’ Henri III et sa cour (1829), 
Vigny’s version of Othello (1829), and the bataille d’Hernani (1830). In 
their quarrel with the classics, the romantics unleashed their loudest voice 
in the theatre. The novel and lyric poetry are of course genres exploited 
during the period, but they did not offer the same opportunity for direct 
confrontation of the old manner. Any controversy aroused by the 
publication of a recueil or a roman noir is paled by the shouting matches 
attendant upon a controversial premiere.
11
 
 
Interestingly, the listed landmarks of the French take on Romanticism not only 
concern the theatre, but in most cases have links to a particularly Shakespearean 
theatre. Stendhal’s texts constitute a sustained attack on the ancien régime of 
French Neoclassicism; Hugo’s preface links the modern grotesque to 
Shakespeare, while the performance of Hernani on November 25, 1830 is often 
                                                                                                                                                               
Quixote (‘which made me die laughing’, Stendhal wrote)...‘Sir Walter Scott, Racine et 
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the Schlegel brothers through to the Racine et Shakespeare pamphlets. 
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considered a watershed for the French Romantics; Vigny adapts and updates 
Othello for a new audience; and the Shakespearean performances of the Kemble-
Smithson troupe were seen and deified by the likes of Hugo, Gautier, and Berlioz 
among other eminent bohemians. Theatrical spectacle propounds the new credo 
with maximum effect. The interconnectivity of audience to activity on stage and 
the reality of ‘direct confrontation’ symptomatic of a live performance announces 
new ideas with great gusto. In doing so, these dangerously new ideas self-
reflexively comment on the importance of the theatre as a public activity in post-
revolutionary France, while emphasising an acute theatricalisation of everyday 
life that had commenced with the public guillotine.
12
 The significance of this 
growing importance of the theatre and performativity will be examined during the 
course of this analysis. If, according to Friedrich Schlegel, the French Revolution 
was one of the principal ‘tendencies’ of the age (the others famously being 
Fichte’s philosophy and Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister), while also being a ‘frightful 
grotesque’ where contradictions and opposites coalesce, it is appropriate that 
some of the most cataclysmic and public demonstrations of artistic transformation 
in European Romanticism happened in the homeland of drastic socio-political 
changes.
                                                          
12
 This line of thought is influenced by Christine Marcandier-Colard’s impressive Crimes de Sang 
et Scène Capitales: Essai sur l’esthétique romantique de la violence (Paris: Presses Universitaire 
de la France, 1998), which treats the idea of crime in Revolutionary France as the foundation for a 
new aesthetics of revolt. The criminal, the outlaw, the murderer, all symbolise the Romantic 
aesthetic. Significantly, scenes of murder—the guillotine primarily—operate as fecund images of 
carnage that feed this developing manner of seeing the world. Future references will be cited in the 
text. 
The epigraphs for this chapter will determine its successive stages of 
progression. In the first, writing in 1818 (five years before the first Racine et 
Shakespeare pamphlet), Stendhal intimates the differences between the two 
dramatists, thereby establishing a binary that negotiates and subverts conventional 
tastes, while opening up French letters to peculiarly foreign influences. Leaving 
little to the imagination, Stendhal proudly declares himself a Romantic, but does 
so by associating himself with Shakespeare against the pre-eminent and prized 
dramatist of his own nation. Racine, the symbol of French neoclassicism, is dealt 
a body blow. The next few sections of this chapter will analyse this dramatic 
interplay between ‘Shakespeare’ and ‘Racine’ as symbolic representatives of two 
intrinsically opposed paradigms of theatrical form. We shall do this by first 
examining the theoretical underpinnings of a forgotten text by A. W. Schlegel, 
Comparaison entre la Phèdre de Racine et celle d’Euripide (Comparison between 
Racine’s Phèdre and that of Euripides, 1807). In doing so, I will set up a seamless 
connection between the Schlegelian theorisation of Shakespeare in the last 
chapter, and the French revisioning of neoclassical dogma in the 1820s, in this 
one. 
 The second epigraph builds upon the first. If Racine personifies the tastes 
of an aristocratic, ‘cultivated society’, Shakespeare according to Hugo is the 
harbinger of a unique democracy of aesthetic experience. Crucially, the Académie 
Française, against which Stendhal would position his pamphlets and Hugo his 
Préface de Cromwell (1827), rejects the play of the Shakespearean grotesque 
because it represents the invasion of ‘low culture’ into the bastion of neoclassical 
good taste. Here, it is vital to note that the hallowed Academy of France hates 
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Shakespeare since his drama depicts, and often celebrates, ‘the very act of 
mingling with the people’ in a range of ‘public thoroughfares’ (italics mine). In 
other words, the Academy betrays an anxiety towards plays that not only 
confound conventional systems of morality and aesthetics, but do so by allowing 
theatrical experience to be accessible to a wide audience. Shakespearean drama 
operates beyond the floorboards of the royal stage.  It attacks the basis of a purely 
aristocratic, noble culture. As I have repeatedly shown in the last chapter, 
theatricality is—or should be—fundamentally primal, transgressive, and opposed 
to systems, first principles, decorum. The fourth section of this chapter will 
develop this paradigm through Hugo’s legendary Préface, which puts forth a 
theory of the grotesque unique to the model of modern drama.  
Finally, Gautier’s appraisal and deification of Hugo’s Préface exemplifies 
its importance within the context of French Romanticism, while leading us 
towards an examination of the effects of Shakespearean reinvention in 
Revolutionary France. The concluding section of this chapter will take us to the 
underbelly of the boulevard theatres of nineteenth-century Paris, as far from the 
madding academicians as possible. In a neglected and short text, ‘Shakespeare 
aux Funambules’ (1848), Gautier recounts his experiences on watching the 
legendary mime Deburau play his stock character, Pierrot, for an adoring, mass, 
often poor, audience. In finding such Shakespearean elements in a ‘drama for the 
people’, Gautier will help us comprehend the essentially democratic and liberating 
quality of a dramatic, Romantic grotesque.  
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II—A. W. Schlegel’s Comparaison and the Negation of Neoclassicism 
 
 Before we approach Stendhal’s key pamphlets, which function by almost 
reductively associating Shakespeare with the modern vitalism of the Romantic 
movement, and Racine with an antiquarianism of collective national nostalgia, I 
would like to resurrect a ‘little book’ written by A. W. Schlegel, in which he takes 
it upon himself to commence a coruscating attack on France’s beloved Racine. 
Comparaison entre la Phèdre de Racine et celle d’Euripide was written in French 
by the great German critic, and published by a little press in Paris in 1807. There 
has been little critical commentary on this obscure work as it ‘is neither included 
in German editions of A. W. Schlegel’s collected works nor widely available in 
libraries’.
13
 Unabashedly, this extended essay takes Racine to task, thereby 
betraying ‘the tendency of German intellectuals to react against the dramas and 
poetics of the classical French tradition and to stake out in opposition a new 
aesthetic for German literature based on a return to the Greek classics’ 
(Mastronarde, 2). Written two years before his landmark lectures on drama and 
theatrical theory (and Shakespeare), the Comparaison adumbrates a particularly 
German discontentment with French drama. As we know from the last chapter, 
the ‘new aesthetic for German literature’, developing from the anti-philosophy of 
Friedrich Schlegel’s fragments, would eventually look towards Shakespeare rather 
than the Greek classics. Nevertheless, given that Stendhal was very familiar with 
the elder Schlegel’s work, we can look upon moments in this little text as points 
                                                          
13
 See the recent digital edition of Comparaison entre la Phèdre de Racine et celle d’Euripide, ed. 
Donald J. Mastronarde (Berkeley: University of California, 2006), p. 2, downloaded at 
<http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucbclassics/cp/paper03_A_W_Schlegel_Comparaison_des_deux_Phe
dres/>. For my own purposes, I have used the original 1807 edition of the text, Comparaison entre 
la Phèdre de Racine et celle d’Euripide (Paris: Chez Tourneisen Fils, Librarie, 1807). Future 
references to the latter will be cited in the text. All translations from the original French to English 
are mine. 
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of departure, the propaedeutics for a reflection on the principal themes in Racine 
et Shakespeare.    
 The first two sentences of Comparaison provide groundwork for the larger 
issues that surround the appreciation of Racine within neoclassical dogma: 
Racine est le poëte favori des Français, et Phèdre est l’une de ses pièces le 
plus admirées. On jouit sans comparer, et l’on arrive bientôt à croire que 
l’objet de notre prédilection est incomparable. Les lecteurs français surtout 
s’attachent de préférence aux détails de la diction et de la versification: ils 
ne relèvent que de beaux morceaux, dans des ouvrages qui devraient être 
sentis et jugés dans leur ensemble.  
 
[Racine is the favourite poet of the French, and Phèdre is one of his most 
admired works. One attains an incomparable aesthetic ecstasy, and one 
soon comes to believe that the object of our predilection is incomparable. 
French readers are particularly attached to details concerning diction and 
versification: they only focus on ‘pretty’ pieces in works that should be 
felt and judged in their entirety] (3) 
 
The attack from the north has begun. The above lines display more than a touch of 
an ironic undercutting of established, privileged positions and norms. By stating 
that Racine is France’s favourite poet, Schlegel imbues ‘Racine’ (and his iconic 
play) with a metonymic significance. This specific French playwright represents 
all that is good and bad in French aesthetics. By ironising the supposed superiority 
of Racine over all dramatic literature—a position that Shakespeare subsequently 
comes to occupy—Schlegel interrogates the premises of popular academic 
wisdom. Furthermore, the German highlights particular themes that we have 
already encountered: the French value sonority and elegance of language over the 
cohesive, organic whole of dramatic action itself. By insisting upon what the 
French reader does not pay attention to, Schlegel alerts us to his own organic 
theory of drama, by which a play must be received and appreciated through a 
totality of dramatic impact. The play is born through the sum of its constituent 
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parts, which are simultaneously isolated (as mini-systems in themselves) while 
being completely co-dependent on the other fragments that help take the dramatic 
experience to fruition.
14
 The ‘beautiful pieces’ of Racine’s play may represent 
great poetry written in strictly formal alexandrines, but may not necessarily 
translate into arresting dramatic action that appeals to a wide audience.  
 After hammering a first nail into the neoclassical coffin, Schlegel plays his 
aesthetico-political hand without reserve. Apposite to my take on the ideological 
signification of the ‘foreign critic’, Schlegel says: ‘On pourra donc écouter la-
dessus un étranger et opposer des arguments aux siens; mais on ne saurait le 
récuser d’avance comme incompétent’ [One may listen to a foreigner on the 
subject and counter-argue with him, but one should not reject him as being 
incompetent] (4). Here we encounter the anxiety that develops from the 
cosmopolitan contact and intercultural interaction characteristic of Romantic 
literature and critical theory. Just as Hazlitt would grudgingly concede that 
Schlegel’s take on Shakespeare was superior to analyses performed by English 
critics (and that his own Shakespearean criticism was being born out of a need to 
provide an adequate riposte), so too the case with the French.
15
 Here, Schlegel 
self-reflexively questions the possibility of outraged, and arrogant, French 
responses to his comparative study. In addition, the German critic unequivocally 
states that he prefers Euripides’ play to Racine’s. It is without doubt that Schlegel 
                                                          
14
 See Friedrich Schlegel’s famous definition of the fragment as being complete-in-itself like a 
porcupine, while being coincidentally linked to other fragments that provide the context for its 
becoming (Firchow, 189). The organic theory of A. W. Schlegel—in light of his brother’s 
theory—has been looked at in Chapters I and II. See also Charles I. Armstrong’s Romantic 
Organicism: From Idealist origins to Ambivalent Afterlife (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2003).    
15
 In Characters of Shakespeare’s Plays in Selected Writings of William Hazlitt, Vol. 1, ed. Duncan 
Wu (London: Pickering and Chatto, 1998), Hazlitt reprints his review of Schlegel’s lectures. I have 
examined this particular review in Chapter II. 
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possesses a political agenda: he seeks to confront, subvert, and undermine a 
prevailing French attitude towards their own cultural self-importance, while 
exemplifying a daring Germanic (or ‘northern’) independence from the burden of 
neoclassicism.  By rating Racine below Euripides, he commits an unthinkable act 
in the language of his oppressors. He questions ‘la prétention ordinaire’ of French 
critics in their vain belief that ‘le théâtre de leur nation, et surtout le théâtre 
tragiqie, repose sur les mêmes principes que celui des Grecs, et qu’il en est 
comme la continuation, quoiqu’il soit infiniment plus parfait’ [the theatre of their 
nation, and especially the tragic theatre, rests on the same principles as those of 
the Greeks, and that it is like a continuation, although it is infinitely more perfect] 
(5).  
This cultural assumption that Schlegel refers to is founded on a myopic 
cultural arrogance perhaps best encapsulated by Voltaire in a letter to Horace 
Walpole: ‘I have believed, I do believe, and I will believe that in the composition 
of tragedy and comedy, Paris is quite superior to Athens’.
16
 Of course, Voltaire is 
the presiding deity of the popular ideals of the French artistic (and social) nobility. 
From a Voltairean perspective then, too much license breeds incoherence and bad 
taste. In contrast, according to Schlegel writing in an age of Romantic 
revisionings, the celebrated French author becomes an academic charlatan. For 
Schlegel, the plethora of Voltaire’s views on Attic tragedy, or Shakespeare for 
that matter, develops on shaky scholastic ground: ‘Voltaire, avec une 
connaissance médiocre des anciens, a essayé le premier de donner une théorie de 
                                                          
16
 Printed in Dramatic Theory and Criticism—Greeks to Grotowski, ed. Bernard F. Dukore (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, inc., 1974), p. 286. I have looked at this letter in Chapter II. 
Vitally, Voltaire seems to associate (aesthetico-political) freedom with failure in artistic coherence 
and impact. 
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la tragédie antique’ [Voltaire, with a mediocre knowledge of the ancients, tried to 
be the first to provide a theory of Attic tragedy] (7). The label of mediocrity sits 
upon Voltaire’s scholarly efforts; he attempted to provide a theory of Attic drama, 
without succeeding. One can detect a competitive element here, given that 
Schlegel was at this point preparing his copious notes and lectures on ancient 
Greek drama. Nevertheless, to make such anti-Voltairean statements would have 
required immense courage. In making such bold claims then, Schlegel performs a 
theatrical act of insidious revolt: he uses the French language to foment a mode of 
intellectual insurrection. In a succinct manner, he asserts that Racine, Voltaire, in 
fact all of French classical theatre and values, are moribund, overrated, outdated.  
Furthermore, Schlegel is quick to seize upon the defining notion that 
governs the artist’s relationship with her audience: ‘Toujours le poëte, surtout le 
poëte dramatique, est modifié par le public’ [The poet, especially the dramatic 
poet, is always modified by the audience] (8). We unearth two Romantic 
tendencies here. If an artist is influenced by his audience, then it goes without 
saying that her work, in one way or other, must be dependent on the world-views 
of that very audience. In other words, audience expectations contaminate the 
work. Here we have the blueprint for a relativism of perspective: by implication, 
Racine’s plays are honed for a specific spectator. Voltaire’s problems with 
Shakespearean drama are similarly dependent on the world-views of such an 
audience. Secondly, Schlegel also affirms the perpetually connected and 
interactive theatrical model, where the trope of immediacy is privileged. It is in 
the dramatic mode, above all else, where the subtle shifts of aesthetic interaction 
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take place with maximum effect. The audience shapes the work, the work the 
audience.    
Positioning himself against Voltairean sentiments, Schlegel goes on to 
recreate the Euripidean idiom in a way that epitomises Romantic leanings: 
‘Euripide est un auteur fort inégal, soit dans ses différentes pièces, soit dans leurs 
diverses parties: tantôt il est d’une beauté ravissante; d’autre fois il a pour ainsi 
dire une veine vulgaire’ [Euripides’ writing is highly unequal, be it in his different 
plays, or in their diverse parts: his writing is sometimes of a ravishing beauty, and 
at other times in a vulgar vein] (11). The key words that characterise the Greek are 
inégal and diverses parties, while the polarity between beauté ravissante and 
veine vulgaire sums up the aesthetic alternation of the dramatic paradigm so dear 
to the German Romantics. Euripides forms himself into a pre-Shakespearean 
character, a volatile force for the fluid mapping of the grotesque: his plays are a 
melange of conflicting parts. In addition, Schlegel negotiates the reality of this 
melange with some generalisations on the quality of ancient passion. For the 
ancients, love as an emotion is inextricably linked with animality, and what is 
consubstantially natural; it is only with modern nations that notions of gallantry 
are introduced, along with ‘un culte plus respectueux pour les femmes’ [a more 
respectable cult for women] (12). What is herein implied, shockingly, is that the 
fair and respectful treatment of women is unnatural, contrary to the animal 
impulses of human coexistence. Consequently, chivalry is a social construct in a 
predominantly Christian world. If the plays of Euripides alternate between 
‘ravishing beauty’ and vulgarity, often in the very same play, then it is because the 
ethereal and the obscene are both natural conditions of human existence. In a 
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manner prefiguring Hugo’s understanding of the modern grotesque, Euripidean 
drama is true to the nature of lived experience. Conversely, the desire to banish 
what is obscene, vulgar, and ugly from the stage connotes the sublation of what is 
natural. Instead, a more manicured product, embellished by an artificial beauty, 
engenders itself.  
In accordance with this renewed battle between the natural and the 
artificial construction, Schlegel does not hesitate to remind the reader that much 
that is good in Racine’s play is ‘prise en entier du grec’ [is taken entirely from the 
Greek] (18). Schlegel is also quick to repeatedly use the word l’imitation for 
Racine, in opposition to l’original of Euripides. Given the Romantic cultural 
scaffolding, where originality is prised beyond all else, Racine becomes the pale 
imitator, using admirable diction and well-crafted verse in order to merely re-
polish the original genius of Euripides’ text. Racine’s play grows from ‘la 
politesse des formes et l’élégance des vers’ [the politeness of form and the 
elegance of verse] (23). Once again, the emphasis falls on the concept of elegant 
and polite presentation. This is epitomised by the nature of the French playwright 
himself, ‘qui nous fait trop souvent ressouvenir de la cour de France’ [who 
reminds us far too often of the French court] (30). Schlegel here unapologetically 
connects the playwright to the ancien régime of the French court and its manners. 
Without going into unnecessary detail, suffice to say that Schlegel abhors the 
character of Racine’s Hippolyte when juxtaposed with Euripides’s original. In the 
Greek, he is solemn and heroic; in the French, he seems impassive, exhausted, and 
morally burdened (45). In Racine’s text, this emotional trauma tenuously weaves 
itself through a ‘malédiction rhétoriquement amplifié’ [rhetorically amplified 
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curse] (51). Repeatedly then, the reader is reminded of Racine’s rhetorical 
postures, and one may question whether Schlegel browbeats us with this 
perspective.  
Perhaps more interestingly, Schlegel returns to the innate religiosity of the 
ancients, stating that ‘Les anciens avaient plus que nous un sentiment religieux de 
la vie’ [More than us, the ancients had a greater religious feeling for life] (54). 
Such feeling manifests itself in an almost casual acceptance of happiness and 
sorrow, past and future, developing into a unique heroism unknown to the modern 
mind (54). In contrast, while the modern poet cannot represent solemnity and 
heroism, he can turn, once again, to the suggestive force of ‘beautiful verse and 
diction’ (57). Moreover, if Racine embodies a particular type of modern poet, 
Schlegel intimates that his work is more suited to the epic, rather than the 
dramatic mode (58). For Schlegel, the effective tragedy must, in essence, be 
uneven and violent, yet illustrative of nobility, which reflects the ‘sentiment de la 
dignité de la nature humaine’ [feeling of the dignity of human nature] (77). 
Tragedy revels in ‘situations difficiles, de collisions compliqués...de revers 
imprévus, de terrible catastrophes’ [difficult situations, complicated 
collisions...unforeseeable reversals, terrible catastrophes] (78, ellipses mine).   
Given this theoretical stance, Euripides’ play—the embodiment of a new form in 
ancient tragedy—is closer to the tragic medium than Racine’s. The terror endemic 
to the drama of Aeschylus and the fatality of Sophocles constitutes the most 
perfect representation of Attic tragedy. Euripides presents a more confounding 
case, the poet who is simultaneously a tragedian and a sophist:     
Dans Euripide, on peut distinctement apercevoir un double personage: le 
poëte, dont les productions étaient consacrées à une solemnité religieuse et 
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qui, étant sur la protection de la religion, devait la respecter à son tour; et 
de sophiste à pretentions philosophiques, qui, au milieu du merveilles 
fabuleuses, liées à la religion, dans laquelle il devait puiser les sujets de 
ses pieces, tâchait de glisser ses doutes et ses opinions d’esprit fort... 
 
[In Euripides, one can distinctly perceive a dual character. On one hand 
emerges the figure of a poet whose work is consecrated to religious 
solemnity and who, being under the protection of this same religion, is 
bound to respect it. On the other hand, one finds the figure of the sophist 
with philosophic pretensions who amidst fabulist marvels connected to 
religion—the framework from which he had to draw his play’s subjects—
tries to slip in strong spirited doubts and opinions…] (88, ellipses mine). 
 
This dual character of the playwright is vital within the context of Schlegelian 
Romantic theory. Operating through the framework of multiple personae is the 
hallmark of the Romantic ironist. Euripides then is simultaneously solemn and 
mischievous. He possesses a smattering of the religious conviction claimed and 
celebrated by the preceding tragedians—Aeschylus and Sophocles—while also 
heralding the birth of a more sceptical spirit. As an artist, or rather, a ‘sophist of 
philosophic pretensions’, his work presents a subtle questioning of established 
values. He is the playwright who brings philosophical doubt into the tapestry of 
ancient tragedy. In this sense, he is Nietzsche’s Socratic dramatist in The Birth of 
Tragedy, who allows the cold rationalist spirit of the philosopher to contaminate 
the Dionysian spirit unique to ancient theatrical spectacle, ritual, and orgiastic 
celebration. Within a Schlegelian context however, one may say that Euripides’ 
creation of doubt functions in a manner similar to the permanent parabasis of 
Romantic irony: solemnity and conviction are repeatedly subverted by sophistic 
intervention. It may be recalled that Friedrich Schlegel often referred to his 
concept of irony as a form of Socratic dialectic. In a different vein, Kierkegaard 
attacks the premises of Romantic irony by associating it with what he perceives as 
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the malaise of Socratic nihilism.
17
 Nevertheless, this supposed nihilism may be 
seen as a fundamentally dramatic act: if the theatre permits multiple views to 
interact without there being a dominant perspective, then a certain sophistry 
alternating with religious conviction widens the spectrum of Attic tragedy. 
Euripides’ double character permits multiple views consubstantial with the play of 
the vulgar and the ethereal in his dramatic output.  
 Here, it is vital to emphasise that the Comparaison is much more than a 
comparative study of two plays, or two playwrights from different historical eras. 
It is foremost a polemically charged pamphlet that interrogates the received 
wisdom of French neoclassical theatre. Secondly, it must be seen as the 
foundation from which Schlegel develops his long-standing views on the nature of 
the dramatic art, which he would collate and propound in the Lectures on 
Dramatic Art and Literature (1809). In several ways, his favourable treatment of 
Euripides may be attributed to the Romantic propensity to idealize the Hellenic 
world. In a fashion related to Schiller’s antinomy of the ‘naive’ and the 
‘sentimental’ poet, ‘ancient passion’ is resurrected by a common cultural nostalgia 
as being elementally different from the nature of ‘modern passion’. The former is 
primarily religious and precedes continual self-consciousness. However, 
Euripides marks the second stage in the development of tragic drama, by being a 
poet who introduces self-reflexivity as a theatrical trope into an obviously 
religious schema.
18
                                                          
17
 See my discussion of Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Irony, with continual reference to Socrates 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, c1989) in Chapter I. 
18
 See Schiller’s On the Naive and the Sentimental in Literature, trans. Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly 
(Manchester: Carcanet New Press, 1981) for his famous treatment of the differences between the 
Hellenic poet, who possessed an intimate and immediate contact with the natural world, and the 
modern poet, who is intellectually separated from nature. For Schiller, the great naive poets are 
Homer, Cervantes, Shakespeare, and Goethe. 
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Nevertheless, the most vital form of tragic theatre comes from further north.  
For Schlegel then, the third significant system of tragic drama—following on from the 
solemnity of Aeschylus and the calculated dramatic sophistry of Euripides—is 
quintessentially Shakespearean. Towards the final pages of the Comparaison, having 
denounced Racine in favour of Euripidean tragedy, Schlegel makes some pertinent 
observations on Shakespeare, in what may be seen as a prolegomena to his discussion 
of the English playwright in his famous lectures a few years later. Analysing some of 
his comments on Shakespeare, particularly those on Hamlet, will help us make the 
transition towards the ideological frame governing Racine et Shakespeare, while 
simultaneously encapsulating the themes that preside over this study—the rejection of 
neoclassical dogma, the self-conscious desecration of Voltaire, and the reinvention of 
Shakespeare as the über-individual author he would become in the Lectures. I quote at 
length: 
Je concois un troisième système tragique, dont l’exemple a été donné par le 
seul Shakespeare; ce poëte à intentions profondes, qu’on a singulièrement 
méconnu en le prenant pour un génie sauvage, produisant aveuglement des 
ouvrages incohérens. J’appelerai Hamlet une tragédie philosophique ou, pour 
mieux dire, sceptique. Elle a été inspiré par une méditation profonde sur les 
destinées humaines, et elle l’inspire à son tour. L’âme ne pouvant acquiescer à 
aucune conviction, cherche vainement à sortir du labyrinthe par une autre 
issue que par l’idée du néant universel. La marche à dessein lente, embarrassée 
et quelquefois rétrograde de l’action, est l’emblème de l’hésitation 
intellectuelle qui est l’essence du poëme: c’est une réflexion non terminée et 
interminable sur le but de l’existence, une réflexion dont la mort tranche enfin 
le noeud gordien. 
 
[I conceive of a third system of tragedy, which has been exemplified by the 
one and only Shakespeare – the poet whose profound intentions have been 
particularly misunderstood by his portrayal as a savage genius who blindly 
produced incoherent works. I will refer to Hamlet as a philosophical tragedy 
or even a sceptical one. It has been inspired by a profound meditation on 
human destiny, which it has influenced in turn. The soul, unable to acquiesce 
to any conviction, searches vainly to escape from the labyrinth through an exit 
other than that of the idea of universal nothingness. The slow-paced plot, that 
hinders and sometimes reverses the action, is emblematic of the intellectual 
hesitation that is the poem’s essence: an interminable reflection on the goal of 
existence, a reflection whose death finally chops the Gordian knot.]  (91) 
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The Shakespearean system, for Schlegel, is perhaps the most complete form of tragic 
theatre. Setting the tone for the bardolatory that would so influence writers as varied 
as Hazlitt and Stendhal, Schlegel declares the English dramatist to be unique. In 
reference to the Voltairean categorisation of Shakespeare as ‘un sauvage ivre’ (‘a 
drunk savage’), Schlegel proceeds to provide a sketch of Hamlet that diverges from 
the popular notion of Shakespeare as an untutored artist. Instead, Shakespeare is here 
said to possess ‘profound intentions’ and his most famous play perhaps represents a 
logical development on the philosophical tragedy first conceived by Euripides. 
Schlegel’s description of Hamlet distils the acute self-consciousness characteristic of 
the modern personality. Significantly, the soul is ‘unable to acquiesce to any 
conviction’—action is often the reflection on the possibility of action (and therefore a 
form of ‘retrograde action’). Finally, the symbol of human striving and existence is 
perpetual reflection rather than the heroic, flawed, and fatal deeds symptomatic of the 
old form of tragedy. 
Here, it would seem to me that Shakespeare does not fall on either side of the 
natural/artificial, naive/sentimental binaries. Instead, in a typically Schlegelian 
fashion, he hovers. On the natural/artificial divide he is somehow both, and neither. 
He marks the transitory unification of the ‘naive’ genius and the ‘sentimental’ artist. If 
Hamlet is the play to endlessly decode for the Romantics, Shakespeare then is 
certainly not solely a wild savage, but an eclectic thinker committed to bringing the 
post-rationalist quandaries of modern civilisation to the stage. Hamlet the persona is 
an almost Cartesian figure, doubting everything he perceives. His real/feigned 
madness is perhaps a stunning, if horrific, dramatic inversion of the philosophical 
requirement of the stability of the individual self. Hamlet goes mad, or acts insanity—
a recurrent theme in Shakespearean tragedy given the importance of Edgar as Poor 
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Tom in King Lear—because he thinks too much. As we saw in Chapter I, 
Aristophanes’ The Clouds, by parodying Socrates as the ultimate sophist, asserts that 
rational thinking can justify any standpoint. Through such fluid justifications, the 
objective stability of perspective so sought after by rational thinking, is undermined. 
If rational debate can vindicate any viewpoint, then the individual subject’s ability to 
make (and act on) decisions is problematised. Hamlet’s condition develops from the 
curse of acute self-consciousness, compounded by the ability to intellectually grasp 
multiple perspectives. Every thought he has morphs into a form of Fichtean 
‘retrograde action’. Too much thinking, not enough doing. If Hamlet is possessed by a 
state of perpetual self-reflection, his madness becomes the means to escape the 
infinite regress of his thinking. Insanity, in a pre-Foucauldean manner, communicates 
the possibility of another way of thinking, or rather, a thinking which is paradoxically 
not thinking. In many ways, it becomes the symbol of the Shakespearean grotesque, 
revelling in the violent disruption of preconceived notions of behaviour. Hamlet’s 
(performed) insanity drives Ophelia to madness and suicide. It is the tipping point of 
the tragic chain of events that takes place.  
In King Lear, something similar happens. Schlegel, when commenting on the 
play, says: ‘Ce tableau gigantesque nous présente un boulversement du monde moral, 
tel qu’il paraît menacer du retour du chaos...’ [This gigantic tableau presents us with 
the shattering of the moral world, such that it seems to threaten a return to chaos] (92, 
ellipses mine]. Madness, individual and moral, is representative of this return to 
chaos. In King Lear, the Fool famously deploys speech patterns comprising songs, 
doggerel verse, nonsense rhymes, puns, and proverbs to accentuate a shocking 
renversement of the conventional significations of rationality and madness, insight 
and blindness, truth and illusion.  It is perhaps tautological to claim that Lear sees 
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clearly when he suffers insanity.  However, moments of madness, or ones that reflect 
dramatically on derangement as an ontologically vital concept, function as hallmarks 
of the Shakespearean grotesque. In numerous ways then, the theatrical representation 
of insanity as illustrative of the grotesque paradigm, heralds one of the most radical 
methods of eliminating the strictures imposed by neoclassical aesthetics. To put it 
simply, it is hard dramatising madness in alexandrines. John D. Lyons, while writing 
on the contradictory connections between the polished tragic mode of the French 
classical theatre and the aesthetic requirement to produce dramatically violent actions 
on stage, says: 
One of the paradoxes of “regularity” in seventeenth-century French poetics of 
tragedy is that these rules aim at perfecting a structure for the representation of 
an irregularity. Tragic subjects all contain a transgressive action, one that 
violates a certain set of rules. These are not the rules of poetics but moral or 
political rules to which poetics must refer both for the choice of dramatic 
subjects and for the choice of character. Do poetic rules require that 
represented actions and characters violate the other rules of society?
19
 
 
The tragic system functions on the premise of violation and disruption. For the theatre 
of Racine, as opposed to that of Shakespeare or Euripides, how can one possibly 
communicate states of violent passion and sudden reversals, without bending the rules 
of versification and dramatic discourse? How does one create rationally when the 
content of tragedy demands a consistent negation of logically deduced rules and 
situations? In Shakespeare’s case, the tone of tragedy is varied, employing a range of 
devices including the alternation of blank verse with prose, the use of popular songs, 
the influence of the supernatural, the representation of shocking and disturbing images 
on stage, and continual references to the frailties of the body, for example. Madness, 
moral and physical, whether in a Hamlet, a Lear, or a Lady Macbeth, operates almost 
as the fulcrum of Shakespearean tragedy, represented through the extensive use of 
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fragmentary passages in prose, and the consistent interrogation of orderly modes of 
conduct. Finally, within the context of Hamlet, madness situates itself as an 
ontological commentary on philosophic rationality itself, often with parodic 
reverberations.    
We can contrast my take on the extended implications of this Schlegelian view 
on Hamlet with Voltaire’s infamous, and almost comic, treatment of the play’s plot: 
Hamlet y devient  fou au second acte, et sa maîtresse devient folle au 
troisième; le prince tue le père de sa maîtresse, feignent tuer un rat, et 
l’héroine se jette dans la rivière…Hamlet, sa mère, et son beau-père boivent 
ensemble sur le théâtre: on chante à table, on s’y querelle, on se bat, on se tue. 
On croirait que cet ouvrage est le fruit de l’imagination d’un sauvage ivre.     
 
[Hamlet goes mad in the second act, and his mistress becomes mad in the 
third; the prince kills his mistress’s father, while pretending to kill a rat, and 
the heroine throws herself in the river...Hamlet, his mother, and his father-in-
law drink together in the theatre: one sings at the table, one quarrels there, one 
fights, one kills. One would believe that this work is the fruit of the 
imagination of a drunk savage.]
20
  
 
Something very interesting emerges here. Voltaire’ treatment of Hamlet seems to look 
forward to Ionesco’s claim that a tragedy done faster would become a comedy. The 
fact that Hamlet continually flirts with the comic mode—Voltaire also has problems 
with the comic gravediggers in the play—signifies how sharply this Shakespearean 
tragedy violates Voltairean notions of tragic theatre.  Voltaire’s intentions are clear 
enough: he recounts the complex, almost convoluted plot of Hamlet, in order to state 
its apparent absurdity and lack of logic. However, the play’s systematic assault on the 
rationally ordered rules of the French theatre, communicate how vitally it rewrites 
prevailing ideas on tragic dramaturgy. Moreover, the play’s negotiations with the 
blurring of the comic and tragic modes illustrate its affinity to the grotesque. In the 
last chapter, we examined several instances where critics like Voltaire commented 
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disparagingly on the ‘mixed genres’ prevalent in Shakespeare. Furthermore, this 
mixing coincided with his pandering to the masses through bawdy humour and 
through stage images that appealed to their baser instincts. However, these traits are 
fundamentally fused with the raw, playful, ever-mutating schema of the grotesque. 
The negation of strict binaries is plausibly the primary affect of the grotesque idiom. 
For Voltaire, in particular, such negations constitute an attack on the carefully 
controlled morality of French aesthetic practice. As W. D. Howarth says: 
Voltaire’s denigration of Shakespeare had focused on three principal heads: 
uncouth construction, typical of a poet who wrote ‘sans la moindre 
conaissance des règles’; le mélange des genres’, which offended against the 
implicit fourth unity, unity of tone, which was even more important than the 
notorious unitites of time, place and action; and failure to preserve the dignity 
required of tragic diction.
21
       
 
The chaotic growth of Hamlet’s story and the infamous parallel plots of King Lear are 
symptomatic of this ‘uncouth construction’. Shakespeare does not know the 
prevailing (French) rules of drama; his liberal mixing of comedy and tragedy destroy 
consistency of dramatic tone; his use of varied speech acts attack the basis of diction 
in tragedy. In Voltaire’s words, Shakespeare is the poet of ‘monstrous forces’, of 
‘bizarre and gargantuan ideas’.
22
  The italicised words prefigure rather Bakhtin’s 
hermeneutics on Rabelais and the grotesque. Here, these vital, if strangely mysterious 
and spectral forces, are painted on a grand scale. There are seismically grotesque, 
primal in power, occupying the preying and primeval landscape of a pre-Christianised 
King Lear. The depiction of these forces and ideas on stage would confront and attack 
an audience, demanding that it wake from its dogmatic slumbers. Voltaire, however, 
is threatened by this interaction of violent forces. Nevertheless, in a reflection that is 
often not quoted in its entirety, he affirms: ‘He [Shakespeare] created the theatre; he 
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had a strong and fertile genius, innate and sublime, without the least glimmer of good 
taste or the least awareness of the rules’ (McMahon, 5, parentheses mine). This 
singular sentence collates the Shakespearean antinomy of natural genius versus 
polished artistry that would be reconstructed during the Romantic age. 
Simultaneously, it illuminates Voltaire’s respect for the dramatist: Shakespeare, as 
stated by Ben Jonson, creates the theatre, or re-creates it according to his own image 
and natural desires. In a pre-Kantian definition of genius, Shakespeare gives the rule 
to art. He destroys pre-existing formats, only to remould them. Taste and rule, two 
dominating tendencies in French neoclassicism, are both subverted. In a similar 
passage from Essai sur la poésie épique (Essay on epic poetry, 1728), Voltaire 
expands on the Shakespearean dichotomy of innate genius in opposition to the 
requirements of cultured taste: 
Such is the privilege of invented genius: he cuts a path for himself where no 
one has walked before; he runs without guide, art, or rules; he gets lost in his 
course, but he leaves far behind him everything which has to do with reason 
and exactness.  (McMahon, 6).  
 
In sharp contrast to Schlegel, Voltaire imagines Shakespeare as the natural 
playwright: he invents and shapes a path in the forest unique to himself. He is beyond 
the dictates of rules, and of self-conscious artifice. As a result, the symmetry of the 
aesthetic construct is vitiated, and the laws of reason ignored.  This is an incisive 
passage that bears both a profound admiration, and a genuine fear of Shakespearean 
vitality.  
 Close to fifty years later, upon the publication of Letourneur’s first volume of 
Shakespearean translations that would go on to have such a profound influence on 
French letters, Voltaire becomes more openly antagonistic towards the bard, betraying 
an almost virulent sense of nationalist injury. In particular, in a letter to Comte 
d’Argental, Voltaire reacts violently to Letourneur’s deification of Shakespeare as the 
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‘god of the theater’: ‘Have you read this abominable black book—of which we must 
look forward to five additional volumes? Have you sufficient stores of hatred for this 
impudent imbecile? Will you endure the affront this is delivering to France?’ 
(McMahon, 10). This apparent ‘affront’ to France so deeply felt by Voltaire perhaps 
explains Schlegel’s comments against French nationalism in the Comparaison. In the 
climate of French commercial and cultural domination, any claims contrary to 
preserving that power were to be negated. In the same letter, Voltaire betrays his own 
scholarly anxiety, stating that he was the first to translate Shakespeare into French. It 
is not surprising that he would take his problems with Letourneur to the Académie 
Française. John Pemble, in Shakespeare Goes to Paris: How the Bard Conquered 
France (2005), accurately adumbrates, and historicises, this Voltairean discontent 
with the British invasion: 
Voltaire learnt with incredulity, and with growing rancour, of the advance of 
the barbarian [Shakespeare] into France. In 1746 the first, selective, translation 
of Shakespeare’s works appeared. Thirty years later the whole dramatic canon 
was published in French—under royal patronage, what is more. When he read 
the preface by Pierre le Tourneur, the chief translator, Voltaire was outraged. 
Le Tourneur claimed that Aristotle would have rewritten his Poetics if he had 
lived to know of Shakespeare’s work, which was greater than that of 
Sophocles or Euripides. (5, parentheses mine). 
 
The last few lines of the above passage are particularly telling. Aristotle’s Poetics was 
the holy grail of French aesthetics, and to have a fellow Frenchman claim that the 
Greek would have altered his treatise had he read Shakespeare, was tantamount to 
blasphemy. Furthermore, to indicate that Shakespeare was superior to the Greek 
tragedians was rubbing salt into the wound. Pemble’s portrait of the ‘advance of the 
barbarian into France’ reconstructs the notion of Shakespeare as the wild, uncivilised 
force of nature. This particular and peculiar vitality would seduce the Romantics. And 
in Voltaire’s confrontation with Shakespeare, ‘there germinated a legend of 
Frenchness, Englishness, race, frontiers, difference, otherness, invasion, resistance—a 
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whole mythology of cultural clash and cross-over’ that would leave an indelible 
impact on the intercultural relations between France and the other waking giants of a 
post-Enlightenment Europe.   
 
In the early 1820s, ‘Shakespeare’ still suggested a monstrous otherness to the 
patrons of the French Academy. He was the barbarian from the north—hunting, 
invading, wild and powerful in magnitude and effect. Shakespeare had become a 
grotesque Gargantua. In his recent Shakespeare in French Theory: King of Shadows 
(2007), Richard Wilson reflects on the predominant perception of Shakespeare from 
the Romantic age to his celebration as the multivocal and heteroglossic postmodern 
playwright in Foucault and Derrida, consecrating an ‘ever-expanding politics of 
inclusion’.
23
 In particular, he claims that in French letters ‘Shakespeare occupies an 
oppositional place as the man of the mob, in contrast to his establishment as a man of 
monarchy in the Anglo-Saxon world’(4). Vitally, within a nineteenth-century context, 
Shakespeare was seen as the ‘Monster of the Latin Quarter’. His dramatic and 
linguistic vitality repelled and seduced. Without doubt, this ‘fear and fascination with 
this unassimilated and mongrel linguistic excess came to define the French concept of 
Shakespeare as a savage and moral monster...his carnivalesque gigantism, 
irrationality, and disorder loomed not only as menacing shadows of neo-classical 
clarity, logic, and decorum, but as uncanny prefigurations of the unpoliced 
revolutionary mob’ (9, ellipses mine). In other words, Shakespearean drama 
mercilessly attacks, and negates, the basis of acceptable French theatre. His is a drama 
for the people, characterised by the original mongrelisation of the world, celebrating 
power, excess, and the margins of madness. Within the context of a society suffering 
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in the throes of revolutionary bloodshed and violent excess, Shakespearean drama 
seems to reflect the world in a far more accurate manner than the plays of the classical 
French dramatists. In the world of the Terror and the guillotine, ‘this ‘Gothic 
Shakespeare’ with his theatre of animality and blood, haunted the imagination of 
nineteenth-century Paris as ‘the man of the crowd’ and a forecast of repressed 
revolutionary crimes’ (5). In the last chapter, we saw how the origins of the grotesque 
go back to a particularly Gothic world, a world of ruins, metamorphosis, and violent 
upheaval. In the nineteenth century, this Shakespearean grotesque becomes 
emblematic of post-Revolutionary anarchy. In the opposition between ‘Shakespeare’ 
as the ‘man of the mob’ and ‘man of monarchy’, this particular study errs in favour of 
the former. However, Shakespeare remains a dramatist, not a politician. Taking the 
cue from the last chapter, I would say that his inclusiveness merely mirrors, albeit in 
the most heightened form, the inclusivity of the stage and the notion of theatrical 
performance as an ever-renewing medium of a shape-shifting grotesque.  
Theatrical action is fundamentally democratic. It permits multiple views to 
coexist and shuffle.  In Hazlitt’s sense, the theatre would seem to democratically 
permit aristocracy: every individual is given the right to freely fashion herself into a 
character or persona of power. As a result, through the theatre we are taken back to 
Schiller’s republican ideal. And it is within this context, that we can begin to 
understand the significance of the Stendhal/ Hugo theorisation of Shakespeare for the 
politics of French Romanticism.        
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III—Stendhal’s Racine et Shakespeare: Dramatising Romantic 
Democracy 
  
  The publication of Stendhal’s Racine et Shakespeare pamphlets (1823/25) 
was one of the defining moments of French Romanticism, highlighting again the 
burgeoning obsession with theatre and dramaturgy on part of the younger poets and 
theoreticians of the day. In a recent essay on the implications of a unique, I would say 
almost Shakespearean, apolitisme in Stendhal’s work, Deborah Houck Schocket 
summarises a peculiarly propulsive theatrical urge in the French author: 
When the young Stendhal arrived in Paris during the early years of Napoleon’s 
empire, he intended to become a great playwright in the tradition of the 
seventeenth-century classical dramatists he had grown up admiring. He tried 
his hand at both tragedies and comedies, but he never completed any of the 
fifty plays he began. During the 1810s, Stendhal travelled to Italy and his 
discovery of European Romanticism led him to reject the tenets of classical 
theatre, although Classicism continued to dominate the stage in France well 
into the Restoration.
24
   
 
The above passage sketches some principal themes. Stendhal aspired to be a 
playwright primarily, and his heroes were our much maligned classical dramatists—
Racine, Molière, and Corneille, for example. Stendhal ended up being a failed 
dramatist, and his travels to Italy inspired his study and assimilation of the developing 
Romantic theories of literature. As we have seen earlier, Stendhal was extremely 
influenced by A. W. Schlegel’s work on theatrical history and Romanticism, while 
also developing a penchant for the Edinburgh Review. Crucially, this contact with 
Romanticism fundamentally altered the way the young Frenchman thought about art 
and literature. The discovery of Romanticism coexisted with the rejection of the 
neoclassicism of his own nation. Nevertheless, the aping of neoclassical dogma 
exercised total control over French theatre. However, it is imperative to note that like 
the Schlegel brothers in Germany, as well as Hazlitt in England, Stendhal feels 
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intimately the need to theorise the stage. Evidently, Shakespeare’s role within this 
context is paramount. Evlyn Gould, in a bracing inquiry that examines what she refers 
to as ‘virtual theater’ for nineteenth-century French writers, locates the significance of 
the Racine et Shakespeare pamphlets in its aesthetics of mixing. The literary and the 
philosophical are merged through a self-consciously theatrical stance: 
Stendhal is yet another author preoccupied with questions of theater. For 
years, he dreamed of becoming a great dramatic genius, a second Molière, and 
of writing the ideal Romantic drama, a “mirror of our times.” Unlike Hugo or 
Vigny, however, Stendhal never realized much more than a theatrical project 
for the theater outlined in his two pamphlets entitled Racine et Shakespeare. 
Nonetheless, Stendhal’s inability to write theater coupled with his fervent 
desire to participate in the literary debates of his times makes his Racine et 
Shakespeare into one of the most striking manifestations of theatrical theory 
as a symptom for the growing confusion of literary and philosophical 
concerns.
25
        
 
 The first few lines of the above passage re-emphasise Stendhal’s failure as a 
playwright, in sharp contrast to the likes of Hugo and Vigny. Instead, what is implied 
is that the out and out failure in one domain corresponds with success in the field of 
theory, the consecration of the critic as dramaturge. What is interesting is Gould’s 
notion that the Racine et Shakespeare pamphlets emerge from a principal confusion 
between, and through the unstable interaction of, the literary and the philosophical. In 
effect, this confusion is plausibly a reflection on the dreamed off integration of 
literature and philosophy so sought after by the Jena Romantics.  In its hybridity, this 
confusion sets up the context for the grotesque. 
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Yet Racine et Shakespeare is a theoretical text with a difference: it is 
continually self-reflexive, while deploying methods borrowed from the art of 
playwriting. For example, a large portion of the first pamphlet in effect dramatises the 
antagonism between the characters of l’Académicien and le Romantique. The 
Academic repeatedly uses words like ‘sévère’ and ‘rigeur’, basing the famous 
theatrical unities on ‘l’exactitude des mathématiques’. The Romantic, functioning as a 
mouthpiece for Stendhal, represents the polar opposite of Romantic aesthetics, 
preferring to defeat cold logic with continual references to the vigorous movement of 
the passions. This interaction could be played out on a stage. The second pamphlet 
wears its own self-reflection proudly. It is written in response to a manifesto contre le 
Romantisme, pronounced by an academician called M. Auger. In a remarkably clever 
move, Stendhal incorporates the scenario of the manifesto into his text: it is read 
aloud, discussed amongst friends, and is stated to be the motivation behind the writing 
of the second text. Stendhal also uses what may be referred to as the play as 
theoretical text within the theoretical text as play device: he proposes the ideal 
Romantic comedy called ‘Lanfranc ou le Poète’. In a manner reminiscent of the 
multiple reflections in the mirrors of Schlegelian Romantic irony, the plot of the play 
concerns a poet presenting a new Romantic comedy to the Académie Française. In 
employing this technique, Stendhal justifies his own polemic. Within this highly 
inventive and self-reflexive schema involving the melange of theoretical and 
theatrical standpoints, Stendhal inserts the political angle that drives his study. 
Evidently, the question is one of a singular aesthetic imperative, based on an urgently 
required, contemporary relevance. ‘Racine’ roots itself in the French interpretation of 
the Poetics, while ‘Shakespeare’ indicates applicability to the inherently modern, 
Romantic movement. Consequently, the two pamphlets constitute an insurrection 
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against aesthetic, philosophic, and political prejudices juxtaposed with a call to arms 
that revitalises the need to be contemporary. In this sense, over fifty years prior to 
Rimbaud, Stendhal asserts the need for literature and art to be absolument modèrne. 
This fervent claim for a (post) Romantic modernity is perhaps the most significant 
statement made by Racine et Shakespeare. 
 For Gould, this need for relevance, or what we may to refer to as the 
modernity imperative, grounds itself in the interrogation of previously accepted norms 
regarding the theatre. Once again, neoclassical aesthetics exemplified in the drama of 
Racine is a prime target: 
The essential impetus of Stendhal’s Racine et Shakespeare is an attempt to 
show in what ways current assumptions about the theater—Aristotelian 
assumptions—are merely a question of “habitude profondément enracinée” (“a 
deeply rooted habit”). He criticizes the tyranny of the unities of time and 
place, the pretension of presenting universal, timeless truths about humanity 
and the mania of imitating imitations, that is, of imitating Racine. (60) 
 
The reviewing of ‘Aristotelian assumptions’ coincides with the condemnation of 
inveterate intellectual routine. The Neoclassical unities are undermined as is the 
search for universal types so favoured by Enlightenment thought. Finally, if Schlegel 
referred to Racine’s work as l’imitation, Stendhal adopts a similar view, thereby 
treating contemporary French imitations of Racine (and therefore, imitations of 
imitations) with Platonic derision. Moreover, the political agenda behind the writing 
of Racine et Shakespeare is worth noting. If Stendhal was a failed playwright, his 
motives behind the construction of the two pamphlets emerge from specific events 
that encapsulate the prevalent ideas governing continental Romanticism. In his essay, 
‘Stendhal, Racine, and Shakespeare’, Kenneth Muir summarises the two principal 
occasions that helped foment this polemic: 
The writing of that tract [Racine et Shakespeare] was stimulated by two 
experiences. One was Stendhal’s visit to London in 1821, when he saw Kean 
as Othello and Richard III and, incidentally, wrote an indignant letter to The 
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Theatrical Examiner complaining of alterations in the text. The second 
stimulus was the hostile reception given to an English touring company that 
visited Paris in 1822.
26
  
 
The relevance of Edmund Kean as an embodiment of the Romantic cult of 
personality, along with the emphasis on individual genius and Hazlittean gusto, was 
touched upon in the last chapter. However, I should emphasise that it is the theatrical 
representation of Shakespearean drama that provokes and leaves an indelible 
impression on Stendhal’s growth as thinker and theorist. In the second instance, the 
‘hostile reception’ given to English actors performing Shakespeare in Paris, we are 
reminded of the politics that animate Stendhal’s polemic in favour of the bard. In 
stark contrast to the Parisian reception given the Kemble-Smithson troupe in 1827, the 
British thespians five years earlier fall victim to a virulent chauvinism and 
xenophobia. Emile J. Talbot furnishes us with further details: 
When a troupe of British actors attempting to perform Shakespeare in English 
in Paris in 1822 was met with disruptive jeers and insults requiring police 
intervention, Stendhal was indignant, for he saw in this disruption an attempt 
by liberals to manifest their political hostility towards England...The theatrical 
prohibitionism of the liberals and the censorship of the establishment overlap 
in the mentality of compulsion which motivates them...Racine et Shakespeare 
is not a political pamphlet, but rather a pamphlet against politics. (Stendhal 
and Romantic Esthetics, 126-127, ellipses mine)  
 
The ‘political hostility’ against Britain epitomises the link between political theatre 
and a theatre of entertainment—the defeat of Napoleon close to a decade ago colours 
the French liberal standpoint. Consequently, for Stendhal, the liberals and the 
conservatives in French society, appear to sing from the same hymn sheet. Liberal 
jeers coalesce with academic censorship. However, while Talbot sees Stendhal’s 
negotiations with, and reactions to, the political sameness of both left and right wing 
camps, I would say that in writing Racine et Shakespeare, Stendhal, like Schlegel 
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before him, launches a radical attack against an old-fashioned conservatism of 
aesthetic taste.   
Even Stendhal’s most admired critic, Michel Crouzet, speaks of Stendhal’s 
‘originality of not agreeing with any party, with any idea’.
27
 This seems reminiscent 
of the play of Friedrich Schlegel’s Romantic irony, or the Fichtean idea of the 
hovering imagination that permits the acceptance of any and every viewpoint, without 
a necessary commitment to any one particularity of perspective. As we have seen, this 
apolitisme is a dramatic act, mirroring as it does the simultaneous creation and 
annihilation of multiple perspectives that is unique to stagecraft. In essence, this 
peculiar freedom from singularity of vision transposes itself into a democracy of 
political acceptance.
28
 In other words, by constantly escaping the strictures of a 
singular standpoint, by reflecting upon a similar all-encompassing largeness of vision 
in Shakespeare, Stendhal widens the hermeneutic boundaries of Romantic literature, 
and of politics as literature.  Apolitisme becomes the foundation for the most 
republican of aesthetic happenings. To be apolitical allows Stendhal, and Shakespeare 
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 I have taken my cue from Paul Hamilton’s study of the inherent republicanism of the ‘lateral 
movement’ of Friedrich Schlegel’s romantic irony  in Metaromanticism: aesthetics, literature, theory 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), which subverts the idea of linear progress in favour of a 
more open-ended acceptance of multiple views relevant to contemporary politics. In Chapter I, I have 
specifically examined the link between the political promises of romantic irony and its fundamentally 
theatrical embodiment. In other words, the representation of [a] play is a socio-political performance or 
happening, a jeu with layered philosophical and political implications that serves to highlight and 
mirror such activity in our ‘real’ lives. This theatrical activity, whose ontology we categorise as 
grotesque (due to its shape-shifting character) is primarily democratic in its acceptance of change and 
multiple standpoints.  
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through Stendhal, a ‘negative capability’ that ultimately suggests political and 
aesthetic acceptance. Rather than representing a denial of politics, Stendhalian 
apolitisme constitutes one of the most nuanced attacks against the comfort of 
convention and dogmatic taste.  
The rhetorical question that opens the first chapter of Racine et Shakespeare 
schematises Stendhal’s politics of apolitisme: ‘Pour faire des tragedies qui puissent 
intéresser le public en 1823, faut-il suivre les errements de Racine ou ceux de 
Shakespeare?’ [To make tragedies that could interest an audience in 1823, must one 
follow the erring ways of Racine or those of Shakespeare].
29
 Two features stand out: 
the modernity imperative, grounded in the need to make artworks relevant to a 
contemporary audience; and the rather non-Classical claim that both Racine and 
Shakespeare were capable of errors. In the preface to his text, Stendhal openly states 
that contemporary French plays, those sanctioned by the Académie Française, are 
merely ‘pale imitations’ of those produced in the seventeenth century. Furthermore, as 
the complete title of these pamphlets—Etudes sur le romantisme—shows, Stendhal 
introduces a concept and an artistic movement that was still alien to the mainstream of 
French letters. He refers to the political revolutions of the last thirty years, and 
classifies the 1820s as ‘la veille d’une revolution semblable en poésie’ [the eve of a 
similar revolution in poetry] (266). The politicisation of art, and the simultaneous 
aestheticisation of political events, begins to emerge. In this context, Stendhal recruits 
Shakespeare for the Romantic cause. In a dense passage that locates the difference 
between Shakespeare and Racine in the divergence of dramatic and epic pleasures, 
Stendhal says: 
                                                          
29
 Racine et Shakespeare (1818-25) et autres texts de théorie romantique, ed. Michel Crouzet (Paris: 
Honoré Champion Editeur, 2006), p. 267. All future references will be cited in the text. All translations 
are mine. See also the earlier French edition of the text, Racine et Shakespeare: Etudes sur le 
romantisme (France: L’harmattan, 1993). 
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Toute la dispute entre Racine et Shakespeare se réduit à savoir si, en observant 
les deux unites de lieu et de temps, on peut faire des pièces qui intéresent 
vivement des spectateurs du dix-neuvième siècle, des pièces qui les fassent 
pleurer et frémir, ou, en d’autres termes, qui leur donnent des plaisirs 
dramatiques, au lieu des plaisirs épiques qui nous font courir à la 
cinquantième representation du Paria ou de Régulus. 
 
[The entire dispute between Racine and Shakespeare is brought down to 
knowing if, while observing the two unities of place and of time, one can 
produce plays that vitally interest spectators of the nineteenth century, plays 
that make them cry and tremble, or, in other terms, that give them dramatic 
pleasures, instead of the epic pleasures that make us run to the fiftieth 
production of Paria or of Régulus.] (269)   
 
By referring to the modernity imperative and juxtaposing it with the hallowed 
neoclassical unities of place and time, Stendhal indicates that like the polished plays 
of Racine, the very concepts governing French theatre during the seventeenth century 
were now redundant. It may be surmised that the average nineteenth-century spectator 
was more trusting of changes in scene and shifts in time, allowing imaginative fantasy 
to transcend the limitations of logic that had appealed to the aristocratic audiences 
over two hundred years ago. One of the features of Racine et Shakespeare, and of 
Continental Romantic theory, is the necessity to address audience expectations. The 
nineteenth-century spectator shadows Stendhal’s text, and it is with her in mind, that 
he seeks to vindicate his polemic.  
In the famous definition and distinction of Romanticism and Classicism that 
commence chapter III, Stendhal declares: 
Le romanticisme est l’art de présenter aux peoples les oeuvres littéraires qui, 
dans l’état actuel de leurs habitudes et de leurs croyances, sont susceptibles de 
leur donner le plus de plaisir possible. 
 Le classicisme, au contraire, leur présente la littérature qui donnait le plus 
grand plaisir possible à leurs arrière-grands-pères. 
 
[Romanticism is the art of presenting people with literary works that, in the 
present state of their habits and their beliefs, are likely to give them the 
greatest pleasure possible. 
Classicism, on the other hand, presents them with literature that used to the 
greatest pleasure possible to their great grandparents.] (295) 
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The emphasis in the first definition falls on the word ‘actuel’, which translates as 
‘present’, ‘current’, or even ‘topical’. In many ways, it is the resonance of this specific 
word that drives Stendhal’s take on the new literature. A work of art is Romantic if it 
provides pleasure that is relevant to the structures of belief belonging to a 
contemporary audience. In contrast, the plays of Racine (representative of Stendhal’s 
classicisme) are hopelessly out of date for the nineteenth-century spectator. And as a 
corollary to this take on Romanticism, we can juxtapose Stendhal’s peculiar and 
emphatic claim that all the truly great writers had been the Romantics of their time, 
and that the imitations which followed constituted the dying literature of Classicism.   
In this claim, Stendhal seems to echo aspects of Friedrich Schlegel’s famous fragment 
that characterises Romantic poetry as forever becoming, yet simultaneously finished. 
In this sense, Shakespeare is a Romantic. Any work that appeals completely to its 
audience by addressing contemporary themes is Romantic. The true work of art is 
vitally reflective of its era, and in being so, it simultaneously transcends the 
limitations of that era. In other words, it will inevitably, and miraculously, speak to a 
later audience as well. In this way, Shakespearean drama is fundamentally 
representative of the blood and gore of Elizabethan and Jacobean England. By having 
been so relevant, it opens up its hermeneutic options for a later date, for a revisioning 
that is particularly Romantic, for example, and particularly relevant to a time in 
French society defined by regicide, civil war, and revolution. By implication, Racine, 
and the imitation of Racine, is obsolete for the nineteenth-century spectator. On the 
other hand, if a playwright could somehow capture the cataclysms of a post-
Revolutionary Europe, that playwright would continue to wield significance for a later 
date.  
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The question that strikes us then, is who exactly are these spectators and 
theatre-goers that Stendhal keeps referring to? Certainly, the revered and royal 
Comédie Française was still out of bounds for a mass audience, except on special 
‘free admission days’. And yet, as F. W. J. Hemmings demonstrates in his excellent 
The Theatre Industry in Nineteenth Century France (1993), during the nineteenth 
century over 500, 000 Parisians went to the theatre each week.
30
 
In a semi-liberated post-Revolutionary environment, theatrical spectacle 
became available to the Parisian masses, in a manner similar to sixteenth-century 
London. The majority of these theatre-goers were working class, and the early 
nineteenth century witnessed the development of varied and vibrant ‘working class 
theatres’ on the infamous Boulevard du Temple, which included theatres with 
arresting names like the Ambigu-Comique, the Folies-Dramatiques, and the 
Délassements-Comiques (Hemmings, 123). One of these boulevard theatres was the 
Funambules, home of the legendary mime so dear to Gautier and the Romantics (and 
immortalised in Marcel Carné’s Les Enfants du Paradis, 1945)— Deburau. Such 
theatres also enabled the rapid growth of a variety of theatre genres that would have 
never been approved of by the academicians and their royal courts: melodramas, 
musicals, mimes, military pageants, fairy plays, historical dramas, and the comic 
opera (Hemmings, 123). There emerges then a fundamental disjunction in nineteenth-
century theatre-going practice in Paris: the Comédie Française remains the bastion of 
Neoclassicism, while the boulevard theatres cater to a vast audience with an 
astonishing variety of taste. Nevertheless, ‘serious’ drama and aesthetic reflections on 
such drama are limited to those in power.  
                                                          
30
 The Theatre Industry in Nineteent- Century France (Cambridge: University Press, 1993), p. 2. This 
is by far the most engaging account of the development of the theatre ‘as a capitalist enterprise’ (3) in a 
post-industrial Paris. Hemmings’s study provides a detailed and entertaining guide to the various issues 
that influenced the theatre industry, from the rapid growth of the ‘working-class theatres’, to changes in 
the acting profession during the course of the century. 
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As Barry V. Daniels affirms in his incisive introduction to Revolutions in the 
Theatre: French Romantic Theories of Drama (1983), the preservation and 
ossification of Neoclassical dogma was inextricably tied to how France liked to see 
herself, as the centre of the world.
31
 Powerful liberals and conservatives alike, 
demonstrated the need to preserve this image. However, as Stendhal correctly 
surmises, the plays of the court (Racine) were no longer relevant to a society that had 
undergone a bloody revolution and cataclysmic change. In such an environment, 
could Racine make an audience ‘cry and tremble’? Perhaps an answer to this question 
lies in Christine Marcandier-Colard’s remarkable exposition on the effects of a new 
aesthetic of blood on a post-revolutionary Paris: 
L’émergence de formes nouvelles passe par le sang: les genres se mêlent, se 
fécondent à travers cette esthétique de la scène, propre à la fois au théâtre, au 
roman et au tableau. La Terreur a fait l’exécution une forme de spectacle 
public. De même, le drame romantique a pris l’exhibition du sang pour 
symbole de sa contestation des conventions classiques. C’est par le théâtre, 
celui de la Révolution puis celui du Boulevard du crime, qu’un public plus 
large a pris goût aux péripéties sanglantes. 
 
[The emergence of new forms happens through blood: genres mix and are 
enriched by this aesthetic common to the theatre, to the novel and to painting. 
The Terror made execution into a public spectacle. Similarly, the exhibition of 
blood in romantic drama was looked upon as a symbol of questioning classical 
conventions. It is through the theatre, that of the Revolution and then that of 
the Boulevard of crime, that a larger audience acquired a taste for bloody 
peripatetics.]
32
    
 
                                                          
31
 Revolution in the Theatre: French Romantic Theories of Drama (London: Greenwood Press, 1983). 
The following passage provides an effective summing-up of the resonances of neoclassical theory in 
French letters: ‘Unlike England with Shakespeare, Spain with Lope de Vega and Pedro Caldéron de la 
Barca, and Germany with Goethe and Schiller, France’s first major body of literature is neo-classical. It 
was, in fact, via eighteenth-century France that neo-classicism spread throughout Europe in the 
eighteenth century. The image of monarchy as developed by Louis XIV was an ideal imitated 
throughout eighteenth-century Europe. French became the language of diplomacy. The plays of 
Corneille, Racine, and Molière were translated and imitated throughout Europe. Thus, neo-classicism 
was very important to France’s self-image as a world power. Napoleon Bonaparte’s imperial image 
merely reinforced this concept of French neo-classicism. Thus, at the point after the revolution when 
France might have been open to radical change in literature, there was, rather, a strong re-affirmation of 
neo-classical values by the Bonapartist regime. Neo-classicism was the party line during the Empire 
and much that deviated from it was discouraged or actively suppressed by the government’ (5).   
32
 Crimes de Sang et Scène Capitales: Essai sur l’esthétique romantique de la violence (Paris: Presses 
Universitaire de la France, 1998), p. 8, my translation. 
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Crucially, these new forms and genres arise out of the aesthetics of mixing, the 
domain of the playful and mutative grotesque. The Terror, and its visual embodiment, 
the guillotine, bring forth this aesthetico-political immanence of blood, 
dismemberment, and criminality to the nineteenth century. The shocking symbolic 
value of the Terror and guillotine schematises the aesthetics of the grotesque. I would 
claim that the spectacle of the guillotine, grotesquely watched and cheered by 
millions of Parisians in a combination of awe, repulsion, and voyeurism, makes the 
process of public execution into one of the earliest and most successful forms of 
modern mass entertainment. The guillotine radicalises the demands of an Aristotelian 
tragic theatre: the fear and the pity are real. The Terror functions as a startling 
counterpoint to the staging of Greek theatre as massive religious and entertainment 
festivals. In a particularly Romantic frame, the guillotine is both ‘real’ and ‘not real’. 
For Marcandier-Colard, the guillotine transcends all conventional systems of 
theatrical activity, while simultaneously encapsulating the range of Romantic genres, 
archetypes, and idiosyncrasies, from the fantastic to a stark realism (27). The 
guillotine forms itself into ‘un absolu littéraire’ (‘a literary absolute’)—the reference 
to Lacou-Labarthe and Nancy’s classic text is plausibly intentional, as this symbol for 
the grotesque spectacle of blood communicates a horrific inversion of more idealised 
Romantic yearnings, or the myth of harmonious unification.  
In such a bloody world, Shakespeare would surely be more suitable than 
Racine. As a result, the Bouleveard du crime (a popular name for the Boulevard du 
Temple, given that it was a hotbed not only of popular theatre, but also of all forms of 
questionable activities from thievery to prostitution) becomes an aesthetic and social 
corollary to the birth-pangs of the Revolution. According to Marcandier-Colard, the 
emergence of new forms of literature—the melodrama, the popular and serial novel, 
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for example—reflects the fracturing of a post-Revolutionary society, where ‘la 
décollation du roi a sacralisé la guillotine, et la presse...a transformé le crime en objet 
de plaisir, presque de consommation’ [the beheading of the king sacralised the 
guillotine, and the press...transformed the crime into an object of pleasure, almost of 
consumption] (2, ellipses mine). Blood is sensationalised, theatricalised, and 
publicised in a fashion we can perhaps relate to in the twenty-first century. Within this 
context, the ‘dramatic pleasure’ that Stendhal demands of his playwright must take 
into account a society thriving on publicised violence.  
Marcandier-Colard, in reference to the redefinition of aesthetic categories after 
Racine et Shakespeare, accurately sums up the difference between the (neo)Classical 
and the Romantic theatre through the latter’s representation of blood. In a Stendhalian 
fashion, she corroborates that ‘le théâtre académique reléguait le sang aux coulisses, 
on ne mourait pas face au public; dans les écrits romantiques, le sang coule à flots, 
symbole même de cette ère de nouveauté, de passions, d’énergie et de redéfinition de 
la beauté par la violence’ [the academic theatre relegates blood to the wings, one 
cannot die in front of an audience; in romantic writings, blood flows in streams, the 
symbol of this new era of novelty, of passions, of energy and of the redefinition of 
beauty by violence] (33). Blood must be reflected in the theatre of the kingdom of 
taste. Beauty no longer stands as the Kantian symbol of morality, but feeds off the 
boundless terror of the sublime, bleeding into the representation of grotesque artefacts 
and theatricalised images. According to Michel Crouzet, Shakespeare for Stendhal 
harnesses the primal power and beauty of violent dramatic action: 
Shakespeare signifie donc d’abord le retour aux sources naturelles et 
vigoreuses des passions, à leur dimension ‘colossale’, à leur expression ‘sans 
freins’, la production de personnages enfin plein de vigeur, de fougue, de 
désirs que Stendhal oppose aux héros évanescents, mais polis de la scène 
francaise. 
 
209 
 
[Shakespeare signifies, above all, a return to the natural and vigorous sources 
of passions, to their ‘colossal’ dimension and to their unrestrained expression, 
and the production of characters full of vigour, ardour and desires that 
Stendhal opposes to the evanescent yet polite heroes of the French stage.] 
(Schocket, 38).     
 
In a perfectly Romantic vein, what emerges is the accent on gargantuan passions, 
flowing vitality, an almost excessive celebration of emotional grandeur. In contrast, 
we are once again reminded of the inherent politeness of the French classical stage. 
Shakespearean beauty is savage. For Stendhal, this new shape and colour of beauty 
grows organically from, and is vitally chained to, moments of l’illusion parfait in 
theatrical activity, when ‘a spectator forgets the actor and sees only the fiction, forgets 
the conventional distinction between stage and audience or reality and imagination’ 
(Gould, 62). These moments of illusion parfait create and communicate the 
powerfully dramatic pleasure that Stendhal so desires for the Romantic stage. In 
revitalising the dyad between truth and illusion, reality and mimetic representation, 
Stendhal makes some pertinent remarks on the nature of theatrical illusion: ‘Illusion 
signifie donc l’action d’un home qui croit la chose qui n’est pas, comme dans les 
rêves, par exemple. L’illusion théâtrale, ce sera l’action d’un home qui croit 
véritablement existantes les choses qui se passent sur la scène’ [Illusion thus signifies 
the action of a man who believes in something that is not, as in dreams, for example. 
Theatrical illusion would be the action of a man who believes that what happens on 
the stage really exists] (274).  What one may add is that the belief Stendhal requires of 
his audience member, mirrors the nature of the theatre in its ontology. An actor 
believes in a persona that is not real. The entire theatrical production strives to make 
as real as possible that which by its very nature cannot be taken as empirically real. 
As a result, the vital immediacy and connectivity of theatrical spectacle basis itself not 
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only on a willing suspension of disbelief, but more instinctively, on a shared bond 
between actor and audience that celebrates the intrinsic truth of lying.  
However, according to Stendhal, such densely saturated instances of the 
illusion parfait take place for half a second, or a quarter of a second (276). 
Furthermore, there is no prescriptive model for the occurrence of these fantastic 
illusions:  
Ces instants charmants ne se rencontrent ni au moment d’un changement de 
scène, ni au moment précis où le poète fait sauter douze ou quinze jours au 
spectateur, ni au moment où le poète est oblige de placer un long récit dans la 
bouche de ses personages, uniquement pour informer le spectateur d’un fait 
antérieur, et dont la connaissance lui est nécessaire, ni au moment où arrive 
trois ou quarter vers admirable, et remarquables comme vers. 
Ces instants délicieux si rares d’illusion parfait ne peuvent se rencontrer que 
dans la chaleur d’une scène animée, lorsque les répliques des acteurs se 
pressent... 
 
[These charming instances occur not during a change of scene, nor at the 
precise moment where the poet makes the spectator skip ten or fifteen days, 
nor at the moment where the poet is obliged to give a lengthy narrative 
dialogue to his characters, solely to inform the spectator of an anterior fact, 
which he needs to know, nor at the moment where three or four admirable 
lines of verse arrive, and are remarkable as poetry. 
These delicious instances of perfect illusion that are so rare cannot be 
encountered but in the heat of a lively scene, when the actors’ lines hurry 
along...] (277, ellipses mine)    
 
 These moments then, cannot be anticipated in advance. It seems that Stendhal is 
ironically questioning the necessity of the rulebook in French aesthetics. In addition, 
he gets to the phenomenology of the stage by revitalising the argument for theatrical 
action over and above the need for beautiful lines of verse. The separation of action 
and verse was investigated in the last chapter, specifically with reference to the 
Shakespearean grotesque as theatrically transcending the limitations of his textuality 
in a specific historical incarnation of the English language. In the above passage, 
Stendhal works through a similar script, instantiating the requirement for action in 
drama. The chaleur (heat) of a dramatic moment—the word itself connotes a 
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Romantic rawness, a vitality of passion—creates the illusion parfait, when both the 
audience and the actor forget themselves. Instead, as in Gadamer’s sensibility, the 
play of theatrical transformation happens, takes over, erupts. The players involved—
actor and audience—become incidental. For Stendhal, these moments that transcend 
purely rational logic, are to be found far more often in Shakespeare than in Racine, 
and the pleasure one draws from tragedy stems from the frequency of such moments 
(15).  
And therein lies the basis of Stendhal’s polemic. Towards the close of chapter 
three of his first pamphlet, he distils the requirement for studying the bard, and not 
merely imitating the technique of his plays. If he must copy Shakespeare, the modern, 
Romantic playwright should copy ‘la manière d’étudier le monde au milieu duquel 
nous vivons, et l’art de donner à nos contemporains précisément le genre de tragédie 
dont ils ont besoin’ [the manner of studying the world in which we live, and the art of 
giving our contemporaries precisely the type of tragedy of which there are in need] 
(302). In these words, the text comes close to being prescriptive. In doing so, it 
affirms and accentuates the modernity imperative inherent in Stendhal’s 
Romanticism.   
 The significance and impact of Stendhal’s theorisation were profound: ‘The 
year after the publication of the first Racine et Shakespeare, Le Globe was founded to 
promote views similar to those of Stendhal on the question of the relationship 
between literature and freedom’ (Stendhal and Romantic Esthetics, 132). Le Globe, 
for a short period, was one of the fountainheads of the Romantic movement in France. 
Raymond Giraud also comments on the revolutionary effect Stendhal’s work had on 
French letters: ‘Stendhal’s witty, irreverent and yet profoundly serious Racine et 
Shakespeare infuriated the French Academy, stirred up more contemporary attention 
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than most of his novels’ (MacMahon, 46). In preferring Shakespeare over Racine, he 
laid the foundation for the growing cult of Shakespeare, and the simultaneous 
rejection of neoclassical principles. A few years later, Victor Hugo would further 
animate the literary establishment in his Préface de Cromwell (1827), where he would 
espouse a new theory of the grotesque. Significantly, Shakespeare was to be its most 
obvious incarnation. 
 
 IV—The Shakespearean Grotesque in Hugo’s Préface de Cromwell  
Our first foray into Préface de Cromwell, given the cyclical nature of the 
hermeneutics in this study, should be through the polarising and problematic figure of 
Voltaire. Again. For John Pemble in Shakespeare Goes to Paris: How the Bard 
Conquered France (2005), Voltaire is ‘the first word, and the last’ on Anglo-Gallic 
intercultural relations (207), and he dichotomises ‘Shakespeare’ and ‘Voltaire’ as 
representatives of ‘the Other’ in their respective countries. Consequently, if a baroque 
and gothic Shakespeare was feared in France—the bastion of taste—then Voltairean 
pronouncements on Shakespeare were constitutive of Gallic xenophobia and jealousy: 
It was not so much the matter, then, as the manner of Voltaire’s critique that 
rankled the British. His tone epitomised vicious Frenchness, and this was 
compounded by the French vice par excellence—envy, the deadly sin. All 
Frenchmen—it was understood—were envious of the British: of their empire, 
their constitution, their freedom, their commerce, and their prestige; and 
Voltaire—it was assumed—was especially envious, because he had 
discovered in Shakespeare a literary genius he could not match and a celebrity 
that exceeded his own. (195) 
 
In historicising the British perspective on the Voltairean attack on Shakespeare, 
through the promulgation of national stereotypes, Pemble reflects on not only the 
battle of cultural prestige and capital, but of commercial gain and empire as Romantic 
concepts. ‘And as France waned, Britain waxed’, states Pemble categorically (17), 
summarising Britain’s displacement of France in Europe, in America, in India. This 
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theme runs through his investigation, which frames the French reconstruction of 
Shakespeare within the narrative of military defeat, invasion, and colonial apotheosis. 
As a result, a set of aesthetics representative of a particular cultural hegemony 
(French) is merely replaced by another (English). In contrast, what  I have attempted 
in the last chapter, and in this one, is to show how the radical Romantic reinvention(s) 
of Shakespeare, heralded by a newly defined German consciousness, frees up the 
essentially theatrical and democratic potential of Shakespearean drama. In other 
words, if his coarseness and licentiousness offend the French court and its manners, 
they should also offend, perhaps to a lesser degree, an English court. As Pemble 
himself remarks, the ‘severest castigators of the cult of Shakespeare were British, not 
French’ (190), including royally esteemed men of letters like Dr. Johnson. 
Consequently, to recruit the Romantic Shakespeare for an almost imperial cause 
seems fraught with problems. After all, a certain licentious and grotesque Rabelais did 
exist in a darker, more medieval France. Consequently, dramatic and theatrical 
subversion, manifested literally in Shakespearean drama, or more textually in 
Rabelais and Cervantes, fundamentally opposes as it allows. As exemplified in the 
last chapter, the more consciously radical the interpretation of the dramatic potential 
in Shakespeare, the more permitting will be its politics. 
 For Hugo, in Préface de Cromwell, it is this accepting and intrinsically natural 
format of Shakespearean drama that consecrates it as the most complete and relevant 
to the modern condition. As Eric Partridge in his classic study, The French Romantics 
Knowledge of English Literature (1924) says, the Cromwell enterprise, both ‘in the 
preface and the text, showed Hugo an admirer and imitator of the English 
dramatist’.
33
 However, it is one of Hugo’s later texts, ‘Postcriptum de ma vie’, in a 
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 The French Romantics’ Knowledge of English Literature, 1820-48 (Paris, Librarie Ancienne 
Edouard Champion, 1924), p. 235. This study outlines the assimilation of British writers—including 
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passage that directly confronts the Voltairean legacy, that illustrates the vital 
differences in the (neo) classical and Romantic mappings of the Shakespearean myth: 
Shakespeare, c’est le sauvage ivre? Oui, sauvage! C’est l’habitant de la forêt 
vierge; oui, ivre! C’est le buveur d’idéal. C’est le géant sous les branchages 
immenses; c’est celui qui tient la grande coupe d’or et qui a dans les yeux la 
flamme de toute cette lumière qu’il boit. Shakespeare…est un des omnipotents 
de la pensée et de la poésie, qui, adéquants, pour ainsi dire, au Tout 
mystérieux, ont la profondeur même de la création, et qui, comme la création, 
traduisent et trahissent extérieurement cette profonduer par une profusion des 
formes et images; jetant en dehors les ténèbres en fleurs, en feuillages et en 
sources vives. 
 
[Is Shakespeare the drunk savage? Yes, savage!  He dwells in the virgin forest 
- yes, drunk! He’s the drinker of the ideal. He’s the giant under immense 
branches; he’s the one who holds the great golden cup and who has in his eyes 
the flame of all this light that he drinks. Shakespeare...is one of the omnipotent 
masters of the sort of thought and poetry that reaches out, if one may so put it, 
to the All mysterious, and possesses the profundity of Creation itself. Like 
Creation, it externally manifests and betrays this profundity by a profusion of 
shapes and images, throwing darkness outside in the form of flowers, foliage 
and vigorous fountains] (Partridge, 166, translation mine).   
 
In this excerpt, Hugo returns to Voltaire’s categorisation of the bard as ‘un sauvage 
ivre’, whose overactive and undisciplined imagination produced works like Hamlet, a 
grotesque farce of a play masquerading in tragic costume. For Hugo however, 
Shakespeare comes to occupy and reconcile oppositions and antitheses: he is the 
Calibanic savage who drinks and dreams of the Ideal realm of forms. In a manner 
reminiscent of earlier Germanic celebrations, Hugo constructs a Shakespeare who is 
god-like, natural, and forever creating myths and manifestations similar to the process 
of creation itself. For Voltaire, Shakespearean excess symbolises a profound lack of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Shakespeare, Byron, and Walter Scott— by the young French Romantics from the 1820s onwards. The 
following passage on Shakespeare is telling: ‘But Shakespeare attracted much attention and caused 
many discussions. More than anyone else, he was regarded as the literary genius most representative of 
the Romantic—as the greatest and most typical romantic. In drama, Schiller was often cited alone with 
him, but for general significance Shakespeare was nearly always named alone. He had many opponents 
in the eighteen-twenties among the Classics, a few in the thirties among the neo-Classics, and still 
fewer in the ‘forties among the members of ‘The Commonsense School’ of dramatists…The evolution 
of Shakespeare’s position in Romantic France may be put thus: in the ‘twenties, he was the very 
powerful pretender to the throne; having won it about 1829, he consolidated his position in the ‘thirties; 
and in the next decade, he ruled as sovereign over a prosperous and fairly-contented dominion, which 
several competent deputies helped him to govern’ (89-90, ellipses mine).   
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taste; for Hugo, it mirrors the infinite variety of natural forms in the visible universe. 
This god-like Shakespeare shadows Hugo throughout his writing career. Famously, 
during the ‘mystical years’ of exile in Jersey (1853-54), he succeeded in magically 
conjuring Shakespeare’s ghost on numerous occasions (MacMahon, 65-66). And in 
his late extended late essay, William Shakespeare (1864), Hugo classifies the bard 
along with Homer, Aeschylus, and Cervantes among a few other luminaries in the 
highest echelon of world-universal and epoch defining writers. In a particular passage, 
he even raises Shakespeare above all else: ‘Shakespeare is the universal antithesis, 
forever and everywhere’ (MacMahon, 68). It is this notion of antithesis that drives 
Hugo’s theorisations in Préface de Cromwell, during his most palpably revolutionary 
and Romantic years. The text itself strives to comprehend the elusive essence of 
drama through an almost Hegelian prism of dialectic and antinomy. Antithesis colours 
Hugo’s notion of drama, the most complete of art-forms, particularly relevant to a 
post-Christianised, melancholic, modern world. This theoretical standpoint reflects 
the basis of theatrical activity: a scene develops from the interaction between 
protagonist and antagonist. Reaction, and the cutting down of inhibitions that prevent 
reaction, constitutes dramatic tension. Of course, Shakespeare stands as its aesthetic 
culmination of this unstable back and forth movement between antithetic forces. In a 
passage in Préface de Cromwell that bears remarkable resemblance to the one from 
‘Postciptum de ma vie’, Hugo introduces the reader to the Romantic naturalisation of 
the Shakespearean grotesque: 
On reproche à Shakespeare l’abus de la métaphysique, l’abus de l’esprit, des 
scènes parasites, des obscenities, l’emploi des friperies mythologiques de 
mode de son temps, de l’extravagance, de l’obscurité, du mauvais gout, de 
l’enflure, des aspérités de style. Le chêne, cet arbre géant que nous 
comparions tout à l’heure à Shakespeare et qui a plus d’une analogie avec lui, 
le chêne a le port bizarre, les rameaux nouex, le feuillage sombre, l’écorce 
âpre et rude; mais il est le chêne. 
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[One reproaches Shakespeare for the abuse of metaphysics, the abuse of spirit, 
of unnecessary scenes, of obscenity, the use of second-hand mythology 
fashionable in his time, of extravagance, of obscurity, of bad taste, of 
embellishment and of harshness of style. The giant oak tree that we were 
comparing to Shakespeare offers more than one analogy: it has a strange 
appearance, gnarled branches, dark foliages, a rough and bitter bark; but it is 
the oak.]
34
   
 
We have already seen that varied Shakespearean interpreters have chosen to dissect 
him through the use of natural images: Pope claims his art emerged from ‘the 
fountains of Nature’, Dr. Johnson inaugurates the forest metaphor that Hugo utilises, 
and Voltaire plays with similar themes and images. In this particular passage, Hugo 
starts by listing the perceived faults in Shakespeare, and we are by now familiar with 
most of them: ‘obscenity, bad taste, harshness of style’. For Hugo, in fact, the 
preponderance of such faults in certain writers is a precondition of genius. In a 
manner that prefigures Browning’s take on imperfection as a prerequisite of truly 
great art, Hugo affirms that faults take root only in masterpieces of literature (322). In 
effect, the unfinished, incomplete, imperfect nature in certain works of art elevates 
them over the immaculately crafted artefact. This eulogising of the imperfect is a 
feature specific to the Romantic revolution. For Hugo, it mirrors the nature of the 
natural world. Consequently, the oak tree is ‘more than an analogy’ for Shakespeare; 
it represents him. He is a force of nature, and his work reflects its processes. Like the 
oak tree with its ‘gnarled branches’ and ‘rough and bitter bark’, Shakespearean drama 
possesses a harshness as well. Nevertheless, like the oak tree, it is natural in being 
what it is.  
 In another isolated passage earlier in his text, Hugo emphasises the 
relationship between Shakespeare and the essence of drama, this most modern of art-
forms: 
                                                          
34
 Préface de Cromwell, texte (par Victor Hugo), ed. Maurice Souriau (Genève: Slatkine Reprints, 
1973), p. 322. Future references will be cited in the text. All translations are mine. 
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Shakespeare, c’est le drame; et le drame, qui fond sous un meme souffle le 
grotesque et le sublime, le terrible et le bouffon, le tragédie et la comédie, le 
drame est le caractère proper de la troisième époque de poésie, de la literature 
actuelle.  
 
[Shakespeare, he’s drama; and drama, which creates in the same breath the 
grotesque and the sublime, the terrible and the buffoon, tragedy and comedy, 
drama is the proper personage of the third epoch of poetry, of real literature.] 
(213-214)  
 
Within two years of the Racine et Shakespeare pamphlets, Shakespeare has ascended 
the throne. He has no competitors; Racine is not even mentioned. In associating 
Shakespeare so completely with the dramatic art, Hugo succeeds in making the bard 
into the most complete plenipotentiary of modern, and therefore, essentially Romantic 
literature. Shakespeare—and drama—function almost as synonyms, amplifying the 
necessary mixing of genres. Drama equals reality. In this sense, Hamlet is the modern 
play par excellence, being both comic and tragic, celebrating the grotesque and the 
sublime. Hugo’s use of ‘le grotesque et le sublime’ differs from popular definitions. 
His sublime is symbolic of the soul, purified and purged by Christian morality; the 
grotesque harks back to an earlier pagan time (207). Desdomona signifies the 
sublime; Falstaff the grotesque. Clearly, Hugo’s notion of the sublime is not Kantian, 
but represents a gentler apperception of beautiful forms, images, and personae. The 
grotesque, however, is symptomatic of modernity.    
One of the defining features of Préface de Cromwell is the promulgation of a 
theory of the grotesque. In the last chapter, we examined specific instances where 
Friedrich Schlegel defines the transformative play and the whimsical arbitrariness of 
the grotesque as a symptom of Romantic irony. However, I chose to define this 
grotesque through its connection with ritual and performance, employing Bakthin’s 
famous treatment of the grotesque model in Rabelais and His World. The grotesque 
becomes ontology, representative of the fissiparous chaos and processes of change 
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that animate the phenomenal world. In its origins deep in the grottoes of baths of Nero 
and Titus, the grottesca signifies the merging and mixing of animal, human, and 
vegetable forms, thereby constituting a world of fluid transformation. For Hugo 
however, ‘le grotesque’ starts to mean something that is peculiarly modern: it 
embodies the ugly. In this tract, Hugo articulates the importance of the grotesque in 
modern literature.  
The grotesque is everywhere in modern life, and so should also be presented in 
works of art. Its role is to create the deformed and the ugly, and perhaps in so doing, 
to give birth to the comedy of the grotesque (to borrow G. Wilson Knight’s title of his 
essay on King Lear). Hugo’s polemic is based on a series of classifications: human 
history is divided into the primitive, the ancient, and the modern. The primitive 
characterizes itself through the lyric and sings of eternity in a manner similar to 
Schiller’s naïve poet; the ancient brings forth the epic that poeticizes an historical 
condition; the modern is found in the dramatic which, crucially for Hugo, paints the 
truth of life. The prophets of the Bible, Homer, and Shakespeare are the fountainheads 
of each stage of human literary development and cognition. The grotesque is a vital 
component of this truth—it resists idealization, and celebrates, as in the plays of 
Shakespeare, the mixing of the ugly and the beautiful, the comic and the tragic. 
Maurice Souriau, in his excellent edition of the Preface, posits a definition of the 
grotesque in Hugo that the playwright himself does not give us: 
En général, dans l’art, c’est le laid rapproché du beau, et placé là 
intentionellement pour faire contraste, paraissant d’autant plus laid, et mettant 
en valeur le beau. En particulier, dans la littérature, le grotesque est d’abord 
tout cela, mais de plus c’est le laid comique, et c’est aussi le laid exaspéré: le 
grotesque est au laid ce que le sublime est au beau: c’est le laid ayant de 
conscience de lui-même, content de sa laideur, le laid lyrique, s’épanouissant 
dans la fierté de l’horreur qu’il inspire, disant: riez de moi, tant je suis ridicule 
à côté du sublime; tremblez devant moi, tant je suis monstrueux.  
 
219 
 
[In general, in art, it (the grotesque) is the ugly juxtaposed with the beautiful, 
and placed there intentionally to create a contrast in which the ugly appears 
even more so and enhances the beautiful. In literature, in particular, the 
grotesque, besides being all of this, is the comic in the ugly, and also the 
exasperated in the ugly. The grotesque is to the ugly what the sublime is to the 
Beautiful: it is the ugly that is self-conscious of itself, and content in its 
ugliness. It is the lyrical ugly, blossoming in the pride of the horror it inspires, 
saying: laugh at me, at how ridiculous I am next to the sublime; tremble before 
me, at how monstrous I am.] (136, parentheses mine) 
 
The stress on contrast and antithesis illuminates the grotesque paradigm. However, 
Hugo’s grotesque also relates to the creation of the comic and the self-consciousness 
of being ugly as opposed to being beautiful, a trope that one is reminded of in the 
more late-Romantic revisionings of the grotesque in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. Baudelaire’s famous carcass (‘Une Charogne’), which we shall examine as a 
case-study in Chapter IV, is a poetic and narrative symbol that repeatedly asserts a 
morbid self-consciousness of an ironic, if not an overtly comic, ugliness. It resists 
being appropriated by the monstrous—in Hugo, a Rabelaisian counterpoint to the 
infinite largeness of the sublime—soliciting instead the aporia of its own existence as 
a symbol of negative apotheosis. Baudelaire’s poetics emerge from the primary 
antithesis of spleen et idéal in a fashion akin to Hugo’s splicing of ‘le sublime et le 
grotesque’. In the case of both iconic poets, one finds a stronger affinity and aesthetic 
attraction to the representation of the ugly.  
According to Emile Talbot, ‘no French critic dared develop an esthetic of the 
ugly prior to Hugo’s Préface de Cromwell, although in Germany such a theory had 
been adumbrated by Friedrich Schlegel some thirty years earlier’ (61). We have 
looked at Friedrich Schlegel’s treatment of the grotesque—also for Bakhtin the 
creator of a modern, ironic form of the grotesque—but for Hugo, the grotesque 
becomes the defining tenet of modern artistic practice and visualisation: 
In his preface Hugo sought to legitimize the presence of the ugly on mimetic 
grounds rather than as part of a theory of art as prophecy, which others would 
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soon adopt. Hugo’s thesis is that the poetics of the ancients was limited, hence 
partial and incomplete, because it focused on but one aspect of reality, namely, 
the beautiful. Modern poetics has the advantage of being complete because, 
while according beauty all the merit it deserves, it also takes into account that 
which is not beautiful, that which Hugo calls the grotesque, a term which he 
was the first to use as a masculine noun and by which he proposes to 
accommodate everything, which cannot be included within classical notions of 
beauty. To depict the ugly is to represent creation in a more complete manner, 
whereas to choose is to believe oneself superior to God and mutilate his 
nature. Hence Hugo’s proclamation: ‘tout ce qui est dans la nature est dans 
l’art’’ [‘all that is in nature is in art’] (61, translation and parentheses mine). 
 
Ancient art subsumes the ugly into the representation of beautiful forms. Or in Hugo’s 
words: ‘Le grotesque antique est timide, et cherche toujours à se cacher’ [the ancient 
grotesque is timid, and always searches to hide itself, 197, translation mine]. In 
modern art, the ugly becomes aware of its ugliness. Here we return to the self-
reflexive displacement of aesthetic hegemony endemic to this investigation. The 
Hellenic ideal and the classical apperception of the beautiful double up on the French 
imitation. The birth of the grotesque, on the other hand, feeds off the classicist’s 
repulsion. Fundamentally, the grotesque for Hugo flirts with the urgent Romantic 
need to simultaneously challenge the rulebook—imaginative fantasy must trump 
rational representation—and to accurately mirror the world as it is in an age of 
industrial reproduction. In their essay examining the links between drama and the 
preponderance of dramatic motifs in the nineteenth-century novel, Susan McCready 
and Pratima Prasad claim that Hugo’s ‘esthetic of hybridity’ developed in the Préface 
‘arose essentially from his theory of drama: the poetic prediction in his celebrated 
preface to Cromwell speaks of the coming of a “novelle poésie” which would blend 
opposing elements such as the grotesque and the sublime, light and darkness…In fact, 
it could be argued that even the realist coda that came to dominate the nineteenth-
century novel during the second half of the century might trace its beginnings to this 
foundational essay in which Hugo describes the drama as encapsulating the poetics of 
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his era’ (McReady/Prasad, 33). What I would say is that this hybrid aesthetic is one 
that undeniably elevates the grotesque above all else. This nouvelle poésie eradicates 
fidelity to the beautiful images of the Classical world, allowing instead the seeping 
through of all that was rejected and negated by the (neo)Classical schema. The 
grotesque renders ugliness into the fecund and feral basis for the new art: 
Dans la pensée des modernes, au contraire, le grotesque a un rôle immense. Il 
y est partout; d’une part, il crée le difforme et l’horrible; de l’autre, le comique 
et le bouffon. Il attach autour de la religion mille superstitions originals, autour 
de la poésie mille imaginations pittoresques. 
 
[In modern thinking, in contrast, the grotesque has an immense role. It is 
everywhere; on one hand, it creates the deformed and the horrible; on the 
other, the comic and the buffoon. It attaches around religion a thousand 
original superstitions, around poetry a thousand picturesque imaginations.] 
(199) 
 
The grotesque reflects the blood and gore of a post-Revolutionary France, 
aestheticising the guillotine and its decapitated heads, mocking them through 
theatrical buffoonery. It shifts fluidly from the ideal world to real, parodying 
humanity’s incomplete striving for perfection (200). As an aesthetic category—or 
rather, a paradigm against paradigmatic schematisations—the grotesque is ‘la plus 
riche source que la nature puisse ouvrir à l’art’ [the richest source that nature could 
open to art] (203). As opposed to the beautiful, the ugliness of grotesque phenomena 
manifests itself through multiple forms and images (207). Most importantly, ‘il nous 
présente sans cesse des aspects nouveaux, mais incomplets’ [it presents us, 
ceaselessly, with new, but incomplete, forms] (207). This unchanging flux of 
marvellous births is the hallmark of the grotesque idiom, reminiscent of Hugo’s 
comparison of Shakespearean drama to the process of creation itself. Crucially, this 
process throws up incomplete forms: like the proliferation of Schlegelian fragments, 
these forms embody the momentary manifestation of vital energy, which reflects on 
the never-ending and essentially dramatic birth and passing away of things in motion.  
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Hugo classifies the march of the grotesque in the modern era as ‘une invasion, une 
irruption, un débordement; c’est un torrent qui a rompu sa digue’ [an invasion, an 
eruption, an overflowing; it’s a torrent that has ruptured its dam] (208). Like the 
Shakespearean invasion into France, the grotesque has a totalising aspect. It 
engenders itself in Gothic architecture, in the work of Rabelais, Cervantes, and most 
of all, in Shakespeare. In its broken mirrors, are reflected the images of the modern, 
(post)Romantic age.    
 The questions that emerge then are: How does the ugly relate to pleasure? Is it 
a form of ‘negative’ pleasure? Does depicting the ugly in art necessitate making it 
beautiful? To what extent is the representation of grotesque forms in the post-
Romantic world emblematic of a self-conscious theatrical performance on part of the 
artist involved? These questions that feed this investigation shall be examined in more 
depth in Chapter IV, when we encounter the troubling persona of Baudelaire. For the 
moment, suffice to say that Hugo’s theorisation of grotesque figures prepares us for a 
nouvelle poésie that permits any and every subject to be addressed, opening up the 
aesthetic practice of the nineteenth-century to a unique democracy of perspective.  
For Ellie Nower Schamber, although Cromwell the play was censored and not 
performed, its famous Préface set the tone for the revolution in the theatre that would 
be the infamous bataille de Hernani, which marked the victory of the Romantics over 
the academicians. In many ways, the opening night itself was a theatrical encounter.
35
 
                                                          
35
 The Artist as Politician: The Relationship Between the Art and the Politics of the French Romantics 
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984): ‘The scene of battle was vividly described by 
Gautier and Madame Hugo. The playwright gave his defenders special tickets of admission in the form 
of pieces of red paper stamped with the word ‘Hierro’ (‘Iron’ in Spanish). The young men showed their 
contempt for the Establishment by wearing outlandish costumes made of brilliantly colored fabric. 
Gautier was especially insulting in his scarlet vest. Instead of the still-fashionable wigs, the youth 
displayed their own hair, sometimes in shoulder-length curls, along with full beards and mustaches. 
Respectable Classicists picked up garbage and rotten vegetables from the gutters and pelted the 
uncivilized Romantics. The latter held their anger in check, for they knew that they were being 
provoked into a brawl which would bring the police, and for which they would be blamed. Instead, the 
youths entered the theater well before the performance began, and secured strategic places of combat. 
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While the Romantics, inspired by Gautier’s gilet rouge, tormented the academicians 
with their outrageous garbs and outlandish behaviour, the latter tried their best to hold 
the court, to keep the invading barbarians at bay. It is fitting that a revolution inspired 
by Shakespearean drama should have reached its culmination in the theatre. As Allain 
Vaillant remarks: 
Le théâtre, on ne l’a pas assez noté, est le seul genre ou la notion de public ne 
repose pas sur une vague analogie—comme lorsque’on parle de public du’un 
livre—, mais offre un équivalent du peuple politique, un équivalent assez 
inquiétant pour justifier le maintien, tout au long du siècle, de la censure. Et 
c’est pourquoi il revient prioritairement au théâtre de faire entendre les voix, 
diverses et discordantes, du peuple. La doctrine hugolienne de mélange des 
genres (tragédie et comédie) n’est que la conséquence esthétique de ce souci 
de démocratie du discours. 
 
It has not been often remarked that the theatre is the only genre where the 
notion of the audience does not rest on a vague analogy like for the audience 
of a book. The audience in the theatre is equivalent to a political body, an 
analogy disturbing enough to justify the upholding of censorship throughout 
the country. And this is why theatre has the primary advantage in making the 
diverse and discordant voices of the people heard. The Hugoean doctrine of 
the melange of genres (tragedy and comedy) is nothing but the aesthetic 
consequence to maintaining a democracy in discourse.
36
      
 
Vaillant succinctly reaffirms the democratic potential of the theatrical encounter, 
which rests on the idea of confrontation and subtle subversion. In its manifold variety, 
the theatrical experience celebrates the grotesque carnival of the world. In attenuating 
the neoclassical categories of aesthetic appreciation, in radicalising the interpretation 
of Shakespeare drama through the prism of the modern grotesque, and in celebrating 
the democratic vitality of theatrical form, Hugo’s Préface sets the tone for the 
revolutions in the French theatre and letters in a manner hitherto unexpected.  W. D. 
Howarth, in his study Sublime and Grotesque: A Study of French Romantic Drama 
                                                                                                                                                                      
While waiting they ate pungent sausage, drank excessively, sang loud songs denouncing the Institute, 
and relieved themselves in the dim corners. When the general audience came in, the atmosphere was 
tense. The Classicists were horrified at the invasion of the Comédie Française by these young heathen. 
Throughout the play the Classicists hissed and laughed, and the Romantics tried to drown them out 
with vigorous applause’ (7). 
36
 La Crise de la Littérature: Romantisme et Modernité (Grenoble: Ellug, Université Stendhal, 2005), 
p. 33, translation mine. 
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(1975), distils the uniqueness of Hugo’s text, particularly in its relevance that 
transcends the forgotten play: 
Like that other Romantic preface which completely overshadows the work to 
which it is normally an introduction, Gautier’s “Préface de Mademoiselle de 
Maupin,” it condenses controversial views which were in the air at the time 
into proactive formulae for the purposes of polemic…It is a masterpiece of 
theoretical writing, which not only provided the young Romantics with the 
rallying-point they were looking for but, in addition, going beyond the context 
of the contemporary polemic in the theatre, expressed something fundamental 
to the Romantic aesthetic in a challenging and permanently memorable way.
37
 
 
By extending the polemic first conceived by Stendhal, by systematising it though a 
theoretical treatment of literature from the lyric to the dramatic mode, Hugo gives the 
French Romantics their bible, their Tablets of Law as claimed by Gautier himself, 
thereby consecrating ‘one of the major theoretical writings of the century, one of the 
outstanding manifestos in an age which set great store by literary manifestos’ 
(Howarth, 125).   
 
 V—‘Pierrot le Fou’: Deburau’s Shakespeare 
    Fittingly, the final act of this chapter takes us from Hugo to his young disciple 
and budding writer of an emerging decadence in French letters, Théophile Gautier. 
However, I will not turn to Mademoiselle de Maupin, but in keeping with the 
theatrical tropes that illuminate this study, to ‘Shakespeare aux Funambules’ 
[Shakespeare at the Funambules] (1842), a very short essay published in the Rêvue de 
Paris.
38
 The title of this essay is particularly significant: it conflates the bard with one 
of the famous working-class theatres on the vice-strewn Boulevard du Temple. In a 
manner that would have appealed to Stendhal and Hugo, Shakespeare becomes a 
‘man of the mob’, extricated from high cultural leanings, distanced from the 
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 Sublime and Grotesque: A Study of French Romantic Drama (London: Harrap, 1975), p. 125-26, 
ellipses mine. 
38
 Souvenirs de Théâtre, D’art et De Critique (Paris: G. Charpentier, Editeur, 1883), p. 55-67. Future 
references will be cited in the text. All translations are mine. 
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aristocratic world of the Comédie Française. Simultaneously, the Funambules itself is 
provided with cultural authentication and prestige. It is in this particular text, which 
recounts Gautier’s experience on watching the legendary mime, Deburau, that we 
may excavate our closing comments.  
In a rare essay on this rare text, Leisha Ashdown-Lecointre highlights the 
unique socio-cultural aura of the Funambulles: 
Frequented by the poorest social classes, the Funambules Theater was known 
for its bad smells and noisy spectators, of whom the most vocal were seated in 
the highest seats, those that were the furthest from the stage and the least 
expensive. Thanks to [Jules] Janin’s and Gautier’s publicity, the theater 
became increasingly fashionable amongst the higher social classes during the 
1830s.
39
 
 
The ‘bad smells and noisy spectators’ are symbolic of the location, while 
communicating the vitally interactive and tangible nature of the theatrical experience. 
The Funambules comes to occupy a nebulous world, a sort of netherland for the 
artistic avant-garde, an edgy meeting point for the Parisian bohèmes.  As a result, this 
theatre marks the unstable merging of social classes and aesthetic tastes. For Gautier, 
the Shakespearean element at the Funambules comes in the form of the mime, 
Deburau, who creates the multivocal and chameleon-like character of Pierrot. It is 
through this specific personage that Deburau ‘portrayed the life of the lower classes 
while mocking the bourgeoisie’ (Ashdown-Lecointre, 184). For F. W. J. Hemmings, 
Deburau’s Pierrot became the prised possession of the poorest of the poor, a 
repository for aesthetic validation: 
Deburau was the magnet that attracted these interlopers from another world; 
but the great Pierrot was theirs alone, sprung from the people and playing for 
the people. However little attention they may have paid to the curtain-raiser, 
when the orchestra struck up the air which announced the mime, a religious 
hush gripped the audience. In the Funambules, the only actor heard in dead 
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 ‘Pierrot and the Pantomime: Théophile Gautier’s ideal Theater’ in Novel Stages: Drama and the 
Novel in Nineteenth Century France, ed. Pratima Prasad and Susan McCready (Newark: University of 
Delaware Press, 2007, pp. 183-198 (p. 184). 
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silence was Deburau, who never uttered a word. Such was their respect for 
him that if a stage-hand made a sound behind the scenes they yelled for  
quiet. (126) 
 
The ‘religious hush’ represents Deburau’s aura, his vitality as a performer who could 
appeal to the working classes, and the ‘interlopers from another world’—the dandies, 
the Romantics, in short, the aesthetic aristocracy that eagerly searched for a truly 
democratic theatrical experience. Deburau embodies a world unimaginable to the 
political nobility of the court, and it is through this unique ability to address and 
animate a spectrum of spectators, that Deburau personifies a Shakespearean 
resonance. 
  Gautier, one of these interlopers, starts by recalling a time—possibly during 
the 1830s— when it was fashionable ‘parmi les peintres et les gens de lettres’ [among 
the painters and the people of letters, 55, translation mine] to frequent the 
Funambules, not only for the art of Deburau, but for the experience of watching him 
amidst a raucous and appreciative audience:  
Quelles pièces, mais aussi quel theatre, et surtout quels spectateurs! Voilà un 
public! Et non pas tout ces ennuyés en gants plus ou moins jaunes; tous ces 
feuilletonistes usés, excédés, blasés; toutes ces marquises de la rue du Helder, 
occupées seulement de leurs toilettes et de leurs bouquets; un public en veste, 
en blouse, en chemise, sans chemise souvent, les bras nus, la casquette sur 
l’oreille, mais naïf comme un enfant à qui l’on conte la Barbe bleue, se 
laissant aller bonnement à la fiction du poète, —oui du poète, —acceptant 
tout, à condition d’être amusé; un veritable public, comprenant la fantaisie 
avec une merveilleuse facilité... 
 
[What plays, but also what theatre, and especially what spectators! Here is a 
real audience! And not all those bored people in more or less yellow gloves; 
all those worn out, exasperating, blasé pamphleteers; all those marquises of 
the rue du Helder; who care only for their outfits and their bouquets; but an 
audience in jackets, in overalls, in shirts, often without shirts, bare arms, caps 
on their ears, but naive like a child to whom one reads Blue Beard, letting 
themselves go beautifully with the poet’s fiction  —yes the poet — accepting 
everything on condition of being entertained. A real audience, understanding 
fantasy with marvellous ease...] (55-56, ellipses mine)    
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Gautier builds his respect for the audience at the Funambules through the prism of 
contrast. The ‘bores in yellow gloves’ are the common crowd associated with the 
literary elite in Paris, the respectable nobility, the patrons of taste and fashion. In 
direct antithesis to such cultivation is the rather ramshackle, varied, and naive 
Funambules audience which responds to Deburau’s art with a unique, uncorrupted, 
perhaps pre-intellectualised sense of wonder. In the phrase, ‘naïf comme un enfant’, 
Gautier seems to be returning to Schiller’s aesthetic nostalgia. This audience 
comprehends the role of fantasy—one of the grievances of neoclassical theory—and 
Gautier claims that it would have understood the theatrical innovations of Tieck and 
the romances of Shakespeare (56). The artist and its audience are celebrated. 
Significantly, Deburau is not just a mime, but a poet of profound intentions.  
Gauiter’s text forms itself around the trope of memory—he recalls his past 
visits to the Funambules, and juxtaposes these reminiscences with the reality of 
wandering into its premises again in search of lost time. Once again, he is confronted 
with Deburau and his Pierrot in a form of aesthetic anamnesis. What follows is a 
summary of the performance he sees, which refers to itself as ‘marrrchand d’habits’ 
(the ccclothes-seller). Gautier recounts the plot of this mime, which has obvious 
Shakespearean elements combined with a scathing, incisive, and ultimately moving 
account of one of the predominant themes of the nineteenth-century realist aesthetic: 
social mobility.     
 The plot is simple enough: Pierrot is in love with Eloa, a duchess, whom he 
desperately wants to marry. He wishes to ‘aller dans le monde’ but he does not have 
the appropriate clothes. He circumvents this problem by killing the clothes-seller, and 
fitting himself with the finest clothes possible. In a form of grotesque parody, Pierrot 
is miraculously and suddenly visible to the duchess. Perhaps as a form of self-
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reflection on the nature of theatrical performance and its vitally social implications, 
Pierrot assumes a persona through his clothes and costume. He morphs into a 
nineteenth-century seducer, whispering into his beloved’s ear, charming her into love 
(60). It is at this moment that the fantastic elements of the mime emerge: 
Une tête sort du paraquet; plus de doute, c’est lui, c’est le spectre. Pierrot lui 
pose le pied sur le crâne et le fait rentrer sous le plancher, en lui disant, comme 
Hamlet à l’ombre de son père: Allons! Paix, vieille type! Puis il continue sa 
declaration avec une resolution héroique. Le spectre resort de terre à quelques 
pas plus loin; Pierrot le renforce une seconde fois d’un si vigoureux coup de 
talon de botte, que le fantôme se tient tranquille quelque temps. 
 
[A head emerges from the floorboards. Without any doubt, it’s him - the ghost. 
Pierrot puts his foot on the ghost’s head, sending him back under the floor, 
while saying like Hamlet to his father’s ghost: Go away! Peace, old fellow! 
Then he continues his declaration with heroic resolve. The ghost comes out 
again from the ground a few steps away. Pierrot kicks him a second time with 
his boot heel—the blow is so powerful that the ghost stays put for some time.] 
(60) 
 
 The above passage is truly symptomatic of a theatre of the grotesque, blurring the 
edges of comedy, farce, and profound intentions, marking a momentary reconciliation 
of high culture (Hamlet) with a populist aesthetic. The mime continues in a similar 
vein. Pierrot loses his money, steals some more, becomes rich, and marries the 
Duchess. Grotesquely, it is during the marriage ceremony itself, amidst the marriage 
guests, that the ghost of the marchand d’habits reappears. He forces Pierrot to dance a 
‘une valse infernale’ (an infernal waltz), and in a truly Shakespearean example of 
dramatic irony, the guests are the only ones who cannot see the ghost. In a manner 
akin to Don Giovanni, the ghost stabs Pierrot, dragging him into a trapdoor 
surrounded by flames. The audience does not know whether to laugh or to cry. 
Gautier continues to find Shakespearean resonances, giving this mime, and 
Deburau’s art, a high cultural vindication. In a grotesque fashion, this mime merges 
laughter and terror, and the spectre of the marchand d’habits recalls both Banquo and 
the old Hamlet (65). For Gautier, Pierrot’s struggle symbolises ‘the innocent and pure 
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human soul tormented by an infinite yearning towards higher regions’ (65). Perhaps 
Gautier is a little guilty of Schlegelian mysticism here. Yet, in his treatment of the 
mime, he reflects on the vitally Romantic theme of finding beauty in the most 
commonplace of situations. It is through this celebration of the Funambules and its 
artist that Gautier confirms the democratic aesthetic linked to dramatic activity, an 
aesthetic that roots itself and grows from a particularly open-ended theorising of a 
Shakespearean grotesque. 
 During the course of this chapter, we have analysed a few neglected examples 
of the revisioning of Shakespeare that we approached in Chapter II. In A. W. 
Schlegel’s Comparaison, the dialectic of Euripides and Racine develops into a 
synthesising process found in Shakespeare, the reconciliation of the naive and the 
sentimental. Stendhal’s Racine et Shakespeare continues the examination of the 
Shakespearean attack on the premises of neoclassical theory (and Voltaire), while 
declaring the figure of ‘Racine’ to be outmoded for the Romantic age. Hugo renders 
Shakespeare a god-like author, attacking Voltaire’s problems with him and his 
Hamlet. Finally, Gautier’s appreciation of Deburau’s art functions as an aesthetic and 
political validation of the theatre as the most modern and democratic of art forms. 
Significantly, Shakespeare—the god of theatrical action—becomes the man of the 
Revolutionary mob, and the rallying point of an artistic revolution that seeks to 
address a variety of spectators. In the next chapter, we shall look into Baudelaire’s 
remarkably relevant De L’Essence du Rire (On the Essence of Laughter, 1855), where 
mime, the figure of Pierrot, and a theorising of the grotesque remerge like the ghost of 
Hamlet. Then, in the poem ‘Une Charogne’, we shall find how vitally theatrical 
performance and irony invade the lyrical apotheosis and practice of a morbid, post-
Romantic, almost modernist, sensibility. 
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     Chapter IV 
 
‘Abnormal Specimens’: The Shakespearean Grotesque in 
    Baudelaire  
 
An artist is an artist only by dint of his exquisite sense of Beauty, a sense affording 
him rapturous enjoyment, but at the same time implying or involving an equally 
exquisite sense of Deformity, of disproportion.
1
 
 
Charles Baudelaire, ‘Further Notes on Edgar Poe’ 
 
I am simply saying that if a poet pursues a moral aim, he will have weakened his 
poetic powers and it would be rash to wager that the result will be bad work. On pain 
of death and decay, poetry cannot transform herself into a branch of science or ethics. 
Her object is not truth, but only Herself.
2
 
 
            Charles Baudelaire, ‘Further Notes on Edgar Poe’  
 
 
I—The Artist as Critic 
In a remarkably apt passage in his essay, ‘Richard Wagner and Tannhäuser in 
Paris’, one that reflects on the uneasy rapport between poet and critic in the post-
Romantic era, Charles Baudelaire distils a theoretical standpoint that elevates the poet 
to the position of insightful and trustworthy critic, or more appropriately as the eternal 
critic in waiting, the keenest observer of the logistics and mysterious resonances of 
the ars poetica: 
To find a critic turning into a poet would be an entirely new event in the 
history of the arts, a reversal of all the physical laws, a monstrosity; on the 
other hand, all great poets naturally and fatally become critics. I pity those 
poets who are guided by instinct alone: I regard them as incomplete. But in the 
spiritual life of the former [i.e. the great poets] a crisis inevitably occurs when 
they feel the need to reason about their art, to discover the obscure laws in 
virtue of which they have created, and to extract from this study a set of 
precepts whose divine aim is infallibility in poetic creation. It would be 
unthinkable (prodigieux) for a critic to become a poet; and it is impossible for 
a poet not to contain within him a critic. Therefore the reader will not be 
surprised at my regarding the poet as the best of all critics.
3
 
                                                          
1
 Baudelaire, The Painter of Modern Life and Other Essays, trans. Jonathan Mayne (New York: 
Phaidon Press Ltd, 1964), p.104. 
2
 Ibid., p. 107.  
3
 ‘Richard Wagner and Tannhäuser in Paris’ in The Painter of Modern Life and Other Essays, 2
nd
 ed 
Jonathan Mayne, (London: Phaidon Press, 1995), p. 124. All future references will be cited in the text. 
In addition to this widely read translation of Baudelaire’s most significant critical essays, I have also 
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There are two simultaneous tendencies at play here: on the one hand, the critic is 
deemed bereft of all artistic talent, while the poet becomes the most complete critic. 
Baudelaire denounces the possibility of a critic becoming a poet, claiming it to be an 
ontological abnormality. The word prodigieux does not necessarily mean 
‘unthinkable’, but rather signifies that a critic becoming a poet would be a strange and 
marvelous event in the history of letters, a type of grotesque creation.  
Here, we have moved away from Walter Benjamin’s treatment of the intrinsic 
critical afterlife of art, coinciding with the aesthetic imperative of critical activity, in 
the first chapter of this thesis. In his study of Romantic irony, Benjamin comments on 
the necessary hermeneutics of the critic-as-artist: ‘Thus, criticism, is, as it were, an 
experiment on the artwork, one through which the latter’s own reflection is awakened, 
through which it is brought to consciousness and to knowledge of itself’.
4
 Vitally for 
Benjamin, criticism is itself an art-form. Without critical reflection, the artwork 
remains incomplete, almost dormant. Critical activity helps the artwork realise its 
potential. In other words, the critic and the artist are in a symbiotic relationship. For 
Benjamin, the critic is an artist in her own right. Perhaps, this claim for the critic-as-
artist is a justification for the Romantic need to theorise aesthetics. As we have seen, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
used, and referred to, the iconic Claude Pichois editions of the complete works, Oeuvres Complètes, 
Vol 1- III (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1961). The passage in the original French is as follows: ‘Ce serait 
un événement tout nouveau dans l’histoire des arts qu’un critique se faisant poëte, un renversement de 
toutes les lois psychiques, une monstruosité; au contraire, tous les grands poëtes deviennent 
naturellement, fatalement, critiques. Je plains les poëtes que guide le seul instinct; je les crois 
incomplets. Dans la vie spirituelles des premiers, une crise se fait infailliblement, où ils veulent 
raisonner leur art, découvrir les lois obscures en vertu desquelles ils ont produit, et de tirer de cette 
etude une série des preceptes dont le but divin est infaillibilité dans la production poétique. Il serait 
prodigieux qu’un critique devint poëte , et il est impossible qu’un  poëte contienne pas un critique’, p. 
1222. All future references will be cited in the text. 
4
 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism’ in Selected Writings, Vol. 1 
1913-26, ed. Jennings et al (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 
151.  See my first chapter for a detailed discussion of Benjamin’s essay on the development of 
Romantic irony as a reaction to the ego-centric/I-centric philosophy of Fichte. Framed within 
Benjamin’s ‘romantic theory of object knowledge’, an artwork is born through critical reflection, and 
reaches its completion through the art of criticism.    
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art communicates to philosophy its inherent ‘groundlessness’.
5
 In response, 
philosophy after Kant’s third critique, tries to come to terms with this lack of ground 
by annexing art into the domain of critical reflection. From Kant to the 
poststructuralists, criticism is the logical development of the so-called Hegelian ‘death 
of art’.  The critics are the poets of our time. 
 In Baudelaire’s aesthetics, however, such claims are perfunctory and without 
substantiation. How can a critic be a poet? Can criticism ever really become an art-
form? These are the vitally relevant questions that emerge from examining not only 
Baudelaire’s critical philosophy (or for that matter, Stendhal’s or Hugo’s), but from 
examining the path of criticism, and of poetry-as-criticism (Schlegel’s ‘poetry of 
poetry’, which characterises Romantic literature), in the architecture of this thesis.
6
 
For Baudelaire, the critic cannot become a poet. On the other hand, ‘tous les grands 
poëtes’ must necessarily develop into critics. According to Baudelaire, this process of 
the artist becoming a critic is naturelle and fatale, simultaneously. The choice of both 
words is significant: it is a law of nature for a poet to be a critic, and yet this aesthetic 
inevitability is fraught with danger. In reflecting upon her art, the poet loses elements 
of instinctual creation. She moves further away from the naive perception of 
Schiller’s lyric poet.  
The above passage then, relocates this post-Kantian binary of intention and 
instinct within the frame of critical inquiry. As if justifying his act of writing 
copiously on a variety of aesthetic matters—fashion, dandyism, caricature—
Baudelaire seeks to eulogise the artist’s critical capabilities. He defends Wagner from 
those who censure him for theorising his music, while at the same time, defending his 
                                                          
5
 I have discussed this particular theme with reference to Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre and Friedrich 
Schlegel’s Romantic irony in Chapter I of this thesis. 
6
 See Paul Hamilton’s Metaromanticism: aesthetics, literature, theory (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2003), for a sustained investigation into the continual self-reflection as a philosophic imperative 
in Romantic and post-Romantic aesthetics and theory. This has been discussed in Chapter I. 
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own theoretical activities. He outlines the passage of development from poetry to 
criticism: ‘Poetry exists and asserts itself first, and then gives birth to the study of 
rules’ (Mayne, 124). Baudelaire operates on the axis of succession, where the critical 
faculty takes shape after creative intuition. As we shall see, in his study of laughter, 
satire and the grotesque in his seminal text on the comic and its relationship to 
modern art, De L’Essence du Rire (On the Essence of Laughter, 1855), Baudelaire—
in a manner akin to the German Romantic philosophers—associates the intellectual 
critical spirit with civilizational progress, as well as with the mythical and mystical 
notions regarding the Fall of humanity. Progress coincides with a necessary fall into le 
mal. The necessary disjunction between a positivist account of progress (framed 
within the discourse of scientific, industrial and technological advancement) and the 
lack of a natural and aesthetic appreciation of reality starts to dominate critical theory. 
Art confronts politics and the overarching nineteenth-century ideal of scientific 
meliorism. As the second epigraph to this chapter indicates, Baudelaire believes that 
poetry must be at odds with scientific and ethical systems. According to Baudelaire, 
its object—and one may say in a Schlegelian reading, its subject as well—must be 
itself. In a manner akin to what Gadamer calls ‘aesthetic differentiation’, art starts to 
position itself against scientific conceptions of nature and reality.
7
 Herein lies the 
roots for l’art pour l’art. One of the aims of this chapter—and this thesis— is to 
examine the extent to which ideas and illusions of aesthetic autonomy are linked to 
socio-political upheaval. Even in its proclamations of separation from scientific and 
empirical reality, art in the nineteenth century perpetuates its own dependence on the 
mechanistic progress of civilisation. In Chapter III, we saw how A. W. Schlegel, 
                                                          
7
 See section IV of the first chapter of this thesis for Gadamer’s concept of ‘aesthetic differentiation’ 
and its relationship to the idea of spiel (play) as it develops its Kanitan afterlife in Schiller and 
Friedrich Schlegel. The idea of ‘aesthetic differentiation’ can be traced back to Schiller’s The Aesthetic 
Education of Man in a Series of Letters, ed. & trans. by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1967). These passages, and themes, have been analysed in Chapter I.     
234 
 
Stendhal, and Hugo eulogise Shakespeare as the modern poet/dramatist, and call out 
for a drama that accurately reflects a bloody, post-Revolutionary world.  Similarly, in 
this chapter, we will see how Baudelaire’s own work as artist and critic, as well as his 
perspectives on the grotesque, inform our understanding of post-Romanticism’s 
negotiation with the modern, industrialised cityscape.  
Consequently, this chapter will analyse the extent to which Baudelaire’s 
conception of the grotesque (and its vital rapport with the comic) constitutes a natural 
progression from the play of Romantic irony (as in the Schlegel brothers), as well as 
the mirroring of this process of irony in Romantic revisionings of Shakespearean 
drama (the Schlegel brothers, Hazlitt, and Stendhal). Furthermore, I will examine how 
Baudelaire’s work as critic and artist marks a culmination of the grotesque as a mode 
that reflects the monstrous vitality of the post-Revolutionary world, which had been 
first propounded in the work of Hugo. In his dual role as the poet and critic of 
modernity, Baudelaire becomes arguably the most important theorist and practitioner 
of the grotesque. Simultaneously, this chapter will also examine how the Baudelairean 
grotesque also differs from that of the Schlegel brothers and Hugo, primarily through 
its consecration of mourning as a necessary function of the modern grotesque. In my 
analysis of mourning in Baudelaire, I will make use of Walter Benjamin’s seminal 
and far-reaching work on the French poet.
8
 Keeping this particular theoretical frame 
                                                          
8
 Walter Benjamin’s fascination with Baudelaire as the poet of an emerging, industrialised modernity in 
European literature constitutes one of the most intimate and vital critical moments in aesthetic and 
political theory. See Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism, trans. Harry 
Zohn  (London: NLB, 1973). The latest translation of the most important essays in the book previously 
mentioned—‘Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century’, and ‘The Paris of the Second Empire in 
Baudelaire’—as well as other essays and early fragments on Baudelaire (‘Baudelaire’, ‘Central Park, 
‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’) can be found in The Writer of Modern Life: Essays on Charles 
Baudelaire, ed. Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2006). See, in particular, Michael W. Jennings informative introduction to the primary themes in 
Benjamin’s  re-writing of Baudelaire with an emphasis on allegory, the aesthetics of shock, as well as 
the implications of cultural mourning. Jennings also makes an intriguing and apt connection between 
Benjamin’s theory of shock, poetic production as commodity, and the idea of fashion to Baudelaire’s 
cultural criticism in The Painter of Modern Life (1863).  In the fourth section of this chapter, I will also 
be making use of Benjamin’s hermeneutics on allegory and historico-cultural catastrophe via his study 
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in mind, I will claim that in writing about a rotting carcass in ‘Une Charogne’ (‘A 
Carcass’), for example, Baudelaire’s poetics exemplify a darker obsession with death 
and decay than what was present in Stendhal or Hugo, presenting a Hamlet-like 
morbidity that characterizes the modern lyric. In this fashion, the Baudelairean 
grotesque represents, in vitality, fragments shored against the ruins of the modern 
world. This chapter will display how,  from De L’Essence du Rire to ‘Une Charogne’ 
in Les Fleurs du Mal (1857/61), Baudelaire as critic, poet, and persona leads the way 
to a more modernist ethos, with the grotesque as its most visible symptom. 
     
II—The Grotesque as Modernity   
The interplay between the critical and artistic faculties in Baudelaire is 
particularly significant after Romantic theorisations. If as we saw in Chapter I, 
Friedrich Schlegel had called for the unification of poetry and philosophy as a means 
of creating the new romantische poesie, by the time we get to Baudelaire, even if the 
arts and philosophy have not established a truce, a large number of poets have 
nevertheless started writing and publishing their theories and reflections on the nature 
of art, from its stylistic and organic origins to its afterlife in audience response. 
Therefore, in the last chapter, after having analysed the insurrectionary aesthetic 
present in A. W. Schlegel’s Comparaison entre le Phèdre de Racine et celle 
d’Euripide (Comparison between Racine’s Phèdre and that of Euripides, 1807, we 
studied the theoretical texts of arguably the two most vital and influential literary 
figures in French Romanticism, Stendhal and Victor Hugo. 
The conclusions drawn in the last chapter, which we must remember here are, 
firstly, for A. W. Schlegel, the Comparaison is a means through which to express an 
                                                                                                                                                                      
of the German trauerspiel (‘mourning-play’) in The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John 
Osbourne (London: NLB, 1997). Future references will be cited in the text. 
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aesthetic-political perspective that interrogates the artistic merits of Racine with 
reference to Euripides, while also exposing the limitations and essential obsolescence 
of French neoclassical theory that had dominated European aesthetics for over two 
centuries. Racine—the icon of French aesthetic ambitions—is a lesser artist than both 
Euripides and Shakespeare. The bard constitutes the most complete form of tragic 
theatre, while signifying freedom from the rigid rules of French theory.  Secondly, in 
Racine et Shakespeare (1823/25), Stendhal takes up a similar position, devaluing 
Racine’s imitative classicism in favour of Shakespeare’s contemporary and eternal 
Romanticism. As in the Schlegel brothers, so too with Stendhal—‘romantic’ equals 
‘contemporary’. Stendhal theorises the need for literature to be modern and 
contemporary, and does so by placing the plays of Shakespeare over and above those 
of Racine, whom he associates with a rigid and artificial classicism. Shakespearean 
drama, in contrast, displays the vigour of passion enacted, glorifying the natural 
source of emotional action, which is elemental rather than intellectual. Shakespeare’s 
characters are real and alive. The expression of emotional grandeur, in a largely 
Romantic frame, takes precedence over intellectualised craftsmanship.  Thirdly, in 
Préface de Cromwell (1827), Hugo extends Stendhal’s argument for a certain vital 
and powerful realism, by which Romantic art must be varied and true to lived 
experience. Hugo propounds his claim for the primacy of drama in modern literature, 
while also outlining a theory of the grotesque in conjunction with a celebration of 
Shakespeare. Finally, in keeping with the poet-as-theorist model, we ended Chapter 
III by examining Gautier’s commentary on the legendary mime, Deburau in 
‘Shakespeare aux Funambules’ (‘Shakespeare at the Funambules’, 1842) and his 
performance of the tales of Pierrot, a unique emblem of nineteenth-century social 
mobility, a working-class hero who satirises the pretensions of the middle classes.  
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What is particularly worth noting in the case of the French ‘poets’ from 
Stendhal to Gautier, is that the creative writer presents the validity of his case by 
opposing the critic and the pamphleteer, and yet does so through the media essentially 
connected to these unfairly maligned writers on aesthetic affairs: the review, the 
extended essay, the manifesto. The poet’s antipathy towards the patrons of the 
academy is documented in each text: Stendhal’s Racine et Shakespeare positions 
itself against the perspectives of the Académie Française that still considered 
Shakespearean excess as barbaric. Nevertheless, as we saw in Chapter III, large 
portions of those pamphlets make use of a dialectical and dramatic interplay between 
the figure of the Romantic and the persona of the academic critic. In borrowing 
extensively from the tricks of stagecraft, the Platonic dialogues, and the culture of 
nineteenth-century pamphleteering, Stendhal’s texts carry out an inherently 
Schlegelian project of merging critical and philosophical concerns with literary and 
aesthetic ones.  In a more peculiar Romantic embodiment, Hugo’s Préface de 
Cromwell, which takes the form of a manifesto, actually overshadows the actual play 
that it is meant to introduce. Instead, this extended, quasi-philosophical essay that 
borrows from the totalising historical aesthetics of A. W. Schlegel, becomes a call to 
arms for the Romantic movement as a whole, building upon the revolt fomented by 
Stendhal. The supremacy of the aesthetic, and its urgent need to reflect the modern 
world in all its manifestations, from the sublime to the grotesque, takes centre-stage. 
Finally, Gautier’s short review openly contrasts the instinctive performance of 
Deburau and the raucous appreciation of a working-class audience with the 
predictable, well-mannered, and often pedantic responses of an audience at the French 
royal courts.   
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In each case, I would claim that this unstable interaction of critical and artistic 
faculties in the mind of the poet, constitutes an essentially hybrid lens unique to the 
Romantic age. As we have seen, hybridity is the hallmark of the grotesque: Hugo and 
Stendhal value Shakespeare because his plays are mixed creations, negotiating the 
imperatives inherent to both tragedy and comedy, thereby creating a new type of 
drama particularly suited to Romantic tastes. The Schlegel brothers call out for a 
Romantic poetry that is similarly hybrid, forging newer ties between poetry and 
philosophy. Shakespearean drama, operating through the aesthetics of mixing—
modes, genres, high and low cultures, linguistic expression—reflects this Romantic 
imperative.  Similarly, artists themselves realise the aesthetic potential of criticism, 
while simultaneously celebrating the critical sensibility of modern poetry that is 
always already present. In Virtual Theater: from Diderot to Mallarmé (1989), Evlyn 
Gould analyses the ‘theatricality of thought’ and the ‘literary representation of 
philosophy’ in nineteenth-century French literature as a means through which to 
understand such an aesthetic culture that essentially breaks down barriers between 
conventionally separated methods of seeing the world.
9
  In the present chapter, 
through the crucial late-Romantic figure of Baudelaire, we shall continue our 
exploration into the hybrid artistic-philosophical lens that is a feature of an age 
committed to theorising art.
10
 Through this methodology, we will readdress and 
provide some sort of closure to our investigation into the grotesque. 
                                                          
9
 Virtual Theater: from Diderot to Mallarme (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1989), p. 7. This book was examined in connection to Stendhal’s Racine et Shakespeare pamphlets in 
the last chapter. 
10
 By referring to Baudelaire as a ‘late Romantic’, I am following the French intellectual tradition, 
which sees him as more of a Romantic than a ‘symbolist’ or ‘decadent’. See particularly Allain 
Vaillant’s wide-ranging and astute La Crise de la Littérature: Romantism et Modernité (Grenoble: 
Ellug, Université Stendhal, 2005). See also the essays collected in Les Fleurs du Mal: Colloque de La 
Sorbonne, ed. André Guyaux (Paris: Presses de L’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2003) for the most 
recent accounts of Baudelaire’s relationship to Romantic and modernist sensibilities. Future references 
will be cited in the text. For the critical historian of nineteenth-century literature, the difficulty in 
classifying Baudelaire is significant: in numerous ways, he simultaneously looks back to the likes of 
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Irrespective of how we classify him, Baudelaire is a poet vitally emblematic of 
modernity. Debarati Sanyal, in her recent and remarkable The Violence of Modernity: 
Baudelaire, Irony, and the Politics of Form (2006) correctly asserts that the claiming 
of Baudelaire as the quintessential poet of modernity—and we could conceivably 
classify this elusive ‘modernity’ as being simultaneously post-Romantic and 
modernist—owes much to Benjamin: ‘Benjamin’s canonization of Baudelaire as the 
bard of modernity’s trauma has made a lasting impact’.
11
 For Sanyal (and Benjamin), 
‘modernity’s trauma’ results from the confrontation of individual subjectivity and the 
march of historical capitalism, which undermines the primacy of subjective autonomy 
through quasi-totalitarian discourses mired in the language of profit and loss. What 
role then does the writer play in the midst of this discourse? How does the lyric poet 
even begin to approach writing about this historical condition? Schiller’s naive poet—
a recurrent shadow on nineteenth-century poetry—who is in constant contact with 
nature, has become a distant dream.  In Chapter III, we saw that Stendhal and Hugo 
demand that the writer stay true to portraying the complexity of modern life in all its 
variety. Stendhal requires a Shakespearean drama that can make a post-Revolutionary 
audience (fed on publicised violence and crime) ‘tremble and cry’, while Hugo 
examines the grotesque as the most ‘fertile source’ for the new, Romantic art. As 
Hugo claims, the grotesque is everywhere.
12
 For Virginia E. Swain, in her recent 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Stendhal, while also laying the foundations for more radical reconstructions of Romanticism in the 
work of Rimbaud. Whether we classify him as a ‘romantic’, a ‘symbolist’ or indeed a ‘modernist’, 
Baudelaire is a crucial poet for the project and condition of modernity. 
11
 The Violence of Modernity: Baudelaire, Irony, and the Politics of Form (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2006), p. 20. Sanyal is making explicit reference to Benjamin’s seminal book on 
Baudelaire as the principle poet of modernity in Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High 
Capitalism,  trans. Harry Zohn (London: NLB, 1973). We will return to both texts later in the chapter. 
Future references will be cited in the text. 
12
 The need for an artist to speak to the fractured sensibilities of an audience raised on post-
Revolutionary bloodshed— from the guillotine and the Revolutionary wars to the upsurge of publicised 
crime—was looked at in Chapter III. For the most authoritative account of the ‘aesthetics of  blood’ in 
French Romanticism, see Christine Marcandier-Colard’s Crimes de Sang et Scène Capitales: Essai sur 
l’esthétique romantique de la violence (Paris: Presses Universitaire de la France, 1998), which 
investigates the notion of crime as formulating a new aesthetic of revolt amongst artists and outlaws. 
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Grotesque Figures: Baudelaire, Rousseau and the Aesthetic (2004), the grotesque as a 
concept starts to mutate after the ‘trauma of the French Revolution’.
13
 Once again, 
history after the bloody Revolution forms itself as cultural trauma. In a Bakhtinian 
reading of the term, Swain associates a pre-Revolutionary grotesque with the notion 
of carnival. In contrast, the post-Revolutionary grotesque (tinged by a popular culture 
of blood and violence), ‘is not an extension of the carnival spirit; it does not evoke 
feelings of freedom and the possibility of change’ (4). We can agree with the first 
assertion: the post-Revolutionary grotesque occupies a darker, more sinister, and 
altogether ironic realm. However, negations of freedom are problematic. While Swain 
is correct to assert a radical disillusionment on part of poets like Baudelaire vis-a-vis 
the more celebrated and ideal yearnings of early Romanticism (within the highly 
influential German context, the Schlegelian myth of unification comes to mind), I 
would nevertheless affirm that despite its darker and altogether more mournful tone, 
the grotesque in Baudelaire still signifies a certain freedom from conventional 
discourses of aesthetics and history. According to Swain, this nouveau grotesque 
appealed to Baudelaire as he ‘welcomed the grotesque, which he understood as a 
principle of instability or a destabilizing force. For Baudelaire, the grotesque was a 
subversive force in oppressive times’ (7).  As a vitally ‘subversive force’, the 
grotesque signifies freedom.  As in the case of the Romantic ironist, the grotesque as 
sustained subversion operates as an essentially radical aesthetic. However, true to its 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Images of grotesque violence come to dominate the post-Revolutionary consciousness. See also Joel 
Black, The Aesthetics of Murder: A Study of Romantic Literature and Contemporary Culture 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1991) and Laurence Senelick, The Prestige of Evil: The 
Murderer as Romantic Hero from Sade to Larcenaire (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987). The first 
book examines the representation of violence as a means through which art attempts to exceed its 
traditionally prescribed boundaries, while the second text examines the association of the Romantic 
hero with the outlaw and murderer, a theme that obviously fascinated many artists in the nineteenth-
century. From my perspective, this celebration of the aesthetics of blood is fundamentally linked to the 
overarching idea of the grotesque. 
13
 Virginia E. Swain, Grotesque Figures: Baudelaire, Rousseau and the Aesthetic (Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), p. 3. All future references will be cited in the text. 
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essence as dramatic mutation and movement, the grotesque can also be reactionary in 
its implications, particularly when we keep in mind Baudelaire’s antagonistic 
perspectives on democracy and mass culture.
14
  
From my perspective, the celebration (and simultaneous mourning) of the 
grotesque, which mirrors the violence and menace of the modern cityscape as well as 
the appetites of a new audience, is fundamentally linked to the overarching idea that 
informs it. Fundamentally, whether the grotesque constitutes the symbolic violence of 
mixed modes and genres, or the depiction of bodily decay, or a certain overabundance 
and laterality of perspectives that question fixed boundaries, it is a form that 
paradoxically is never included in a conventional system of aesthetic or critical 
representation. It somehow always remains beyond stereotypical conceptions of ‘art’. 
It is always antithetical to classically formed phenomena. In many ways then, as a 
critical writer and as a poet of the modern, industrialised cityscape, Baudelaire 
exemplifies the larger Romantic project of modernity, and does so by exemplifying 
what we referred to as the modernity imperative in the last chapter. Alternatively, we 
can refer to this as the aesthetic of the contemporary. The grotesque is a principle 
component of this aesthetic.  
In Stendhal and Romantic Esthetics, Emile J. Talbot correlates the 
contemporary with the idea of relevance, most importantly by relating Stendhal to 
Baudelaire: 
                                                          
14
 In ‘Edgar Allen Poe: His Life and Works’, Baudelaire says: ‘You might think that the impious love 
of liberty had given birth to a new tyranny, a bestial tyranny, or zoocracy, whose savage insensibility 
recalls the idol of the Juggernaut...’ (Mayne, 71-72). Similarly, his perspectives on the USA reveal a 
similar hatred for the culture of commodification: ‘As a country, the United States is like a gigantic 
child, naturally jealous of the old continent. Proud of her material, abnormal and well-nigh monstrous 
development, this newcomer in history has a simple faith in the all-power fullness of industry; like 
some unhappy spirits among us, she is convinced that Industry will end by gobbling up the Devil. Time 
and money have so great a value over there! Material activity, inflated to the proportions of a national 
form of madness, leaves the American mind with very little room for things which are not of the earth’ 
(Mayne, 73). 
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The concept of contemporaneousness appreciates the notion of the relevance 
of the arts. It considers the arts as living entities organically related to the time 
and place in which they are produced. Whereas Neoclassical art looked 
backward for inspiration, Romantic art looks to the present. This relationship 
between the arts and the contemporary was to become a key concept of 
Baudelaire’s critical thought. In the chapter “Qu’est-ce que le romantisme?” of 
his Salon de 1846 Baudelaire, after recognizing the great diversity of the 
Romantic movement, defined Romanticism as “l’expression la plus récente, la 
plus actuelle du beau,” a definition very close to Stendhal’s...Yet Stendhal’s 
concept of modernity is related to audience response (the contemporaneity of 
subject matter and form being a prerequisite to response), while Baudelaire’s 
concept of modernity refers to the artist’s relation to his material.
15
 
 
Talbot posits that Baudelaire’s definition of Romanticism as ‘the most recent and 
most current expression of the beautiful’ reflects a perspective intrinsic to Stendhal’s 
critical philosophy. It is a connection that is specifically relevant to our investigation 
in this chapter. Stendhal’s consideration of the Romantic notion of beauty is 
synonymous with modernity. This modernity is tied to ‘audience response’, and we 
are reminded here of Stendhal’s famous definition of Romantic art in Racine et 
Shakespeare as that which gives the greatest possible pleasure to a contemporary 
audience. In opposition, Classical art is created for the great-grandparents of that same 
audience. Baudelaire adopts a similar perspective on contemporaneity. In his case, 
‘the artist’s relation to his material’, often takes the form of the poet-flâneur watching 
and responding to phenomena that are ugly, especially given the classical 
apperception of beauty as a reference point. In addition, I would assert that 
Baudelaire’s aesthetics of shock are not only rooted in the material of his art, but 
emerge as insurrectionary tools that destabilise audience expectations and perceptions 
of the nature of artistic activity. The Baudelairean grotesque, founded in the material 
of art (a rotting carcass, for example), fundamentally alters our methods of 
comprehending the very process of becoming inherent to the artwork. This process, 
                                                          
15
 Stendhal and Romantic Esthetics (Lexington, KY: French Forum Publishers, 1985), p. 119. 
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tinged with the shock of audience reaction, forms itself into the condition of the 
grotesque.  
One of my claims in this chapter, as we approach Baudelaire’s theory of the 
grotesque in De L’Essence du Rire, combined with a case-study of his famous poem 
‘Une Charogne’ (‘A Carcass’), is that the grotesque in all its varied guises, is vital to 
this larger project of Romantic and post-Romantic modernity.  Taking my cue from 
Benjamin, the grotesque characterises shock as the foremost component of modernity 
in art. If the Schlegels, Stendhal, and Hugo equate Romanticism with an essentially 
contemporary ethos, Baudelaire functions as the writer who continues this very 
project in multiple ways: as a critic who reflects on the rules of his art, as a poet who 
records the sensibility of shock endemic to the modern metropolis of Paris, an most 
importantly, as a theoriser and practitioner of a theatrical grotesque. Baudelaire’s 
most obvious and overarching method of representing modernity is through the 
framing of the industrial cityscape. In Baudelaire’s vision of a brave new world, 
modernity consists of the artistic attempt to collate and reconstruct the contemporary 
scrapheap of the modern, industrialised city, to find in the detritus of a wasteland the 
‘eternal promise of beauty’. The chiffonier of Paris—the city’s rag-picker—becomes 
its consummate artist.
16
 The chiffonier’s objects of collection can invariably be 
referred to as ‘grotesque’.  
                                                          
16
 Baudelaire’s fascination for le chiffonier is evidenced most blatantly in the poem ‘Le Vin des 
Chiffoniers’ (‘The Ragpickers’ Wine’) in Les Fleurs du Mal, where the ragpicker’s affiliation with the 
poet is made through the use of simile that likens him to a drunk poet. Benjamin’s analysis of the rag-
picker-as-poet and vice versa is once again vital in this context. In the essay, ‘The Paris of the Second 
Empire in Baudelaire’, he writes: ‘When the new industrial process gave refuse a certain value, 
ragpickers appeared in the cities in large numbers. They worked for middlemen and constituted a sort 
of cottage industry located in the streets. The ragpicker fascinated his epoch. The eyes of the first 
investigators of pauperism were fixed on him with the mute question: Where does the limit of human 
misery lie?’ (Jennings, 54). 
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In a section devoted to modernity in Le Peintre de la Vie Moderne (The 
Painter of Modern Life, 1863), the Baudelairean artist’s search for truly modern 
makes him into a chronicler of its fashions and tastes: 
He makes it his business to extract from fashion whatever element it may 
contain of poetry within history, to distill the eternal from the transitory...it is 
much easier to decide outright that everything about the garb of an age is ugly 
than to devote oneself to the task of distilling from it the mysterious element 
of beauty that it may contain, however slight or minimal that element may be. 
By ‘modernity’ I mean the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent, the half of 
art whose other half is the eternal and the immutable.  (Mayne, 12,  ellipses 
mine) 
 
Crucial themes related to Baudelaire’s task as critic and artist emerge. La beauté 
mystérieuse of the contemporary world must be found in the midst of apparent 
decadence and decay. If Hugo fought for the validity of representing the ugly in art in 
Préface de Cromwell, Baudelaire makes the task of finding beauty in the ugly into a 
post-Romantic dictum. In addition, the elements of the modern are concerned 
primarily with the transient rather than eternal images. As a result, modern beauty—or 
more appropriately, a grotesque and paradoxical beauty that is almost 
indistinguishable from the ugly—is inherently a Schlegelian process than a product. 
The fixed images of classicism recede, existing only as shadows that surround the flux 
of modernity. In a classical/modern dialectic reminiscent of Stendhal (and by 
‘modern’, we also signify ‘romantic’), Baudelaire claims that it is  ‘an excellent thing 
to study the old masters in order to learn how to paint; but it can be no more than a 
waste of labour if your aim is to understand the special nature of present-day beauty’ 
(Mayne, 13). In other words, imitative Classicism and study cannot tell us anything 
about ‘present-day beauty’ (la beauté présente). In a riposte to artistic training in the 
academy and official art schools of Paris, Baudelaire says: ‘If a painstaking, 
scrupulous, but feebly imaginative artist has to paint a courtesan of today and takes 
his ‘inspiration’ (that is the accepted word) from a courtesan by Titian or Raphael, it 
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is only too likely that he will produce a work which is false, ambiguous and obscure’ 
(Mayne, 14). Being inspired by a courtesan from Titian corresponds with the 
neoclassicism of a Racine, whose famous characters were borrowed from the legends 
and plays of antiquity. Shakespeare’s characters, in contrast, while often based on 
earlier texts and historical chronicles, nevertheless seem to have arisen from the 
matter of life. Coincidentally, Manet’s controversial and strikingly modern Olympia, 
was painted the same year as Baudelaire’s essay. The reference to a courtesan as a 
subject of art is similarly not accidental on Baudelaire’s part. The prostitute in 
Baudelaire—or for that matter in Rimbaud or Rossetti or Wilde or Dostoyevsky—
becomes the quintessential modern muse for the male writer. According to Benjamin, 
she is ‘seller and sold in one’, thereby occupying a liminal space in the capitalist 
market (Jennings, 41). She functions as an inverse ideal: she is celebrated because she 
is a victim of male desire, and commerce. Yet, through the power of her individuality, 
and due to the fact that she (along with the criminal, the murderer, and other such 
outlaw fantasies) represents the seething subculture that subverts the established 
system of exchange, the prostitute becomes almost heroic.
17
 She is the lifeblood of the 
new, hyper-realist aesthetic. She is a symptom and subject of the modern grotesque.  
 Nature takes over art. Art cannot be completely separate, totally differentiated 
from reality. As we saw in Chapter III, if nature in the nineteenth-century is 
characterised by violence, bloodshed, and a certain fragmentation of systems and 
                                                          
17
 See Richard Burton’s ‘The Unseen Seer, or Proteus in the City: Aspects of a Nineteenth Century 
Parisian Myth’ in French Studies, XLII, 1988, pp. 50-60. Concerning the Parisian fascination for crime 
and the underworld, which became a form of parallel society, Burton says: ‘With its supposed secret 
languages, clandestine forms of communication, its infinite capacity for disguise and duplicity, 
mysterious hierarchies and ramifying, web-like organisation, the underworld was seen as nothing less 
than a counter-society intent on infiltrating, undermining and eventually seizing control of orthodox 
society’ (51). Burton actually makes the criminal and the outlaw into an actor, or omniscient author, 
given her play with a multiplicity of identity: ‘All-seeing yet invisible, susceptible of an indefinite 
series of avatars and able, finally, to reincarnate himself at will in the being of another, the Protean 
criminal offers a first instance of what will be shown to be a recurring lietmotiv of the mid-nineteenth 
century Parisian imagination: the deus absconditus whose hidden hand controls the destinies of men 
and women from afar’ (53). Future references will be cited in the text. 
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values, then art must necessarily mirror such a world. Grotesque images emerge from 
grotesque subjects.  
For Allain Vaillant, in his encyclopaedic La Crise de la Littérature: 
Romantisme et Modernité (2005), the crisis of modernity caused by socio-political 
upheaval, gives birth to a poetry of fragmentation characteristic of later Romanticism: 
La poésie est marquée, au XIX siècle, par le déclin des formes longues—celles 
du premier romantisme—au profit des genres brefs, tels qu’ils sont pratiqués, 
par exemple, par un Baudelaire. Cette évaluation est généralement rattaché à 
la nouvelle vision du monde, éclatée et atomisée, qui est justement celle de la 
modernité, et à la poétique de la brevitas, voire du fragment, qui lui est 
corrélée. Mais on oublie de rappeler que ce changement de format est d’abord 
imposé par la transformation de la publication poétique, qui doit presser 
presque obligatoirement, sous la monarchie de Juillet, par la revue ou la petite 
presse littéraire : or on n’écrit évidemment pas la même chose ni de la même 
manière pour un livre personnel ou pour une publication collective et par 
nature hétéroclite. 
 
[In the 19th century, poetry is marked by the decline of long forms—those of 
the first romanticism—in exchange for brief genres, like the ones practised by 
a Baudelaire, for example. This evaluation is generally attached to the new 
vision of the world, exploded and atomised, which is rightly [the vision] of 
modernity, and to the poetics of brevitas, indeed of the fragment, to which it is 
correlated. But one forgets to recall that this change in format is first of all 
imposed by the transformation of poetic publication, which was almost 
inevitably hurried along, under the July monarchy, by the review or the little 
press: evidently, now one did not write the same thing nor in the same manner 
for a private book or for a collective publication, [but] in a hybrid way]. (9, 
translation and parentheses mine) 
Vaillant outlines some vital historical and literary conditions in the above passage, 
accentuating the extent to which literary revolution is a function of socio-political 
change. Essentially, early Romanticism gives way to a fragmentary form of poetic 
expression that mirrors the atomised world of which it is a product. This fragmentary 
vision is particular to Baudelaire, and to the larger vision of modernity. I am reminded 
of Friedrich Schlegel’s remarkably astute comment on the fragmentation 
characteristic of modern literature in one of the Athenäeum Fragments: ‘Many of the 
works of the ancients have become fragments. Many modern works are fragments as 
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soon as they are written’.
18
 It is as if Schlegel’s method of fragmentary exposition has 
become the historical setting of nineteenth-century aesthetics. It is also worth noting 
that Vaillant explains this condition by referencing the cataclysmic changes in the 
publishing industry, from the appearance of the serial novel, the little press, and the 
review. Implicitly, Romantic modernity is linked to the sudden and fragmentary 
explosion of multiple media. The rise of an educated middle class, the influence of 
criticism in guiding the tastes of a variety of classes, and the emblems of a truly 
modern mass culture (the serial novel, the review) coexist with the growth of a poetry 
that reflects on its own lack of completion, on its own endless deferral. Furthermore, 
the creation of a modern mass culture, through which writing is bought and sold in a 
marketplace governed by profit and loss, changes the equation of how writing is 
produced. Irremediably, the poet becomes, in Baudelaire’s terminology, a prostitute.
19
 
In other words, the popular object of aesthetic appreciation in a variety of poems and 
novels, also operates as the mirror that reflects the identity of the modern writer as 
commodified product.  She acknowledges her dependence on the marketplace, which 
essentially undercuts art’s celebration of its mystical and autonomous origins. As we 
shall see, this commodification of art paradoxically promotes the concept of art as 
being beyond commodity fetishism. Words are sold to the highest bidder. As a critic, 
Baudelaire perhaps draws attention to this culture of buying and selling. As a result, 
writing develops through the collective subconscious of a unique hybridised 
interaction between writer, publisher, critic, and a mass audience. For Baudelaire, this 
state of affairs constitutes a fall, catalysing a sense of mourning in the serious artist, 
juxtaposed with laughter indicative of his own superiority to the world that he mocks. 
                                                          
18
 Schlegel, Friedrich, Lucinde and the Fragments, trans. Peter Firchow (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1971) p. 164. 
19
 See Mary R. Anderson’s analysis of aesthetic reactions to commodity culture in Art in a 
Desacralized World (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984).   
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One of my claims in this chapter is that this alternation between mourning and 
laughter—mirroring a certain alternation of self-creation and self-destruction in 
Romantic irony—constitutes the defining characteristic of the Baudelairean 
grotesque.   
The rest of this chapter will examine the characteristics of this grotesque in 
more detail. The next section will focus on De L’Essence du Rire, one of the most 
original and influential of Baudelaire’s essays, where specific themes relevant to our 
investigation—the origins of laughter and the comic, the importance of the 
grotesque—will re-emerge. Significantly, the figure of Pierrot as a vital character in 
mime, with whom we ended Chapter III, will appear as a theatrical manifestation of 
the grotesque. Through Baudelaire’s analysis of an English troupe playing the story of 
Pierrot in a manner starkly different from Deburau, we will review the grotesque’s 
rapport with drama, while looking forward to Baudelaire’s implementation of the 
poetics of the grotesque through his own creative persona. In the following section, 
we shall move from theory to practice: after examining the primary themes 
surrounding Les Fleurs du Mal, we will undertake a close-reading of ‘Une Charogne’. 
In doing so, we shall examine particularly the alternation of the ‘comic’ and ‘tragic’ 
categories in the poem, as well as its relation to an obsession with bodily decay 
reminiscent of Hamlet. My aim is to show how the poem is arguably one of the more 
significant ones of ‘late-Romanticism’ as it looks forward to the decadence in 
Huysmans or Swinburne or Wilde, while simultaneously containing within its 
aesthetic framework the roots of a more modernist apperception of reality. 
Furthermore, in its open references to Hamlet, the poem self-reflexively 
acknowledges its Shakespearean origins. As a poem that blurs the boundaries between 
tragic and comic, lyric and dramatic, while also confronting the reader with the 
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subversive aesthetics of shock, ‘Une Charogne’ becomes a text that most openly 
negotiates the varied representations of the grotesque as an aesthetic category. 
Through this examination, I will illustrate the extent to which the Baudelairean 
grotesque becomes a force of radical subversion and transgressive theatricality that 
paves the way for the more innovative experiments of twentieth-century modernism. 
 
III—‘Spleen et Idéal’: the Grotesque as Shock  
  The complete title for Baudelaire’s treatise on laughter and the comic reads as 
De L’Essence du Rire et Généralement du Comique dans les Arts Plastiques (On the 
Essence of Laughter and, in General, on the Comic in the Plastic Arts). Published in 
1855, two years before the first scandalous issue of Les Fleurs du Mal, the essay 
constitutes Baudelaire’s most developed analysis of the ontological significance of 
laughter, and its manifestation in artistic activity. The entire title of the essay is 
indicative of a poet who claims that ‘Glorifier le culte des images (ma grande, mon 
unique, ma primitive passion)’ [‘To glorify the cult of images (my great, my unique, 
my primitive passion), Mayne, ix]. The reference to ‘the comic in the plastic arts’ 
reminds us that Baudelaire as a critic spent much of his time writing about nineteenth-
century painters (particularly on the work of Eugene Delacroix and the infamous 
Constantine Guys), and also that this treatise was published along with his two essays 
on French and foreign caricaturists.
20
 Yet, as we shall see, the dramatic implications 
of this essay extend beyond the field of the purely plastic, absorbing instead 
influences from philosophy, theology, and most vitally, the theatre and its 
                                                          
20
 Claude Pichois says that De L’Essence du Rire was first published in le Portefeuille in July 1855 
before being reprinted elsewhere. A version was published in the influential Revue des Deux Mondes. 
Along with the supplementary Quelques Caricaturistes français and Quelques Caricaturistes 
étrangers, De L’Essence du Rire was also part of larger project on caricature dating back to the Salon 
de 1845, called simply De La Caricature. The text of the essay I am using is the standard English 
translation by Jonathan Mayne in The Painter of Modern Life and Other Essays, 2nd ed. (London: 
Phaidon, 1995),  juxtaposed with a reading of the original in Claude Pichois canonical edition of 
Baudelaire’s Oeuvres Complètes, Vol 1- III (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1961).   
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manifestation as mime. In its peculiar methodology—the manner in which it chooses 
to approach the idea of the comic—the essay is unique, playing with our ideas of what 
to expect from a treatise or an essay. Michelle Hannoosh in Baudelaire and 
Caricature: From the Comic to the Art of Modernity (1992) emphasises the 
multifocal, and simultaneously problematic, nature of this essay and its supplementary 
ones: 
The “essence of laughter” alleged in the title of the first essay is developed 
through a blatantly personal, even idiosyncratic theory, which derives this 
most contemporary and radical of arts from one of the oldest and most 
traditional of cultural myths, the Fall of Man. Baudelaire purports to take his 
subject seriously, but frequently betrays a flippant, cavalier attitude toward it, 
and subjects some of the artists to a devastating sarcasm. The history of the 
project itself was a comic fiasco of the highest order: at least a decade in the 
making, it was revised, recast, cut, expanded, and re-written for the benefit of 
various unappreciative editors.
21
 
 
This ‘blatantly personal, even idiosyncratic theory’—focusing on the dual nature of 
laughter and the comic as being coincidentally indicative of celebration and 
mourning—grows from a merging of the study of caricature with the Judaeo-Christian 
myth of the Fall. Implied in this myth is the nostalgic longing for a state of innocence 
(a certain Schillerian naivete) combined with the comic acknowledgment of things as 
they are in the present. The divide between innocent longing and grotesque reality 
informs the dynamics of Baudelaire’s essay, and his theory of the comic. In addition, 
Hannoosh also alerts the reader to the battle between ‘seriousness’ and sarcasm in 
Baudelaire’s text. The ‘comic fiasco’ that is the project’s history somehow seems to 
mirror the nature of the subject itself (see endnote 12). The curious nature of this 
essay informs its governing aesthetic. In other words, Baudelaire chooses to write 
about the comic in a format that self-reflexively addresses it.   
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 Michelle Hannoosh, Baudelaire and Caricature: From the Comic to an Art of Modernity  
(University Park, PA: The Penn State University Press, 1992), p. 1. Future references will be cited in 
the text. 
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Given that Baudelaire is a rather playful critic, the opening lines of the essay 
are ambiguous in critical intent: 
I have no intention of writing a treatise on caricature: I simply want to 
acquaint the reader with certain reflections which have often occurred to me 
on the subject of this singular genre. These reflections had become a kind of 
obsession for me, and I wanted to get them off my chest. Nevertheless I have 
made every effort to impose some order, and thus to make their digestion more 
easy. This, then, is purely an artist’s and a philosopher’s article. (Mayne, 147)  
 
This is a rather strange introduction to a subject. Baudelaire starts off by telling us the 
opposite of what the reader thinks that she is going to encounter in an essay that 
claims to distil the ‘essence’ of the comic, its cause and its embodiment in art. 
Baudelaire undercuts any preconceived expectations that are announced by the title of 
the essay. Instead, the primary object of contemplation is the art of caricature, and the 
author asserts that what is to follow is merely a series of thoughts rather than a 
developed or rigid academic essay. The third sentence in the above passage restates 
the apparent flippancy of the critic—Baudelaire merely wants to get these reflections 
‘off his chest’ (the word soulager in the original French connotes the need to relieve 
oneself, to calm the mind). However, the following line seems to contradict the 
previous one, as Baudelaire displays his desire to impose order on his seemingly 
random reflections. The final statement, in a manner that would have delighted 
Friedrich Schlegel, appears to conflate the perspectives of both artist and philosopher, 
perhaps in opposition to the critic. Evidently, these opening lines are playing with a 
unique multiplicity of perspectives, a shared polysemy of relations. Each statement in 
the quoted passage tries to undercut, or outdo, the other in a manner similar to 
Schlegel’s alternation of ‘self-creation and self-destruction’.  The opposition between 
apparent seriousness and sarcasm underscores what the essay is attempting to talk 
about and articulate. In a fashion that perhaps prefigures poststructuralist theory, 
while extending the Schlegelian imperative, Baudelaire’s essay formatically 
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represents its subject—the comic can only be written about in an essay that self-
reflectively flirts with the comic mode.   
 Baudelaire then proceeds to acknowledge the lack of ‘a general history of 
caricature’, which would have supplied the art historian with ‘a history of facts, an 
immense gallery of anecdote’ (Mayne, 147). To expand on his position regarding this 
historicising of les faits surrounding the history of caricature, Baudelaire divides this 
branch of arts into two predominant types. The caricatures of the first kind ‘have 
value only by reason of the fact which they represent’ (Mayne, 147). In other words, 
these caricatures are located within a precise historical moment with a precise satirical 
intent that would appeal to ‘the historian, the archaeologist, and even the philosopher; 
they deserve to take their place in the national archives, in the biographical registers 
of human thought’ (Mayne, 147). These caricatures, which mirror the fact-based 
chronicles of the history of this particular art, are compared to journalistic inquiry and 
publication. By making this comparison, Baudelaire implies that these caricatures 
have only a momentary historical and social importance. In contrast, the other types of 
caricature that Baudelaire wants to write about ‘contain a mysterious, lasting, eternal 
element, which recommends them to the attention of artists. What a curious thing, and 
one truly worthy of attention, is the introduction of this indefinable element of beauty, 
even in works which are intended to represent his proper ugliness—both moral and 
physical—to man! And what is no less mysterious is that this lamentable spectacle 
excites in him an undying and incorrigible mirth. Here, then, is the true subject of my 
article’ (Mayne, 147-148). As in Le Peintre de la Vie Moderne, the ‘indefinable 
element of beauty’ (cet élément insaissible du beau)—the mysteriousness of a beauty 
peculiar to the modern world that also possesses otherworldly and mystical 
connotations—makes another appearance. Somehow, this type of beauty of caricature 
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transcends historical time-frames, and is beyond historical and socio-political 
specificity. This is a beauty divorced from the predominance of factual historical 
perspectives. The last few sentences of the above passage also enunciate the recurrent 
theme prevalent in Baudelaire’s aesthetic theory: beauty is contained in the ugly. For 
Baudelaire, caricature comes into being by echoing humanity’s ugliness to itself. In 
portraying this ugliness, the beauty inherent in caricature is born. More vitally for the 
author, ‘this lamentable spectacle’, the aesthetic evidence of humanity’s fallen-ness, 
creates the comic, enticing a continual laughter in the spectator. In effect, the 
spectator or reader of art that plays with caricaturial tendencies, is laughing at the 
sketching of her own intimate and private frailties. These shortcomings could be 
bodily (physique) or moral (morale).  In the Schlegelian frame that governs this study, 
the portrayal of bodily frailty could mirror moral turpitude, simultaneously.  
What is imperative to note here is that Baudelaire wants to analyse not only 
the aesthetic existence of caricature and the comic element in art, but also the reasons 
behind our readiness to laugh at the depiction of our own insufficiencies. As a result, 
through a very complex and nuanced introduction to his essay, Baudelaire adumbrates 
its principal themes: the significance of the comic in art, the tangled bond of the 
comic with the illustration of physical and moral ugliness, and the implicit and 
complicit participation of the audience with the degradation that is portrayed. In 
Baudelaire’s subtle examination of audience response to caricature, we have the 
blueprint for his ‘hypocrite lecteur’ (‘hypocrite reader’) of the opening poem of Les 
Fleurs du Mal, whom he castigates and simultaneously seduces into his poetic 
tapestry.
22
 As a critic, Baudelaire’s reading of the reader is far ahead of its time.    
                                                          
22
 The poem referred to here is the infamous ‘Au Lecteur’ (‘To the Reader’) in Les Fleurs du Mal 
(1857/61), where the poet implicates the reader in his poetics of evil. In a sustained and remarkably 
honest self-mutilation, Baudelaire locates himself within the Satanic themes and archetypes that 
dominate the structural imperative of his book of poems. The poem outlines a world of vice and 
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As an addendum to this introduction that merges the subject-object dichotomy 
in art (the artwork itself as subject, and the audience as its object, and vice versa), 
Baudelaire begins to assail the French academics through a caustic wit and irony, 
continuing a campaign that was begun by Stendhal in Racine et Shakespeare, and by 
Hugo in his Préface de Cromwell and the bataille d’Hernani: 
Should I reply with a formal demonstration to the kind of preliminary question 
which no doubt will be raised by certain spiteful pundits of solemnity—
charlatans of gravity, pedantic corpses which have emerged from the icy 
vaults of the Institut and have come again to the land of the living, like a band 
of miserly ghosts, to snatch a few coppers from the obliging administration? 
First of all, they would ask, is Caricature a genre? No, their cronies would 
reply, Caricature is not a genre. I have heard similar heresies ringing in my 
ears at academicians’ dinners...If they had been contemporaries of Rabelais, 
they would have treated him as a base and uncouth buffoon. (Mayne, 148, 
ellipses mine) 
 
Interestingly, A.W. Schlegel had begun his Comparaison entre le Phèdre de Racine et 
celle d’Euripide  with a similar stance: in being well aware that French academics 
would respond negatively to a German telling them that Racine was a lesser artist than 
Euripides (and Shakespeare), Schlegel chose to self-consciously incorporate the 
potentiality of Gallic criticism within the framework of his essay. Stendhal 
incorporates a similar tactic in Racine et Shakespeare, where the objections of the 
académique to the elements of Romanticism become part of Stendhal’s text. 
Baudelaire does something similar. He anticipates a severe reprimand of his treatment 
of caricature as a genre—given that ‘tragedy’ and ‘comedy’ were the prised and fixed 
genres of French aesthetic theory—and chooses to pre-empt such criticism by 
attacking the critics. By defining them as ‘spiteful pundits of solemnity—charlatans of 
gravity, pedantic corpses’ (professeurs jurés de sérieux, charlatans de la gravité, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Satanic debauchery, which ends with the most profound nineteenth-century sin: boredom (l’ennui). 
Significantly, the reader is embroiled in this startling desecration of humanity, becoming Baudelaire’s 
semblable and frère. T. S. Eliot would famously use this fraternising between Baudelaire and his reader 
as the closing line of ‘The Burial of the Dead’ section of The Waste Land. What should also be noted is 
that the Greek origin of the word ‘hypocrite’ (hypocritos) refers to ‘actor’. 
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cadavres pédantesques), Baudelaire constructs the dark, morbid humour that 
comprises the very object of study in his essay. The academician is devoid of 
lifeblood; he emerges from the deathlike tomb of the Institut; he represents the 
antithesis to the living, breathing world of art, and of grotesque caricature as art. 
Finally, in exhuming the figure of Rabelais—who for Bakhtin would become the 
prime plenipotentiary of the grotesque—Baudelaire emphasises that the ‘base’ and the 
‘uncouth’ occupy essential roles in aesthetics, while also questioning the interpretive 
capabilities of the custodians of French culture. Michelle Hannoosh comments on the 
importance of Baudelaire’s opposition to the academicians, while establishing its 
relationship to Stendhal’s aesthetic theory: 
The serious “pedantic corpses” who ridicule Rabelais as a vulgar buffoon here 
become the right objects of ridicule, the true buffoons: the essay thus 
accomplishes this first inversion, dethroning the ruling aesthetic powers and 
making way for a new system of value...But the joke has a further point: the 
Academic dinner recalls Stendhal's parody of a session of the Academy in 
Racine et Shakespeare, and, like it, uses the comic to propose a new aesthetic 
altogether. De L'essence du Rire becomes the modern version of Stendhal's 
Romantic manifesto, formulating an aesthetic proper to the age... (15, ellipses 
mine) 
 
According to Hannoosh, Baudelaire’s pose contre l’Académie Française is 
symptomatic of a vital reversal of values: the ones who ridicule are in turn made into 
the objects of laughter. This renversement in De L'essence du Rire is not only 
reflective of Stendhal’s influence on Baudelaire, but through Stendhal, we are 
reminded of the Schlegelian irony which delights in such fluid reversals.
23
  For our 
purposes then, Hannoosh’s delineation of Stendhal’s influence on Baudelaire is 
paramount. In effect, De L'essence du Rire forms itself into an extension of the 
methods and goals of Racine et Shakespeare. Intertextual referencing, self-reflective 
                                                          
23
 In Chapter III, I outlined and documented Stendhal’s reading of A. W. Schlegel’s lectures on drama, 
which had a tremendous effect on the formulation of his critical opinions. While I cannot claim that 
Baudelaire ever copiously read either of the Schlegel brothers, one of the ideas implicit in this thesis is 
that the Schlegelian influence on European aesthetics in the nineteenth-century, through a process of 
intertextual cross-pollination, was profound. 
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metacriticism, and the dramatic proliferation of perspectives that delight in ironic 
reversals, come to the fore. This passage that echoes Stendhal’s opposition to the 
critics of the French academy is most representative of Baudelaire’s grotesque 
mockery of established values. The essay’s textual becoming reflects its philosophical 
imperative. As Benjamin says in an isolated passage on this essay in ‘The Paris of the 
Second Empire in Baudelaire’:  
‘De L’Essence du Rire’ contains nothing other than the theory of satanic 
laughter. In his essay, Baudelaire goes so far as to view even smiling from the 
standpoint of such laughter. Contemporaries often testified to something 
frightful in his own manner of laughing. (Jennings, 158-59)   
 
This ‘theory of satanic laughter’, which was given its most recent fictional and 
theoretical exposition in Milan Kundera’s The Book of Laughter and Forgetting 
(1979), is a theory that brings together themes vital to Baudelaire’s aesthetic: mockery 
and its relationship with the devil.
24
 This mockery emerges from the recesses of 
Baudelaire’s conception of spleen, the polar opposite to the idéal of Les Fleurs du 
Mal. It is by comprehending the relationship of spleen (the first and longest section of 
Les Fleurs du Mal is called ‘Spleen et Idéal, with a few poems simply called ‘Spleen’) 
and Baudelaire’s conception of Satan and his power to animate poetic activity that we 
can begin to understand the role of grotesque laughter in the poetics of modernity. For 
Christine Marcandier-Colard, Baudelaire’s irony, and the mocking laughter that is its 
embodiment, communicates his ‘satanic essence’: ‘Comme le douleur, le rire déforme 
le corps, il est signe de la misère humaine...il est en un meme temps signe de 
supériorité, de domination de cette misère’ [‘Like sorrow, laughter deforms the body, 
it is the sign of human misery...it is at the same time the sign of superiority, of the 
                                                          
24
 The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, trans. Michael Henry Heim (London: Faber, 1980). Part III of 
the novel, ‘The Angels’ begins with definitions of two types of laughter: angelic and demonic. The 
first, which could be connected to Baudelaire’s laughter-in-joy, is innocent and pure. In contrast, the 
demonic type of laughter constitutes a laughing at, a mockery of all things holy and divine. Kundera’s 
theory of laughter to be eerily similar to Baudelaire’s ‘satanic theory’ in De L’Essence du Rire. 
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domination of this misery’, 260, translation and ellipses mine]. Consequently, the 
essence of Baudelaire’s satanic laughter lies in the acknowledgment and simultaneous 
subjugation of human sorrow. This aesthetic representative of this sorrow is the 
spleen that constitutes its result. 
So how do we define ‘spleen’ in the framework of Baudelaire’s aesthetics and 
poetic practice? How crucial an antinomy is it to the transcendental, mystical, and 
Classical yearning for the ‘ideal’? As we shall see in more detail in the next section of 
this chapter, the essentially dramatic conflict between one and the other as embodied 
in the poet-persona of Baudelaire, propels his vision du mal. The dialectical play and 
tension between spleen et idéal crystallises Baudelaire’s approach to the grotesque.  
Leo Bersani begins his influential Baudelaire and Freud (1977) with the 
following quotation from the Baudelaire’s Mon Coeur Mis à Nu (‘My Heart Bared 
Naked’): ‘There are in every man, at every moment, two simultaneous postulations, 
one towards God, the other toward Satan. The invocation to God, or spirituality, is a 
desire to climb higher. Satan’s invocation, or animality, is a delight in descent’.
25
 
Bersani refers to Baudelaire’s poetics as being ‘an exemplary drama in our culture’, 
emphasising the vitally dramatic conflict between God and Devil, spleen et idéal, 
spiritual and animal. Interestingly, ‘spleen’ connotes melancholia—madness, 
depression, the mind at war with itself. Its dramatic opposition to ‘idéal’ is a fertile 
source for Baudelaire’s anomic poetics. The passage in the original text that 
immediately follows what Bersani cites furthers the complications of this drama: 
‘C’est à cette dernière que doivent être rapportés les amours pour les femmes et les 
conversations intimes avec les animaux, chiens, chats, etc’ (It is to this last to which 
                                                          
25
 Baudelaire and Freud (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1977) p. 1, translation his. 
The passage in the original French reads: ‘Il y a dans tout home, à toute heure, deux postulations 
simultanées, l’une vers Dieu, l’autre vers Satan. L’invocation à Dieu, ou spiritualité, est un désir de 
monter en grade; celle de Satan, ou animalité, est un joie de descendre’ (Pichois, Oeuvres Complètes, 
Vol I, 1277).   
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the love for women and the intimate conversations with animals, dogs, cats, etc must 
be accounted for, Pichois, 1277, my translation). What emerges is Baudelaire’s 
misogyny—woman is like an animal, she is natural, and by implication inimical to 
spiritual striving. In a characteristically decadent reading, woman and nature need to 
be transformed into art, or negated for the sake of artistic endeavour, thereby setting 
up the foundation for transcendental yearnings. However, what is vital in this battle 
between God and Devil, a standpoint not noted by Bersani, is the simultaneous quality 
of this reaching after transcendence (the upward movement) and the equally powerful 
and conflicting desire for animality (the ‘delight’ in descent). The male subject, or 
perhaps more precisely the male poète maudit, is perennially caught in an ontological 
condition that threatens to consume him—the simultaneous movement towards the 
ideal and spleen confounds any desire for stability of perspective. One actually cannot 
choose between one and the other, but oscillates between one pole of energy to 
another.  
What this alerts us to is the coincidence and simultaneity of contradictions, 
strikingly similar to Schlegel’s Romantic irony. In this aesthetic system, the binary 
opposites that dominate are intention and instinct, creation and destruction, order and 
chaos, stasis and motion. Of course, the point of irony is that there are no fixed 
absolutes, that even the choice of one ‘opposite’ over another is illusory, as all in the 
world exists in a state of Heraclitean flux. In other words, for the perennially self-
reflective individual and poet, one cannot choose the spiritual over the animal without 
the trace of irony that in effect questions fixity and substance. This irony of 
positionality revels in paradox and opposition.  
It is the awareness of this tension between the desire for purity and the 
irresistible pull towards an almost pagan playfulness—symbolised by Satanic 
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archetype—that is crucial in the self-reflexive and multivalent poetics of Baudelaire. 
In Baudelaire, as opposed to Schlegel, this tension that threatens to annihilate the 
fixed perspectives of a fixed ego consummates a sense of mourning—the gap between 
spleen et idéal places itself before the reader. Chaos is too hard a burden to bear. 
Memorably, Baudelaire in Les Fleurs du Mal aligns himself with Satan. In the of-
quoted ‘Les Litanies de Satan’ (‘Satan’s Litanies’), one of three poems in a section of 
Les Fleurs du Mal unequivocally titled ‘Révolte’, Baudelaire commits blasphemy by 
eulogising the virtues of Satan, granting him the role once reserved for the Judaeo-
Christian God:  
 O toi, le plus savant et le plus beau des Anges, 
Dieu trahi par le sort et privé des louanges, 
 
O Satan, prends pitié de ma longue misère.  
[Oh you, the most wise and beautiful of Angels, 
 God betrayed by fate and deprived of praises, 
 
Oh Satan, take pity on my long misery.]
26
  
 
The above lines approach an almost prayer-like quality. In deifying the devil, 
Baudelaire illustrates the extent of his revolt. This insurrection qualifies his satanic 
bearing and laughter. In ‘Les Litanies de Satan’, Satan is ‘the most beautiful of 
angels’ and a god cheated by fate. He now is the opposite of these hallowed entities 
but was once one of them. Satan is a mixed and paradoxical and grotesque being—
god in devil, devil in god. He becomes Baudelaire’s male muse for the creation of the 
grotesque in his controversial and subsequently deified collection of nineteenth-
century poetry. Satan-as-muse bequeaths his legacy of mocking laughter and Hamlet-
like melancholy to the French poet and critic. Baudelaire’s engendering of misogyny, 
fragmentation, the sordid continually recalls the remembrance of ideal love, purity, 
                                                          
26
 Les Fleurs du Mal, ed. Claude Pichois (Paris: Gallimard, 1972/1996), p. 161, 1-3, translation mine. 
All references to Les Fleurs du Mal are to the edition de 1861. All future references will be cited in the 
text. All translations are mine. 
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spirituality. The attempted ascent to spiritual perfection contains the residue of past 
forms and beliefs that complicates every glaring description of the modern grotesque 
in poems as apparently different as ‘Une Charogne’ (‘A Carcass’) and ‘A celle quie 
est trop gaie’ (‘To one who is too gay’). The self-consciousness of the position, as 
initiated by Baudelaire, where the subject moves vertically, horizontally, and 
perpetually in every movement between the spiritual and the animal, Apollo and 
Dionysus, beautiful and grotesque, makes this fractured and confused poetic character 
into a hyper-conscious Hamlet not knowing how he should act to redeem himself. The 
mockery and ‘satanic laughter’ that results is a function of this paralysis, while also 
exemplifying a total disdain that emerges from the reality of spleen, and the 
simultaneous failure to achieve the purity of l’idéal. Or as J. A. Hiddleston illustrates 
in Baudelaire and the Art of Memory (1999): ‘The notion of duality is essential to 
Baudelaire’s Romanticism; for without it the spirituality and aspiration to the infinite 
world would be meaningless’.
27
 
The connection to Hamlet—a Shakespearean persona prone to grotesque 
mockery— is significant. In ‘La Béatrice,’ Baudelaire describes a ‘troupe of vicious 
demons’ resembling ‘cruel and curious dwarfs’ who emerge from a cloud and mock 
him as ‘the shadow of Hamlet imitating his posture’ who ‘knows how to artistically 
play his role’: 
 —“Contemplons à loisir cette caricature 
 Et cette ombre d’Hamlet imitant sa posture, 
 Le regard indécis et les cheveux au vent. 
 N’est-ce pas grand pitié de voir ce bon vivant, 
 Ce gueux, cet historien en vacances, ce drôle, 
                                                          
27
 Baudelaire and the Art of Memory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), p. 12-13. In another passage, 
Hiddleston says that ‘Baudelaire’s Christianity was both vacillating and bleak, since he maintains a 
belief in original sin and the power of evil, without the accompanying redemption through the sacrifice 
of Christ’ (51). This passage illuminates Baudelaire’s attraction towards the Satanic archetype. Original 
sin, le mal, the implicit belief in the Fall of Man, which drive Baudelaire’s critical thinking in De 
L’Essence du Rire, are all representative of poetics that celebrate grotesque mockery over spiritual 
perfection. 
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 Parce qu’il sait jouer artistement son rôle... 
 
 [—“Let us leisurely contemplate this caricature 
 And this shadow of Hamlet imitating his posture, 
 The indecisive gaze and the hair in the wind. 
 Isn’t it a great pity to see this bon vivant, 
 This rogue, this absentee performer, this clown, 
 Since he knows artistically to play his role...] (Les Fleurs du Mal, 153-54, 
 ellipses mine)  
  
This is perhaps the only blatant reference to Hamlet in Les Fleurs du Mal. Yet, as I 
will show in the next section of this chapter, Hamlet casts a long shadow over 
Baudelaire’s persona as the poet of mourning and satanic laughter. These lines in ‘La 
Béatrice’ are indicative of the most lacerating self-reflection. Baudelaire becomes a 
simulacrum of Hamlet and of himself as Hamlet, since he can only imitate a character 
who is condemned to play roles, to act insanity, to be caught in perpetual reflection 
and stasis. In an example of a Platonic decline and distance from the Ideal, Baudelaire 
is an imitation of a character who imitates. In this way, Baudelaire’s self-critique that 
confirms a lack of substance and fixed identity reminds us of the endless reflections in 
Schlegel’s hall of mirrors. Identity is defined by emptiness, reflection, plurality. 
Vitally, Baudelaire in ‘La Béatrice’ is a caricature, bereft of substantial reality, 
worthy only as an object of derisive laughter. The rapport with De L’Essence du Rire 
becomes acute. Furthermore, Hamlet the persona provides us with clues to read 
Baudelaire as poet. Helen Phelps Bailey’s Hamlet in France: From Voltaire to 
Laforgue (1964), in addition to furnishing us with details about Stendhal’s obsession 
with this proto-Romantic Shakespearean character, also underscores Baudelaire’s 
identification with the dark prince: 
There are grounds for the association of Baudelaire with Hamlet: his enduring 
admiration for the Hamlet lithographs of Delacroix; his lifelong devotion to 
the memory of his father and the reproaches he addressed to his mother for her 
apparent indifference to that memory, his resentment of her remarriage, his 
avowed hatred of her second husband; the feeling he had all his life of being 
different, set apart from others, and alone; his aversion to finality; the affinity 
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with anguish, the craving for insensibility accompanied by dread that death 
may not be the end of suffering, the intimacy with death itself, reflected 
throughout his writings.
28
 
 
The above passage pinpoints Baudelaire’s self-fashioning as a late-Romantic Hamlet. 
In one of his ‘Spleen’ poems, Baudelaire declaims: ‘Je suis comme le roi d’un pays 
pluvieux, / Riche, mais impuissant, jeune et pourtant très vieux’ [‘I am like the king of 
a rainy country/ Rich, but weak, young and yet too old’, Les Fleurs du Mal, 106]. 
These lines seem particularly applicable to Baudelaire’s fascination for Hamlet. Here 
he is both Hamlet and Shakespeare (as the literary monarch of England, a rainy 
country). The use of paradoxical inversions in the second line mirrors Hamlet’s 
existential conundrum: rich but weak, young but old. The rest of the poem, in its 
articulation of a divine ennui, fits in with the role Baudelaire seeks to play. In Les 
Fleurs du Mal, Baudelaire as Hamlet—the archetype of the post-Romantic and 
modern poet and the archetype of the incessantly self-conscious modern character—is 
lover, victim, sadist, misogynist, misanthrope (to name a few poses) all at once, and in 
successive performances. Like his ‘hypocrite lecteur’, (whom T. S. Eliot would 
appropriate for his waste land), whom Baudelaire accuses of playing multiple roles 
like himself (the word ‘hypocrite’ harks back to the ancient Greek word for actor), the 
poet yearns for the spiritual while acknowledging the pull towards the sexual and the 
natural in all their amorality. As in Sade, where every form of grotesque perversion is 
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 Hamlet in France: From Voltaire to Laforgue (Geneve: Librairie Droz, 1964), p. 138.  This book is 
an invaluable contribution to our understanding of the complex and fraught relationship between 
Shakespeare’s most famous play and French critical theory. In her introduction to the topic, Helen 
Phelps Bailey writes: ‘This 'tragedy,' so opposed to the French dramatic tradition, this 'hero,' seemingly 
so far removed from the concern with logic, clarity and order that is commonly supposed to distinguish 
the French national character, exerted a curious and relentless fascination on the Gallic mind' (xiv). In 
the last chapter, we had spent some time on France’s problems with Shakespeare and his play, 
particularly through the complex figure of Voltaire. For Bailey, Voltaire’s denigration of Hamlet 
signals the larger context: ‘Voltaire had parodied a play in a desperate effort to combat an enthusiasm 
for Shakespeare that threatened a whole aesthetic system, even a way of life’ (xiv). The book then goes 
on to illustrate how sharply attitudes towards Hamlet changed during the course of the nineteenth-
century, from Stendhal to Baudelaire to the symbolists and the inauguration of Hamlétisme in French 
letters. Future references will be cited in the text. 
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sanctioned and celebrated as being natural, the modern male poet, while mourning for 
the past, learns to accept the instinct of attraction to what seems repulsive. Therefore, 
he cannot be one, fixed, stable. He must be Hesse’s wolf/man. In fact, he must be 
more than that. He must be many.  
 Keeping this paradigm of satanic laughter in mind— its relationship with 
spleen et idéal, as well as Baudelaire’s affinity with Hamlet—we can return to its 
articulation in De L’Essence du Rire. The second section of the essay starts with a 
rather solemn maxim: ‘The Sage laughs not save in fear and trembling’ (Mayne, 148). 
This represents the polar opposite to Baudelaire’s Satanic posturing, his Hamletian 
mockery of endeavoured transcendence. The Sage implies the yearning for an ideal 
that does not exist. As a result, this harsh tone of solemnity in De L’Essence du Rire is 
immediately undercut by Baudelaire who treats it merely as a quote taken from some 
‘orthodox pen’ (Mayne, 148, de quelle plume parfaitment orthodoxe). This Sage, who 
reminds us of Kierkegaard’s knight of infinite faith, is ‘quickened with the spirit of 
Our Lord’ and ‘does not abandon himself to laughter save in fear and trembling. The 
Sage trembles at the thought of having laughed; the Sage fears laughter, just as he 
fears the lustful shows of the world. He stops short on the brink of laughter, as on the 
brink of temptation’ (Mayne, 149). Stopping short on the ‘brink of temptation’ is an 
interesting way to reframe the inquiry within a Judaeo-Christian schema. To give in to 
temptation is human. By implication, to resist ‘the primordial nature of laughter’ (le 
caractère primordiale du rire) means denying the basic necessities of human 
expressivity. Baudelaire’s Sage seems to belong to the Christian world that 
Kierkegaard values in opposition to the negativity he associates with Friedrich 
Schlegel and Socrates.
29
 The Sage seems similar to Schlegel’s ‘harmonious bores’ 
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 See my analysis of Kierkegaard’s response to Romantic irony in The Concept of Irony, with 
continual reference to Socrates; together with Notes of Schelling's Berlin lectures, Trans. Howard E. 
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who do not recognize grotesque irony and are therefore always its victim. For 
Baudelaire though, to laugh is to be human, and to be human is to acknowledge the 
mythical reality of the Fall, as ‘it is certain that human laughter is intimately linked 
with the accident of an ancient Fall, of a debasement both physical and moral’ 
(Mayne, 149). Moral and physical debasement is inextricably, and disturbingly, linked 
to laughter. Similarly, the comic is ‘of diabolic origin’ as its essence lies in the idea of 
superiority, which is fundamentally Satanic (Mayne, 150-52). As an interesting aside, 
Baudelaire calls the ‘Romantic school’ the ‘Satanic school’, asserting that this group 
of artists ‘had a proper understanding of this primordial law of laughter...’(Mayne, 
153, ellipses mine). By doing this, Baudelaire places himself within the Romantic 
ethos, while consummating its development into something even darker. 
 About halfway through this essay, Baudelaire finally summarises, this ‘satanic 
theory of laughter’: 
Laughter is satanic: it is thus profoundly human. It is the consequence in man 
of the idea of this own superiority. And since laughter is essentially human, it 
is, in fact, essentially contradictory; that is to say that it is at once a token of an 
infinite grandeur and an infinite misery—the latter in relation to the absolute 
Being of whom man has an inkling, the former in relation to the beasts. It is 
from the perpetual collision of these two infinites that laughter is struck. 
(Mayne, 153-54) 
 
Baudelaire utilises the prism of duality and dialectics in order to illuminate his take on 
the essence of laughter. Just as the principal opposition in Baudelaire’s poetics and 
criticism is spleen et idéal, laughter too is also a manifestation of ‘an infinite grandeur 
and an infinite misery’ (d’une grandeur infini et d’une misère infini), with the former 
being representative of the ideal, and the ‘infinite misery’ communicating the 
primarily splenetic drive contained in the human psyche. Antinomies animate 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Hong et al (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, c1989) in Chapter I of this thesis. Kierkegaard 
refers to Schlegel as ‘the knight of infinite negativity’ and Socrates as the ultimate sophist and nihilist. 
Kierkegaard displays a vehement antagonism towards ironic posturing. Baudelaire, in contrast, 
celebrates it. 
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Baudelaire’s vision of the world. Infinite grandeur implies godhead, thereby 
corroborating our insignificance. Infinite misery locates us through interrelationships 
with the animal world. Here we are taken back to Baudelaire’s simultaneous reaching 
after transcendence and animality. Laughter emerges, or more appropriately, functions 
as a signifier of this basic ontological state, which denotes a primordial confusion 
between earthly existence and transcendental yearning. The key word in the depiction 
of the two states of ‘grandeur’ and ‘misery’ is infinite. This attempt to conceptualise 
these two infinites—the one operating as imaginative creation, the other as the 
perennial reminder of our baser origins—catalyses the process of laughter. Laughter 
then is not just emblematic of a sense of superiority, but also indicates our essential 
metaphysical uncertainties. The element of superiority results from our relations with 
the animal within us: we laugh at other human beings whose actions somehow 
symbolise our bestial constitutions. This laughter also epitomises the infinitesimal 
quality of our existence in the face of the imaginary unknown that is the cosmos and 
its creator. J. A. Hiddleston provides an interesting summary of Baudelaire’s 
conception of laughter:  
Baudelaire's originality in this remarkable theory was to put the comic in the 
laugher instead of the object of laughter, since one laughs at someone not just 
out of superiority, but also in a sense out of identification, the convulsions 
indicating that the laugher is as threatened as an object. (110) 
 
These lines reemphasise the trope of identification essential to comic laughter. The 
one who laughs at someone, recognises the root cause of the laughter in herself. The 
root cause reinstates our connection to the animal world. Most importantly, laughter 
punctuates a feeling of ‘superiority’, while simultaneously betraying the laugher’s 
own unease. It should also be pointed out that Baudelaire differentiates this ‘satanic 
laughter’ from ‘joy’: ‘Joy is a unity. Laughter is the expression of a double, or 
contradictory, feeling; and that is the reason why a convulsion occurs’ (Mayne, 156). 
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Joy knows nothing of this ‘double feeling’ (sentiment double), which arises from the 
gap between animality and godhead, and is often the province of children uncorrupted 
by Satan.   
 Having outlined the difference between le rire (laughter, the comic) and le 
joie, Baudelaire now proceeds to introduce a new element to this theory of satanic 
laughter, the grotesque (le grotesque), which he defines in detail. The grotesque 
creates a world of ‘Fabulous creations, beings whose authority and raison d’etre 
cannot be drawn from the code of common sense’, which often draws out ‘an insane 
and excessive mirth, which expresses itself in interminable paroxysms and swoons’ 
(Mayne, 156-57). The grotesque results in ‘a true and violent laughter’ (le rire vrai, 
rire violent) and does not just emerge from the sight of human frailty (Mayne, 156). 
Similarly, this ‘insane and excessive mirth’ (une hilarité folle, excessive) is something 
unique, and Baudelaire’s use of such excessive epithets to describe the laughter 
caused by the grotesque is significant. With the grotesque, ‘satanic laughter’ 
multiplies itself into a cosmological roar. In a detailed preliminary description of the 
grotesque, Baudelaire says: 
From the artistic point of view, the comic is an imitation: the grotesque a 
creation. The comic is an imitation mixed with a certain creative faculty, that 
is to say with an artistic ideality. Now human pride, which always takes the 
upper hand and is the natural cause of laughter in the case of the comic, turns 
out to be the natural cause of laughter in the case of the grotesque too, for this 
is a creation mixed with a certain imitative faculty—imitative, that is, of 
elements pre-existing in nature. I mean that in this cause laughter is still an 
expression of superiority—no longer now of man over man, but of man over 
nature. (Mayne, 157) 
 
The difference between le rire and le grotesque is crucial. In a fundamental sense, it is 
a development on the comic, being based on a shared sense of superiority over animal 
instinct. In this context, the grotesque extends the trajectory of the comic. However, 
the manner in which Baudelaire chooses to separate the comic from the grotesque is 
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interesting: the comic grows from the imitative faculty common to humans, while the 
grotesque signifies a creative essence that locates itself in the natural world. The 
comic implies a human being’s superiority (and shared misery) towards the object of 
laughter, which results in the knowledge that this process of laughing is characterised 
by a back and forth movement to a point where the laughter doubles back on the one 
who laughs. The grotesque operates through a similar paradigm, except that, as I have 
already suggested, this laughter is gargantuan as its object is nature. In a Romantic 
sense, nature connotes the universe. Consequently, in keeping with the intellectual 
thrust of our study, the grotesque reiterates a primal connection with ontology. The 
grotesque then is a product of nature—a rotting carcass for example or the reality of 
Yorick’s skull—and the laughter it causes italicises humanity’s endeavoured 
systemisation of that which is beyond itself. Or, to apply the system programme of le 
rire to the grotesque, we can say that grotesque laughter attempts to establish 
humanity’s power over nature, only to insinuate and reflect the laughter back onto the 
one who laughs. By extension, Baudelaire’s description of this particular form of 
laughter as embodying humanity’s superiority over nature actually reclaims nature’s 
power over the human. In the reflective model vital to our study, the grotesque 
euphemises humanity’s powerlessness in the face of the natural world. In this sense, it 
seems akin to the Kantian sublime. For Baudelaire though, the grotesque is symbolic 
of a unity that is not present in the comic, and he divides his theory of the comic into 
le comique absolu (‘the absolute comic’ or the grotesque) and le comique significatif 
(‘the ordinary comic’): 
The latter (the ordinary comic) is a clearer language, and one easier to analyse, 
its element being visibly double—art and the moral idea. But the absolute 
comic (the grotesque), which comes much closer to nature, emerges as a unity, 
which calls for the intuition to grasp it. There is but one criterion of the 
grotesque, and that is laughter—immediate laughter. (Mayne, 157, parentheses 
mine) 
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Baudelaire chooses to view the grotesque through a unity similar to his treatment of le 
joie. I am wary of such a monism, and prefer seeing the grotesque in constant 
interplay with the idea of the ordinary comic. The grotesque is symptomatic of duality 
and unity. Its natural signifier is ‘immediate laughter’ (le rire subit). This suddenness 
of laughter exceeds rigorous analysis, and can only be grasped through intuition. 
 Michelle Hannoosh contextualises her take on Baudelaire’s grotesque by 
referencing arguably the two most famous theoreticians of the grotesque in the 
twentieth century: 
Bakhtin had criticized Kayser's definition of the grotesque—indeed, the 
Romantic notion generally—for neglecting the sense of renewal implied by 
the term. For Bakhtin, the grotesque testifies to the possibility of a utopian, 
authentic world, where people become one with themselves, body, soul, and 
mind, embracing and participating fully in the continually regenerating cycle 
of life, and where fear from an unknown other is wholly absent: in Carnival 
the existing world is accordingly destroyed and reborn in a new form. 
Harpham argues that Bakhtin, in his belief that through the grotesque we 
reappropriate that world, misses Baudelaire's point about the Satanic origins of 
laughter, and thus the impossibility of doing so. (21) 
 
In my introductory chapter, I had framed the theoretical stance of this study as being 
located, or oscillating between, Bakthin’s carnivalesque treatment of the grotesque 
and Wolfgang Kayser’s analysis of it as the representation of estrangement from the 
modern world/nature.
30
 The above passage also recalls Geoffrey Galt Harpham’s 
excellent On the Grotesque: Strategies of Contradiction in Art and Literature (1982), 
which reconnects the grotesque to Baudelaire’s conception of satanic laughter. 
Bakhtin claims that the modern grotesque, which is darkly ironic in its bearing, began 
with Friedrich Schlegel, and morphed into the estranged consciousness more palatable 
                                                          
30
 See Michael Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. Hélène Iswolsky (USA: Midland Books, 1984), 
Wolfgang Kayser, The Grotesque in Art and Literature, trans. Ulrich Weisstein (Gloucester, Mass : P. 
Smith, 1968), Geoffrey Galt Harpham, On the Grotesque: Strategies of Contradiction in Art and 
Literature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982). 
269 
 
to Kayser.
31
 Baudelaire’s conception of the grotesque marks a logical development to 
this particular historical incarnation of the grotesque. For Hannoosh, Baudelaire’s 
grotesque ‘has meaning only in relation to that damnation of which it is a sign’ (22). 
In other words, the grotesque (like the comic, which it magnifies) emblematises the 
Fall of Man, which in turn brings humanity into contact with the devil. Furthermore, 
the grotesque ‘validates the dualism from which it seems to free us, but it is a product 
of that very dualism too’ (Hannoosh, 22). The grotesque then re-inscribes the original 
duality of spleen et idéal, while attempting to overcome it.  
 Having articulated his theory of the grotesque as a developed mode of ‘satanic 
laughter’, Baudelaire spends the last section of De L’Essence du Rire searching for, 
and illustrating, examples of the grotesque in art. In a remarkable, if accurate, 
generalisation, he asserts that German and English artists are ‘more naturally 
equipped for the absolute comic’ (Mayne, 158). Even Rabelais, like Molière (or for 
that matter Voltaire), is bound to the ordinary comic due to his proximity with 
utilitarian purpose (Mayne, 159). The absolute comedy of the grotesque has no 
practical or satirical significance. In contrast, in a manner perfectly suited to our 
exploration of the grotesque, Germany and England are nations that exemplify its 
existence: ‘Germany, sunk in her dreams, will afford us excellent specimens of the 
absolute comic. There all is weighty, profound and excessive. To find true comic 
savagery, however, you have to cross the Channel and visit the foggy realms of 
spleen’ (Mayne, 159). Germany’s excessive dreaming constructs the matter of 
grotesque art, and yet it is the almost comic reference to England in the above passage 
that is critical. The grotesque depends on the depiction of ‘comic savagery’ (du 
comique féroce et très féroce), thereby aligning it to an element of violence, which is 
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 See Michael Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, trans. Hélène Iswolsky (USA: Midland Books, 1984), 
p. 25. 
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to be found in England, ‘the foggy realms of spleen’ (les royaumes brumeaux du 
spleen). The use of that semantically loaded word, ‘spleen’, is important given that 
much of Baudelaire’s poetry emerges from it. By implication, English art, be it 
Hogarth’s remarkably grotesque ‘The Reward of Cruelty’ (which Baudelaire analyses 
in a supplementary essay, Quelques Caricaturistes Etrangers, ‘Some Foreign 
Caricaturists’) or the plays of Shakespeare, constitutes a grotesque ideal.  
This land of spleen takes us to the last act of Baudelaire’s essay, which reflects 
and mirrors our study of Gautier’s ‘Shakespeare aux Funambules’ in the last chapter. 
In order to underscore the rapport between grotesque art and English sensibility, 
Baudelaire recounts for us a unique performance by an English pantomime (the 
Penley troupe) at the Théâtre de Variétés in Paris.
32
 While the Baudelaire wistfully 
recalls the production of this particular English troupe: 
It will be a long time before I forget the first English pantomime that I saw 
played. It was some years ago, at the Théâtre de Variétés. Doubtless only a 
few people will remember it, for very few seem to have taken to this kind of 
theatrical diversion, and those poor English mimes had a sad reception from 
us. The French public does not much like to be taken out of its element. Its 
taste is not very cosmopolitan, and changes of horizon upset its vision. 
Speaking for myself, however, I was excessively struck by their way of 
understanding the comic. (Mayne, 160) 
 
A remembrance of a thing past coincides with the criticism of a typical French 
audience that constitutes the polar opposite of Baudelaire’s internationalism. The 
troupe’s Englishness is a major qualification for Baudelaire’s study of the grotesque: 
‘They were English; that was the important thing’ (Mayne, 160). The aesthetic 
significance of the performance was its overriding sense of violence (Mayne, 160). If 
                                                          
32
 While the Théâtre de Variétés is not one of the theatres on the boulevard du temple, it may be 
surmised that like Gautier, Baudelaire also frequented the Boulevard theatres, far away from the 
regulated productions of the Comédie Française. See Chapter III for my analysis of the significance of 
the Boulevard theatres that catered to the masses by producing a variety of plays and genres from the 
musical to the mime to the melodrama. See F. W. J. Hemmings informative and entertaining The 
Theatre Industry in Nineteenth Century France (Cambridge: University Press, 1993) for an excellent 
description of the society that surrounded the Boulevard theatres.  
271 
 
Chapter III of this thesis closed with Gautier’s study of Deburau playing the part of 
Pierrot, then in a remarkable coincidence, Baudelaire’s analysis hinges on the 
performance of the same character. Consequently, we establish a vital theatrical 
connection between Gautier’s Deburau and Baudelaire’s unknown, unnamed Pierrot. 
It is imperative to note that theatrical performance informs the critical perspectives of 
both writers. Gautier’s review, ‘Shakespeare aux Funambules’ merges the bard—the 
progenitor of a theatrical grotesque—with a Boulevard theatre known for catering to 
the poorer classes. Baudelaire’s Pierrot relocates Shakespeare through a reclaiming of 
a French character played by an English mime.  Evidently, the English Pierrot is 
sharply different from the French one: 
First of all, Pierrot was not the figure to which the late-lamented Deburau had 
accustomed us—that figure pale as the moon, mysterious as silence, supple 
and mute as the serpent, long and straight as a gibbet—the artificial man 
activated by eccentric springs. The English Pierrot swept upon us like a 
hurricane, fell down like a sack of coals, and when he laughed his laughter 
made the auditorium quake; his laugh was like a joyful clap of thunder. He 
was a short, fat man, and to increase his imposingness he wore a be-ribboned 
costume which encompassed his jubilant person as birds are encompassed 
with their down and feathers, or angoras with their fur. (Mayne, 160) 
 
In the first line of the above passage, Baudelaire reconnects us to Gautier’s Deburau. 
Nevertheless, this English Pierrot is more like Falstaff, and in reading the differences 
between him and Deburau, Baudelaire highlights the precise divergence of the Anglo-
Saxon aesthetic from the Gallic one. In many ways, Baudelaire’s study of this 
particular mime underlines the dichotomy between a grotesque Romanticism and a 
more elegant neoclassical representation. The legendary Deburau is in fact depicted 
by Baudelaire as an ‘artificial man’ (cet homme artificial). Once again, the artificial is 
positioned against the natural, and in the original French, Deburau is actually referred 
to as le regrettable Deburau (‘the regrettable Deburau’). In contrast, Baudelaire 
portrays the English Pierrot through metaphors drawn from nature: he ‘swept upon us 
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like a hurricane, fell down like a sack of coals...his laugh was like a joyful clap of 
thunder’ (arrivait comme la tempête, tombait comme un ballot...ce rire resemblait un 
joyeux tonnere). These natural images are reminiscent of how numerous Romantic 
writers characterise Shakespeare. Furthermore, the fact that this performer’s laugh 
resembles a clap of thunder allows Baudelaire to conflate the essence of laughter (ce 
rire) with the grotesque that is drawn from the natural world: the ‘joyful clap of 
thunder’ is a paradoxical proposition, which succeeds in bringing together the comic 
and the fearful, thereby creating the condition of the grotesque. Furthermore, 
Baudelaire’s attention to this Pierrot’s costume accentuates the vital theatricality of 
the character and the experience. Additional comments are made to distinguish the 
English and French aesthetic: 
As for his moral nature, it was basically the same as that of the Pierrot we all 
know...The only difference was that where Deburau would just have 
moistened the tip of his finger with his tongue, he stuck both fists and both 
feet into his mouth...And everything else in this singular piece was expressed 
in the same way, with passionate gusto; it was the dizzy height of hyperbole. 
(Mayne, 160-61, ellipses mine) 
 
Deburau’s innate and artificial elegance is contrasted with the English Pierrot’s 
violent, almost crude physicality. It is this very physicality, which Baudelaire 
describes in the language of Romantic excess (‘passionate gusto’, avec emportement, 
‘the dizzy height of hyperbole’, le vertige de l’hyperbole), that distinguishes the 
Shakespearean elements of the performance. 
 Finally, Baudelaire recounts the singular dramatic image and process that 
personifies the intuitive apperception of the grotesque. This particular performance of 
the tales of Pierrot culminates with the guillotine (for our purposes, we should also 
keep in mind that in Chapter III, the guillotine becomes the most visible socio-
political symbol of the grotesque). Pierrot’s fate is sealed as he is brought to the 
guillotine, ‘bellowing like an ox that scents the slaughter-house’ (Mayne, 161). Once 
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again, Baudelaire chooses to animalise his subject. However, nothing prepares 
Baudelaire (and the reader) for what follows: 
His head was severed from his neck—a great red and white head, which rolled 
noisily to rest in front of the prompter’s box, showing the bleeding disk of the 
neck, the split vertebrae and all the details of a piece of butcher’s meat just 
dressed for the counter. And then, all of a sudden, the decapitated trunk, 
moved by its irresistible obsession with theft, jumped to its feet, triumphantly 
‘lifted’ its own head as though it was a ham or a bottle of wine, and, with far 
more circumspection than the great St. Denis, proceeded to stuff it into his 
own pocket! (Mayne, 161) 
 
This moment of the absolute comic, or what Baudelaire refers to as ‘the metaphysics 
of absolute comedy’ (Mayne, 162, metaphysique du comique absolu) conveys to us 
the essence of the grotesque. Its condition is drama, movement, and an Artaudian 
cruelty. First of all, we must keep in mind that the exhibition of violence on stage was 
banned in French neoclassical theatre.
33
 In contrast, Shakespearean drama was more 
at ease in showing us images of brutality and physical deformity, whether we think of 
the blinding of Gloucester in King Lear, or the depiction of a headless corpse in 
Cymbeline.  However, the portrayal of a guillotined body on a French stage would 
have been scandalous on two fronts: it would have grossly violated the still-prevailing 
orthodoxy of French dramatic practice, while also reminding Baudelaire’s insular 
French audience of its own traumatic history and its complicit participation in the 
massacres enacted by Robespierre’s guillotine.
34
 In contrast, Baudelaire seems to 
delight in depictions of blood and gore. Baudelaire’s description of ‘the bleeding disk 
of neck’, compared with ‘a piece of butcher’s meat’ reinforces the essential ugliness 
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 See my discussion of the French neoclassical aesthetics (in opposition to the Shakespearean 
grotesque) in Chapter II and Chapter III. See also Erich Auerbach’s Scenes From the Drama of 
European Literature (USA: Meridian Books, 1959) for an historical account of French classical theatre 
and its principles that so influenced European aesthetics until Romanticism, and Barry V. Daniels 
insightful introduction to Revolution in the Theatre: French Romantic Theories of Drama (London: 
Greenwood Press, 1983), where he says that ‘Violence is not allowed on the stage, as the audience will 
be conscious that it is not really happening if it is merely simulated…’ (23, ellipses mine). 
34
 See Christine Marcandier-Colard’s Crimes de Sang et Scène Capitales: Essai sur l’esthétique 
romantique de la violence (Paris: Presses Universitaire de la France, 1998) for a sustained analysis of 
the theatrical motifs of public execution in Revolutionary France, and its aesthetic legacy. I have 
analysed passages in this text in Chapter III. 
274 
 
of this particular stage image. As if honing his skills for the descriptions of rotting 
matter that he would use in Les Fleurs du Mal, Baudelaire’s recollection of this 
shocking image is stark and detailed. It is horrific in its vivid portrayal of physical 
deformity, in a manner that would have appealed to Hugo’s notion of the modern 
grotesque. And yet, it is not the mere exhibition of decapitation that is crucial, but the 
moment that follows, which consummates the dramatic shape-shifting so emblematic 
of the grotesque. The fact that Pierrot’s decapitated body somehow manages to pick 
up its head and stuff it into his pocket marks the zenith of a grotesque theatre. The 
action is somehow ridiculous, comic, and frightening at the same time. The violence 
of the action combined with the dramatic element of surprise invokes the spirit of the 
absolute comic, while blurring and ironizing the boundaries and genres canonised by 
French aesthetic theory. How does an audience respond to such a performance? Are 
we meant to be horrified by it? Are we meant to laugh uneasily? Can this performance 
even be classified as art, or is it more akin to the horror film in our contemporary 
culture? Debarati Sanyal, in her classification of le comique absolu in Baudelaire, 
does not provide an answer to this last question, but nevertheless emphasises the 
uniqueness of Baudelaire’s conception of the grotesque: ‘The absolute comique is an 
irreducibly singular artistic expression that is apprehended in its textuality and 
sensuous immediacy. It induces a rapturous vertigo in the spectator and must be 
grasped intuitively, from within its own economy’ (Sanyal, 46). Pierrot and the story 
of his guillotined head responds to these lines, and the immediacy of its effect is what 
Baudelaire is trying to communicate. This immediacy reflects on the ‘doubling 
laughter’ that forms the aesthetic method of Baudelaire’s ‘satanic theory of laughter’. 
The grotesque heightens the comic, reaching a transcendental crescendo.  
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According to Michelle Hannoosh, Baudelaire inherited this inventive way of 
looking at the ‘doubling laughter’ from Stendhal: 
But the most direct source in the transmission of this theory to Baudelaire was 
Stendhal, who discusses it in Racine et Shakespeare, the Histoire de la 
peinture en Italie, the Journal, and numerous notes, and frequently quotes the 
passages on laughter from Hobbes's Human Nature. Baudelaire read the 
Histoire de la peinture en Italie and, as Pommier showed, rifled it rather 
unscrupulously for his Salon de 1846...Like Baudelaire, Stendhal insists on the 
suddenness of laughter, its relation to pride, and the 'philosophical' spirit that 
permits the poet to understand, and thus create the comic... (Hannoosh, 27-28, 
ellipses mine) 
 
This doubling engenders itself through interplay and movement, while uniting the one 
who laughs with the object of laughter. The defining characteristic of this type of 
laughter, which emerges from the absolute comic, is its suddenness. It is this very 
immediacy that correlates with the aesthetics of shock that Baudelaire as poet so 
effortlessly develops in Les Fleurs du Mal. 
   
IV—‘Abnormal Specimens’: Baudelaire as Hamlet in Les Fleurs 
du Mal 
 
In our analysis of Baudelaire’s artistic tendencies through De L’Essence du 
Rire, we unearthed a few vital themes that are specifically resonant when scanning the 
territory of nineteenth-century aesthetic theory: the importance of the grotesque and 
its rapport with the comic; the notion of the comic as being fundamentally linked to 
Satanic mockery, thereby implying and confirming the Fall of man as a mythopoeic 
theme; Baudelaire’s conception of spleen (and its opposition to the ideal) as being the 
dramatic motor for his creation of grotesque laughter; and finally, the relationship of 
the grotesque to performance and theatricality, illustrated through the example of the 
English Pierrot.  
The last theme is reflective of much of the work done in this thesis, which has 
reviewed significant moments of critical theory in continental Romanticism in order 
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to reposition the Shakespearean grotesque. In other words, Continental theory reflects, 
and builds upon, the revisioning of an English aesthetic. Shakespeare, reincarnated as 
a Romantic, becomes the symbol of the post-Revolutionary grotesque. Viewed from 
this hermeneutic lens, Baudelaire’s recollection of an English mime playing Pierrot-
like-Falstaff is significant because it manifests a Shakespearean influence through a 
singular moment of theatrical play and subversion. Baudelaire’s validation of the 
Penley troupe—amidst a largely disapproving French audience at the Théâtre de 
Variétés—can be viewed as a climactic moment of an emerging obsession with 
English drama. The English Pierrot’s grotesque physicality reaffirms the revolt 
against the conformity of French neoclassicism. This Shakespearean thematic conveys 
and creates the urgency of French Romantic theory, from Hugo to Baudelaire. 
Significantly, a portion of our analysis of De L’Essence du Rire focused on 
Baudelaire’s identification with Hamlet the character and persona. Baudelairean 
spleen mirrors Hamlet’s melancholia. Furthermore, his imitation of the character, as 
evidenced in a poem like ‘La Béatrice’, is symptomatic of the ironic mockery and 
mourning characteristic of his poetry. Consequently, Baudelaire’s self-fashioning as 
Hamlet can give us further clues about his creation of grotesque symptoms in Les 
Fleurs du Mal.       
In the introduction to Hamlet and his Modern Guises (2001), which traces the 
influence of the dark prince on modern European literature from Goethe’s Wilhelm 
Meister to Joyce’s Ulysses, Alexander Welsh asserts: 
Hamlet’s melancholy ironizes rather than condemns the world. His tolerance 
for clowning and penchant for ridicule arrive at a pitch when he is nearest his 
own death. For most of the play he mourns and is unsparing of himself, but the 
jarring of disgust and constraint results in a heightened consciousness. 
Mourning, I suggest, is partly what we mean by modern consciousness, for 
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which Hamlet would not seem nearly as representative if it were not for his 
youth.
35
  
 
The use of the word ‘ironizes’ is interesting, and sheds light on the dramatic 
methodology of ironic posturing that is representative of Hamlet the character and 
persona. In addition, his attraction to ‘clowning and ridicule’ places him firmly within 
the framework of the ‘satanic laughter’ so dear to Baudelaire. Welsh sketches 
mourning as the prime thematic hue for Hamlet, and the play is later referred to as a 
‘tragi-comedy of modern consciousness’ (Welsh, xi). The use of the word ‘tragi-
comedy’, one that self-consciously blurs the distinctions of classical theatre in a 
manner that would become common for Beckett and the absurdists, is also indicative 
of the modern significance of the play. While Welsh does not explicitly refer to 
Baudelaire in his book, he nevertheless acknowledges that ‘The ghost of Hamlet—the 
son and not the father—frequented the nineteenth century so often and so freely that it 
is difficult to imagine the course of literary history without him’ (Welsh, 100). As 
shown in the last section of this chapter, the themes prevalent in Hamlet—ironic 
awareness, mourning as an existential condition and performance, the mixing of 
genres and registers—fascinated Baudelaire and cropped up in his work as critic and 
poet. The French poet felt a strange affinity to the existential angst of the 
Shakespearean character, seeing similarities in his own personal life as a form of 
reflection. Martin Scofield claims that Baudelaire was particularly receptive to 
Hamlet’s ‘melancholy sensitivity’,
36
 and for Helen Phelps Bailey, the fascination 
Baudelaire had for the Shakespearean character is uncanny: 
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 Hamlet in his Modern Guises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. xi. Future references 
will be cited in the text. 
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 The Ghosts of Hamlet: the play and modern writers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 
p. 13. I see this text as a precursor to Alexander Welsh’s book (see above). Scofield provides us with a 
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Hamlet the character, or Hamlet the play, is taken up by a creative writer and used as a persona, or 
myth, or symbol in the writers’ own creations. The unique malleability or indeterminate nature of the 
play almost invites this: it seems to leave room for further creation...The enigmatic character of the 
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It was of course, the paintings and lithographs of Delacroix—the poets' 
painter—that fascinated the Romantics and helped to shape their image of the 
meaning in Shakespeare's play. Baudelaire, for example, seems to have 
thought of Hamlet mostly in images from the paintings and lithographs of 
Delacroix and the acting interpretation of Rouvière. In the tiny apartment he 
occupied in 1843 on the Quai d'Anjou, against a background of glazed 
wallpaper with a huge red and black branched pattern that matched the heavy, 
antique draperies, hung the whole series of Delacroix's lithographs of Hamlet. 
(Bailey, 62) 
 
Hamlet exercises a limitless influence on the French Romantics, and Baudelaire’s 
own creative and epistemological interpretation of the character is based on Delacroix 
and Rouviere. Through the media of painting and performance, Baudelaire constructs 
his self-fashioning, his recreation of Hamlet.  
 However, Baudelaire was also familiar with the extensive Gallic criticism of 
Shakespearean drama from Voltaire onwards. Max. I. Baym’s rare essay, ‘Baudelaire 
and Shakespeare’ provides significant details, affirming that the French poet was 
specifically enamoured of Hugo’s linking of Shakespeare to a theory of the modern 
grotesque: 
Unquestionably, we have here [Hugo’s Préface de Cromwell] another 
important source for Baudelaire’s conception of the comic, especially as it 
relates to the grotesque...suffice it to say here that his conception of the comic 
also involves a definition of the grotesque. It will be recalled that for Hugo—
and this was what Baudelaire read in the Préface—the characteristic quality of 
medieval and therefore of Romantic art is the ‘grotesque’. The grotesque and 
the beautiful blended to produce Shakespeare.
37
 
 
In a manner that seamlessly connects Hugo’s Romanticism with Baudelaire’s poetics 
of modernity and emerging decadence, Baym corroborates that the grotesque and the 
comique absolu are thematic traits that characterise nineteenth-century French critical 
theory, while also highlighting the impetus provided by the Shakespearean grotesque. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
hero and the different perspectives it is possible to take of the play as a whole have made them themes 
for reflection and symbols for the perplexing, fragmented experience of modern life’ (6, ellipses mine). 
I am particularly intrigued by the concept of using Hamlet as a persona, which I think is particularly 
applicable to Baudelaire and his treatment of the grotesque. 
37
 ‘Baudelaire and Shakespeare’ in The Shakespeare Association Bulletin, vol. 15, no. 3, July 1940, pp. 
131-149 (p. 133), parentheses mine. 
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According to Baym, Baudelaire embeds the grotesque ‘at the very heart of the 
creative process and therefore of beauty, and that in doing so, he was indebted to 
Victor Hugo...’ (138, ellipses mine). Furthermore, Baudelaire was conversant with 
Shakespeare in the original: he learnt English from his mother, ‘who was born in 
London of French parents’, studied English in college, and became the famous French 
translator of Poe (134). Evidently, the English language and literature held a strange 
fascination for Baudelaire, which transposed itself onto his reading of Shakespeare. 
For Rosette Lamont however, it is Baudelaire’s fraternising with Hamlet—the darkest 
and most intellectual of all Shakespearean heroes—that remains the most complex 
and telling experience for the reader of Les Fleurs du Mal: 
Three times in his life Baudelaire met with “des âmes soeurs,” and without 
hesitation identified with them completely. They were De Quincey, Poe, and 
Hamlet. Baudelaire not only interpreted and translated the work of the first 
two, but also felt free to lift any passages from their works and incorporate 
them into his own; it was a right derived from the privilege of perfect 
intuition. His identification with Hamlet was even more complete. He realised 
his oneness with Shakespeare’s hero with the result that, though the Prince of 
Denmark is everywhere in Baudelaire’s poetry, he is often nameless as are all 
those beings we cherish most but fear as well: our Gods, our lovers, our other 
selves.
38
     
 
Hamlet is a ‘sister soul’ along with Poe and De Quincey (also, coincidentally writers 
in English), becoming as human a persona as the other two. Lamont’s assertion that 
Baudelaire was so influenced by Hamlet that the prince is almost unnamed in Les 
Fleurs du Mal is vital. By implication, Hamlet’s name is effaced as a form of 
psychological suppression. Hamlet’s story mirrors Baudelaire’s own damaged 
relationship with his mother and step-father, his conception of ‘spleen’ emerges from 
an intimate reading of the character, and his aesthetic grows from ‘reliving 
consciously and subconsciously the tragic life of the Shakespearean hero’ (Lamont, 
87). Hamlet hovers as a ghost over Baudelaire’s life and work, tormenting him, 
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enabling him to channelize his vision of the grotesque as a dialectical play between 
mourning and laughter. 
 When thinking about Hamlet and Les Fleurs du Mal, one is inevitably 
reminded of specific emblems of the grotesque that unite the Shakespearean character 
and the French poet. Following a Schlegelian paradigm that prefers a synchronic 
perspective to a linear one, we can say that the most Baudelairean moment in Hamlet 
comes in Act V, scene 1, which opens with two clowns who double up as 
gravediggers digging for Ophelia.
39
 Famously, Voltaire found this scene to be 
particularly distasteful. How could one have clowns in a tragedy? Moreover, what is 
significant is that the jocular comportment of these two characters is framed within a 
situation that recalls the horrific madness and resulting suicide of one of the prime 
characters (and Hamlet’s idealised love interest) in the play. The grotesqueness of the 
situation emerges, ironically, from a question Hamlet poses to Horatio: ‘Has this 
fellow no feeling of his business that a sing at grave making?’
40
 The famous scene 
that follows merges Hamlet’s meditation on mortality with stage images of him 
picking and throwing skulls. He comments on ‘my lady Worm’ as it creeps into a 
particular skull, and then responds to the shock that comes from learning that one of 
them belonged to Yorick, a court jester from his childhood. His diatribe on the 
inevitable decay in death corresponds with a misogynist mockery. He tells the skull of 
Yorick: ‘Get thee to my lady’s chamber and tell her, let her paint an inch thick, to this 
favour she must come. Make her laugh at that’ (Norton, 2
nd
 ed., 5.1, 178-180, p. 
1772). The lady’s make-up represents her vanity (while representing Hamlet’s 
complex misogyny, while Yorick’s skull intimates her destiny. Hamlet’s mockery of 
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her lack of laughter in the face of death conveys a sense of spleen, the harbinger of 
Satanic posturing.  
 Hamlet’s preoccupation with decay is well-documented, and in an earlier 
scene with Claudius, which follows Polonius’s accidental murder, the rapport between 
mockery and the ironic celebration of the essential democracy in death becomes 
visible: 
  King Claudius: Now, Hamlet, where’s Polonius? 
 Hamlet: At supper. 
 King Claudius: At supper? Where? 
 Hamlet: Not where he eats, but where a is eaten. A certain convocation of  
politic Worms are e’en at him. Your worm is your only emperor for diet. We 
fat all creatures else to fat us, and we fat ourselves for maggots. Your fat king 
and your lean beggar is but variable service—two dishes, but to one table. 
That’s the end.  
King Claudius: Alas, alas!  
Hamlet: A man may fish with the worm that hath eat of a king, and eat of the 
fish that hath fed of that worm. 
King Claudius: What dost thou mean by this? 
Hamlet: Nothing but to show you how a king may go a progress through the 
guts of a beggar. (4. 3, 17-31, p. 1755) 
 
The above exchange denotes the back and forth interplay of dramatic and grotesque 
irony. This is another Baudelairean moment that functions not only as a precursor to 
the scene with Yorick’s skull, but also as a prolepsis for much of Baudelaire’s take on 
the grotesque in Les Fleurs du Mal. Hamlet conveys to us the shocking image of a 
human body being eaten by worms. In addition, the very act of worm-eating-flesh 
becomes the common ground that unites king and beggar. This is a trope that will 
reappear most vividly in Baudelaire’s ‘Une Charogne’. 
 Keeping the inherent Englishness of Baudelaire’s conception of the grotesque 
in mind, let us look at one of the rare, isolated definitions of this particular aesthetic 
category in English critical theory in the nineteenth century. Walter Bagehot’s 
thoughts on Browning’s poetry realign this exploration of the grotesque that forms 
itself through bodily degradation, a theme that links Hamlet to his French epigone. In 
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differentiating the poetry of Wordsworth (‘Pure’), Tennyson (‘Ornate’), and 
Browning (‘Grotesque’), Bagehot defines the grotesque in poetry as that which 
accounts for what is aberrant and abnormal in nature: 
It deals, to use the language of science, not with normal types but with 
abnormal specimens; to use the language of old philosophy, not with what 
nature is striving to be, but with what some lapse she has happened to become. 
This art works by contrast. It enables you to see, it makes you see, the perfect 
type by painting the opposite deviation. It shows you what ought to be by what 
ought not to be; when complete, it reminds you of the perfect image by 
showing you the distorted and imperfect image.
41
 
This ‘lapse’ in nature is important—within an aesthetic construct it signifies a fall 
from perfection, and renders itself antithetical to a meticulously achieved work of art. 
The grotesque functions in contrast to Keats’s Grecian urn for example (with its 
proclamations of the unity of beauty and truth), because it essentially is in a state of 
ruin—the grotesque suffers neglect (in nature and in art) and therefore becomes 
emblematic of decay. This prism of contrast relates to Hugo’s engendering of the 
grotesque as the aesthetic counterpoint to the sublime, and it is likely that Bagehot 
was aware of Hugo’s thesis in the Préface. The ‘perfect type’ that Bagehot refers to 
shifts attention to the notion of the ideal instead. Dialectically, the abnormal 
specimens of the grotesque imply the simultaneous failure and nostalgic longing for 
the ideal. The grotesque occupies the field of play that opens up after the Fall. 
Significantly, Bagehot’s essay associates grotesque art as being characteristic of an 
epoch that has seen the growth of the ‘scattered, headless’ and half-educated middle-
classes which need an art that shocks the senses. 
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Walter Benjamin’s analysis of the religious resonance of the symbol in 
Romantic art can also help us comprehend how the grotesque differs from 
conventional and classical ideals of beauty: 
The introduction of the distorted conception of the symbol into aesthetics was 
a romantic and destructive extravagance which preceded the desolation of 
modern art criticism. As a symbolic construct, the beautiful is supposed to 
merge with the divine in an unbroken whole. The idea of the unlimited 
immanence of the moral world in the world of beauty is derived from the 
theosophical aesthetics of the romantics.
42
 
 
Benjamin here has in mind the highly influential tradition of German Romantic 
philosophy, of the idea that the ‘highest act of reason’ is an aesthetic one, which 
thereby alerts us to the assumed co-dependence of aesthetics, ethics, and logic. If the 
early Romantics believed in, and tried to forge, the symbolic wholeness of the 
individual contemplative subject with nature, the grotesque possibly heralds the 
irremediable and self-conscious separation of the beautiful and the divine, of beauty 
and truth. The grotesque represents an inevitable state of fragmentation, a fall from 
Romantic wholeness, where the beautiful is no longer consubstantial with the good.  
Aesthetics and ethics are becoming mutually exclusive. The grotesque for the aesthete 
becomes worthy of a deep existential lament.  
The poems of Les Fleurs du Mal (1857/61) are obsessed with representations 
of the grotesque—these figures that symbolise metamorphosis and decay align 
themselves with the modern in nineteenth-century poetics and become symptomatic 
of the post-Romantic condition that emerges from, and continually reflects upon, the 
ruins of the modern world. These poems show us ‘the distorted and imperfect image’ 
of things in the world of change, and instead of reminding us of the ideal, perhaps 
self-consciously profess that the era of ideals was coming to its end. Consequently, in 
establishing a poetry of contrasts to question the validity of older beliefs and forms of 
                                                          
42
 The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (London: NLB, 1977), 160. 
284 
 
expression, the poetics of the grotesque in Baudelaire form modes of mourning for the 
loss of traditional notions of beauty and perfection in a world conditioned by industry, 
mechanical production, and the laws of the marketplace. To expand on a position 
provided by J. M. Bernstein in The Fate of Art (1992), the character of the modern 
artwork, and to my mind the poetry of the grotesque, is its growing alienation from 
truth and morality and the subsequent, or simultaneous, process of mourning for this 
alienation as the poem comes to be. In other words, the post-Romantic artwork in 
particular constitutes this bifurcation of aesthetics and ethics as being an intrinsically 
historical condition, a state of affairs that it ponders upon as already having taken 
place, while also at the same time, creating this very condition through the trope of 
the eternal present of mourning. The Baudelairean grotesque is the idiom that 
comprehends the process of exhuming the past through nostalgia while self-
consciously mourning the very need for this longing.  For the industrialized world 
which deals on a day-to-day basis with the by-products of Marx’s feared factory of 
the industrial capitalist—refuse, garbage, pollution—the fallen images of the 
grotesque aesthetically reflect upon a fallen world. 
A recurrent theme in discussions of late-Romanticism is that it grew from a 
passionate rejection of this post-industrial and post-Revolutionary life. Gautier’s 
pronouncement that all that is useful is ugly becomes the flag bearer of this revolt in 
European aesthetics that bases itself on a growing hatred of culture as 
commodification. In a world dominated by the philistine sentiments of Bagehot’s 
headless middle classes, where the existence of God had become a pervasive doubt, 
where art went for sale on the market, writers after Gautier worked towards 
establishing an artistic aristocracy to create an art that would function as theodicy and 
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antidote in a consumer society.
43
 In Baudelaire’s own critical work, the figure of the 
dandy becomes the most vociferous denigrator of bourgeois capitalism through the 
performance of mockery. The dandy possesses an ‘aristocratic superiority of mind’ 
and represents ‘last spark of heroism amid decadence’ (Mayne, 27-28). What is 
interesting here is that a revolt in aesthetics (and often in political perspectives, 
keeping in mind Baudelaire’s participation in the barricades of 1848 in Paris) 
accompanies a disturbing distancing from the concerns of the growing mass culture. 
The bohemian avant-garde, from Hugo’s cénacle to le club des haschischiens, while 
intending to represent a revolt against the established aesthetic and political norms of 
the day, did so by ironically creating an art that was often limited in audience and 
support to a marginalized elite. The Romantic cult of the individual, as manifested in 
the figure of the dandy and the aristocrat artist, set the tone for the avant-garde and 
contained within its schematic framework a set of ideological contradictions that have 
continued to the present: elitism and mass culture, high art and low art, revolt and 
conformity, obscenity and beauty. If anything, Gautier’s reaction to commodification, 
and subsequent desire to create an art that would be on one hand Platonically ‘pure,’ 
and on the other oppositional to mass culture, betrays the paradoxical elitism of revolt 
in post-Romantic aesthetics. An ironic detachment on part of the aesthete asserts 
itself, which aims at confirming the separation of truth and beauty, while also merging 
ideological opposites, consuming contradictions. This is how the grotesque, slouching 
towards Bethlehem, is born. 
In his philosophic inquiry into the conscious cultivation of artifice in late 
nineteenth- century French literature, Les Evasions Manquées (1986), Gérard Peylet 
speaks of the artist’s need for ontological evasion in a world of irreconcilable 
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dualities—l’artifice volontairement cultivé (voluntarily cultivated artifice) becomes a 
necessity and a spiritual refuge creating the illusion of transcendence, which only 
leads to the realization that such an escape is impossible.
44
 This lack of escape, in my 
view, prefigures the very modernist/existential Heideggerian anxiety, where the 
individual being that is capable of questioning the meaning of Being (Dasein) ‘finds 
itself face to face with the nothing of the possible impossibility of its own 
existence…the nothing that anxiety brings before us unveils the nullity that 
determines Dasein in its ground—which is its being thrown into death’.
45
 The 
anxiety/dread that I feel is an objectless fear since its only possible object is the 
‘nothing’ of the certainty of death. Paradoxically, once I confront this nothing, I can 
realize the full potentiality of my being.  
Accordingly, the result for writers suffering from such anxiety transposes 
itself into Peylet’s recours à la dérision (recourse to derision), by which an acute, 
playful, and often flagrantly ironic self-consciousness comes to the fore. In a world 
that has lost promises of transcendence, an agonistic perspective towards this same 
world is adopted—the artist becomes increasingly elitist, eclectic, and oppositional 
and takes pleasure in poking fun at conventional codes of morality and behaviour. 
These aesthetic tropes vitalize themselves in the plethora of poses and theatrical 
performances adopted in the literature of the period that have as their target the realm 
of conventional ethics. One has the misanthropy and misogyny of Baudelaire and of 
Huysmans’ Des Esseintes, the immoral recreation of self in the character of Wilde’s 
Dorian Gray, and the violent anti-theism and insurrectionary poetics of Swinburne as 
corroborations that the questioning of artistic boundaries in the nineteenth century 
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represents a sense of dissatisfaction, of mourning, and of Baudelaire’s eternal ennui. 
Whatever its manifestation, artistic transgression—a revolt based on half-hidden 
elitist premises—becomes a crucial feature of the nineteenth-century aesthetic elite as 
a means by which to come to terms with this deep sense of philosophic lack and 
civilizational loss. It is not coincidental that Baudelaire’s ‘Une Charogne’ takes as its 
object of poetic contemplation a rotting carcass. In a world of fragmentation, perhaps 
a rotting carcass functions as the most daring symbol of aesthetic activity, which 
though provocation and shock, reminds us of the modern’s obsession with nostalgia 
and ruin. 
 
In a projected epilogue to Les Fleurs du Mal, Baudelaire writes of his grandest 
muse, Paris, an unequivocal symbol of the modern industrialized city, ‘tu m’as donné 
ta boue, et j’en ai fait de l’or’ [you gave me your mud, and I turned it into gold, Les 
Fleurs du Mal, 240]. These lines encapsulate the poet’s project in this collection—the 
transformation of the mud of modern life into the gold of the poet’s words. 
Furthermore, this endeavoured aestheticization becomes more poignant, given the 
connotations of la boue for nineteenth-century Paris. In fact, it represents something 
more sinister that the normal English translation of the term. In Sick Heroes: French 
Society and Literature in the Romantic Age (1997), Alan H. Pasco defines la boue as 
‘a fetid, black, sticky substance that would occasionally eat through clothing’.
46
 
Furthermore, la boue ‘stands as much for the vile, for shame, for failure as it does for 
sludge...Boue symbolized poverty, disgrace, moral degradation, failure in all its 
forms’ (26). Pasco’s perspective locates itself in the discourse of mass migration to 
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the city, which was characteristic of the Romantic age and the Industrial Revolution. 
With this migration, there came disease and the reality of urban displacement and 
poverty: ‘The new urban populace was undernourished, overworked, and unresistant 
to the epidemics of typhus, cholera, syphilis, and tuberculosis. Many lived in 
incredible squalor’ (13).   Pasco goes on to explain the extent of this squalor: 
Until the radical restructuring of Paris in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, conditions for immigrants were at best frightening, at worst 
devastating. When one was not wealthy enough to purchase protection from 
the harsher realities, life in Paris was appalling. Louis Sébastien Mercier, the 
peripatetic witness of late eighteenth-century life in Paris, called it very simply 
“the filthiest city in the world”; Pierre Chauvet, despite the restraint imposed 
by his scientific pretentions, calls it “the center of stench”. In places, he adds, 
the fetidity made flowers wilt. (22) 
 
The streets were like sewers, needing specialised ‘boueurs’ to clean them on a regular 
basis. Baudelaire, who lived to see the transition of Paris from being ‘the filthiest city 
in the world’ to its reconstruction by Baron Haussman, became its morbid chronicler. 
For Benjamin, Baudelaire’s portrayal of an industrialised Paris launches a new way of 
seeing in lyric poetry: 
Baudelaire’s genius, which is nourished on melancholy, is an allegorical 
genius. For the first time, with Baudelaire, Paris becomes the subject of lyric 
poetry. The poetry is no hymn to the homeland; rather, the gaze of the 
allegorist, as it falls on the city, is the gaze of alienated man. It is the gaze of 
the flâneur, whose way of life still conceals behind a mitigating nimbus the 
coming desolation of the big-city dweller. (Jennings, 40) 
 
 For Benjamin, Baudelaire’s gaze is allegorical, not symbolic, since there is no 
merging of the beautiful with the divine. Instead, the allegory always represents 
something that it is not, thereby implying a lack of substance.
47
 The flâneur is the 
alienated man who watches and records the surge of city-life around him, and the 
allegorical emptiness of its becoming. The ‘coming desolation’ becomes the condition 
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of the ‘man of the crowd’ (l’homme des foules). As Richard Burton says: ‘Flânerie 
began as a quest for the true being of the Other; it ends as an autoscopic nightmare in 
which, like Baudelaire’s homme de foules, the self goes through the city forever 
meeting itself, a Proteus imprisoned by its own self-projections’ (French Studies, 66).  
The Baudelairean poet’s association with Proteus is vital: like the crowd he studies 
and simultaneously joins in through a process of separation and assimilation, the 
poet’s condition is one of dramatic metamorphosis, of perpetual ‘negative capability’. 
For Burton, this Proteus that shifts in shape through each encounter in the city creates 
a nightmare of eternal self-projection. Yet, in my view, each encounter with the other 
alters the poet’s self as well. The self mutates, becomes, proliferates through a Protean 
change of masks. Coincidentally, Baudelaire defines the flâneur in terms that recall 
the Fichtean negotiation of self and non-self: ‘He [the flâneur] is an ‘I’ with an 
insatiable appetite for the ‘non-I’, at every instant rendering and explaining it in 
pictures more living than life itself, which is unstable and fugitive’ (Mayne,10, 
parentheses mine). The activity of the flâneur is fundamentally dramatic. 
Significantly, Barbey Aurevilly, in one of the earliest celebrations of Les Fleurs du 
Mal, calls it ‘un drame anonyme dont il [Baudelaire] est l’acteur universel’ (‘an 
anonymous drama of which he [Baudelaire] is the universal actor).
48
 Aurevilly 
compares Baudelaire to Shakespeare and Molière as a truly modern dramatic poet, 
and refers to his engendering of horror and abomination as ‘un grand spectacle’ (‘a 
great spectacle’, 11, italics mine). The italicised word in French conveys the sense of 
the theatrical. It is as if Hugo’s drive to celebrate the grotesque core of modern 
(Shakespearean) drama has been assimilated and internalised into lyric poetry. 
Fundamentally, the opposition between irreconcilable dualities creates the dramatic 
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motor of Baudelaire’s aesthetics. Baudelaire’s lyric mode must engender dramatic 
reverberations. Importantly, Baudelaire’s poetics are representative of ‘la literature 
satanique’ (13-14). Within this schema of the dramatic creation of satanic 
melancholy, Baudelaire’s desire to transform la boue to l’or (or spleen into l’idéal) is 
representative of an old-fashioned Romanticism, a desire to escape the squalor and 
misery that he sees around him. Simultaneously, it also underscores another dramatic 
pose that is self-reflective in its creation. Consequently, whether they are the visions 
of prostitutes in ‘Le Crépuscule du Soir’ [‘Dusk’], the celebration of spleen in the 
‘Spleen’ poems, or the consecration of Satan as demiurge in ‘Les Litanies de Satan’, 
Baudelaire makes the grotesque performance of melancholy into a vital theme.  
In contrast, through the miracles of dream in ‘Rêve Parisien’ [‘Parisian 
Dream’] or the self-conscious musings on beauty in ‘L’Idéal’, Baudelaire also 
nostalgically longs, and performs a yearning for a Platonic realm of forms where 
perfection exists in a perpetual stasis. For example, the celebrated and musical refrain 
in ‘L’Invitation au Voyage’ [‘Invitation to a Voyage’] crystallizes this ideal, which is 
to be found in a distant country, possibly in the Orient: 
 Là, tout n’est qu’ordre et beauté, 
 Luxe, calme et volupté.     
 
 [There, all is but order and beauty, 
 Luxurious, calm and voluptuous]   (27-28)     
 
In this idealized country, The Hellenic ethos (order, beauty) coexists with a certain 
sensuousness characteristic of nineteenth-century Orientalism. Interestingly, the poem 
with its ‘soleils couchants’ (sleeping suns) and its ‘rares fleurs’ (rare flowers) smacks 
of a Classical celebration of beauty that is sharply at odds with other poems in the 
collection that paint harsher portraits of industrial Paris with its abundance of waste, 
decay, and death. In fact, the Baudelairian ‘gold’ is not as unique as his ‘mud’, and it 
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is the attempted transformation of one to the other, and sometimes the failure of this 
ideal alchemy that is worth noting.  In ‘Rêve Parisien’, after dreaming of other 
Oriental realms, the speaker returns to the reality of his surroundings: 
J’ai vu l’horreur de mon taudis… 
  
 La pendule aux accents funèbres 
 Sonnait brutalement midi, 
 Et le ciel versait des ténèbres 
 Sur le triste monde engourdi 
 
 [I saw the horror of my slum… 
 
 The pendulum with dark accents 
 Was brutally ringing in the noon, 
 And the sky was pouring out its gloom 
 On the sad, numb world]   (54-60, ellipses mine) 
 
 Unlike “L’Invitation au Voyage,” the reader is not lost in a vortex of golden 
sunsets, but is reminded of the details of a dull noon in a Parisian slum. 
While hinting at the Platonic dialectics of transience/permanence in Aestheticism, 
or late-Romanticism, Leon Chai asks: 
In shifting to the search for a transcendent element, however, Aestheticism 
raises an obvious question: is meaning intrinsically impossible within 
experience itself? And if so, must the quest for meaning necessarily become a 
quest for transcendence in one form or another?
49
 
 
These questions characterize the struggle for meaning that contextualizes Baudelaire’s 
poems—the endeavour to transcend the world of phenomena becomes a task that 
subverts itself, and the quest for the permanent in fleeting moments is often 
impossible, even if one stretches the limits of aesthetic endeavour. So, the contrast 
created between the nostalgia for ideals and the profusion of sordid city images drives 
Baudelaire’s poetics—in his best poems, one remains in the realms of the grotesque, 
with a few faint, iridescent shadows of an ideal to comfort the reader. Writing in 
1865, an emerging poet of the French decadence, Paul Verlaine, comments succinctly 
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on this tension between spleen et idéal in Baudelaire—in portraying the modern 
subject with its ‘sharp and vibrating senses’, with a brain saturated with tobacco and 
blood burnt by alcohol, Baudelaire succeeds in constructing poems that are marked by 
‘l’incompressible essor de l’âme vers un idéal toujours réculant’ [the uncontainable 
progress of the soul towards an ideal that is always retreating, translation mine].
50
 The 
movement towards this ideal is continuous and yet with every effort made to capture 
it, the modern subject and the modern poem encounter their own insufficiency.  
 ‘Une Charogne’ works as an example of poetics that attempt to grapple with 
this ideal, and to ironize it in a manner reminiscent of Hamlet. Most obviously, the 
poem constructs its dramatic denouement through the appropriation of an explicitly 
‘unpoetic’ subject matter—a rotting carcass. In a formalist analysis of the poem, Peter 
Broome says: 
Une Charogne is also an art poétique: a multi-faceted metaphor of the poetic 
process and the function of artistic creation. The initial object of 
contemplation is…the female body, not seen here in sublimated form as quasi-
divinity, but rather as undisguised carnality, repellent and grotesque…here she 
is the epitome of abandoned, degenerate matter.
51 
 
Although the word ‘charogne’ is a feminine noun, the poem itself does not openly 
confirm if the carrion is that of a woman. However, I think that Broome’s reading 
ambiguously welcomes the gender-inflective sense of the word, and connects it with 
two features in the poem—the unnamed person that the speaker talks to is a woman, 
and the fact that Baudelaire characterizes the carrion with ‘female’ imagery, most 
grotesquely in his description that it had its legs in the air ‘comme une femme 
lubrique’ (like a lecherous lady). This adumbrates the misogyny often associated with 
Baudelaire (and Hamlet), of the woman as representative of the natural as opposed to 
what is created by art. By asking his love to remember the details of this carcass, the 
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 Charles Baudelaire’ in Paul Verlaine, Poèmes Saturniens, ed. Martine Bercot (Paris: Le Livre de 
Poche, 1996), p. 204. 
51
 Peter Broome, Baudelaire’s Poetic Patterns (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1999), p. 69, ellipses mine. 
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speaker/poet also engenders a parody of the traditional love poem or the Petrarchan 
sonnet to Laura. Broome’s assertion that the poem is a metaphor for the act of 
creation can be questioned through its re-embodiment of the ideal—of art, of woman, 
of love—through an overarching sense of irony and the grotesque parody of the lyric 
genre.  
 The poem constructs this ironic interplay through the juxtaposition of 
oppositional images, a process that begins in the first verse employing what Friedrich 
Schlegel would have described as the ‘alternation between self-creation and self-
destruction’: 
Rappelez-vous l’objet que nous vîmes, mon âme, 
 Ce beau matin d’été si doux: 
 Au detour d’un sentier une charogne infâme 
 Sur un lit semé de cailloux,  
  
[Remember the object that we saw, my soul, 
 That beautiful summer morning so soft: 
 At the curve of a path, a vile carcass 
 On a bed sown with stones] (1-4, translation mine) 
 
The first two lines tritely rephrase the sentiments of a conventional love poem—the 
lover is referred to as a soulmate, and is asked to remember an object encountered on 
an innocuous summer morning. The last two lines, in contrast, deconstruct and 
annihilate any cherished illusions of what should constitute the subject matter of a 
love poem—the image of the carcass asserts itself, and creates the first in a series of 
juxtapositions that startle the reader, interrogating the poem’s process of coming to 
be. Benjamin theorises the importance of this shock-value in Baudelaire: 
Without reflection there would be nothing but the sudden start, usually the 
sensation of fight which, according to Freud, confirms the failure of the shock 
defence. Baudelaire has portrayed this condition in a harsh image. He speaks 
of a duel in which the artist, just before being beaten, screams in fright. This 
duel is the creative process. Thus Baudelaire placed the shock experience at 
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the very centre of his artistic work…since he is himself exposed to fright, it is 
not unusual for Baudelaire to occasion fright.
52
 
 
This passage recalls a definition of the artistic act in one of Baudelaire’s prose poems: 
 ‘L’étude du beau est un duel où l’artiste crie de frayeur avant d’être vaincu’ [the 
study of the beautiful is a duel where the artist cries in fright before being vanquished, 
translation mine].
53
 This duel in fright between subject and object thematically 
dominates ‘Une Charogne’—the poem becomes a metaphor for the artistic act in 
Baudelaire’s philosophy of art, where shock, the grotesque and beauty necessarily 
coexist. The choice of subject in the poem becomes
 
even more demonic considering 
that the poem adheres to strict prosodic rules, being arranged in immaculately 
organized quatrains of alexandrines alternating with octosyllables.
 
In fact, we are now 
in the domain of the absurd, the roots of a Beckettian humour that
 
provokes us and 
confronts myths about art and beauty. Furthermore, Baudelaire’s encounter with a 
rotting carcass mirrors Hamlet’s encounter with Yorick’s skull. Both moments lead to 
meditations on mortality. The grotesque becomes the motor for a dramatic reflection 
on the lack of spiritual transcendence. 
 
The second verse proceeds to concretize the images of the grotesque (‘les 
jambes en l’air, comme une femme lubrique’), while the third begins with the image 
of the sun shining on ‘cette pourriture’ (this putrescence). In more conventional 
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 Walter Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism, trans. Harry 
Zohn (London: NLB, 1973), p. 117, ellipses mine.  See Cassandra Laity’s expansion of Benjamin’s 
notion of shock as the defining feature of the modern artwork in ‘T.S. Eliot and A.C. Swinburne: 
Decadent Bodies, Modern Visualities, and Changing Modes of Perception’ in Modernism/Modernity 
(Volume 11, Number 3, 2004), p. 425-448. Laity ties shock to urban poetics and extends it  to the 
notion of montage—cinema as being the art form in an age of mechanical production—in the work of 
T. S. Eliot as growing from Baudelairean aesthetics. Also illuminating is J. M. Bernstein’s analysis of 
the shudder caused by the modern artwork in The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to 
Derrida and Adorno (Cambridge: Polity, 1992): ‘The shudder released by the work of art, the 
experience of the modernist sublime, is the memory of the experience of the terror and strangeness in 
the face of threatening nature. Shudder is the memorial experience of nature’s transcendence, its non-
identity and sublimity, at one remove. But, as such, it is equally a memory of the libidinous desires that 
were repressed in the face of primal nature. Shudder is a memory, an after-image, of what is to be 
preserved’ (220). 
53
 Charles Baudelaire, ‘Le Confiteor de L’artiste’ in le Spleen de Paris: Petits Poèmes en Prose, ed. 
Jean-Luc Steinmetz  (Paris: Le Livre de Poche, 2003) p. 65. 
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poetry, the sun is often a symbol for growth, regeneration, valour, truth—in this 
stanza, these noble associations evaporate, as the rays of the sun only serve to stress 
the inevitable decay of all living things. The fourth verse presents another sardonic 
association of contrasting images: ‘Et le ciel regardait la carcasse superbe/ Comme 
une fleur s’épanouir’ [And the sky was watching this superb carcass that bloomed like 
a flower, 13-14). The use of a simile that melds a blooming flower to a rotting carcass 
furthers our sense that we are reading something unique, frightening, and comic, and 
that Baudelaire is incessantly interrogating, with glee, the categories valorised by 
earlier poets.   
Baudelaire continues to rub salt in this wound by embracing a stark realism for 
a few verses, almost presenting a Zola-like scientific analysis of his object of study. 
The unnamed listener is asked to remember the flies that buzzed around the carcass’s 
belly, and the black battalions of larvae that streamed forth from it. Then, as if to add 
further layers of complexity to a poem that multiplies, and decenters, meaning, we 
have two verses of calm reflection: 
Et ce monde rendait une étrange musique, 
Comme l’eau courante et le vent, 
Ou le grain qu’un vanneur d’un mouvement rhythmique 
Agite et tourne dans son van. 
 
Les formes s’effacaient et n’étaient plus qu’un rêve, 
 Une ébauche lente à venir, 
 Sur la toile oubliée, et que l’artiste achève 
 Seulement par le souvenir.  
 
  [And the world was emanating a mysterious music, 
 Like flowing water and the wind, 
 Or the grain that a winnower, in a movement rhythmic 
 Shakes and turns in his basket. 
 
 The forms were fading, nothing more than a dream. 
 A sketch slow to shape 
 On the forgotten canvas, and that which the artist completes 
 Only through memory] (25-32) 
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Lines 25-28 invoke metaphysical connotations, as if the image of the rotting carcass 
and its larvae becomes synonymous with an attempt to construct a transcendental 
ideal, a movement away from base reality. The ‘l’eau courante et le vent’ as well as 
the winnower in the fields are reminiscent of Du Bellay’s ‘D’un Vanneur de Blé aux 
Vents’ and connote an almost pastoral atmosphere, signifying a temporary harmony 
with the forces of nature. The next quatrain moves towards a self-referential musing 
on the process of art. Line 29 returns to the shadowy world of Platonic forms, as the 
metaphysical classification of the world as appearance/dream (the veil of Maya) 
becomes a balm to assuage the subject’s horror on remembering the decaying carcass 
and its ontological implications. The artistic act plausibly becomes Platonic, as form 
takes shape on a forgotten canvas through a certain anamnsis—at this point, the 
poem reminds us of how it began (with an apostrophe to the listener’s memory), and 
we have a moment of ‘pure’ aesthetic contemplation, where the nature of art and its 
struggle for the ideal take centre-stage.  
 However, just as the poem begins to define stable meaning, the next verse 
drags the reader back to a set of harsh realistic images, thereby undermining any 
idealist constructions achieved in the preceding one—the speaker recalls the impatient 
bitch who hungrily eyes a piece of flesh on the skeleton of the decayed body, as the 
endeavour to transform mud into gold halts abruptly through the use of such stark 
visuals. Jean-Claude Mathieu, in a recent essay on the poem, sticks to the desire to 
aestheticize the rotting object: ‘La charogne devient quasi oeuvre d’art, musicale, 
peinte, qui peut désormais être transposée, achevée, dans le système des signes 
verbaux’ [The carcass becomes partly a work of art, musical, painterly, which can 
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further be transposed, completed, in the system of verbal signs].
54
 This perspective 
simplifies the poem, and the last three stanzas only attempt, with great bitterness, the 
idealization of the object. In the tenth quatrain, we confront again the juxtaposition of 
oppositions, as the speaker exclaims to his love that she will rot like the carcass as 
well: 
 —Et pourtant vous serez semblable à cette ordure 
 A cette horrible infection, 
 Etoile de mes yeux, soleil de ma nature  
 Vous, mon ange et ma passion !  
  
 [—And yet you will be like this stench, 
 Like this horrible infection, 
 Star of my eyes, sun of my nature, 
 You, my angel and my passion!] (37-40) 
 
For the first time, the contrasts of the grotesque move away from images and embed 
themselves in the basic structure of the poem—the rhyme scheme. ‘Ordure’ and 
‘infection’ rhyme with ‘nature’ and ‘passion,’ as do ‘sacraments’ with ‘ossements’, 
and ‘vermine’ with ‘divine’ in the last two stanzas. This is the most obviously 
Shakespearean moment in the poem, as these lines directly recall Hamlet’s 
admonition to the woman who paints her face thick. A dark, Satanic humour renews 
itself as even the desire to establish concrete meaning in the face of one’s mortality 
(and bodily decay) is undermined by a negation of the very possibility to idealize the 
grotesque. The last quatrain confirms Baudelaire’s mournful standpoint: 
 Alors, ô ma beauté! dites à la vermine 
 Qui vous manger de baisers, 
 Que j’ai gardé la forme et l’essence divine 
 De mes amours decomposes! 
 
 [Then, O my beauty! tell the vermin 
 That will eat you with kisses, 
 That I kept the form and divine essence 
 Of my decomposed loves!] (45-48) 
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 Jean-Claude Mathieu, ‘Une Charogne’ in Les Fleurs du Mal: Colloque de La Sorbonne, ed. André 
Guyaux (Paris: Presses de L’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2003) pp. 161-181 (p. 179, translation 
mine). 
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 The first two lines are again reminiscent of Hamlet’s obsession with worms eating 
through corpses, while the last two lines of the poem convey a Romantic belief in the 
soteriological significance of aesthetic practice that ironically asserts its sense of 
failure. The carcass, which becomes a symbol of barbaric cruelty and neglect in 
capitalist Paris cannot be romanticized about except by ironizing that very process of 
poetic indulgence. In effect, Baudelaire engenders the limitations of art to achieve 
transcendence and meaning, and the rotting carcass becomes a multivalent and 
grotesque representation that reflects dramatically on aesthetic and ontological failure. 
There is no sublimity. Neither is there an assertion of the moral superiority of the 
human agent in the face of nature. Vitally, the carcass is nature not as monstrous self, 
but as decayed, degenerate, and even minute negation of being, a forgotten biological 
specimen. In a poem like ‘Une Charogne’, one is not left with a specific idealisation. 
Instead, the poem inspires a strange and disturbing coexistence of pathos and dark 
comedy, which creates the grotesque. The grotesque becomes the ironisation of the 
longed for unity of the Platonic triad—the true, the good, and the beautiful. What 
happens here is a curious and unstable ironisation of nostalgia as well, which still 
allows room for its yearning for the past. The grotesque, in its mingling of the comic 
and the tragic crystallizes the ironic standpoint on a historical reality that is 
encapsulated by the loss of god, the division of truth and art, and the propagation of 
putrescence in the daily life of profit and loss. In a passage on ruins and allegory from 
The Origins of German Tragic Drama (1963), Benjamin asserts:  
In the ruin history has physically merged into the setting. And in this guise 
history does not assume the form of the process of an eternal life so much as 
that of irresistible decay. Allegory thereby declares itself to be beyond beauty. 
Allegories are, in the realm of thoughts, what ruins are in the realm of things. 
(Osborne, 177-78)
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‘Une Charogne’ recalls the line from ‘Le Cygne’ where the poet convincingly affirms 
that ‘tout pour moi devient allégorie’ [all for me becomes allegory]. Amidst this 
architecture of little allegories in Les Fleurs du Mal, ‘Une Charogne’ functions as a 
depiction of the ruins—the lapses of nature—of nineteenth-century civilization. In 
this fashion, the neglected carcass itself becomes symptomatic of ruin in a modern 
city, thereby conveying to us the feeling of ‘irresistible decay’. The poem too is 
perhaps beyond beauty as it has tested, and ceaselessly questioned, the lyric genre as 
well as our traditional conceptions of the function of poetry.  
 
V—Performing the Grotesque 
Through successive stages of this chapter, we have examined Baudelaire’s 
conception of the grotesque in his aesthetic theory and poetic practice. In several 
ways, the Baudelairean grotesque is an extension of Stendhal’s theorisation of 
Shakespeare, and Hugo’s analysis of the grotesque in Préface de Cromwell. 
Baudelaire’s study of (satanic) laughter and its connection to the grotesque builds 
upon the reframing of an English aesthetic that is fundamentally dramatic. This 
dramatic imperative—evidenced through the influence of Hamlet and the resurgence 
of Pierrot—becomes the aesthetic motor for the battle between spleen et idéal. ‘Une 
Charogne’, in its mixing of dramatic tone and register, combined with the vitality of 
shock as aesthetic technique, constitutes a culmination of sorts. Perhaps more than 
other text, this particular poem (and the collection of which it is a part) reaffirms 
Romantic conceptions of irony and the grotesque, while simultaneously looking 
forward to an even more fragmented modernism. Through the poet-persona of 
Baudelaire, we look back to Friedrich Schlegel while also glimpsing the utilisation of 
multiple personae as poetic idiom in The Waste Land.  
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Baudelaire then remains a fundamentally dramatic poet who constructs the 
urban lyric of decadence and decay.  There is one question that remains to be 
answered: is the carcass a representation of the comique absolu, or is Baudelaire’s 
poem still too connected to a moral purpose? Does Baudelaire fail to achieve the 
grotesque by his own estimation of it in De L’Essence du Rire? Is Hamlet also a 
moralist, and Baudelaire’s subtle recreation of his angst a manifestation of a 
performed melancholy? Can lyric poetry ever achieve the grotesque, or does that 
remain the province of the theatre? Like the English Pierrot’s performance, perhaps 
the truly grotesque requires the continual physical transformation that is brought 
about in dramatic activity. In Staging the Savage God: The Grotesque in Performance 
(2004), Ralph E. Remshardt states just as much when he says that ‘every performance 
is a kind of grotesque, every grotesque is a kind of performance’.
55
 Taking my cue 
from Remshardt, perhaps we must wait for the theatre of Jarry at the fin de siècle for a 
true creation of the absolute comic. Nevertheless, in theorising performance through a 
Shakespearean imperative, in blurring the boundaries between critic and artist, in 
systemising the need for a (post)Romantic art that accurately reflects the bruised 
world of which it is a product, the likes of Stendhal, Hugo, and Baudelaire create 
some of the defining moments of nineteenth-century European literature. The figure 
of Baudelaire simultaneously marks a summation of Romantic preoccupations with 
the grotesque, and an opening to a new world of modernism where the ‘abnormal 
specimens’ of the fragmented, post-industrial life become commonplace in the art of 
its principal practitioners. 
 
                                                          
55
 Staging the Savage God: The Grotesque in Performance (Southern Illinois: Southern Illinois 
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  Conclusion: The Fates of the Grotesque 
 
In his review of Baudelaire’s Les Fleurs du Mal in The Spectator (1862), the 
first of its kind in England which would introduce modernism’s godfather to a 
Victorian public eager to be scandalized, Algernon Charles Swinburne eulogizes the 
French poet’s ability to extract beauty from the sordid, referring in particular to ‘Une 
Charogne’: ‘Thus, even of the loathsomest bodily putrescence and decay he can make 
some noble use; pluck out its meaning and secret, even its beauty, in a certain way, 
from actual carrion’.
1
 As Philip Henderson points out, ‘This review tells us as much 
about Swinburne as about Baudelaire,’ and that ‘It required courage to champion a 
volume of modern French verse in England in 1862, let alone the work of a man who 
had been condemned for obscenity in his own country’.
2
 Once again, there emerges a 
curious connection between obscenity and beauty in this account—the one seems to 
coexist precariously, and ironically, with the other.  Furthermore, the very act of 
correlating the obscene and the beautiful, of writing about carcasses in a collection of 
lyric poetry—keeping in mind the more elevated examples of the lyric mode in the 
European tradition—represents an act of aesthetic insurrection. Baudelaire’s 
collection, and Swinburne’s celebratory review of it, seems to vitiate the concept of 
poetry in an age often remembered for its strict notions of morality.  
To make matters worse for Victorian readers, four years later Swinburne’s 
notorious first collection of poems, Poems and Ballads, First Series, would appear 
containing references to incest, lesbianism, sado-masochism, and even necrophilia, 
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 Swinburne as Critic, ed. Clyde K. Hyder (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1972), p. 30. 
2
 Swinburne: The Portrait of a Poet (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1974), p. 63-64.  Henderson 
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de Swinburne (Paris: Société d’Edition, 1928), p. 200-02. 
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highlighting his own endeavour to nobly use explicitly unconventional subject matter 
in order to create poetry. In many of these poems, Swinburne rewrites Baudelaire’s 
fragments of evil in a series of dramatic monologues. He explores and ceaselessly 
interrogates the limits of literary expression in the post-Romantic world, continuing 
the intertextual cross-pollination of ideas in nineteenth-century European literature. 
Patricia Clements, in her seminal Baudelaire and The English Tradition (1985), 
accentuates the seriousness of the English poet’s reconstruction of Baudelaire’s vision 
du mal: ‘Swinburne enacted what he saw as Baudelaire’s international vision, 
reopening the borders long before most modernist writers attempted by conscious 
(and inherited) cosmopolitanism to escape the confinements of national tradition’.
3
 
This thesis is a testimony to this remarkable cosmopolitanism of perspective that 
began with the Schlegel brothers and found its way through the French Romantics. 
The celebration of Shakespeare, the quintessential English dramatist and 
representative of the modern drama of the grotesque, underpins the international 
vision that is unique to Romanticism and nineteenth century letters. There is no room 
left for us to explore Swinburne’s recreation of Baudelaire, but in bringing Baudelaire 
to the English, he establishes another transnational connection that would have an 
immense influence on a later generation of English language poets, from Arthur 
Symons to T.S. Eliot. Swinburne’s idiosyncratic reading of Baudelaire becomes a 
critically important modernist moment, which paves the way for later writers to 
continue the normalization of unconventional and subversive subject matter, a 
                                                          
3
 Baudelaire and the English Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 25. See 
also Margueritte Murphy’s recent ‘The Critic as Cosmopolite: Baudelaire’s International Sensibility 
and the Transformation of Viewer Subjectivity’ in Art and Life in Aestheticism: De-Humanizing and 
Re-Humanizing Art, the Artist, and the Artist Receptor, ed. Kelly Comfort (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2008), p. 25-42 for a detailed appraisal of Baudelaire’s cosmopolitanism. Murphy begins 
by examining Baudelaire’s desire to replace neoclassicism with ‘the strange’ (l’insolite), which could 
be seen as a component of the grotesque. Baudelaire undermines the absolutism of neoclassical beauty 
by locating notions of beauty in a celebration of the relative, first evidenced by his appreciation of 
Chinese art in the Exposition Universelle in 1855.   
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procedure that reached its apotheosis in European modernism and that is perhaps 
moving inexorably towards repetition in postmodern art. 
Throughout this study, we have grappled with the spectre of the grotesque and 
its embodiment in Romantic theory and criticism. We began by trying to understand 
this troublesome term through the dramatic interplay between the self and its 
fragmentation in the aesthetic theory of the Schlegel brothers, and its opposition to 
concepts of neoclassical wholeness and distinction. Romantic irony, in its continual 
shifts and metamorphoses, contextualises the birth of the modern grotesque that 
heralds a remarkable multiplicity of perspective, which implies a unique plurality of 
vision. Neoclassical niceties are repudiated. Conventional concepts of beauty and 
knowledge are overturned. Shakespeare, representing the democracy of aesthetic 
discourse and ways of seeing, becomes the focus of this modern grotesque. For the 
Schlegel brothers, he constitutes the ontology of the world, delighting in hybrid forms 
and endless change. As I have shown, Hazlitt’s hermeneutics on Shakespeare—
influenced by and positioned against the lectures of A. W. Schlegel—shifts the 
English apperception of Shakespearean dramaturgy by celebrating Shakespeare’s 
impersonality. Furthermore, the channelling of the Schlegelian recreation of 
Shakespeare into France has revolutionary effects. Stendhal’ Racine et Shakespeare 
corroborates the obsolescence of a neoclassical Racine in favour of a Romantic 
Shakespeare, while Hugo’s Préface de Cromwell explicitly fuses Shakespearean 
drama with the idea of the modern grotesque. Finally, through the criticism and poetry 
of Baudelaire, the theories of Stendhal and Hugo reach a culmination: the 
Shakespearean grotesque in its drama and theatricality is internalised within the lyric 
mode of mourning. From Hugo to Baudelaire, the grotesque becomes reflective of a 
bruised, post-Revolutionary world. The grotesque signifies the deformed and 
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sanctifies the obscene. Shock contaminates its aesthetic of confrontation. Finally, 
through the example of Swinburne’s review of Les Fleurs du Mal, and his particular 
attraction to the repulsion as evidenced through his enjoyment of a poem like ‘Une 
Charogne’, the grotesque in its playful and dramatic essence is brought back to 
Baudelaire’s ‘land of spleen’. An inherently English aesthetic is smuggled back into 
the British isles. Furthermore, the grotesque starts to become a truly international 
idiom, transcending the provinciality of national borders. The grotesque would be 
reviewed by the likes of Browning and Wilde in England, and by Lautréamont and 
Jarry in France. In the aesthetics of modernism, it would reach its dramatic climax in 
The Waste Land. This text in particular would exemplify the internalisation of the 
dramatic imperative into the form of the poem, giving birth to its grotesque play of 
voices, genres, and perspectives. The Waste Land also becomes the ultimate poem of 
mourning, building upon the energy located in Baudelaire’s treatment of the 
grotesque.  
 
In an excellent reading of the grotesque in contemporary theory, Geoffrey Galt 
Harpham accentuates its intrinsic amorphousness, claiming that it is ‘a single protean 
idea that is capable of assuming a multitude of forms’ and that it is fundamentally a 
‘species of confusion’.
4
 I feel that his use of the word ‘protean’ is vital, as it 
emphasises the aesthetics of transformation and movement that characterises the 
grotesque. In its alignment with Proteus, the grotesque communicates its dramatic and 
theatrical agenda. If the primary claim of this thesis is that the grotesque in the play of 
Romantic irony is an aesthetic happening (rather than a concept) that mirrors the 
perennial motion of the world, then according to Harpham, it itself is this movement. 
                                                          
4
 On the Grotesque: Strategies of Contradiction in Art and Literature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1982), p. xv. Future references will be cited in the text. 
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Consequently, I would say that one cannot speak of ‘a single protean idea’ wearing 
multiple masks, but instead intimate its multifariousness. In other words, perhaps one 
cannot even speak of the grotesque, but only of the dramatic proliferation of grotesque 
moments, best exemplified by Shakespearean drama. The attempt to codify it as a 
single idea inevitably leads to confusion. In another remarkable passage in the 
introduction to his book, Harpham asserts: 
Whether considered as a pattern of energy or as a psychological phenomenon, 
it is anything but clear. Whereas most ideas are coherent at the core and fuzzy 
around the edges, the grotesque is the reverse: it is relatively easy to recognize 
the grotesque “in” a work of art, but quite difficult to apprehend the grotesque 
directly. Curiously, it remains elusive despite the fact that it is unchanging. 
Although it appears in various guises, it is as independent of them as a wave is 
of water, for it is somehow always recognizable as itself. Most curious of all, 
it has no history capable of being narrated, for it never began anywhere. (xvi) 
 
My study has continually attempted to resist a grotesque descent into chaos, in the 
hope of highlighting moments of grotesque becoming in Romantic theory. The 
Romantic grotesques, visible in their Shakespearean incarnations and interpretations, 
always resist definition and control.
5
 As Harpham states, the grotesque is beyond 
historical specificity, and yet I would claim that the only means through which one 
can even approach it is through a pluralistic and interdisciplinary interpretation of 
grotesque moments. Definitions necessarily encounter their insufficiencies with these 
grotesque phenomena. Harpham accurately affirms that ‘Grotesque is a word for that 
dynamic state of low-ascending and high-descending’ (74, italics mine) and the 
italicised word conveys its state of motion. This merging of ‘high’ and ‘low’ is 
particularly reflective of the Shakespearean treatment of the grotesque that we have 
returned to on numerous occasions in this study. However, this is but one 
characteristic of grotesqueness, a word I now prefer to the singular ‘the grotesque’. 
                                                          
5
 Here I am recalling Ralph E. Remshardt’s comprehension of the grotesque as an illimitable 
phenomenon in Staging the Savage God: The Grotesque in Performance (Southern Illinois: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 2004), which I have examined in the introduction to this study. 
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This grotesqueness can constitute the play of Romantic irony, the dramatic 
impersonality in Keats and Hazlitt, the contemporary Romanticism of a Stendhal, the 
deformed world in Hugo, as well as the sudden shock of unbridled laughter in 
Baudelaire’s comique absolu. The violence implicit in the guillotine schematises a 
type of grotesque, while on the other hand, the uniquely hybrid lens of criticism and 
artistic activity prevalent in Baudelaire also confirms a grotesque syndrome. Finally, 
the very act of interpreting grotesqueness and the possible failure of trying to do so, 
illustrates the wisdom inherent in this aesthetic and ontological happening. 
Grotesqueness is momentary, and in that it is primarily dramatic. Furthermore, it is 
characterised by a perpetual potentiality and not the illusion of fixed substance. The 
possible problems in hermeneutically containing these states of potential are itself a 
sign of grotesqueness. Theatrical activity—the clouds of Aristophanes, Prospero’s 
elaborate masque, the fleeting comedy inherent in Hamlet musing upon Yorick’s 
skull—communicates its elusive essence. This study, located in Romantic theory’s 
obvious negotiations with grotesqueness, illuminates its perennial fascination for 
theorists and practitioners of art. In studying grotesqueness in the play of Romantic 
irony, I would hope to have opened further doors to our interpretation of 
(post)Romanticism, while simultaneously (a key word in this exploration) helping us 
localise possibilities of grotesqueness in contemporary criticism, from postcolonial 
politics to performance theory. Grotesqueness denies closure, and it is by keeping this 
in mind that we can find our points of departure and arrival for its inevitable 
recognition. 
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